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ABSTRACT
PSYCHOTHERAPY AS CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE: A DETAILED
INTERACTION ANALYSIS OF THE CHANGE PROCESS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY

By
Cody L. Maddox
December 2013

Dissertation supervised by Martin Packer, Ph.D.
Psychotherapy is concerned with changing individuals: it is a practice devoted to
the constitution of certain kinds of subjects. Although the various therapeutic schools
have their own explanations of psychotherapeutic change, more empirical work needs to
be dedicated to understanding how this process takes place. In this study, a fine grain
research methodology is used to produce an account of the change process that occurred
over the course of two psychotherapy sessions. The data consists of naturally occurring
video recordings of a single therapist and client dyad. The goal of this research is to
examine the relationship of mutual formation between the practice of psychotherapy and
the client as it unfolds across time. This process of mutual formation is what Martin
Packer (2011) refers to as constitution. A new research method was developed for this
study. The methodology is grounded upon Heidegger's (1927/1962) understanding of
iv

practical engagement and Foucault's (1983) method of genealogical interpretation. The
research procedure combines conversation analysis with de Rivera’s (1977) Structural
Theory of Emotion, and Wortham’s (2001) action based theory of narrative positioning,
to form a coherent methodology called Detailed Interaction Analysis. The study
demonstrates how conversation analysis can be augmented in order to better analyze
emotion and subject positioning. There were four major findings. First, the study shows
how psychotherapy constitutes the client as a deep emotional subject who must
understand her emotions in order to be an ethical being. Second, interpretation was
shown to be a pragmatic practice that asserts the therapist’s subjective perspective into
the conversation. This allows the client to respond with her own interpretation. This
collaborative process was found to be an important change process in psychotherapy and
these findings conform to the more interactional understanding of interpretation (Aron,
1992; Winnicott, 1971). Third, the analysis provides a description of how Foucauldian
problematizing occurs through the deployment of conversational actions that shift the
location of the therapeutic problem and encourage the client to think about herself as an
emotional being. Last, this study demonstrates how the indeterminacy of talk is used as a
creative resource for both the therapist and the client during problematizing.
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1
INTERPRETATION AND CONSTITUTION IN PSYCHOTHERAPY
"If we are indeed to have evidence-based psychotherapies grounded in
systematic, well replicated research…and evidence-based training for
psychotherapists…– both of which I approve – then it would be very nice
(in fact, I would think essential) for that research to be based on a
standard model or paradigm which more adequately matches the actual
experience and lived reality of what it presumes to study. I don’t know
what a more satisfactory paradigm or model for research will turn out to
be. Constructing it is the task of the next generation – but from it will
come the sort of psychotherapy research I think I would like to read.”
David Orlinsky, Comments on
the State of Psychotherapy
Research (As I See It) ,
(2006, p. 6).

Interpretation as a Way into Psychotherapy
Prior to being trained as a therapist I studied sociology and was interested in the
postmodern critique of language, subjectivity, and institutional practices. It is ironic that I
chose to become a therapist because psychotherapy is a practice that has been highly
scrutinized and critiqued by postmodern theorists. At times, these critiques can be quite
discouraging for a therapist. However, therapy has played an important role in my own
life. At a time when life was most chaotic I turned to therapy and found it to be
transformative. Years later, I chose to become a therapist because I believed in its
importance as a cultural practice that plays a vital role in peoples’ lives. Yet, when I
made this decision I was also very aware of how psychotherapy operated on certain
assumptions about what human beings are and what they should be. My interest in
1

critical theory – in the critiques of Foucault and Nietzsche for example – fostered an ever
present suspicion of the very practices that I found to be so vital in my own life. Out of
my passion for critical reflection and my passion for psychotherapy came a conflict that
has driven my own constitutional process of becoming a therapist and a researcher. This
project is my attempt to use this conflict to understand psychotherapy. My goal is to
understand the institutional practice of psychotherapy, taking seriously the postmodern
critique of representationalism, and to produce an account that can convey the humanity
and wholeness of contemporary psychotherapeutic practice.
One difficulty with a large project such as this is how to start, where to start. The
impossible task of speaking about psychotherapy arises because of the overwhelming
complexity and diversity of practices. We might be tempted to capture the complexity by
creating flow charts and lists in an endless effort to define the discipline by difference.
However, my task is not to describe psychotherapy, but to find a way into it—to speak
about it in a way that is limited, yes, but that grasps the discipline securely. My route into
the practice will serve two functions. First, I would like to approach psychotherapy on its
own terms and use the traditional constructs (such as interpretation) as pivot points that
allow new understandings to emerge. And second, the path must be carved out by a
research language that is useful for the researcher, but still speaks to practitioners and
patients. In other words, this path must be able to speak to all the parties in a way that
takes into account cherished assumptions not as givens, but as access points through
which a new understanding can be forged. I believe that this is a promising intention, and
yet I am well aware of the difficulties.
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The search for a way to talk about psychotherapy has been an ever present
problem facing researchers and scholars. Psychodynamic, existential, cognitive, family
psychotherapy all have a different theoretical understanding of human beings and
psychology. The differences can be exhausting. Furthermore, each one of the above
categories can be cracked open to expose numerous theoretical differences inside similar
schools of thought.
Psychodynamic therapy is a prime example. Since the time of Freud there has
been a warring proliferation of approaches, apparent even to the casual observer. Freud,
Klein, Lacan, Kohut, Reich, and so on all hold contrary visions of psychology and
psychotherapy. Again, this diversity often leads to a cataloguing or taxonomy of
differences (Herink, 1980). Some have taken another approach. Contemporary theorists
such as Gabbard (2005) and McWilliams (1994) have tried to integrate many of the
prominent schools of psychodynamic psychology and form a holistic theory that can
guide contemporary psychotherapy. Where some are tempted to point out the differences
between various schools of thought, Gabbard and McWilliams want to find commonality.
Their works can be seen as an attempt to mitigate differences by creating inclusive
frameworks and identifying common ground.
As one can guess from my introductory paragraph, I too am integrationist of sorts.
I like compromise and commonality as opposed to defiance and difference. However, the
initial problem that this project poses, finding a way into psychotherapy, is not an attempt
to identify an underlying structure or essential element hidden behind the consulting
room door. Rather, I am faced with articulating a means of understanding psychotherapy
that is new, offering a fresh glimpse at something we are familiar with. I do not need to
3

capture all of psychotherapy, but I need to speak towards its primary aim. That aim is
obvious, I believe: psychotherapy is concerned with changing people, it is a practice
devoted to the constitution of certain kinds of subjects.
Making the case that psychotherapy is a constitutive practice can be done in many
ways, but I believe that by examining interpretation we will see one such avenue emerge.
Lynn Harper (2006) in her doctoral dissertation acknowledged many of the difficulties
with psychotherapy scholarship that I have been discussing. The initial question that she
posed was: "What is it that the analyst does in psychoanalysis that makes the process
work?" She goes on to state, as I have, that various schools of thought identify different
important aspects and fundamental concepts, which makes finding an underlying
commonality difficult. However, she contends that "interpretation, as a key ingredient in
a psychoanalytic work, does seem to provide one way to compare various schools of
analytic thought around the issue of therapeutic process" (p. 1). From here, she goes on to
compare and contrast Freud, Klein, and Lacan, charting the similarities and differences in
both theoretical understanding and professional practice. I empathize with her struggle to
find a common ground and agree that interpretation is an important concept that can help
us to understand psychotherapy. However, this is not because it bridges various schools
of thought, but because it is a pivotal construct that can be reinterpreted and put to work
for both the researcher and the practitioner within each school.
Interpretation has always been seen as basic to psychotherapy. It was the central
construct in Freud's (1900/1998) The Interpretation of Dreams and it has been a subject
of concern for psychotherapists ever since. However, since Freud's time psychotherapy
has changed. Our understanding of interpretation has shifted and some have even
4

declared that interpretation is relatively unimportant compared to relational factors such
as the therapeutic alliance (Bohart & Tallman, 1999; Orlinsky, Grawe, & Parks, 1994).
The psychoanalysis, Lewis Aron (1992) states that this shift toward a relational
understanding of interpretation was initiated by Winncott who thought that “the point of
interpreting [was] to show the patient that the analyst was fully alive and imperfect” (p.
487). Winnicott (1971) expressed his opinion of interpretation this way: “I think I
interpret mainly to let the patient know the limits of my understanding. The principle is
that it is the patient and only the patient who has the answers” (pp. 86-87). This is what
has happened inside psychoanalysis. Outside psychoanalytic or even psychodynamic
circles interpretation has pretty much been forgotten. CBT and behavioral therapies have
their own languages and pet constructs. However, in my experience as a psychotherapist I
can say that interpretation is alive and well in modern-day therapy. Granted, my training
and supervision has been largely psychodynamic. This makes it difficult or almost
impossible to speak for CBT or behavioral therapists. Therefore, throughout this project
I'll be sticking to what I know, which is a psychodynamically oriented psychotherapy,
which relies on interpretation to provoke therapeutic change in the client. Keep in mind,
that my analysis of interpretation is simply a way into psychotherapy, allowing us to see
how therapy is a constitutional practice. CBT and behavioral therapies are also
constitutive. It is possible that these therapies shaped the client in different ways, but like
psychodynamic therapy, CBT and behavioral therapy aim to change the client. By
examining interpretation I am simply opening the door that is most familiar and therefore
most accessible to me. I hope that by the end of the dissertation we can begin to think of
all psychotherapies as constitutive regardless of how we initially imagined the project.
5

That being said let us begin by examining interpretation in psychotherapy.
Often, when we talk about interpretation in psychotherapy we are referring to
something specific: the method of understanding the meaning of our client’s symptoms,
behaviors, and dreams, and then conveying that meaning to our clients. In the theory, the
meaning is carefully packaged and delivered through language. This package, which
consists of a statement or a question, is called ‘the Interpretation’. The Interpretation,
carrying the true meaning of the symptom or dream, is thought to impact the client
consciously or unconsciously and so cause a psychic shift, which eventually leads to a
new understanding that is helpful in some way—possibly by relieving symptoms,
decreasing problematic identifications, or by causing a reorientation of the client’s desire.
Freud and his work provide the clearest demonstration of this method of
interpretation. For example, in The Interpretation of Dreams, Freud (1900/1998) makes
his classic distinction between "the manifest and latent content of dreams" (p. 168). One
cannot take the dream at face value. The characters, objects, and actions of the dream do
not provide the true meaning or cause of the dream. In fact, the manifest content -- what a
person might describe to a friend or to a therapist -- is really a series of masks meant to
fool the dreamer, to keep hidden the forbidden desires that prompted the dream in the
first place. These desires, or wishes, foment dreams and symptoms in both the
psychologically healthy and unhealthy. It is a universal process that lies at the center of
what it means to be human.
Human beings experience desires that are contrary to their self-image and threaten
to damage their social relationships and obligations. Therefore, these desires are
repressed, pushed down and forgotten. However, these desires return in disguise. In the
6

unhealthy person they return during the day as psychological symptoms -- hysterical
paralysis, obsession, and so on -- and in the healthy (and unhealthy alike) the desires
return during the night in dreams. At night our defenses are weaker and we are more in
touch with what is commonly forgotten and forbidden. However, our desires are still not
able to stand in plain sight. Therefore, even in dreams our desires are transformed and
hidden from us.
The disguise can be simple or can be complex. As Freud stated: "The stricter
censorship, the more far reaching will be the disguise and more ingenious too may be the
means employed for putting the reader on the scent of true meaning" (p. 176). Here,
Freud is hinting at the complex machinery of interpretation that he will construct during
the next four decades in order to uncover the true meaning of dreams and symptoms. This
sentence is quite revealing. Not only is it prescient, predicting the course of a career that
only Freud could have imagined, but it also highlights a central metaphor that Freud
employed during the course of his career. Here we can clearly see how he positioned
himself as the "reader" of his patients, who are texts in need of interpretation.
The use of this metaphor is not surprising as it aligns with the classic
understanding of interpretation as described by Schleiermacher and others. Interpretation
as a discipline existed long before Schleiermacher. The term hermeneutics, a method of
interpretation, originates from the exegesis of biblical texts. Schleiermacher took up the
general principles of biblical hermeneutics and applied them to creative human activity,
such as texts, speeches, and music. Martin Packer (2011), in his discussion of the
hermeneutic project, summarizes Schleiermacher’s aim: "Hermeneutics, as
Schleiermacher intended to define it, would systematically employ the skills of
7

interpretation that operate within all occasions of understanding" (p. 84).
Schleiermacher’s analysis consisted of two parts: the study of language and the
psychological study of the subject. Schleiermacher viewed language as the medium
through which thought was expressed. Language was objective whereas thought was a
creative instance derived from pure subjectivity and uniqueness. The interpreter, or
"reader" as Freud put it, needs to understand the objective system of language and the
creative subjectivity. The latter is more essential and privileged. According to
Schleiermacher, to grasp the creative core the interpreter must engage in a "divinatory"
process where she empathetically understands the author better than the author herself (p.
88).
However, Schleiermacher did not have the last word on hermeneutics. His
position was taken up and critiqued first by Dilthey (1990) who widened the scope of
hermeneutics by stating that all cultural artifacts are in need of interpretive
understanding. This is because all of our worldly activities derive from "the same human
spirit [which] addresses us and demands interpretation" (cited in Packer, 2011, p. 89). In
some ways, this position is directly in line with Schleiermacher. However, Dilthey
contended that every act of interpretation is grounded in our experience which is "always
concrete and historical" (p. 89). This position distanced Dilthey from Schleiermacher. In
many ways it undermined the central notion in Schleiermacher’s theory; namely, that
interpretation requires the meeting of the human spirit, which occurs during the
empathetic union of interpreter/reader and author. Packer notes the impact of Dilthey's
turn to history by stating that:
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Understanding is not merely a contact between minds, or a reconstruction of the
author’s mental state, it is a reconstruction of the historical process that has
shaped a cultural product…. Interpretation is not simply penetrating an
individual's mind, but contact with a manifestation of the life process. (p. 91)
Packer notes that Dilthey’s emphasis on the historical nature of interpretation became
somewhat of a poisonous pill that damaged his goal of erecting a science of interpretation
that would produce objective meanings that were universal and ahistorical. To Dilthey
this was devastating because his analysis undercut his aim. You could not have one
without the other, he thought, and hence hermeneutics was lost.
Others, such as Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960/1986) disagreed. The insight that our
understanding is based upon our history has profound consequences, which should not be
overlooked simply because it undermines the quest for universal, a-historical knowledge.
This was Gadamer's basic stance. Gadamer critiqued Schleiermacher and Dilthey for their
desire to reproduce the original creative intention as if it was preserved somewhere inside
the text or cultural artifact. According to Packer (2011), Gadamer proposed that
interpretation "is a productive process, a mediation between text and interpreter, a
dialogue between past and present….neither interpreter nor text can step outside of their
historical context" (p. 93, Italics in original). During this dialogue new meanings are
produced, which are always practical, aligning with the needs and concerns of the
interpreter’s everyday life. Therefore, "a true interpretation is one which points out
something relevant in [the interpreter's] present situation which we have not noticed" (p.
94). The interpretation is true because it involves a practical concern. The meaning
allows us to do certain things that we weren't able to do before. This might be the
implementation of a new skill that manipulates the physical world or it might be a new
9

understanding of ourselves as human subjects. As Packer puts it "meaning is always an
experience, an event, a moment of application" (p. 94).
Now, if we return to Freud and psychodynamic interpretation we can see certain
parallels as well as avenues of critique. First, it is worth noting that describing Freud's
method as hermeneutic is not new. Forty years ago, Ricoeur popularized the phrase,
“hermeneutics of suspicion” as a way of describing Freud's general intent (Ricoeur, 1970,
1974; Scott-Baumann, 2009). Ricoeur’s basic claim was that Freud's project was
concerned with uncovering deep structures hidden under the surface appearances of
psychic life (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, pp. xxii-xxiii). Here we can see parallels with
Schleiermacher. Great works of art, like our dreams, capture our attention because hidden
deep within them is the essential truth of ourselves—the creative spirit. Where
Schleiermacher claimed that one could commune with the human spirit of the author,
Freud argued that psychoanalytic interpretation was able to uncover the unconscious
desires of the patient. Both men placed emphasis on the interpreter's ability to
systematically decode the complicated texts before them. Therefore, meaning can only be
found by a capable interpreter who employed the correct methodology. Schleiermacher
and Freud developed different systems of interpretation for the tasks they undertook.
However, there can be no doubt that they both believed that the truth of text (dreams or
symptoms in the case of Freud) lay in the interpreter’s efforts. For Freud, the patient
automatically produces a text for the analyst to examine and excavate. In many ways the
description that Freud gives in The Interpretation of Dreams is of the patient as a passive
medium through which the text manifests. Therefore, the patient is in dire need of the
analysis because, much like Schleiermacher, Freud believed that the
10

analyst/reader/interpreter could understand the author better than the author herself.
However, if we take Dilthey and Gadamer seriously then Freud's depiction of how
psychoanalytic interpretation works cannot hold. For Gadamer the meaning of a text is
not found underneath its manifest content as Schleiermacher and Freud would contend.
Rather, “the meaning of the text is an effect” that is produced during the act of
interpretation (Packer, 2011, p. 97, Italics in original). It is an effect upon the interpreter
that occurs during the act of reading.
In psychotherapy, interpretation is often discussed in a manner that aligns more
with Freud and Schleiermacher. The client comes in and presents her symptoms, stories,
and dreams while the psychotherapist silently interprets. Eventually the therapist
ascertains certain meanings that only implicitly connect to the manifest content that the
client provides. The therapist then devises a way to tell the client the meaning of her
symptoms. This interpretation is then thought to impact the client. It might startle them,
or make them angry, or possibly the client will simply dismiss it outright, but regardless,
we hold that the interpretation does its work whether it is conscious or unconscious. Our
training and our methods are concerned with refining our skills of interpretation and our
method of delivery. How do we understand the client and how do we convey our
understanding? We concern ourselves with these questions because we believe that
speaking the true meaning of the client's symptoms will produce an effect on the client.
However, if we follow Gadamer then we have to admit that our understanding is slightly
askew. Meaning is an effect, this much all parties agree on, but Gadamer stated that
meaning is produced during the act of interpretation and it affects the interpreter.
Therefore, if we are concerned about how meaning produces effects in psychotherapy
11

then we need to realize that the most important interpreter in the room is not the therapist
but, the client.
Following Gadamer, the client is affected by meanings which are produced during
her own act of interpretation. With this shift we now see the psychotherapist
interpretations as texts that are read and interpreted by the client. It is during this reading
that the meaningful effects of psychotherapy occur. Furthermore, we must remember that
the meaning of the text is grounded in the historical constitution of the interpreter. The
meaning grabs us because it has immediate practical concern, allowing us to see things in
different ways and do things we could not do before. Yet, our practical concerns are not
given, universally; they are constituted by the very practices we engage in. Therefore, if
we want to better understand how psychotherapy works we need to understand how the
client is constituted as a particular kind of interpreter during psychotherapy. This
interpreter is not simply someone who thinks in a certain way, but is a certain way
depending on the practices in which they are engaged. It is, therefore, better to refer to
this interpreter as a certain kind of subject. The subject that we are referring to here is not
a universal subject of essentialism, but the distributed subject who comes into being
through concerned engagement with others within their form of life.1 Hence, the question

1

Psychotherapy is a not a benign tool of understanding; rather it is a practice that constitutes the
very subjects with whom they engage. And yet, it is important to understand that psychotherapy
is one of many discursive practices that have constitutive effects on the subject. Therefore, we see
a "dispersion of subjectivity" across different ways of speaking and acting, rather than a classic
subject of essentialism (Packer, 2011, p. 349). This is not to say that the subject is in pieces, or
lacks freewill and initiative. Rather, it means that the subject comes to be through certain
discourses that are related to one another in a complex web of actions. This web of actions is not
stagnant, but is part of an ongoing historical process. Later in The History of Sexuality, Foucault
(1978) talks about this "action upon action" as the field of power (quoted in Packer, 2011, p.
413).
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that confronts us is: How is the client constituted as a certain kind of subject during the
practice of psychotherapy?
Constitutional Research on Psychotherapy
I have left the term constitution undefined up to this point because I wanted to
avoid the discussion prior to introducing my project. Although the term is familiar to
most, I am following Martin Packer's use of the word. Packer (2011) defines constitution
as "the relationship of mutual formation between people and their forms of life" (p. 20).
By focusing on constitution we hold that people are always part of their cultures and
communities. Communities are not simply a benign container but are integral to how
human beings change and develop. Simply put, different communities use different
practices that involve people, tools, institutions, ideas, and discourse. These practices
have constitutive effects which bring rise to different ways of seeing and acting -- being
and becoming. Psychotherapy is one such practice. By focusing on constitution we can
see psychotherapy as part of a larger field of practices, all producing their various, yet
related, constitutive effects. Hence, in order to understand psychotherapy we need to
attend to the details of the practice itself, while also attending to its larger constitutive
aims. In conventional terms, if we want to understand psychotherapy we have to
understand how it changes people. Hence, I will often talk about how this study
explicates change and how it explicates constitution. In part, this is because I see change
and constitution as synonymous. I prefer to talk about the study as a constitutional
approach to change. The difference between the constitutional approach to change and
the standard approach to change will be discussed in the methodology chapter (chapter 4,
sub-section: studying constitutional change).
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Carl Rogers (Rogers & Dymond, 1954) was one of the first therapist/researchers
to study whether psychotherapy produced measurable change. After nearly 50 years of
outcome research it is clear that psychotherapy does produce change (Lambert & Bergin,
1994; Orlinsky, Ronnestad, & Willutzki, 2004). However, as one of the leaders of
empirical psychotherapy research, Allan Kazdin (Kazdin, 2009), states:
A randomized controlled trial may show that treatment compared with no
treatment leads to therapeutic change. [Hence] we can say that the treatment
caused the change, as that term is used in science. Demonstrating a cause does not
say why the intervention led to change or how the change came about. (p. 419)
Kazdin goes on to call for a type of analysis that can provide a “meticulous description”
of how psychotherapy produces change (p. 421). These accounts would be aimed at
describing what happens in psychotherapy, but when the description reaches the level of
meticulous detail, the “what” would become a sufficient case for “how”.2 Psychotherapy
researchers are developing the “fine-grained” analysis that Kazdin identifies as the new
frontier of psychotherapy research (Elliott, 2010; Howard, Lueger, Maling, &
Martinovich, 1993). However, approaches that originated outside of psychology have
long been interested in examining what happens in psychotherapy.
Conversation Analysis (CA) is a research approach that combines the
phenomenological focus of Harold Garfinkel’s Ethnomethodology, with the attention to
conversational detail characteristic of discourse analysis (Garfinkel, 1967; C. Goodwin &
2

Interestingly, Kazdin demonstrates how descriptive research was used to change public policy
and shift public norms about smoking. He claims that an analogous type of research could be
used to understand how change happens in psychotherapy: A chemical (benzo[a]pyrene) found in
cigarette smoke induces genetic mutation at specific regions of the gene’s DNA that is identical
to the damage evident in lung cancer cells. This finding is considered to convey precisely how
cigarette smoking leads to cancer at the molecular level. This is an example of where ‘‘the what’’
(description) can be sufficiently fine grained as to convey ‘‘the how.’’ (p. 421)
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Heritage, 1990; Packer, 2011). CA has been used to examine psychotherapy at a level of
detail not found in conventional psychotherapy research. The current movement to apply
CA to psychotherapy is part of a long history of the exploration of therapeutic language.
This history includes foundational linguistic studies such as Labov’s Therapeutic
discourse: Psychotherapy as Conversation, which was published over 30 years ago
(Labov & Fanshel, 1977). One change worth noting is that conversation analysts are no
longer just sociologists, but now also psychotherapy researchers, and psychotherapists
hoping to influence how we understand and practice psychotherapy. Their work has
shown a lot of promise. CA allows us to see psychotherapy as a negotiated series of
sequential actions between the therapist and the client that unfolds in real time.
Researchers have shown how different utterances have different effects. Furthermore,
they have begun to show how the participants’ understanding of what is being said
greatly depends on the unfolding context.
So far most of the research has relied on the CA method of finding numerous
cases of one type of utterance or sequence and then developing a normative structure and
functional explanation. Few attempts have been made to understand psychotherapy
sessions as a whole or how multiple sessions relate to one another. Furthermore, CA has
just begun to explore the role of emotion in conversation. This is problematic for
conversation analysts studying psychotherapy because the majority of therapeutic
conversations involve implicit, as well as explicit, emotional topics and displays. A focus
on the sequence of the conversation, rather than the content of the conversation also
limits CA’s ability to study the role of narrative positioning in psychotherapy. Despite
these limitations, CA provides a powerful methodology that is based on ontological
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assumptions of a constitutional approach to change.
Hence, CA forms the backbone of the methodological approach for this study.
However, certain changes and additions to the basic methodology had to be made in
order to produce an account of constitution in psychotherapy. These changes profoundly
shifted the way I saw, thought, and talked about the interactional process I observed in
the dataset. These additions do not violate the basic ontological assumptions central to
CA. However, the changes are significant and as a result the methodology cannot be
classified as a pure CA study. Rather, in order to achieve the goal of producing an
account of the constitutional processes in psychotherapy, I had to develop a new
methodology, which uses the procedures of CA, yet incorporates other akin approaches so
as to expand CA’s analytic power and increase its suitability for studying constitution.
In the following chapters, I will describe how I analyzed video recordings and
transcripts of two psychotherapy sessions between a single client and therapist, in order
to show how the client is constituted as a certain kind of subject during psychotherapy.
Hence, this study uses a case study approach. At times, case studies have been criticized
by those who see them as unable to provide generalizable findings. Yet, I will argue that
the results are valid descriptions of a real constitutional process in psychotherapy and
therefore generalizable. The four major findings of the study are as follows. First, the
study shows how psychotherapy constitutes the client as a deep emotional subject who
must understand her emotions in order to be an ethical being. Second, interpretation was
shown to be a pragmatic practice that asserts the therapist’s subjective perspective into
the conversation. This allows the client to respond with her own interpretation. This
collaborative process was found to be an important change process in psychotherapy and
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these findings conform to the more interactional understanding of interpretation (Aron,
1992; Winnicott, 1971) Third, the analysis provides a description of how Foucauldian
problematizing occurs through the deployment of conversational actions that shift the
location of the therapeutic problem and encourage the client to think about herself as an
emotional being. Last, this study demonstrates how the indeterminacy of talk is used as a
creative resource for both the therapist and client during problematizing.
The analysis is preceded by three chapters that provide the necessary context and
background for this study. In chapter 2, I discuss the ontological assumptions that ground
a constitutional approach to change. This is followed by chapter 3, which provide the
reader with an overview of CA, as well as a review of the rich research that CA has
generated on psychotherapy. This chapter ends with a reflection on how CA in its current
state is unable to describe important aspects of psychotherapy. Hence, in chapter 4, I
show how CA can be combined with de Rivera’s (1977) Structural Theory of Emotion
(STE), and Wortham’s (2001) action based theory of narrative positioning (NIA) to form
a new methodology capable of explicating the constitutional process in psychotherapy. I
call this methodology Detailed Interaction Analysis. In chapter 4, I argue that CA, STE
and NIA all share ontological assumptions that are in harmony with the constitutional
approach to change. This methodology, which was developed over the course of this
study, is one of the major achievements of this project. With the methodology described,
Chapters 5, 6, and 7 are devoted to the analysis and findings of the study. Chapter 5
concerns the first session, session A, while Chapter 6 covers the second session, session
B. Chapter 7 will be an overview of the findings. The final chapter, chapter 8, provides a
reflection on the research project and possible future research. Now, let’s take a careful
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look at the ontological assumptions of constitution and how this can be translated into a
methodology capable of explicating the change process in psychotherapy.
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chapter

2

THE ONTOLOGICAL ASSUMPTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL APPROACH
TO CHANGE
"Our conception of the psyche, Foucault contends, has been sculpted by the
techniques that we have devised to probe its secrets, to oblige it to give up hidden
knowledge that will reveal to us the truth about who we are. Psychoanalysis is from a
historical perspective a later addition to that enterprise, born of a long but erratic linage
of techniques of the care of the self.”
Patrick Hutton, Technologies
of the self: A seminar with
Michel Foucault ,(1988b, p.
121).

Introduction: Ontological Assumptions and Constitution
The goal of this chapter is to describe the ontological assumptions of a
constitutional approach to change. These assumptions create the foundation on which the
following chapters will be built. My understanding of constitution is grounded in the
work of Martin Packer, Heidegger and Foucault. To begin let’s define ontology.
Ontology is the branch of philosophy that tries to define the kinds of entities that exist
and has its historical roots in the metaphysics of Aristotle (van Inwagen, 2012). We all
hold ontological assumptions. These assumptions are active when we make claims about
the world and in addition we always say something, directly or indirectly, about ourselves
as certain kinds of beings. This is especially true of research. When research makes
specific claims about people or the world, it inevitably carries certain ontological
assumptions about what human beings are. These assumptions impact the kind of
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research we conduct and the results we obtain. This chapter uses plain language to
explicate the ontological assumptions that ground this study. In short, these ontological
assumptions are that humans are relational, historical beings whose fundamental nature is
not given, but constituted through the social practices of a form of life. Psychotherapy is
one such practice, and consequently this chapter ends with a brief summary of Foucault’s
genealogy of psychotherapy.
Human Beings are Relational and Part of a Form of Life
This study assumes that human beings are relational, first and foremost. Our
understanding of things and of ourselves arises out of our relational form of life. Form of
life can be defined simply as all of a person’s worldly relationships past and present. This
encompasses the person’s culture as well as her idiosyncratic history. I think of a form of
life as synonymous with Heidegger’s “Being-in-the-world” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p.
78). However, the term form of life is most often attributed to Ludwig Wittgenstein, who
employed the term to emphasize how language is interwoven into our historically rich
and complex contextual world. Hence: “Forms of life can be understood as changing and
contingent, dependent on culture, context, history, etc” (Biletzki & Matar, 2011). This is
echoed by Martin Packer (2011) who describes a form of life as “‘cultural processes,’
distributed dynamically” through time and space, which are both constituting and
constituted through human participation (p. 234).3 In other words, living is a way of
participating with our form of life. This is a process that constitutes us as certain kinds of
people. However, through this process we change the form of life itself; therefore
3

Packer points out that he uses the term ‘form of life’ in the place of culture because it helps
remind us that culture is a process rather than a circumscribed thing.
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allowing for new and future ways of living and being.
An individual’s form of life encompasses both personal/cultural history and
present context. Hence, context is part of the form of life, but refers to one’s most
immediate engagement. When we talk about context, we narrow the scope from large
historical patterns to the immediate practices in which one is engaged. For example, in
psychotherapy the context is first and foremost: what is happening and what has just
happened. This includes what was just talked about and how the participants were just
relating to one another. However, the context can be extended by the participants as they
refer to previous sessions, or past events from their lives.
This means that context is observable. Now one might ask if some elements of the
context are invisible or implicit. Maybe there are things that have happened to the person
or things that were said previously that have an effect on what is happening in the
session, and maybe these invisible processes are very important. This might be the case,
but we must remember two things. First, absolute knowledge is impossible as a
researcher and as a human being in general. One does not need absolute knowledge to
conduct a meaningful examination of a phenomenon. If this were the case, no knowledge
or research would be meaningful. Just because Newton could not explain the “first”
movement does not mean that his theories and research were meaningless. Second, we
are concerned with how actions (action on action) are used in the practice of
psychotherapy to make change. When we talk about context, we are talking about the
context that the participants build through their actions on each other. This
contextualizing is really what we are looking at rather than the static mass of things that
have happened in the past.
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The way participants use elements of a given context acts to reproduce or change
the current order within a form of life. The form of life is not given, but constituted
through our concernful engagement in day-to-day practices. Practices are, simply, the
things we do: the activities we engage in, which serve some purpose or address some
problems. I will use the terms ‘practices’ and ‘activities’ interchangeably throughout this
project. However, ‘practices’ is in many ways preferable because it helps to convey the
historical nature of the things we do. Although practices might be something we do in the
present moment, they have a history and this history is important. Furthermore, practices
are always part of one’s social life and therefore they are often referred as social-practices
to remind the reader of the grounding ontological assumption that humans are relational
beings.
The First Aspect of Constitution: The Hermeneutic Circle
When we are engaged in a practice that is free of problems, we can commit
ourselves to what we are doing fully. We are concerned, engaged, and focused. Our
attention might wander, but our bodies and effort are focused on the task at hand. This
concernful engagement is what Heidegger called “understanding” (Heidegger,
1927/1962, p. 182).
Understanding is a type of knowing that is fundamental to what human beings are,
and it amounts to an implicit pre-reflective grasp of the world that we find ourselves in. It
is a kind of knowing where there is no mind body split. The hand grasps and the mind
attends in concert and without reflection. There is only concernful action with the task at
hand. When you grab a hammer there is no need to sort out what it is for and what it
does. When you grab the hammer and begin to work, the hammer and nail are
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understood. The understanding is tied up with the project you are working on. You build
the house for your family, for your future. The hammer, as it is understood, is bound up
with this project.
Hence, one of the core existential facets of our existence is that through our
engagement with the world all sorts of possibilities emerge. A rock can be a weapon, a
cooking utensil, a seat, a composition of minerals, a geological time capsule and so on.
What the rock is depends on our engagement with it, and this engagement is made
possible by a certain understanding that arises out of our form of life, which is sociohistorically unique. Hence, our actions, the way we think, work and relate to others, self
and world, is constituted by the form of life to which we belong. However, understanding
is not simply a cognitive process. It is a way of being-in-a-form-of-life and actively
participating within an unfolding context. Thoughts, behaviors, and emotions are actions
that arise out of the unfolding context and in turn shape the unfolding context (i.e. the
contextualizing of the form of life). Participants can change the context, renew the
context, or make certain things more or less important and it is through this process that
we work out the possibilities that are implicitly grasped by our understanding. This
process of working out possibilities can be described as a Hermeneutic circle. Through
this hermeneutic process we are shaped by our context (which is grounded in our
understanding of our form of life), but we in turn shape our context through our actions.
This process is the first aspect of Constitution: we are shaped by our socio-historical
form of life, yet through our engagement we reproduce or reconfigure the order within a
given form of life. As Packer writes: “People are not merely products of a form of life;
their actions sustain that form of life, and can transform it” (Packer, 2011, p. 288).
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The Second Aspect of Constitution: Changing Ourselves through Problematizing
Foucault’s research can be separated into three stages or types of research:
Archaeology, Genealogy, and Ethics. All of these can be seen as attempts to describe
how the hermeneutic circle in the constitutional process actually works. To do this,
Foucault developed what he called: “‘A critical history of thought’” (quoted in Packer,
2011, p. 374). For Foucault, thought is not limited to the realm of internal
representations. Thought takes many forms: tools, words, actions, institutions. Therefore,
thought is something that is in the world. It is observable because thought is social and
interpersonal—even our private thoughts are connected to our form of life, which is
fundamentally interpersonal and social.
This view of thought is influenced by Heidegger. When we are concernfully
engaged with a given social practice, things are understood. We grab our tools without a
thought and begin working away. When we are in this mode, our tools, the project we are
engaged in, and even ourselves are understood. When something, such as a hammer, is
understood in this way Heidegger referred to it as “ready-to-hand”: readily available for
use and understood in terms of one’s form of life and the unfolding project in which one
is engaged (Heidegger, 1927/1962, p. 99).
Yet, if a problem arises, if tools break-down, then our engagement with the world
changes. If you are hammering away and suddenly the hammer breaks, everything stops.
The hammer is no longer a hammer, it is a broken piece of wood and a chunk of iron. The
hammer is no longer ready-to-hand. It is no longer un-reflectively understood as part of
an unfolding project (context) and the form of life; rather it is “un-ready-to-hand” (p.
103). It becomes something for our thought. We look at it and wonder what happened
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and what to do. This is what Heidegger referred to as “circumspection” (p. 98).
Therefore, thought arises when there is a problem. The way a person relates to the world
shifts from concernful engagement to concerned circumspection: concerned thought
directed toward the project at hand in order to assess the possibilities that one has
available.
However, problems do not simply occur when things break. Problems arise out of
the form of life, “when how we live becomes a matter of concern” (Packer, 2011, p. 376).
And problems do not just pop-up as clear and understood. When problems occur there are
all sorts of responses. Different views of what the problem is and what caused the
problem are explored. Different solutions are devised. Organizations, movements, and
institutions are created. Practices are developed to address the problem. People are
trained and re-trained based on new thoughts about what the problem is and what the
solution may be. Hence, where there is a problem, there is thought in all its forms.
Furthermore, problems and thought have to be seen as active social processes. For
Foucault, trying to separate problems from thought is impossible. As Packer puts it:
“thought is problematization” (p. 376).
From this viewpoint, psychotherapy and constitutional research are both forms of
thought, which problematize what human beings are. The goal of constitutional research
is to expose the contingency of subjectivity and the relationship between human subjects
and social practices. This process frees us up to find new possibilities, new ways of
thinking, living, and being. Yet, constitutional research also problematizes psychotherapy
and depicts it as a contingent historical practice that is used as a mechanism of productive
power. This description moves against many of the common assumptions that
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psychotherapy is simply a ‘helping profession.’ This demonstrates how at the heart of
problematizing is action on action—different ways of thinking about a problem, which
change the problem, as well as all those who are engaged in these acts of problematizing.
In sum, human beings are historical beings who are born into a certain sociohistorical form of life where living and the problems of living have already been
established.4 Yet, these conditions are not axiomatic or unchangeable. Rather, they are
contingent because the form of life and the problems in it are always changing. Changes
happen when new ways of thinking, of problematizing, arise and lead to new practices.
From large scale institutions to the smallest aspects of our daily activities, all forms of
thought are part of the process of problematization. The process is hermeneutic and all
our thoughts and actions are in response to the unfolding context, yet how we act changes
the context. By engaging in problematizing we change who we are in relation to the
unfolding context that is, itself, changing in response to our actions. This leads to the
second aspect of constitution: Thought and understanding are not just things we do, they
are processes through which we become certain kinds of subjects.
Understanding Constitution through Historical Ontology
In order to understand this constitutional process, empirical research needs to be
guided by the work of both Heidegger and Foucault. For Heidegger (1927/1962), human
beings are their understanding: a clearing in which things light up, become available for
use, and have meaning. Heidegger states:
when we talk in an ontically figurative way of the lumen naturale in man, we have
in mind nothing other than the existential-ontological structure of this entity, that
4

What Heidegger (Heidegger, 1927/1962) referred to as “thrownness” of Dasein (p. 174).
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it is in such a way as to be its 'there'. To say that it is 'illuminated'… means that as
being-in-the-world it is clear... in itself, not through any other entity, but in such a
way that it is itself the clearing.... Dasein brings its 'there' along with it... Dasein is
its disclosedness….In understanding and state-of-mind, we shall see two
constitutive ways of being the 'there'; and these are primordial. (p. 171)
In other words, Human beings are pure possibility, which allows things to show up as
meaningful and useful. When we understand something as something, its meaning
depends on our actions, our intentions, and how it fits into the unfolding context of our
form of life (for-sake-of-which). Yet, because human beings are pure possibility, the kind
of person we are is contingent and always subject to change. As Heidegger writes:
“Dasein is the entity which, as Being-in-the-world, is an issue for itself" (p. 181). There is
no human nature or given human condition. Who we are gets worked out through
participating in practices within our form of life. Any type of action we take is a way of
constituting who we are in relation to others, self, and world. Hence, by engaging in
practices we constitute ourselves as certain kinds of people in relation to others and the
world.
Foucault’s historical research shows us how constitution occurs in the varied acts
of problematizing. Archaeology explicates how, for example, discursive practices shift
along with our understanding of the other, who now might be called mentally ill, but at
one time was call the madman. This shift is part of the discourse of reason, which has as
its counterpart the discourse of madness. Yet, madness changed along with the practices.
The medieval notion of mad wisdom faded with the ship of fools and the animality of
madness went away with the rise of hospitals in 1657 and the humanistic liberation of the
‘mad’ in 1794 (Foucault, 1988a). This liberation marked the transition from madness to
mental illness and the development of practices that are aimed at subduing madness
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through internalization of rational control. All the confluences of practice and discourse
can be uncovered by the archaeologist and serve as time points when things were
different. The conclusion is that we are now is contingent on the unique history of our
form of life. Genealogy was developed to map the changes and show how practices and
people change. Genealogy is a method that describes the two elements of constitution: the
dialectical relationship between participants and their form of life and how people
become certain kinds of subjects through their engagement in the practices of their form
of life. In other words, genealogy maps the actions on actions, what Foucault described as
power, which occurs within any given social practice. Hence, archaeology describes the
order with a form of life and genealogy describes how this order changes. The order and
the changes to the order occur through problematization. Ethics is related to genealogy
and archaeology, in that it is a description of how problematizing affects people.
However, its focus is on how people work on themselves in order to become ethical
beings.
The Four Elements of Foucault's Ethics
In one of his last interviews, Foucault (1983) stated that there are four elements to
ethics. These elements are the way that ethics shows itself to the researcher and the
means by which subjects fashion themselves into ethical beings. These elements are not
the ethical code a prescribed to each generation. Foucault remarked that these codes stay
relatively stable; what changes is our relationship to ourselves—the means by which we
see ourselves in light of the ethical code. Let's look at each of these elements individually
so we get a better understanding of what Foucault was trying to convey.
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The first element is what Foucault called the "ethical substance" (p. 238). It is the
‘substance’ that is manipulated by ethics. For example, Foucault stated that the substance
manipulated by modern people is feelings. If the modern person acts against the ethical
code he can still be moral as long as his feelings are in the right place. "You can have a
girl in the street or anywhere, if you have very good feelings toward your wife," Foucault
once stated (p. 238). Here, Foucault was making a distinction between, on the one hand,
the ethical code and its relation to prohibited acts, and on the other hand, the relationship
that one is supposed to have with oneself in order to be a moral subject. The latter is what
Foucault described as Ethics. Both the ethical code and the ethical self-relationship are
part of any morality, but they don’t always align perfectly. Hence, even though cheating
on a spouse is against the ethical code, one can examine one’s own feelings in order to
understand the violation and through this process of self understanding one can regain or
reaffirm their own morality. The ethical substance in this example is one’s feelings: it is
what has to be examined in order to remain moral. Foucault contrasted this with the
Greeks. For them the ethical substance was "aphrodisia....[which are] acts linked to
pleasure and desire" (p. 238). "For the Greeks, when a philosopher was in love with a
boy, but did not touch him, his behavior was valued. The problem was does he touch the
boy or not. That's the ethical substance: the act linked with pleasure and desire" (p. 238).
This brings up an important question for this project: What is in question ethically
during psychotherapy? What substance is interrogated so as to determine if one's
behavior is ethical? Foucault hinted that the substance I will find is feelings; however, we
must only use this as a guiding thought and let the analysis discover the problematic
ethical substance that is being constituted in the practice of psychotherapy.
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Next, is the "mode of subjection:” how people are encouraged to recognize their
“moral obligations” (p. 239). Foucault pointed out that this mode has changed over the
centuries. During the Enlightenment, people were interested in how rationality could
guide behavior; hence reason was the mode. Before that the mode was God's law or the
natural order. These different modes of subjection incorporate various discursive
practices. Foucault stated that “political power, glory, immortality, and beauty are all
linked at a certain moment" and that moment is marked by the mode of subjection at play
within the practice at hand (p. 239).
The third, element is the means by which we become ethical, the devices we
employ as ethical beings. This is a reference to the practices that are prescribed to a
person in order to change. Once we have identified the problematic ethical substance and
the standard by which we recognize our deficiencies, we may ask what we can do to
change. How are we "to moderate our acts, or to decipher what we are, or to eradicate our
desires….and so on -- all this elaboration of ourselves in order to behave ethically" (p.
239). Therefore, I will be examining what tools the client takes up in order to change.
One focus will be how the client uses the therapist’s interpretation or other inventions in
order to understand herself.
Last, Foucault suggested that we need to be interested in the end or goal, the telos,
what kind of person we imagine we will become through the application of ethics. Will
we "become pure, or immortal, or free, or masters of ourselves, and so on" through
ethical practices? (p. 239). Hence, I will be attending to the kind of person that the client
aspires to become through the practice of psychotherapy. This requires attention to ethics
as well as a genealogy of power as it is enacted during the course of the dataset.
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The rest of this chapter, as well as, chapter 3 and 4 will be devoted to describing
how we can conduct a genealogy that can attend to how psychotherapy uses actions on
actions to constitute the client as a certain kind of subject. This current chapter ends with
a brief overview of Foucault’s understanding of psychotherapy as a practice of power and
his method of genealogical interpretation. This review will provide a general overview of
power and different types of hermeneutic strategies that can be used in psychotherapy.
Then, in chapter 3, I will discuss how conversation analysis as a research methodology is
designed to describe how actions on actions affect participants within a given practice. I
will argue that conversation analysis, with some modifications, is an ideal method for
studying constitution in psychotherapy.
A Brief Genealogy of Psychotherapy
James Miller (1993) describes an encounter between Foucault and his graduate
students who were vacationing at a mountain cabin. He writes:
After the group had gathered….another one of the young men said that he felt he
needed psychotherapy, and asked Foucault what kind he would recommend.
“‘Freudian will be fine,’” said the philosopher…. “I would have thought
‘schizoanalysis’ would be more in order,” said Wade, alluding to the…vision of
psychology that Deleuze and Guattari had elaborated in Anti-Oedipus….Foucault
roared with laughter. Finally composing himself, he said, as Wade recalls,
“‘There cannot be a general theory of psychoanalysis—everyone must do it for
themselves.’” (pp. 281-282)
The disbelief of Wade and the other students is understandable given what Foucault
wrote about psychoanalysis over the course of his life. Foucault’s position toward
psychotherapy is not uniform, but it is clear that he viewed the depth hermeneutic of
psychoanalysis as troubling. Much of his later work was devoted to exposing the way that
psychoanalysis typified a way of constituting people as having deep selves that needed to
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be understood in order to heal and become ethical beings. Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982)
pointed out that the deep self is aggressively targeted by Foucault because, given the
socio-political climate, it is ripe for historicizing “in order to open the possibility of the
emergence of a new ethical subject” (p. 254). Hence, Foucault did not see the depth
hermeneutic of psychoanalysis as the most vital threat facing the modern subject, but he
did see it as a pervasive way of constituting ourselves that has certain dangers.
Furthermore, this depth hermeneutic has become so much a part of us that we have
forgotten that it is contingent on a history of human practices. In other words, it is
contingent and capable of transformation given the proper circumstances. What will
follow will be an overview of the historicizing that Foucault conducted on psychotherapy
in order to explicate its contingency. Then we will look at how Foucault’s view of
psychotherapy as a modern practice was not as dogmatic as one might expect and how
Foucault can be seen as acknowledging the benefit of psychotherapy aimed at enlarging
the scope of personal freedom.
Although critical of psychology and psychiatry, Foucault spoke favorably of both
Freud and Binswanger in his early writings (Foucault, 1984, 1987). In his first book,
Mental Illness and Psychology, Foucault (1987) outlines how mental illness became
constituted through the exclusion and silencing of the modern asylum. He credits Freud
with breaking this silence, stating that madness “entered a phase of silence from which it
was not to emerge….until Freud….opened up once again the possibility for reason and
unreason to communicate” (p. 69). However, this kindness toward Freud began to shift in
his book, Madness and Civilization. There, Foucault (1988a) concluded: “To the doctor,
Freud transferred all the structures Pinel and Tuke had set up within confinement….he
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created the psychoanalytical situation where…alienation becomes disalienating because,
in the doctor, it becomes a subject (p. 278). This critique of Freud continues through
Foucault’s genealogies of sexuality and his examination of modern ethics; however he
always delivers Freud and psychoanalysis a nuanced verdict.
For example, in his genealogy of sexuality, Foucault (1978) elaborated his theory
of power. Foucault sees power as a manifold of "force relations" that are connected in a
uniform manner, which have their strategies, which are its effects (p. 92). He elaborates
by saying:
It seems to me that power must be understood in the first instance as the
multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they operate in
which constitute their own organization; as a process which, through ceaseless
struggles and confrontations, transformations, strengthens, or reverses them; as
the support which these force relations find in one another, thus forming a chain
or a system, or on the contrary, the disjunctions and contradictions which isolate
them from one another; and lastly, as the strategies in which they take effect,
whose general design or institutional crystallization is embedded in the state
apparatus, in the formulation of the law, in the various social hegemonies. (pp. 92
-93)
In other words, "there is no power that is exercised without a series of aims and
objectives.... the logic is perfectly clear, the aims decipherable, and yet it is often the case
that no one is there to have invented them" (p. 95).
He then goes on to discuss two great strategies of power in western history: the
“deployment of alliance” and the “deployment of sexuality” (p. 106). He notes that there
is a trans-cultural tendency for sexuality to be used to strengthen family and societal
relationships. This results in a field of power-relations that actively enforces communal
law regarding sexual behavior. There is an emphasis on what can and cannot be done and
the strategic end is the reproduction of the prevailing power-relations, such as patriarchal
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domination, and heteronormativity. This is the deployment of alliance. Foucault states
that this great strategy dominated the western world through much of the modern age.
However, in the 19th century this strategy gave way to the deployment of sexuality.
Foucault clarifies that this strategy of power differs in that, “its reason for being [is] not
in reproducing itself, but in proliferating, innovating, annexing, creating, and penetrating
bodies in an increasingly detailed way, and in controlling populations in an increasingly
comprehensive way” (p. 107). The deployment of sexuality is made up of a host of
practices, which constitute the modern subject as a deep self, full of unknown desires that
must be understood in order to become an ethical being.
This strategic shift of power did not happen suddenly. Rather, practices that were
developed and used to strengthen social structures in the 16th and 17th century made the
shift possible. Foucault details how the Christian confessional became a powerful tool for
maintaining the structure of the family and of western society (p. 116). This practice was
based on turning every whim, inkling, or fancy “into discourse” and then providing
pastoral instruction for how to atone for the sin. In the 18th century this way of turning
every detail of one’s soul into discourse became, more and more, secular until it was no
longer in the domain of the church, but the domain of medicine and the state. It seems
that for Foucault this is when the deployment of sexuality was at its most dangerous
juncture.
Across his work concerning psychotherapy and psychology, Foucault returns to
the danger of locating sexuality, madness, or humanity in biology (Foucault, 1978, 1984,
1987, 1988a). He argues that in the 19th century medicine tried to inscribe sexual desire
into biology, which created “the opening up of the great medico-psychological domain of
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the ‘perversions,’ which was destined to take over from the old moral categories of
debauchery and excess” (p. 118). In other words, the practice of turning sexual desire into
discourse, along with the moral undertone of sin, were adopted and transformed into a
biological science that equated moral degeneracy to heredity. This is where
psychoanalysis plays a more nuanced role. Although psychoanalysis is a practice based
on the confessional, it did not locate sexuality in biology and for this Foucault
acknowledges psychoanalysis as a counter-force that stood against the strategy of power
as was historically deployed:
It is very well to look back from our vantage point and remark upon the
normalizing impulse in Freud….but the fact remains that in the great family of
technologies of sex, which goes back into the history of the Christian West, of all
those institutions that set out in the nineteenth century to medicalize sex, it was
the one that…rigorously opposed the political and institutional effects of the
perversion-heredity-degeneresence system. (p. 119)
Foucault goes on to show how psychoanalysis played a differentiating, yet pivotal
role in the deployment of sexuality. It acted with and against prevailing deployments of
power in ways that shifted the overall strategy. Beyond opposing biologism,
psychoanalysis realigned the deployment of alliance and the deployment of sexuality
under the banner of secular science. As Foucault writes: “psychoanalysis whose technical
procedure seemed to place the confession of sexuality outside family jurisdiction,
rediscovered the law of alliance, the involved working of marriage and kinship, and
incest at the heart of this sexuality” (p. 113). Hence, it is through the “interrelatedness of
the law and desire” that psychoanalysis constituted the 19th and earlier 20th century
bourgeoisie as deep selves with unknown desires that could be interpreted by medical
professionals and understood in ways that established the bourgeoisie as a unique social
class (p. 129). The upsurge of discourse regarding sexuality is used to direct the
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bourgeoisie on how they are to become ethical and good people and through this process
they strengthen the class alliances—those of family and business—that define and
distinguish them as a class. Foucault quips that the aristocracy of old Europe maintained
power through blood and inheritance, yet on the contrary: “The bourgeoisie’s ‘blood’ was
its sex” (p. 124).
Hence, Foucault held a nuanced opinion of psychoanalysis seeing, it as a practice
that opposed some dangers (biologism), while creating others (self-surveillance and
normativity). Dreyfus and Rabinow (1982) point out that at the end of his career Foucault
became more and more convinced that psychoanalysis, and for that matter
psychotherapy, furthered the deployment of a restrictive and insidious form of power that
needed to be critiqued and transformed (or abandoned). They write:
As long as the interpretive sciences continue to search for a deep truth, that is, to
practice a hermeneutics of suspicion, as long as they proceed on the assumption
that it is the Great Interpreter who has privileged access to meaning, while
insisting that the truths they uncover lie outside the sphere of power, these
sciences seem fated to contribute to the strategies of power. (pp. 180-181)
In other words, Foucault became highly suspicious of psychotherapy, yet left open the
possibility of a type of therapy that would not conform to the deployment of sexuality.
Psychotherapy as a Hermeneutics of Suspicion
For Foucault, therapists should not engage in a hermeneutic of suspicion. Both
Ricoeur (1970) and Habermas (1968) describe psychoanalysis as a hermeneutic practice.
Habermas contrasted Freud's hermeneutic method with Dilthey’s. He pointed out that
Freud was not solely interested in the conscious intention of a person’s story (i.e. text).
He was interested in the mistakes, omissions, and errors. These were conceived not as
accidents or meaningless corruptions of the text, but as meaningful symbolic actions that
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must be understood in order to comprehend the text (patient) as a whole. Habermas wrote
that, "the symbolic structures that psychoanalysis seeks to comprehend are corrupted by
the impact of internal conditions. The mutilations have meaning as such…. this
distinguishes…[psychoanalysis as] a hermeneutics that unites the linguistic analysis with
the psychological investigation of causal connections” (p. 217). Habermas viewed
Freud's method as a depth hermeneutic. The symptoms that bring the patient into therapy
are seen as "the scars of a corrupted text that confronts the author as incomprehensible"
(p. 219). The “scars” and the text itself are then interpreted producing a final
understanding that might be quite contrary to the original intent of the text. In this way
the depth hermeneutic questions what lies underneath the text because its relevancy is of
utmost importance if we are going to understand the text itself.
This is similar to Ricoeur’s description of Freud's method as a hermeneutics of
suspicion comparable in structure to interpretive investigations of Karl Marx or the
second division of Heidegger's Being and Time (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. xxii).
Ricoeur (1970) stated that "psychoanalysis is a modification of the Spinozist critique of
free will; analysis begins by denying that the apparent arbitrariness of consciousness is
anything more than the nonrecognition of underlying motivations" (p. 391). Freud’s
grand suspicion is that what we take as free choice is actually motivated by unconscious
dynamics only to be understood by analysis of a patient’s textual corruptions. Therefore,
for both Habermas and Ricoeur we can describe psychoanalysis as an active suspicion of
underlying motivations behind consciousness and a practical hermeneutic method that
attempts to understand these motivations by interpreting the text via its scars. The
symptom presents itself as incomprehensible and it is the hermeneutic practice that
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attempts to comprehend the symptom in relation to the text. In the end, the symptom
decodes the text itself, giving a fuller picture of the patient's psyche.
The unconscious is an essential idea, which guides psychoanalytic hermeneutics
and the dialogue that unfolds between therapist and patient. It sets a bearing towards the
past. Through the interpretation of present day symbols, psychoanalysis discovers the
repetition of childhood fantasies and fixations. In many ways, the "unconscious is
fate"(Ricoeur, 1974, p. 118). This hermeneutic bearing towards the past can be directly
contrasted with what is found in the hermeneutics of phenomenology, which looks
toward the future. Like psychoanalysis, phenomenology states that there is no certainty to
consciousness. However, unlike psychoanalysis, phenomenology sees consciousness as a
"task" (p. 108). "Consciousness is a movement which continually annihilates its starting
point and can guarantee itself only at the end” (p. 113). Here, Ricoeur is influenced by
Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit where the present can only be understood by future
figures that are able to look back upon the process of history. In other words, ‘human
nature’ is never set, or determined; rather what human beings are gets worked out
through existing, which up unfolds temporally. This idea is a mainstay of most
phenomenology. We can see it in the work of Heidegger (1927/1962), where he
emphasizes how Dasein essence is existence: the living out of one's possibilities. We can
also see this idea in the work of Medard Boss, Ludwig Binswanger, and Merleau Ponty.
Dreyfus (1987) argues that it is this hermeneutics of phenomenology that
Foucault seems to advocate for, as opposed to the hermeneutics of suspicion. After
reviewing Foucault’s writing on psychotherapy, he states that Foucault never took back
his endorsement of Ludwig Binswanger and existential psychotherapy. Instead, Foucault
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hinted that psychotherapy should be concerned with opening up one’s present freedom in
order “to give one's life the stability and uniqueness of a work of art” (p. 321). This
means freedom from the universal norms (i.e. heteronormativity) and restrictions that
people often take to be a matter of fact, but are themselves constituted and therefore
contingent. Dreyfus points to the work of Anna Freud and the ego psychologists along
with the notion of the “restricted clearing,” found in Boss and Binswanger, and
“emblem,” found in the work of Merleau Ponty. The basic idea is that possibilities open
to us remain foreclosed because of misunderstandings and sedimented ways of relating.
Dreyfus writes:
Merleau-Ponty, who was one of Foucault's teachers, offers a more plausible
existential account of pathology that Foucault seems to integrate into his account
of Binswanger. In Merleau-Ponty's ontological view, pathology occurs when a
particular way a person relates to some people or some objects becomes a way of
relating to all people and all objects, so that it becomes the form or style of all
relationships, i.e., some aspect of the epistemological relation of a subject to other
persons and objects, which should take place in the clearing, becomes a
dimension of the clearing itself. (p. 325)
Hence, therapy would look a lot like genealogy, in that it would expose the contingency
of our current way of being and then, through historicizing, discover times in which the
client acted different and counter the restrictiveness characteristic of his presenting
problem.
This concludes my overview of constitution and the brief genealogy of
psychotherapy. I have described constitution as having two aspects. First, constitution
occurs because of the dialectical relationship between a person and their form of life.
People are shaped by their form of life (i.e. cultural practices and unfolding context), yet
their actions also shape the form of life. A form of life is therefore contingent on the
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social action of participants engaged in shared practical activity. Even when these
practical activities reproduce the basic order within the form of life (relationships of
status and the means through which people become ethical beings), this order is re-newed
or re-constituted by the participants themselves. This leads to the second feature of
constitution: by engaging in social practices where we act on others and ourselves we
constitute ourselves as certain kinds of people. This type of constitutional activity occurs
at the level of micro-practices and it is here that power is generated as people act on one
another in ways that align with strategies of power manifesting within the form of life.
However, we are not only constituted by the actions of others. Our own actions on
ourselves and others are constitutive of who we are as certain kinds of subjects. This was
described by Foucault as ethics. This refers to the way in which who we are, is
problematized through certain practices that are meant to make us good people. These
actives are undertaken by us and therefore it is through our own actions that we become
certain types of people.
This led into a short overview of Foucault’s writings on psychotherapy. Over his
career, Foucault held a nuanced and shifting view of psychotherapy. It the end, Foucault
was skeptical of psychotherapy because of its adherence to the depth hermeneutic
typified by psychoanalytic therapy. This type of hermeneutics was shown to extend
beyond psychoanalysis and originate in the Christian confessional of the 16th and 17th
century. Dreyfus argued that for Foucault, therapy should be about expanding one’s
freedom so as to allow one to live as if one’s life is a work of art. However, it is
important to point out that for Foucault there is no perfect practice or system of ethics
that is free of danger. As Dreyfus and Rabinow write, “any new ethical system will
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presumably bring new dangers which it will be the job of interpretive analytics to
discover and resist” (p. 263). Hence, we will always need critical research to uncover the
way in which practices constitute us as certain kinds of subjects. This, research exposes
the totality of the practice and allows for transformations to occur that diminish old
dangers. Yet, these transformations, which lead to new practices, carry new threats and
therefore perpetuate the need for critical research.
The next chapter will be a review of theories and research methodologies that can
be used to conduct a critical examination of psychotherapy. Consistent throughout the
next section is a critique of language as representation and a grasping for a pragmatic
understanding of language and human interaction. This is key. Psychotherapy that relies
on the depth hermeneutic is based on the “Cartesian/Kantian conception of the
mind….[as] a set of ideas….which represent the outside world” and when this is “used to
account for pathology [it] becomes a depth psychology concerned with representations”
(Dreyfus, 1987, pp. 316-317). Hence, a critical research methodology needs to reproblematize language in order to offer a compelling critique that allows us to see
psychotherapy differently.
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chapter

3
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS ON PSYCHOTHERAPY
"The fundamental coherence of conversation is reflected in connections
between actions rather than connections between utterances.”
William Labov and David Fanshel,
Therapeutic Discourse: Psychotherapy as
conversation , (1977, p. 333).

Constitutional Research: the Original Problematizing of Harold Garfinkel
This chapter will provide an introduction to conversation analysis (CA) and
review the conversation analytic research on psychotherapy. In order to show how this
research methodology aligns with the ontological assumptions discussed in chapter 2, we
will begin by looking at the ethnomethodology of Harold Garfinkel and discuss how a
pragmatic understanding of language is fundamental to constitutional approaches to
change. Then I will give an overview of CA and of CA applied to psychotherapy, which
takes on the form of a traditional literature review. The chapter will end with a discussion
of the current limitations of CA and this will open up new methodological possibilities
that can be used to study change in psychotherapy.
Harold Garfinkel’s work blossomed in the shadow of the sociological giant
Talcott Parsons. During the 1950’s and 1960’s, Parsons seemed like the only sociologist
of importance in America. Knapp (1994) writes that this somewhat unimposing man
wielded an inexplicable influence that could not be explained by his abilities as a writer
or a researcher. In fact, most of Parsons’ writings were very abstract and convoluted.
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Furthermore, his empirical research rarely produced any results of significance. However,
Parsons himself explained that the social sciences in America were influenced by a
number of different theories, all of which had a different explanation for the relationship
between individuals and society. These theories were fragmented and ranged in scope:
what they lacked, according to Parsons, was a unifying theory. Hence, Parsons equated
his influence with the desire and need for an overarching theory that could explain the
relationship between individual action and societal structure (p. 189).
Parsons (1937) argued in his first work, The Structure of Social Action, that the
social sciences needed a of common frame reference that could guide theory and
research. According to Knapp (1994), it was here that Parsons put forward his classic
theory of “volunteerism.” Volunteerism is the view that "people act on the basis of their
values; their actions are oriented and constrained by the values and norms of the people
around them; and these norms and values are the basis of social order" (p. 191). At the
time, the social sciences were dominated by crude theories that reduced human action to
natural or biological laws. Parsons argued that these theories (or even the more
sophisticated utilitarian theories that viewed human action as a reasoned choice based on
self-interest) failed to take into account the importance of societal values in explaining
individual behavior. It might seem common sense to claim that people are influenced by
their values, but for Parsons the crucial insight was that values are created by the societal
structures. In his view, in America, the social structure is largely influenced by religion
and capitalism. Individuals internalize a large array of values from this social structure,
but the structure itself is not stagnant. Rather it is a complex dynamic structure and, at
times, it can be at odds with the values of any one individual. As Knapp points out: "the
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master problem within Parsons’ theory is the relation between a theory of action, at the
level of individual and differentiation as a theory of institutions and large-scale
structures" (p. 193). In other words, if there are competing values (a competition between
micro and macro concerns) how can we explain individual action?
Parsons’ influence was so complete that sociology solely concerned itself with
how macro social structures transferred values to individuals. This was the sociological
domain. Goodwin and Heritage (1990) argue that by carving out large-scale social
structures and institutions as the purview of sociology, linguistics was able to claim
authority over the micro interactions between individuals. This seemed like a natural
division of labor that allowed the two disciplines to adequately analyze the totality of
social life. But, during this time, linguists were more interested in the particulars of
language rather than the practicality of language use. As Goodwin and Heritage write:
"Both sociology and linguistics thus defined the scope of their subject matter in such a
way that the relevance of in-talk-interaction fell between disciplinary boundaries" (p.
285).
It was between these two disciplinary boundaries that Garfinkel placed himself.
His theoretical position was first mapped out in his dissertation, which Parsons chaired.
There, Garfinkel argued against Parsons by claiming that individuals are constantly
revising and applying social reason. Therefore, commonsense understandings are always
up for revision. Furthermore, the way people come to a mutual understanding is
influenced by the context, yet their newly formed understanding also changes the context
(i.e. the first aspect of constitution). Uniquely, Garfinkel created “procedures with which
he was able to show not only that mutual understandings are highly contingent and
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revisable, but also that participants invoke a vast array of background understandings to
make sense of the course of activity" (p. 286). In other words, when we examine people
talking to one another we see that they are not simply animated by competing social
values. They are more active, constantly examining the interaction at hand by referring to
the context. This context, therefore, is subject to change as the participants actively
constitute the context through their interaction. This approach was a radical departure
from Parsons because it placed more importance on everyday social interaction as
opposed to the internalization of macro social values.
Garfinkel's turn to everyday experience was influenced by his interest in the
phenomenology of Alfred Schultz. Yet, unlike Schultz who argued that every day
interaction creates "‘commonsense constructs’….[that] enable us to make sense of the
world," Garfinkel argued that all kinds of social order are constituted through social
interaction (Packer, 2011, p. 165). We might say that Schultz thought everyday
interaction changed the way we see the world, where Garfinkel thought that it produced
the world. These are not minor differences; they are fundamentally different ontologies.
With Schultz we see the continuation of the representational view of language, which is
predicated on the subject and object dualism that Kant introduced (pp. 164 – 166). For
Garfinkel to move beyond this perspective he had to adopt and develop a new
understanding of language which jettisoned the old Kantian assumptions.
Language: from Dualism through Representation to Pragmatics
The representational view that language is a series of statements, which attempts
to describe the external objective world, is inherently tied up with Western philosophy
and subject and object dualism. We can trace this dualism to Plato who claimed that there
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was a true and constant world behind our perceived reality. In the Republic, Plato (1994)
uses the allegory of the cave to describe human beings as bonded and lost in an illusory
world of shadows which we take for reality. Yet, reality is beyond the cave where the sun
shines and gives light and life. We are slaves to the shadows, but we can see reality if we
take "the upward journey and the sight of things up on the surface of the earth,” which is
analogous to “the mind’s ascent to the intelligible realm” (p. 244). In this allegory we see
two important ontological assumptions that have shaped the way language and reality
have been understood ever since. First, our initial understanding of the world is false and
we must develop a process (science) that will uncover the true nature of reality. And
second, whether we human beings remain as bonded slaves or become free people
perceiving the true light which animates the world, we are always looking out upon a
world that is separate from us.
Each generation since Plato has grappled with this dualism in one way or the
other, yet it is fair to say that the divide between subject and object entered into its
modern form with the work of Immanuel Kant. By the time Kant entered the stage,
philosophers such as Locke and Descartes, had put forward a representational theory of
knowledge (Fancher, 1979/1996). The basic idea of representationalism is that objects
that are independent from us impinge upon our senses and cause us to form
representations. Representations have been described as images or ideas, which reside in
the subject’s mind, but have the capacity to accurately represent the external world.
Therefore, it is possible for human beings to find a process through which they can know
the world-in-itself via their representations. At first, Kant, who started his career as a
scientist, agreed with the representationalists. However, after Hume destroyed the
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certainty upon which empiricism (and therefore representationalism) was built, Kant
began to rethink the relationship between human knowledge and the external world.
Kant felt that we can and must assume that the independent world exists, however
we cannot assume that our ideas about the world correspond to the world in itself. The
problem comes down to this: human beings proceed by testing our ideas against the
world. Hence, we might assume that good ideas conform to the world in itself. However,
we are unable to know the world in itself because we proceed by first forming concepts
about the world. In other words, we come into the world through ideas and there is no
way of getting beyond or behind this fundamental aspect of our existence. Human beings
have no way of knowing the world independent of thought and, therefore, searching for
ways to prove that our concepts conform to the mind-independent world is a futile quest.
As Kant (1781/2007) stated: "I can assume either that concepts through which I arrive
at…conform to the object [or the world], and I would again be perplexed about how I can
know anything about it a priori; or else that the objects, or what is the same thing, the
experience in which alone they are known (as objects that are given to us), conform to
those concepts" (p. 18). Hence, by testing our ideas against the world we assess whether
our ideas and theories conform to our experience, but our experience is not made up of a
mind-independent world. It is a constructed world already understood by and through our
concept latent mind.5
Kant argued that in order to understand science and human knowledge, we have
to understand how our ideas are constituted. As Packer (2011) states, Kant would go on
5

The Model Dependent Realism of modern physicists is a prime example of Kantian ontology
(Hawking & Mlodinow, 2010).
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to claim that "our experiences are not merely ideas but representations, related outwardly
to objects and inwardly to a subject" (p. 144-145). These representations are not simple
pictures. Rather, they are the means by which our experience of the world is constructed.
These representations are built from sensory experience, but they are always shaped and
organized by concepts. According to Packer, Kant's "concepts are innate and universal,
the same for all people at all times. They include space, time, causality, and object -- each
of which seems to be a property of the world but in fact, Kant argued, are concepts the
human mind brings to experience" (p. 145). Therefore, for Kant the most important factor
when attempting to understand human knowledge and experience is not the world, which
impresses itself upon us through our empty and transparent consciousness
(representationalism); but rather it is reason, which actively constructs our experience by
way of universal concepts (transcendental realism).
Upon this foundation we built our understanding of language and this has created
quite a stumbling block. First, what may be referred to as ‘mainstream’ science holds a
representational theory of knowledge and language. Packer (2011) points out that the
Vienna Circle attempted to purify scientific inquiry so they could accurately describe the
objective world (p. 22). One of their first orders of business was to distinguish between
meaningful and nonsensical statements. Statements would be designated as meaningful if
they could be tested empirically. The Vienna Circle used Wittgenstein's theory of
language, developed in Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus. As Packer summarizes it, in the
Tractatus Wittgenstein describes language as "‘atomic propositions’ that ‘mirror’ or
‘picture’…the world. Such propositions —each of them either true or false—can be
systematically combined in ‘truth tables’” (p. 25). Here we can clearly see how the
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Vienna Circle was trying to fulfill the representationalists’ dream that a specialized
process could be developed through which we could accurately know the world via our
own representations. However, this proved to be very difficult. First of all, by the time
the Vienna Circle met with Wittgenstein in 1927 he had already began to repudiate his
earlier understanding of language. Also, the circle found themselves mired in Hume’s
critiques of induction. The scientists became quite unsure how their simple empirical
statements, which were supposed to accurately mirror the world, could be deemed
infallible (p. 26). In other words, how can we be sure that what one scientist sees is an
accurate reflection of the world? This is exactly the question that Kant had attempted to
answer by offering his fundamental critique that we can never know if our
representations are accurate because we can never know the world in itself.
By that time the Vienna Circle finally spoke to Wittgenstein, he had turned away
from the idea that language could be used to make atomic propositions that mirror the
external world, and, instead, suggested that language could only be understood by
considering the larger context in which it was used. He described language use in this
context as a "language game" (Wittgenstein, 1994, p. 42). Others, such as the American
pragmatist Richard Rorty (2000) followed a path similar to Wittgenstein, yet Rorty took a
more Darwinian approach. He states that by "looking at language in this Darwinian way,
as providing tools for coping with objects rather than representations of objects, and in
providing different sets of tools for different purposes…makes it hard to be an
essentialist" (p. 65). Rorty (1991) also said that his view of language was influenced by
the great 20th-century philosophers in both the analytic and continental traditions. He
argued that Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Derrida’s collective contribution to philosophy,
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and to the world, has been to move us away from the idea of language as representation;
towards the view of language as transformative and potentially therapeutic. Rorty states
that metaphors are “a call to change one’s language and one’s life, rather than a proposal
about how to systematize either” (p. 13).
Although Rorty's work has influenced many in the social sciences, conversation
analysis is more indebted to the work of the language philosopher John L. Austin. In How
to do Things with Words, Austin (1962) examined language as speech acts, rather than a
system of signs. He argues that in order to understand how language works, we have to
consider the context in which language is used (p. 52). He begins by looking at
contrasting statements and performatives. Statements are utterances that can be seen in
representational terms, which are either true or false. Performatives are utterances that by
their very nature do something. He states: "the uttering of the words is, indeed, usually a,
or even the, leading incident in the performance of an act" (p. 8). For example, when a
bridegroom says: "I do," he is performing an act -- promising -- which is done solely by
the utterance itself within its proper context. Now, surely the groom's act of promising,
which is extended into the future as all promises are, can go wrong and therefore the
performative utterance can fail, but this is different than conceiving of it as either true or
false. When a performative utterance goes wrong, Austin describes the utterance as
"unhappy" and he lists a series of infelicities, which make an utterance unhappy (pp. 1415).6
A statement can be reduced to a single word as a description of an object or event.
6

These infelicities are: a conventional procedure in which the words used to make sense, the
presence of particular people and circumstances, the completion of the procedure, proper
intentions and feelings of the participants, and adherence to the performed acts in the future.
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As we have discussed, the word ‘rock’ names an object in the world and the description
can be determined as either true or false. However, Austin argues that even our most
simple statements are very ambiguous. If the word ‘rock’ is spoken, it could be that the
speaker is simply describing a rock in the field and we can judge as true or false based on
whether he is referring to a rock or a cow patty (dried cow manure that looks a lot like a
rock). However, the speaker could also be referring to a rock that was hurling toward the
hearer’s head. In this case the statement would actually be a performative because it is
performing an act—a warning. Austin argues, counter intuitively, that statements are
primitive utterances. He claims that the development of the performative utterance is
actually an attempt to be more precise and that this linguistic evolution reveals how
language is always some kind of action. "Language…in its primitive stages is not precise,
and it is also not…explicit: precision in language makes it clear what is being said—its
meaning: explicitness…makes clear the force of the utterances, or 'how... it is to be taken'
" (p. 73).
For Austin the meaning of an utterance is directly tied up with the action it
performs within a certain context. Therefore, the meaning of the utterance does rely on
the world within which it is spoken, yet not because it describes this world but because it
changes it. Furthermore, the meaning of the utterance has to do with its effect on other
people. To clarify this point Austin states that there are three actions the utterances can
perform: (1) locutionary -- the traditional sense of an utterance which has "sense and
reference," which carries a certain meaning, (2) illocutionary "utterances which have a
certain force" such as "informing, warning, ordering", (3) and perlocutionary acts, which
are what has been brought about by saying something: persuading and deterring (p. 107).
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Next he states that illocutionary acts produce effects, but not in a straightforward way of
changing the "natural course of events" (p. 117). Rather they —if they are happy—require
a certain response from others who are involved with the act. For example, if I name my
child Monroe, I do so by performing an illocutionary act, "I name her Monroe." Now,
assuming that this utterance is happy certain things must occur. First, “…the performance
of the illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake" (p. 117). That is, the nurse,
doctor, and my wife all have to hear me and agree that I have named my child. Second,
"the illocutionary act 'takes effect' in certain ways…,” such as by naming my child
Monroe it is from that point forward wrong to call her by another name (p. 117). This is
the subtle way in which utterances are fundamentally actions on actions, yet are different
from physical acts because utterances usher in, or reproduce, a state of affairs which has
certain consequences and obligations. Last, “illocutionary acts invite by convention a
response or sequel” (p. 117). Therefore, when I name my child, my wife responds with an
agreement, "Yes, Monroe," which then is responded to simultaneously by the doctor and
nurses nodding their heads to acknowledge that they heard us and that the utterance was
indeed happy.7.
In the end, Austin argues that the old notion that utterances truly or falsely
represent the world fails because utterances always have a force (performative dimension
that does something) and it is impossible to form an exact statement that conforms to the
world. The first part has been detailed above, but let me point out that even our most
7

If, for example, I coughed as I was naming her: "I name her Hch!hhl,” everyone would look at
me and wait for my coughing to subside instead of agreeing that I named my daughter “Hch!hhI”.
This example of coughing in the middle of an utterance shows how a performative can be
unhappy when the procedure is interrupted and left incomplete.
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precise scientific statements such as: “The speed of light is 299,792,458 meters per
second,” is a claim that is implicitly being argued, exclaimed, or denounced. By
prefacing the statement with "I argue…" or “I exclaim…” that “The speed of light is
299,792,458 meters per second,” I only make a statement more clear, explicating what
was implicit to begin with. Therefore, locutionary acts are by their very nature are also
illocutionary acts. As Austin states: "In general the locutionary act as much as the
illocutionary is an abstraction only: every genuine speech act is both" (p. 147). As for the
second point, if our criterion for whether a statement is true or false relies on its exact
conformity to the object that it describes, then all statements would be false. This is
because it is impossible to exactly describe any object. Austin asserts that, "in the case of
stating truly or falsely, just as much in the case of advising well or badly, the intents and
purposes of the utterance and its context are important; what is judged true in a school
book may not be so judged in a work of historical research" (p. 143). Here he uses the
statement "France is hexagonal” as an example. He considers the statement to be a "rough
truth" that is appropriate for elementary school education, but not for professional
geographers. Statements such as this are used all the time and their truth or falseness has
more to do with the context than with its ability to exactly represent the object that it
addresses.
Austin's work can be seen as a solution to the problems created by dualism. It is a
paradigm shift that moves away from attempts to salvage the view of language as
representation toward the vision of language as action, based in context. As we have
seen, Austin was only one among many philosophers, linguists, and social scientists who
were moving towards this new understanding of language. As we now turn back to
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Garfinkel, we can see how his view of language coincides with Austin’s. As Packer
(2011) describes, Garfinkel saw words "as indexes, not as symbols or representations" (p.
199). Words point (much like pointing with one’s index finger) to the context in which
they are being used. Yet, as stated previously, participants are always revising and/or
reproducing the context in which all interactions are couched. In short, participants are
always constituting their form of life as well as actively responding to the form of life in
which they dwell. Garfinkel's focus on constitution led him to develop what he called
ethnomethodology, which Packer describes as "the study (logos) of the methods used by
folks (ethnos) and their commonsense everyday activity” (p. 190). Ethnomethodology,
with its focus on how "things are..... produced and accomplished" was grounded in the
new understanding of language as action, based in context. As Packer writes
"ethnomethodology pays attention to language as a dynamic, social phenomenon and to
speech not as an inert vehicle—the expression of inner meanings—but as fundamental to
the constitution of social life" (pp. 198-199).
From Garfinkel to Sacks and Schegloff: the Birth of Conversation Analysis
Harvey Sacks and Emanuel Schegloff are typically credited with creating
conversation analysis (C. Goodwin & Heritage, 1990; Liddicoat, 2011). For some,
discovery might be a disagreeable word. It is not as if conversation analysis lay buried in
some remote crevice, lying in wait for humans to discover her. Nonetheless, creating is in
an apt description. Paul ten Have (1999) points out that in Kuhnian terms the creation of
conversation analysis was nothing less than a paradigm shift, which uncovered nascent
possibilities on the horizon of academic sociology and linguistics (p. 7). These
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possibilities, which Sacks and Schegloff grabbed on to, were largely created by the work
of Garfinkel.
When Sacks and Schegloff began developing conversation analysis they were
both students of Irving Goffman, but all three men were in constant contact with
Garfinkel. In many ways conversation analysis can be seen as a combination of the
phenomenology/ethnomethodology of Garfinkel with the interaction analysis (Bateson,
1972; Scheflen, 1973) that emerged during the 1970s (cited in C. Goodwin & Heritage,
1990, pp. 286-287). The empirical method used by conversation analysis today was
largely developed by Sacks while conducting his dissertation research. In this early work,
Sacks analyzed telephone calls placed to a suicide prevention hotline. When Sacks began
lecturing on conversation analysis he used much of his work to explain his theory and
methodology. One of the most important discoveries that Sacks made was the way in
which callers avoided giving their names (ten Have, 1999). As Sacks (1989) explained:
I [had] a large collection of these conversations, and I…looked at these first
exchanges...A series of persons who called this place would not give their names.
The hospital's concern was, can anything be done about it? One question I wanted
to address was, where in the course of the conversation could you tell that
somebody would not give their name? So I began to look at the materials. It was
in fact on the basis of that question that I began to try to deal in detail with
conversations. (p. 35)
For a crisis worker it is vitally important to get the name of the person in crisis. The crisis
workers would often offer their name first. This utterance, as Sacks came to note, can be
seen as a pragmatic action because it forces the recipient to reply by giving their own
name (see excerpt below). Sacks observed that the callers would avoid giving their own
name by offering an "occasional usable device" such as "I can't hear you"(ten Have,
1999, p. 15). The fact that callers had to use tactics to avoid giving their own name,
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supports the claim that a conversational sequence was initiated by the crisis worker. This
might seem benign at first, but when looked at closely, what it reveals is a way of
constraining the speech of the caller.
Excerpt from Sacks’ Work Analyzing Crisis Phone Calls (Sacks, 1989, p. 35)
Example 1
This is Mr. Smith, may I help you
Yes, this is Mr. Brown
Example 2
This is Mr. Smith may help you
I can't hear you
This is Mr. Smith
In this early work, Sacks pointed out two conversational features that would
become central to CA studies. First, he recognized that by being able to speak first, the
crisis worker gains an advantage over the caller. The crisis worker has a certain amount
of freedom to choose how he or she initiates the conversation, but the caller has an
obligation to respond to the crisis worker’s initial utterance. This observation led to the
proposal that the initial utterance by the crisis worker opens up a “slot” into which the
caller has to insert a reply. This coupling of the initial utterance and the reply has become
known as the "adjacency pair" (p. 20). It is a fundamental procedural rule of
conversation. Over the years conversation analysts have found that certain replies are
more preferred than others and that participants can use a number of tactics to avoid
giving the preferred response (Schegloff, 2007). The adjacency pair has become the
fundamental building block of CA's empirical methodology. Each conversational
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sequence can be analyzed as a series of adjacency pairs so as to continually show how the
participants are orienting to previous utterances. This discovery is exactly what Austin
was talking about when he said that utterances require a sequel or response. Require is
the key word because participants have to give some kind of response or end up having to
make excuses for why they changed the subject or did not respond at all.
This leads us to the second discovery that Sacks made in his early study. When
participants do not give the preferred response or there is some breakdown in the
conversation (such as when participants don't hear each other), the participants will make
what has become known as a “repair” (ten Have, 1999, p. 116). In Sacks's initial work he
found that callers used repairs to avoid giving their name (see table 1, line 5). Over the
years conversation analysts have shown the complex ways in which repairs may be
initiated by all the participants in the conversation. For conversation analysts the repair is
of primary importance because it demonstrates how participants are aware of the
conversational sequence even when that sequence begins to break down.
Sacks’ prototypical study introduced many of the core concepts in conversation
analysis. Also, it defined the basic methodological procedures which would guide
research. Sacks’ basic method was to identify a common conversational sequence (in this
case the initial utterances of a crisis call) and then examine all variations that could occur
during the sequence. In most cases researchers might see variations from a common rule
or pattern as anomalies, but Sacks claimed that the divergent examples could be
understood as variations of the sequence. By offering a repair and straying away from the
typical answer/reply sequence participants were actively trying to shape the conversation
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in a way that fit their own needs. Therefore, changes in the sequence became evidence of
the sequence itself. This has now been codified as a core methodological procedure.
Researchers identify sequences they are interested in and then examine how participants
both comply with and disrupt the sequence of interest.
This methodology is an inductive approach to data analysis. Heritage (1988)
argued that by using "inductive search procedures," researchers build a collection of
regularly occurring sequences that the participants orient themselves to (cited in ten
Have, 1999, p. 39). This can be seen as a collection of ‘specimens’ rather than a
collection of ‘facts’ (p. 37). Data from surveys and interviews are seen as facts about the
outside world. This is based on a representational understanding of language and
thinking. On the contrary, conversation analysts hold what is called a radical realist
perspective (Packer, 2011, pp. 204-205). They see each conversational sequence as a
specimen of a real species. As Alasuutari (1995) writes:
Unlike data seen from the factist perspective, a specimen as a form of research
material is not treated as either a statement about or a reflection of reality; instead,
a specimen is seen as part of the reality being studied. Therefore, honesty is the
irrelevant concept to be used in assessing the material. A specimen may be badly
representative of the whole, or it may be technically bad, but he cannot lie. (cited
in ten Have, 1999, p. 38)
This brings us to some of the defining features of ethnomethodology; namely, the
importance of membership and a focus on social interaction as a constitutional process.
Both ethnomethodology and conversation analysis focus on how the world is
constituted by participants. Therefore, there is no search for hidden forces, such as
beliefs, libido, or personality traits, which lie behind social interaction. They are
interested in the practices that the participants themselves use to generate their world.
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These practices are not hidden, but on the surface of day to day life. As Packer (2011)
writes: "Ethnomethodology is about the work of producing a phenomenon and ‘coming
upon’ the phenomenon in and through this work; it is a matter of describing how people
produce and display, how they demonstrate, the local phenomena of order" in everyday
life (p. 193). Hence, recorded conversation is an analyzable specimen of the
constitutional processes that participants use to make sense of themselves, each other, and
the world.
The participants of a conversation orient to each other’s speech as members of a
form of life. In ethnomethodology there are no individuals or subjects, but members who
share competencies that allow them to mutually order their world (p. 195). This principle
is also foundational in conversation analysis. Members are seen as actively interpreting
each other's speech in terms of their mutual competencies and the surrounding context.
The ways that members make sense of each other is displayed in their utterances. These
utterances are best understood as actions in response to actions. These actions are
available to the researcher because she, in a sense, is in the position of a bystander. By
listening and watching, the researcher imagines her own reaction and becomes affected
by the participants’ actions. It is through this active involvement with the data that the
researcher first grasps what is being said. In order for the researcher to achieve this type
of understanding, she must have a certain amount of membership knowledge. The
research process involves members of a form of life who are actively making sense of the
conversational actions. The researcher must attend to her own reactions, while also
attending to the actions of the participants. By documenting both her own reactions and
the actions of the participants, the researcher builds a case of how the participants
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actively reproduce the social order, through actions and tactics visibly displayed.
Conversation analysis can be seen as a rigorous empirical method that attempts to
explicate social interaction from an ethnomethodological perspective. Attention to
conversational sequence allows the empirical study of how members use procedures to
interpret the here-and-now context and actions of their conversational co-participants. As
Goodwin and Heritage (1990) write:
adjacency-pair framework described by conversation analysis is not a description
of statistical regularities in the patterning of action, or a specification of an
internalized rule drives behavior. Instead it describes a procedure through which
participants constrain one another, and hold one another accountable, to produce
coherent and intelligible courses of action….Within this framework of reciprocal
conduct [i.e. adjacency pair organization], action and interpretation are
inextricably intertwined. Each participant must analyze the developing course of
others actions in order to produce appropriate reciprocal action. (pp. 287 - 288)
When something is said the words attain a certain meaning because they are part of a
sequence. The participants are responding to this sequence, which is part of the here-andnow structure of the context. Participants have an active understanding of this context and
perform speech acts that can shift the context. As Goodwin and Heritage described,
speech acts are "context shaped and context renewing" (p. 289). By studying the detail of
conversations captured and transcribed we can follow this act of ordering. In this sense,
conversation analysis and ethnomethodology are interested in constitution. As Packer
argues: "Each person involved in a conversation has their own interpretation of what is
going on, but these interpretations are intersubjective in the sense that every person treats
the adjacent utterances in similar ways. People share an understanding of the ‘game’’
they are engaged in and its ‘order’” (p. 256). In this sense, CA is interested in the
"ontological work accomplished in practical activity" (p. 263). CA takes into account
how reason is a product of practical human activity (Hegel), how understanding and
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interpretation are grounded in practical activity (Heidegger) and how meaning is a result
of an embodied act (Merleau-Ponty). All these forebears find a place in the empirical
methodology of CA.
Context and Subjectivity in Conversation Analysis
Earlier, context was defined as the actions that participants use to constitute the
order of a form of life. Hence, we cannot think of context as a static container inside
which all interactions unfold. “Time and transformation are essential constituents of
context” (C. Goodwin & Heritage, 1990, p. 289). The essential idea is that the actions of
the participants typically renew (or reproduce) context, which implies that even the
renewal is something new, even if nothing seems to be changed. Also, it implies that the
context is never given, that it could always change. Because context as a term is
frequently employed, it can become quite a buzz word. This is because it stands for and
replaces familiar words such as culture, subculture, and environment. In conversation
analysis, context is an encompassing term that refers to the here and now conversational
sequence, institutional setting, participants’ identities, subculture, culture, macro global
politics, and so on.
By studying the organization of adjacency pairs, conversation analysts see all
aspects of social life woven together. For example, identities are intimately woven into
the structure of conversation. As Goodwin and Heritage point out:
The organization of the speaker's action not only provides positions for recipients
within it; it also specifies attributes that should be possessed by a proper
incumbent of that position—i.e. the action embodies a categorization of its
recipient.... some of these categorizations take the form of discourse identities. (p.
293)
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The way we organize our speech positions the participants in the conversation as
therapist/client, officer/civilian, teacher/student and so on. These are identities are
implicitly recognized and taken on, but this does not mean that the roles are stagnant or
the result of lopsided power relations. Instead they are a product of the discourse that is
co-constituted by both participants in light of their particular form of life. Hence, context
is a process of ordering a form of life and this ordering involves the positioning of
participants in relation to one another as certain kinds of people. Interestingly, the idea
that identity is intimately tied up with the overall context leads to the idea that identity is
dispersed across various discursive practices, which aligns with Foucault's understanding
of subjectivity (Packer, 2011).
Pure vs. Applied and Institutional vs. Ordinary
There are two binaries used to describe CA research (ten Have, 1999). The first
binary is institutional conversation versus ordinary conversation. Early on conversation
analysts began to notice was that speech in institutional settings was more constrained
than what one would find in ordinary conversation (ten Have, 1999). Ordinary
conversation can be defined as conversation in everyday settings outside of large-scale
institutions.
Earlier, we looked at Sacks' initial study of calls to a suicide hotline. You will
remember that from the beginning the crisis worker and the caller played a conversational
game where the crisis worker attempted to obtain the caller’s name. This pattern arose
because of certain institutional constraints—the need to get the caller’s name because the
caller was in crisis and possibly a danger to themselves or others. If this was an ordinary
conversation the pattern might not have been so prominent because the initial opening of
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the conversation would have enjoyed a certain amount of freedom. Later, conversation
analysts argued that the fundamental premise, which allows us to study institutional talk,
is that institutional talk is a variation of ordinary conversation (p. 163). This idea was put
forward by Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) in a paper on turn taking. They
described conversational specimens as on a linear array with ordinary conversation at one
extreme and institutionalized conversation at the other. "For it appears likely that
conversation should be considered the basic form of speech exchange system, with other
systems of the array [more constrained institutional talk like ceremonies or debates]
representing a variety of transformations on conversation’s turn taking-system” (quoted
in ten Have, 1999 p. 163).
The second binary is the distinction between pure and applied conversation
analysis. Pure conversation analysis examines interactions as an entity in its own right,
while applied conversation analysis examines how interactions are influenced by, or
maintain, an institution. According to ten Have, applied analysis also includes "CAinspired studies" that attempt to improve social life or to identify and critique social
problems (p. 162). The binaries do overlap, but obviously there are differences. One can
conduct a pure conversation analysis on institutional talk if they are only interested in the
mechanisms of conversation. Likewise, applied analysis can be done on ordinary
conversation if the researcher is interested in, for example, how gender roles are
maintained between a husband and wife in ordinary conversation.
Psychotherapy is certainly a form of institutional talk; however, it is not as
structured as medical interviews, news interviews, or courtroom proceedings (Peräkylä,
Antaki, Vehviläinen, & Leudar, 2008a; Rae, 2008). It would most likely fall somewhere
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in the middle of the array of institutional talk discussed above, depending on what type of
psychotherapy was being practiced.8 Researchers do examine clinical practices with the
sole interest of understanding the conversational mechanisms employed. Sacks' pivotal
study is one such example. However, CA on psychotherapy is largely a form of applied
analysis. Peräkylä and his colleagues (2008b) state that the goal of CA research on
psychotherapy is to “show the embeddedness of psychotherapy in generic interactional
practices having to do with questions, answers, comments and the like and the related
interactional consequences that therapists and their clients employ" (p. 6). Peräkylä states
that all therapeutic schools have "professional stocks of interactional knowledge (SIKs)"
and in order for CA to be relevant to psychotherapy, researchers need to "enter into a
dialogue with the SIKs—extending, specifying or correcting the picture of the direction
given by them" (p. 23). This type of analysis aims to correct or improve the institutional
interaction and therefore it fits ten Have’s definition of applied research.
Schegloff (1997) argues that this kind of applied CA is a preferable alternative to
discourse analysis, which tends to use external variables to make sense of social
interaction. Schegloff claims that any object of study (therapy being one such object) is
always constituted first by the participants, and this original constitutive event should be
our object of study. As he states: "it is those characterizations which are privileged in the
constitution of the socio-interactional reality, and therefore have been a feature claim to
being privileged in efforts to understand it" (pp. 166-167). Therefore, if you start with a
Freudian perspective of unconscious group processes, then you are studying what is
8

There is a vast array of psychotherapy practices. Certainly manualized treatment practices
would be highly institutional whereas collaborative therapies such as narrative analysis might be
quite similar to everyday conversation.
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relevant to you, not the participants. At the very least you should start with CA and then
move on to an academic analysis of that data. This latter step would not be CA because it
“would be grounded in and answerable to concerns extrinsic to the interaction,” but it
would be grounded in what is important to the participants (Schegloff, 1998, p. 415). By
grounding research in conversation analysis and then interpreting the findings based on
certain interests of the researcher, we limit the risk of leaving behind the constitutive act
of interaction for our academic interests.
Before we begin looking at CA research on psychotherapy it may be helpful to
review the difficulties that researchers face when they attempt to apply analysis on
institutional talk. One of ten Have's research interests is medical interviews (ten Have,
1999). He notes that findings from many studies on institutional talk have found that the
turn taking systems are pre-established, allocating prescribed turns to the institutional
agents and the other participants (p. 166). In other words, in medical interviews,
courtroom interviews, and so on, the institutional agent is given the right to ask questions
and the other participants (client, defendant interviewee) are expected to provide answers.
Ten Have points out that many researchers looking at medical interviews have attributed
this turn allocation to institutional power. Yet, he warns that by quickly jumping to the
conclusion that it is institutional power that creates the pre-allocation of turns, one begins
to interject assumed external factors (e.g. power) that are not present in the conversation.
Here we have an example of researchers who assume that the social structure influences
a conversational structure. However, as ten Have points out: "the distributional fact that
doctors ask patients more questions than patients ask doctors can be discussed in
institutional terms, as an aspect of ‘professional dominance’… but it can also be analyzed
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in terms of the overall sequential organization of the encounter" (p. 167). Medical
interviews can be viewed simply as "a request for assistance" (p. 167). This creates a
“request/service” adjacency pair that can be lengthened by a number of insertion
sequences, which are used to gain diagnostic information. Ten Have concludes by stating
that: "The questioning of patients by doctors….would be…an issue not of turn-type
preallocation, but rather of a sequential-organizational…of institutional activity
allocation" (p. 167).
The move to interpret the sequence of medical interviews as a result of
professional dominance is not improper in itself. However, this example points out how
easy it is to neglect important conversational features, which would then shift the
researcher’s interpretation in important ways. It is a reminder that CA moves slowly and
methodically before reaching the interpretive phase where the researcher can confidently
began to ask her own research questions based on the conversation analytic examination
of the data.
Conversation Analytic Research on Psychotherapy: The Beginnings
Many studies predating CA have focused on the interaction that occurs in
psychotherapy. Peräkylä, Antaki, Vehviläinen, and Leudar (2008a) point out that case
reports, such as those made famous by Freud, attend to the interactions that occur in
psychotherapy. However, as we all know, case studies summarize hundreds of sessions
and are reliant on the memory and personality of the therapist. Researchers interested in
clinical interaction began to move away from the case report in the 1950s. It was during
this time that a handful of pivotal studies emerged. These researchers employed linguistic
analysis to psychotherapy while also attending to the therapeutic importance of
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interaction. However, Peräkylä et al. distinguishes these early studies from CA in that CA
focuses on the “sequentiality of social action" (p. 13).
For example, an early study conducted by the linguist Charles Hockett and
psychiatrists Pitterger and Daheny (1960) examined the first five minutes of therapy
sessions, between patients and a psychiatrist. Analyzing audio recordings of the sessions
the researchers examined lexical choice and grammatical passivity as clues to implicit
meaning of the utterances. Yet, the claims were not systematic and analysis had little to
do with the coordinated sequence of utterances between the patient and therapist
(Peräkylä et al., 2008a p. 8).
More in line with conversation analysis, William Labov, a linguist, and David
Fanshel, a social worker, (1977) performed a detailed analysis of a 15 minute therapy
segment between a psychodynamic practitioner and an anorexic patient. They conducted
a detailed analysis that looked at actions that utterances perform such as "meta-linguistic
action (initiating, continuing, or ending action), representation, request, and challenge"
(Peräkylä et al., 2008a, p. 9). One major finding indicated that the client creates what can
be described as “resistance” by avoiding direct discussion of the problem (Labov &
Fanshel, 1977, p. 334). This turns out to be, in part, an avoidance of emotion (p. 341).9
Labov then goes on to describe how the therapist uses “factual contradictions” and
“emotional displays” as sources of therapeutic insights, where as the client uses the close
connections of topics, “interpretation”, and “direct suggestion” as sources of insight (pp.
337-345).

9

This aligns with the analysis and findings discussed in chapters 5, 6, and 7.
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However, what has been most influential for conversation analysts studying
psychotherapy has been the distinction between what Labov called A-events and Bevents (Peräkylä et al., 2008a). A type A-event is a representation of the speaker’s past,
such as narratives and commentary about biographical events. As Labov (1977) states:
“[the client] has privileged access to these events and can deal with them as an expert
without fear of contradiction” (p. 62). A B-event is different. It is a “description of a
matter in another speaker’s experience, and the speaker thereby has limited access to
it”(Peräkylä et al., 2008a, p. 10). Elsewhere Peräkylä and Silverman (1991) have shown
how the ownership of experience affects sequential organization and turn taking rights.
For example, “participants, in orienting to the owner's privileged right to response, can
also make use of this right, in order to manage the interactional contingencies and
sensitivities related to the issues addressed in the sessions” (p. 466). In psychotherapy,
the client is expected to produce A-event utterances, while the therapist responds with
questions, reflective statements and interpretations. Hence, unlike ordinary conversation,
only one participant (the client) produces A-event statements and this greatly affects the
sequential organization of the therapeutic conversation. However, as Labov (1977) points
out: “The therapeutic session is designed to produce a great deal of talk” which leads to
an accumulation of shared experience that both participants have access to (p. 122).
Utterances concerning shared experience are called “AB-events” and they accumulate
quickly as the therapist learns more and more about the patient’s experience and have
greater access to the patient’s biography (p. 122). The importance of this distinction will
be discussed in the next section dealing with formulations in psychotherapy.
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The impact of Labov’s study cannot be understated, and yet Peräkylä et al.
(2008a) points out that much like The First Five Minutes, Labov did not "seek to offer a
systematic view of recurrent practices in psychotherapy" and the conclusions were very
abstract (p. 10). According to Peräkylä et al., the study that really bridges the gap
between linguistic analysis and conversation analysis was conducted by Kathleen Warden
Ferrara. In Therapeutic Way with Words Ferrara (1994) analyzed 40 hours of therapy
sessions between six different therapists (cited in Peräkylä et al., 2008a) . She identified
"recurrent discourse strategies" such as certain narration techniques and repetition of
different types of talk (p. 10). This study attempts to produce a systematic account of
recurrent patterns in psychotherapy, which Peräkylä et al. consider to be the goal of CA.
However, again, the Ferrara study, like the other linguistic analyses, only paid limited
attention to the sequential organization of conversation.
Many conversation analysts researching psychotherapy attempt to identify the
predominant conversational structure in psychotherapy and then interpret how that
structure affects the client therapeutically (Antaki, 2008; Antaki, Barnes, & Leudar,
2005; Bercelli, Rossano, & Viaro, 2008; Peräkylä, 2004, 2005, 2008; Vehviläinen, 2008).
Peräkylä et al. (2008a) states that conversation analysts describe how conversational
actions are used for therapeutic ends. Hence, applied CA on psychotherapy assumes "a
distinction between action, local consequence, and therapeutic function" (p. 189). The
action has to do with the sequential structure of the talk, the local consequence describes
the immediate effect of the talk, and the therapeutic function refers to the overarching
goals of the therapy. Vehviläinen, Peräkylä, Antaki and Leudar (2008) state: "what we
mean by action can be conceived as moving a piece in a chess game, while local
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consequence can be conceived as the move’s contributing to the overall tactic, and
therapeutic function as the move’s contribution to the overall strategy" (p. 189). In other
words, they are interested in understanding how certain forms of talk are connected with
certain therapeutic strategies. By mapping the overall structure of the therapeutic
conversation, researchers identify effective tactics and connect those tactics with
overarching institutional goals.
For example, summarizing the research compiled in Conversation Analysis and
Psychotherapy, Vehviläinen et al. (2008) listed numerous therapeutic actions, which were
all correlated with “possible therapeutic functions” (p. 191).10 This process of correlating
conversational interactions with therapeutic functions has been put proposed as an
important way for CA to be relevant to psychotherapy (Peräkylä et al., 2008a, p. 22).
According to Peräkylä et al., each therapeutic school has its own theory about therapeutic
interaction. As mentioned previously, these have been referred to as professional stocks
of interactional knowledge (SIKs). Hence, in order for conversation analysis to be
relevant to psychotherapy, CA research needs to "enter into a dialogue with the SIKs-extending, specifying or correcting the picture of the direction given by them" (p. 23).
This description of CA research on psychotherapy has been echoed elsewhere.
Forrester and Reason (2006) summarize conversation analysts’ interest in psychotherapy
as threefold. First, to examine it as an institutional interaction like conversation analysts
have done with news interviews and medical interviews. Second, to translate
10

The therapeutic actions are as follows: lexical substitution, extension, formulation,
reinterpreted statement, optimistic questions, follow-up question using zero person, answers that
resist the question presuppositions, defensive responses to topicalizations of prior action,
elaboration, and extended agreements.
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psychotherapeutic terms into conversation analytic terms. And third, correcting
therapeutic theories that are used in the practice of psychotherapy (p. 44). This is similar
to McGee, Del Vento, and Bavelas (2005) who state that conversation analysis “can help
to identify possible discrepancies between theories of what happens and what we can
observe when therapists and clients do therapy” (p. 382). Again, we see that researchers
are using conversation analysis to correct psychotherapeutic theory. However, McGee et
al. see conversation analysis lending empirical support to larger theories about human
life. They state: “We are proposing an empirical approach to social construction in which
the process of construction is examined in the details of the interaction.” (p. 382).
In sum, all these authors describe CA research on psychotherapy as applied
research. The goal of this type of research is to understand, refine, and critique the
institutional practice of psychotherapy. It can be distinguished from pure analysis of
institutional talk such as Harvey Sacks’ examination of group psychotherapy (Sacks,
1992a). There, Sacks produced a detailed analysis of the interactions between teenagers
and their group therapist, but his interest was uncovering the machinery of conversation,
not understanding or critiquing psychotherapy.
Applied Conversation Analysis on Psychotherapy
So the question remains: How does one actually conduct an applied analysis of
institutional talk? Heritage (1998) advises that applied CA of institutional interactions
should attend to how the conversation is constrained by the institution. He states that by
examining turn taking organization, overall structural organization of the interaction, the
sequence organization, turn design, lexical choice, and epistemological or other forms of
asymmetry, analysts will find examples of institutional constraints. For example, turn
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taking is "the construction of turns, pauses, overlaps, etc" (ten Have, 1999, p. 104). In
ordinary conversation participants enjoy a certain amount of freedom in negotiating their
turn taking. Both participants can easily ask questions and provide answers for each other
depending on the nature of the conversation. But as Heritage (1998) points out, when we
look at institutional interactions such as news interviews, the turn taking becomes highly
regimented. The news anchor is expected to ask questions of his interviewees who
provide answers. The conversation follows a question/response sequence, and if there is a
disturbance in the sequence, the participants offer repairs pointing toward the fact that
there is a disturbance in the conversational order. For example, an interviewee will
apologize after asking the news anchor a question because this is an institutional privilege
granted to the news anchor and not the guest.
By examining the turn taking pattern in the example above, Heritage is simply
doing pure conversation analysis similar to the works of Schegloff and Sacks. His
analysis turns into applied research when he begins to interpret why these regimented
patterns occur. His explanation for the turn taking system found in news interviews is that
it has a practical purpose. He explains that the turn taking system helps the interviewer
control the interview, giving the audience a clear understanding of the issues and also to
help inexperienced interviewees answer questions. Furthermore, it allows the anchor to
keep experienced politicians and pundits from using the news as their soapbox. Here we
can see that Heritage has made a functional analysis of the institutional talk (p. 15). Later
in the article he discusses how the notion of the news anchor neutrality actually
constrains both the interviewees (they are not allowed to ask the anchor questions) and
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the anchor (any utterance that seems personal can be called into question by the
interviewees).
Most CA on psychotherapy follows a pattern similar to the example above. For
example, Peräkylä (2010) conducted a study examining the adjacency pairs that occur
during sequences involving interpretation. He examined how psychoanalytic
interpretation can be seen as a three step process. First, the analyst makes an
interpretation of the client’s behavior, symptoms, or dreams. Next, the client responds to
the interpretation by extending what the analyst said or simply by disagreeing. Last, the
analyst makes a third response, replying back to the client. By studying these sequential
patterns and comparing them across therapies, Peräkylä found that the "third interpretive
turn” has two basic effects: "one is towards showing that the patient's experience is
emotionally more intensive than what the patient indicated in the elaboration, and the
other towards showing that the patient's experience has more layers in it” (italics in the
original, p. 18). Hence, by examining the adjacency pairs, Peräkylä was analyzing the
sequential organization as discussed above by Heritage. This type of research attends to
the local level organization, which is the way in which conversational objects are
organized by the sequence of the adjacency pairs, rather than larger sequencing structures
such as the ending of the overall topic of conversation (ten Have, 1999, p. 21). After the
sequential organization was identified as a reoccurring pattern, Peräkylä went on to
interpret how this action contributes to the overall strategy of therapy: making therapy
more emotionally intense.
Sequential organization is a central interest of many conversation analysts
studying psychotherapy. Researchers working with a variety of therapeutic approaches all
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point to the power of conversational sequence as central to the practice of therapy.
Charles Antaki (2008) has pointed out that therapists can respond to a client's turn by
using challenges, corrections, extensions, reinterpreted statements, and formulations.11
All of these are attempts to grasp what the client has said while also making subtle, or
not-so-subtle changes in the original utterance. Of these, Antaki has paid particular
attention to formulations (Antaki, 2008; Antaki et al., 2005; Antaki, Barnes, & Leudar,
2007).
The formulation has a long history in conversation analysis. It was first
introduced by Garfinkel and Sacks (1970), who were interested in how participants
comment on what is happening between them and make certain ways of interacting
explicit. Meta-comments such as: ‘I knew you would not understand’ or, ‘you got me, I
was trying to cheat,’ are “public display[s] of agreed intersubjectivity, a kind of
sociological glue” (Antaki, 2008, p. 31). Later, Heritage and Watson (1979) broadened
the definition to include all utterances used to comment on what was being said and done
during an interaction (Antaki, 2008). Formulations are common in psychotherapy and fall
into the AB-events class as described by Labov (Labov & Fanshel, 1977).
During my training I was taught to use reflective statements, which are an
important type of formulation. The reflective statement is used to ‘reflect’ back what the
client has said. The therapist might say: "So you're saying that you were upset at your
mother because she was not attending to your needs." Yet, conversation analysts point
11

Antaki and other researchers like Bercelli et al. (2008) often use the term reinterpretation
instead of interpretation. These two terms in many ways seem synonymous, but they insist on
using different terms because interpretation is thought to apply only to psychoanalytic or
psychodynamic therapies. This distinction is confusing and seems to me to be a product of old
antagonisms, rather than a necessary empirical distinction.
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out that the formulation is no mere reflection. It uses "local editing" to change what was
previously said or add a different emphasis (Antaki, 2008, p. 33). Formulations have been
found to be used quite regularly in institutional talk such as radio talk shows and news
interviews (p. 34). Therapists offer formulations to convey that they are listening and
they understand the client’s story. Even though formulations seem non-coercive and
benign, the sequential power can exert a lot of influence on to the client. Antaki states
that this is not simply because formulations modify the client's original utterance: "I
already mentioned the power of the formulation to delete, select, and transform, but now
let me emphasize what Heritage and Watson identified as its sequential power -- its
projection of agreement" (p. 31). Antaki argues that formulations have a constraining
effect on the following utterance, encouraging the client to agree with the therapist. This
occurs because the formulation is designed as an accurate summary of what was said and
hence there is an assumption of agreement between the participants. It is expected that
the utterance that follows the formulation will reaffirm this agreement. In other words,
agreement is the preferred response12 in a formulation adjacency pair.
In CA, the observation that different types of conversational sequences have
preferred responses referred to as “preference organization” (ten Have, 1999, p. 120).
One can respond to an utterance in various ways, but depending on how the utterance was
formed (turn shape), there are preferred and dis-preferred responses. Formulations are
designed as a gloss of what the client has said to the therapist. Hence, formulations
comment on a shared experience. The therapist and the client both have access to or
12

Preference is not a matter of what an individual wants, but the norms built into conversation. It
means that extra work has to be done in order to make a non-preferred response.
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“ownership” of the experience and therefore it is hard for the client to flat out disagree.
Again, this type of utterance is what Labov referred as an “AB-event.” It is designed as a
statement of what has happened between participants. Yet, formulations in psychotherapy
also concern the client’s personal experience. It is a ‘reflection’ of what the client thinks
and feels and therefore the formulation acts to modify the account of the client based on
the local editing done by the therapist.
Hence, formulations occur in both ordinary and institutional talk, but in
psychotherapy the formulation is used strategically to enact therapeutic change. Antaki's
work has shown how the sequential power of formulations project agreement even when
one is actually modifying what was previously said. By focusing on the sequential
organization, conversation analysts have been able to demonstrate how ordinary
conversational mechanisms are used in therapy.
Today, focus on sequential organization is being directed toward different types
of utterance used in psychotherapy. There is not enough time or space to discuss all this
research here. However, the reinterpretation, or interpretation, is central to this research
project and therefore demands some attention. According to Bercelli et al. (2008),
reinterpretations can be distinguished from formulations. Reinterpretations are a way of
addressing material that the client is familiar with, but the utterance is framed as coming
from the therapist’s perspective. Bercelli et al. differentiates between formulation and
reinterpretation by stating that the therapist's reinterpretation displays an "independency"
from the perspective of the client (p. 48). These two types of utterances can be further
distinguished by their sequence and design elements. Formulations are marked by phrases
such as "you mean, you say, you told me" (p. 47). Reinterpretations can be identified by
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their epistemic markers (“I think,” “it is clear to me”) signifying that the statement
derives from the therapist's understanding (p. 49). However, they can also be marked by
neutral figures of speech (“it seems,” “all things considered”).
Being able to distinguish between formulation and reinterpretation is helpful.
Bercelli et al. demonstrates how formulation is often used to create agreed-upon material
that can be brought up later and utilized by both the therapist and client (p. 48). Bercelli
et al. admits that formulation and reinterpretation are not universally distinct categories
and that it is difficult at times to distinguish between the two. However, beyond the
epistemic markers that distinguish them, reinterpretation is often followed by an extended
agreement or disagreement where the client offers her own understanding of the
therapist’s statement. It is this kind of interaction that I am most interested in, not as a
means of identifying a universal adjacency pair, but as the site where the therapeutic
problem is being worked on and actively constituted by both the therapist and the client.
Bercelli et al. lists various ways that reinterpretation can be extended, beginning with the
most minimal extension: acknowledgment tokens (p. 51). These are "neutral or
uncommitted responses" that can be offered when the client, for whatever reason, is not
inclined to offer a strong agreement or disagreement with the therapist’s statement (p.
51). The client can also extend their agreements from acknowledgment tokens to mere
agreements, agreements with descriptions, and qualified agreements. Here Bercelli et al.
have noted that:
through their responses to reinterpretations, clients can display a change of
perspective on their own events and experiences, and display it as triggered by the
therapist’s utterances. Such changes are, quite obviously, precious stuff in
psychotherapy, especially when manifestly triggered by the therapist’s
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interventions. Indeed, one of the institutional tasks of the therapist's action is to
facilitate such changes. (p. 60)
In other words, change in psychotherapy occurs intersubjectively; it is a collaborative act
of constitution—something that we will attend to in greater detail later on.
However, now I would like to discuss in more detail the CA research on
interpretation. This research, in many ways, ties interpretation, collaboration and
resistance together. It is my perspective that the research being done on interpretation
brings to light a central aspect of psychotherapy that we are only now just beginning to
understand. It is truly the “precious stuff in psychotherapy.”
Interpretation, Collaboration and Resistance
This focus on sequential organization has often resulted in an exploration of
collaboration and resistance. It is no wonder that conversation analysts have found
collaboration to be a central element of psychotherapy. Remember, that one of the basic
assumptions and findings across conversation analysis is that reality is being
collaboratively constituted through interaction (C. Goodwin & Heritage, 1990; Heritage,
1998; Packer, 2011; Sacks, 1989; Schegloff, 1997; ten Have, 1999). Therefore, studies
have consistently found collaboration unfolding in almost every aspect of psychotherapy.
McGee et al. (2005) found that questions can be seen as interventions because they
constrain "the recipient to answer within a framework of presuppositions set by the
question” (p. 371). Again this is a focus on the sequential organization of the adjacency
pairs; the way in which questions about pathology lead to responses about pathology or
questions about health lead to answers about health. McGee et al. defined this as
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collaborative because both the therapist and the client have a hand in the construction of
the content of the talk.
Collaboration and resistance are often paired together as a binary, with
collaboration held up as therapeutically positive. A study by MacMartin (2008) looked at
how client’s resist optimistic questions by giving answer-like responses, and nonanswers. Answer-like responses are downgrades such as joking or refocusing, whereas
non-answers are complaints or flat out refusals to answer. In the face of this resistance,
therapists respond, most of the time, by recycling the question and reincorporating some
of the new material that came out of the client's response. These sequences lead to more
nuanced utterances that incorporate both the therapists’ and patients’ previously spoken
material. If, however, the therapist sticks to her original statement, the interaction usually
becomes stifled. A number of other studies also found that therapists tend to align with
the client when they face resistance (Lepper & Mergenthaler, 2007; Madill, Widdicombe,
& Barkham, 2001; Saladin & Grimmer, 2009; Viklund, Holmqvist, & Nelson, 2010).
Madill, Widdicombe, and Barkham (2001) found that resistance can be
understood at the level of interaction as a set of strategies that attempts to negate the prior
turn. These strategies "include reasserting or revising the prior case, non-uptake of
aspects of a prior turn, managing and rejecting topic shifts, and the withdrawal of
cooperation" (p. 429). Their research led them to make two basic claims about resistance:
first, the client and the therapist have different perspectives about the central therapeutic
problem, and if these perspectives cannot be reconciled the therapy will deteriorate.13
13

The difficultly of the problem of “negotiation” has also been discussed elsewhere by Antaki,
Barnes, and Leudar, (2004) and will be relevant during the forthcoming chapters (p. 136).
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Second, that simply by pointing out resistance as defensive the therapist might be
damaging the therapy. Here we can see that they are using their detailed study of
therapeutic interaction to make claims about how we can make therapy more successful.
As she states quite eloquently:
Successful therapy may rest on the client complying with the therapist’s topic
shifts or else on the therapist abandoning protocol in the face of the client’s
continued opposition. This, in turn, requires sensitivity to the strategies through
which the client and therapist may try to resist the other’s projects. Conversation
analysis provides a way of identifying such strategies and therefore of sensitizing
the therapist to their use and role in therapy. (p. 431)
In order to make this claim, Madill et al. appealed to how their own research was
in line with many other studies, both quantitative and qualitative, on therapeutic
resistance, alliance, and positive therapeutic outcomes (Bergin & Garfield, 1994; Bohart
& Tallman, 1999; Kazdin, 2009; Lepper & Mergenthaler, 2007; Muntigl & Horvath,
2005; Orlinsky et al., 2004; Saladin & Grimmer, 2009; Streeck, 2008; Viklund et al.,
2010; Voutilainen, Peräkylä, & Ruusuvuori, 2010; Wynn & Wynn, 2006). Tying
traditional psychotherapy therapeutic alliance and outcome research to conversation
analysis can also be seen in the work of Kozart (1996) who “suggests that ‘collaboration’
in psychotherapy consists of methods that establish an impression of common sense
between patient and therapist” (p. 361). Like Madill et al., Kozart has shown how this
‘common sense’ is constructed interactionally.
Researchers who have studied interpretation also focus on collaboration and
resistance. However, they tend to have a more complex understanding of resistance.
Remember that conversation analysis typically refers to interpretation as a specialized
practice unique to psychoanalysis and psychodynamic therapy (Peräkylä, 2004).
Vehviläinen (2008) has stated that CA research lines up with psychoanalytic theory quite
80

well. When studying interpretation he has found that psychoanalysts do preparatory
work, which builds a foundation upon which the interpretation is made. This preparatory
work usually focuses on areas of resistance as classically understood in a psychoanalytic
theory. "The analyst, in response to something the client has said and using a formulation
and a noticing statement, topicalizes the client's action" (p. 126). This idea of "noticing,"
which was first put forward by Harvey Sacks (1992b), refers to how a speaker can
comment on experience that both parties have access to (cited in Vehviläinen, 2008, p.
123). Therapists make comments (“noticings”) on how their clients are late, fall into long
silences, change the subject, or make slips of the tongue. In psychoanalytic theory these
behaviors are thought to be signs of resistance to the therapeutic work. The therapist
comments on these behaviors, using his turn to make a "complaint" (p. 145). However,
the complaint calls for a response and the client is free to agree, disagree, or elaborate. As
Vehviläinen describes, this is a way of encouraging the client to think about herself as a
kind of puzzle:
The analyst does preparatory work to create the relevance, and an interactional
"slot," for the interpretation, thereby co-constructing it with the client.
Connections and contradictions in the associated materials, pointed out by the
analyst, provide puzzles: noteworthy, enigmatic issues calling for exploration and
explanation. (pp. 121-122)
When these puzzles are offered by the therapist, the client typically accounts for her
action. Interestingly, these accounts are also actions that are available for both the client
and the therapist and therefore they provoke further noticings by the therapist. If the
client is resistant toward accepting the analytic puzzle, then the therapist and the client
engage in a sequence that is argumentative. However, if “the client collaborates and
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aligns with the analyst’s invitation to treat her own action as a puzzle to explore, free
association or self reflection follows" (p. 137).
Here we can see the similarities between the collaboration and resistance research
I mentioned above. Vehviläinen’s research shows how clients continue to resist topics
introduced by the therapist, or offer preferred responses. This type of resistance is usually
considered to be negative and indicative of a weak alliance and poor therapeutic
outcomes (Voutilainen et al., 2010; Wynn & Wynn, 2006). Some interactional outcome
research outside of CA paints a more complex picture, showing that it is not the ability of
the dyad (client and therapist) to change topics that is important, but the ability of the
dyad to follow the topic changes at least for a period of time (Tracey & Ray, 1984, p. 24).
Furthermore, as stated before, resistance in psychoanalysis is complex. First, it is
recognized and pointed out by the therapist using formulations, noticings, and why
statements14—this is an institutional way of seeing the client’s action. This preparatory
work then creates a puzzle that is offered for both the client and the therapist to consider.
Here the client can resist this puzzle or accept it. This latter form of ‘resistance’ is what is
conventionally studied by conversation analysis.
Vehviläinen (2003) has stated that all this preparatory work and the interpretation
that follows is part of the "interpretive trajectory" (p. 573). In a nutshell, this preparatory
work can be seen as creating "relevance" for the interpretation, which functions, as
Vehviläinen has stated, "as an explanation, which attends to the accountability or the
puzzle established in the prior talk" (p. 580). Obviously, the interpretation does not end
14

“Why were you late?””
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the conversation. As we have seen with Peräkylä's work (2010) on the interpretive third
turn, both the client and the therapist continue to rework the interpretation even after it is
initially offered by the therapist.
Interpretation Sequence and Client Elaboration
Most of Peräkylä's work has also been on interpretation and he has come to some
interesting conclusions. First, Peräkylä (2005) has shown that interpretation cannot be
thought of as a single utterance. Rather, what we see occurring is the construction of
"multiple unit organization of interpretations" where both the analyst and the patient
create new therapeutic objects (p. 173). As he states:
The analysts actively pursue extended responses to their interpretations and in
doing so are informed by the patient's initial responses. Interpretation is often not
one entity, but consists of a series of attempts by the analyst to elicit a response
from the patient (p. 175).
In other words, Peräkylä has found that analysts actively seek to extend the elaborations
of their clients. Analysts reply to their patient’s responses in ways that solicit further
elaboration beyond minimal agreement with the initial interpretation. This can be done
through the use of silence, asking the client to "reveal what is in his mind," or offering a
"formulation of the patient's actions as problem-indicative" (e.g. “you don't sound
excited") (p. 166). Also, analysts simply offer their own elaboration on the client’s
response to their initial interpretation. Peräkylä states that based on the research
"elaborations appear to be the kind of responses" that analysts seek (p. 168).
Hence, it is not enough for the client to simply hear the interpretation, have it
wash over them, and produce some kind of effect. Interpretations are not blunt
instruments designed to make an impact. Rather, they are strategic devices designed to
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elicit a response. While studying interpretive interactions Peräkylä found that clients
respond to interpretations in three different ways: (1) by offering acknowledgment
tokens, (2) by "expressing their attitude towards interpretation in a compact form" such
as clear disagreement, showing skepticism, or simply showing that they are thinking
about interpretation ("wonder if it could be like that"), (3) by offering elaborations which
display agreement with the interpretation, and yet the content of the elaboration can differ
substantially from the interpretation itself (italics in the original, pp. 164-165). The
client’s elaboration can "involve different degrees of discontinuity with the initial
interpretations" (p. 168). For example, Peräkylä shows how a client makes a "distinct
topical shift" from the "dynamics of the patient's inner world," as suggested by the
analyst to more mundane complaints about his parent’s inability to fulfill their prescribed
gender roles (p. 171). Many times analysts elaborate on these topical shifts in ways that
are divergent with the original interpretation. Hence, Peräkylä’s work relies on the
research previously cited that examines how the client and therapist initiate and follow
topic changes. This focus on collaboration and resistance is common in CA research on
psychotherapy. However, Peräkylä goes beyond collaboration and resistance and uses his
findings to critique the stock interactional knowledge of psychotherapy.
Peräkylä argues that CA provides empirical support for the interactional
understanding of interpretation, rather than the traditional notion that interpretation is
aimed at making the unconscious conscious. The interactionist perspective holds that
“interpretation does not lead so much to the patient discovering something, but to the
patient and the analyst together creating new ways of understanding and experiencing.
Here, the psychoanalytic process is understood as a thoroughly interpersonal one,” where
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the goal is, “joint creation of [a] new reality” (pp. 163 & 174). Hence, according to
Peräkylä’s research, interpretation is designed to elicit an elaboration sequence where the
client and the therapist constitute the ‘reality’ of the therapeutic problem. This new reality
is not a continuous one-sided production, but an elaboration between two participants
with somewhat divergent points of view.
This is in line with many of the theorists in the relational school of
psychoanalysis. Peräkylä (2008) cites Donald Stern’s concept of a "mutual penetration of
minds” where there is a "moment of meeting” which is followed by convergence of the
perspectives displayed in the participant’s talk (p. 114). Although there is no evidence for
dramatic change in the participants’ ways of relating to each other, Peräkylä has found
brief moments where the participants’ perspectives touch one another and then move
away along divergent paths. For example, clients and therapists have been observed using
extensions (adding more and more to the story) to create a kind of intersubjectivity where
both the client and the therapist are responding to "expressions of mind" (p. 115).
Peräkylä describes this as a “complementarity of actions” (p. 118). Yet, this
complementarity ends when, for example, a therapist shifts his comments from talking
about other people to talking about the client herself. This is followed by a long period of
silence and an argumentative sequence that is quite different from the complementarity of
the talk that the two participated in previously.
The divergence between the client and the therapist can be overt or subtle,
depending on the design of the conversational turns. Peräkylä has shown how a client can
extend the therapist's interpretation with language that suggests that the client is neither
simply clarifying what the analyst was saying, nor fully endorsing it as her own
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experience. For example, Peräkylä examined an exchange where the therapist’s is trying
to show how a dream signifies the client’s fear of death. In response to the therapist
elaboration, the client says: "So that I fight fiercely against that?" referring to her
attempts to avoid thinking about death (p. 117). Now, the client could have said: "do you
mean that I fight fiercely against that?" which would be a clear attempt at clarifying what
the analyst meant, distancing herself from the interpretation, but she did not. The turn
initiator: "so that" indicates that her comments are about understanding what the analyst
has said, yet the utterance seems to endorse the analyst’s perspective at least in part.
Peräkylä points out that the entire sequence can be seen as an insertion sequence where
the client works to clarify what the analyst meant when he said "in the shape of death."
The analyst does not clarify his utterance by directly saying "I mean that;" rather he
extends his description and the description of the client and collaboratively constitutes the
meaning of previous comment.
In sum, Peräkylä’s work explicates how interpretation is an interactional practice
that serves an institutional function. Peräkylä (2004) states that interpretation deals with
three different temporal orders: "other" involving current or recent past, "transference"
involving here and now, and "parent involving usually the distant past." (p. 292).15 It is
the job of the therapist to make links between these temporal orders even though the
patient is usually not ready to see these links. This link of temporal orders is the central
difficulty that multi-unit interpretation and the interpretive trajectory attempt to address.
Therefore, interpretation, states Peräkylä, is the central institutional act of psychoanalysis.

15

Based on David Malan’s interpretative triangle (Malan, 1979).
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This task is achieved because the interpretation calls for elaboration by the client. This
elaboration process involves both the therapist and the client, and requires them to
collaboratively constitute the therapeutic problem. Hence, interpretation is an invitation
for further interpretation by both the client and the therapist.
Methodological Possibilities and Limitations
CA is a promising tool that sheds light on the working mechanism of
psychotherapy, but, as Peräkylä et al. (2008a) admit, conversation analysts have struggled
to identify an overarching structure in psychotherapy. Conversation analysts are not sure
why identifying a structure in psychotherapy has proven to be so difficult. Possibly it is
because the field of research is so new or because psychotherapy is a diverse field of
practices, making it impossible to identify one single structure (p. 22). It seems logical
that psychotherapy would function like many other institutional discourses. Peräkylä et
al. frequently compare psychotherapy to medical consultation, which has been heavily
studied by conversation analysis. Medical consultation proved to be highly structured and
this allowed conversation analysts to make claims about the function of the structure and
its direct ties to institutional medicine. For example, conversation analysts have been able
to show how both doctors and patients expect the medical consultation to proceed
"through a number of distinct phases: opening, presenting complaint, examination,
diagnosis, treatment, and closing" (p .17).
But psychotherapy has not been as cooperative. So far, conversation analysts
"have investigated separate practices without gaining much understanding about the ways
in which different practices are related to each other so as to produce a psychotherapeutic
session as whole" (p. 22). For example, at the end of Conversation Analysis and
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Psychotherapy, Vehviläinen et al. (2008) identifies the different types of utterances used
by both the therapist and client and how they relate to certain therapeutic functions.
Again, this is a way of using conversation analysis to refine or critique the stock
interactional knowledge of psychotherapy. In other words, conversation analysts have
been able to identify various tactics and then argue for how these tactics fit into larger
institutional strategies. However, few have taken the further step and used conversation
analysis to explicate the inherent institutional strategy as it unfolds within a given
specimen of psychotherapy.
I contend that this only furthers the fragmented nature of psychotherapy.
Although it is worthwhile to identify how certain types of talk serve certain therapeutic
functions, there are other ways that conversation analysis can interpret psychotherapy so
as to produce a more coherent depiction of its aims. Namely, conversation analysts would
profit by focusing on how psychotherapy works as a constitutive practice. By focusing on
constitution, researchers can examine psychotherapy as a process through which the
client and her world fundamentally changes. In some ways, by focusing mainly on how
therapeutic interaction correlates with therapeutic function, conversation analysis moves
backwards not forwards. I understand that this type of analysis is helpful in many ways.
As a therapist I realize that we often do not know how our interactions serve the goals of
therapy. But, by focusing on therapeutic functions, we learn nothing about psychotherapy
that is all that new. We gain competency over our practices, how they work at a minute
and detailed level, but we do not learn how psychotherapy changes people. We are
interested in people: the people that our clients hope to become through the process of
therapy. This is what constitution as a guiding research framework allows us to examine.
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In the next chapter the methodology for conducting constitutional research will be
described. CA will be the core methodological approach. However, if CA is going to be
used to study constitution, there are a few changes that need to be made. First,
conversation analysts have avoided explicitly studying how emotion factors into human
interaction. There are exceptions. Most recently, Goodwin and Goodwin (1999), as well
as Sandlund (2004) have used CA analysis to study emotion. In the next chapter, their
work will be examined and their insights, as well as their limitations, will be used to
construct a methodology capable of understanding both conversation and emotion as
forms of human action. This requires a theory of emotion that holds similar ontological
assumptions about language and human interaction. The Structural Theory of Emotion
developed by de Rivera is such a theory. By incorporating the Structural Theory of
Emotion into conversation analysis, emotion can be understood as a visible transaction
that is used as part of an overall constitutional strategy. This ability to examine emotion
from an interactional standpoint will prove pivotal during the analysis.
The second limitation of CA that needs to be addressed is the reluctance of
conversation analysts to examine how conversational practices constitute people as
certain kinds of subjects. This is a result of the traditional focus of pure CA as an
empirical methodology aimed at explicating the mechanics of both everyday and
institutional conversation. Applied studies have expanded the scope of CA, but there is an
overall conservatism when it comes to interpreting how power, gender relations,
hegemony and so on can be understood in light of conversation analytic findings. Neill
Korobov’s (2001) positioning analysis, which originates out of narrative studies, can be
used to study subjectivity. He writes in positioning analysis, “identity is seen as the local,
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or ‘ethno’-ways in which talk is used in interactive contexts to evince the local display of
perspective, or the positioning of self vis-à-vis the other, and vice-versa” (p. 9).
Examining this way of positioning oneself as a character within a story, as well as
positioning oneself vis-à-vis the other participant will prove to be important during the
analysis. In order to ensure that we are on strong methodological footing I will use
Stanton Wortham’s method for studying narratives in action. His approach aligns with
the positioning analysis discussed by Korbov and also shares similar ontological
assumptions with the constitutional research. This methodology, along with conversation
analysis, and the structural theory of emotion will be discussed in chapter 4. The chapter
will end with a detailed account of how these different methodologies can be
incorporated into a single research procedure. However, the chapter begins with a
discussion of how the ontological assumptions discussed in this chapter influence the
epistemological stance of the researcher.
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chapter

4
METHODOLOGY FOR ANALYZING PSYCHOTHERAPY AS A
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE
“The pure ‘that it is’ shows itself, but the “whence” and the “whither”
remain in darkness”
Martin Heidegger, Being and Time
(1927/1962, p. 173)
"It is investigation not of a hidden, underlying structure of the rich,
teeming surface of life.”
Martin Packer, The Science of Qualitative
Research (2006, p. 389)

Grounding the Methodology in Radical Realism
All studies are guided by ontological assumptions. Regardless of whether these
assumptions are made explicit, they are fundamental because they allow us to understand
the phenomenon that is being studied and set the horizon at which this understanding
ends. In chapter 2, we discussed the fundamental ontological assumptions of this study.
Namely, that human beings are their understanding, but this understanding is constituted
by socio-historical practices. These practices develop through thought, which
problematizes what it means to be human in relation to things, others, and oneself. By
engaging in these practices we become certain kinds of people within our form-of-life.
This chapter details a methodology that can be used to explicate how this constitutional
process works in psychotherapy.
The research methodology developed in this chapter is based on a constitutional
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understanding of human change. The ontological assumptions discussed in chapter 2
influence everything from the epistemological stance of the researcher (my understanding
of how human beings come to know themselves, others and the world) to the very design
of the research question. In this chapter, we will discuss the epistemology assumptions of
the study. This stance will be characterized as a “Radical realism,” which takes seriously
the role that culture plays in shaping who we are, but avoids the relativism that has
plagued other approaches. Based on these fundamental assumptions, we will then set
down four core methodological principles that will guide the study: (1) DetailedInteraction-Analysis (DIA) as the appropriate methodological approach for study
constitution, (2) specimen approach to data collection, (3) researcher access through
form-of-life membership, and (4) research account as re-problematization, not
representation.
After this, we will review the inability of current research to provide a detailed
account of the change process in psychotherapy. This will lead to a consideration of how
the research methodology discussed in this chapter can explicate the change process in
psychotherapy because it allows us to examine narrative, emotion, and conversation
utterances as actions. Last, we will end the chapter with a detailed look at the research
process, examining the decisions made during the data collection and the basic research
procedures used to analyze the dataset. To provide clarity the research procedures will be
described as a linear step-by-step process, yet in practice, research is always hermeneutic,
with constant refinement of assumptions and methodology.
This refinement process can be seen in evolution of the research question.
Originally I had phrased the question as: How is the client constituted as a certain kind of
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interpreter during psychotherapy. However, during the data collection process I realized
that I was most interested in therapies that I viewed as psychodynamic. Hence, the
question was changed to: How is the client constituted as a certain kind of interpreter
during psychodynamic therapy. Yet, as I moved to a case study approach during the data
collection process and I began to reevaluate the purpose of the study and I came realize
that this was not simply a study focused solely on the constitutional process in
psychotherapy. Rather, this was a project aimed at developing a methodology that could
be used for examining constitution in psychotherapy. In other words, this project is a case
study aimed at answering whether DIA can be used to show how a client is constituted as
a certain kind of subject in psychotherapy.16 The sets up the basic task of the dissertation
as developing and demonstrating a methodology derived from Martin Packer’s
explication of constitution (Packer, 2001, 2011). The project will be completed when I
have answered the research question and will be judged by the quality and rigor of my
methodological approach, application, and final account.
Radical Realism and the Hermeneutic Circle
Let us now turn to the epistemological principles that arise out of the ontology in
chapter 2. These principles answer two fundamental questions about knowledge. First:
what is knowledge and second: how do we come to know? The ontological framework of
this study is based on Heidegger’s phenomenology and Foucault’s historical ontology. It
aligns with the perspective that both Heidegger and Foucault are realists who see the

16

The shift in language from “interpreter” to “certain kind of subject” is reflective of the
importance of Foucault in Packer’s work and the centrality of Foucauldian genealogy and ethics
in my understanding of constitution.
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material world as real, extant, and immediate, but also accept that any knowledge about
the world is a product of culture. This incorporation of both realism and idealism into a
coherent theory is why Heidegger’s phenomenology is so novel and often misunderstood
(Wilkins, 1984).
Packer (2011) has referred to this type of realism as “radical realism” because it
holds on to the concept of an “objective world,” but fundamentally changes our
relationship to this world (pp. 204-205). First, it rejects the independency thesis, most
notably held by G.E. Moore (1903), that we can know the world as it is, independent of
our knowing. Moore’s argument is complex, but basically he concludes that our
perception is not mediated by representation, which is culturally configured, rather it is
direct awareness of the world in-itself. As he states: "what I am quite sure of is that [our
awareness] is of blue; that it has to blue the simple and unique relation the existence of
which alone justifies us in distinguishing knowledge of a thing from the things known,
and indeed in distinguishing mind from matter" (p. 450). But, Moore has a hard time
explaining how we come to know this independent world without going through culture.
For example, how do we decide what the true blue is: a primary color, reflected light
waves, a chemical compound, expression of mood, and so on. These are all perfectly fine
ways of defining blue and they all arise out of a particular cultural-historical epoch.
In Moore’s defense he is simply trying to say that there has to be a real world out
there because we are aware of it—the world cannot simply be something that is in our
heads. This is what happens when we take representational thinking to its inevitable ends.
As Moore exclaimed, "What do we know?.... What reason have we for supposing that
there are things outside the mind corresponding to these that are inside it?" (p. 449). The
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answer is that we do not. If we continue to assume that our relationship to the world is
based on forming representations that may or may not conform to the world in-itself, then
we end up here with Moore trying to prove that there is a real world despite the fact that
all knowledge arises out of a cultural-historical process as described by Hegel,
Heidegger, and Foucault (Foucault, 1978, 1988a; Hegel, 1952/1977; Heidegger, 1966;
Packer, 2011).
Radical realism avoids this quandary because it holds that practical activity, not
representational cognition, is how human beings come to know the world. This not only
eliminates the need for the independency thesis to prove that the world really does exist,
but also moves away from subjectivism which, in itself, is a product of representational
ontology.17 As Packer writes:
The standard view is that individuals in different cultures form different concepts,
so they lived in different subjective worlds. For radical realism, in contrast, an
object becomes something of significance by virtue of its incorporation into
human practices. It is incorporation of objects, both fabricated and natural, into
human practical activity that gives them significance with which they show up as
objects of a certain kind. Heidegger said, being — what something is — is an
issue only for humans. What something is — that this object in front of me is a
cup, for example — is an anthropocentric fact, dependent on the continued
existence of human kind, but it is a fact independent of any individual mind. (p.
204)
In short, we never know the world in-itself, yet our knowing is not a mere
17

Radical relativism avoids subjectivism, not cultural relativism. Radical realism does shift our
understanding of cultural relativism. Namely, cultures have different practices that change over
time and these differences matter because it is through these practices that people become
constituted as certain kinds of subjects. There will always be differences both between and within
cultures, but there is no personal practice that cannot be shared because all practices (and objects
tied up with those practices) are social. This is important because as researchers, we develop
membership through the local practices within a given form of life. This membership process
changes us and allows us to grasp the phenomenon we are studying. Our findings will always be
relative to the form of life that is being studied, but what is being studied is a real object that
matters within the given context.
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representation. It arises out of our concernful engagement with the world. It arises out of
our everyday practices—practical activities—and our relationships with others. These
practices are not a single person’s, but shared and therefore mark on the mutual horizon
of human knowledge.
As discussed in chapter 2, Heidegger (1927/1962) argued, that at a core
existential level—or structure as he refers to it—human existence is “possibilities as
possibilities” (p. 185).18 In a sense, we are pure possibility. But, for actual, everyday
people this unlimited possibility has been diverted into a practical understanding that is
part of the person’s cultural-historic, form-of-life. All knowing is a process of working
through the implicit assumptions that arise out of how people engage with each other and
the world. Therefore, we can never come to know something without cultural
assumptions. This does not lead to nihilistic relativism because our engagement with the
world is the fact of our existence: it defines what it means to be human. Fundamental to
human existence is that we are in a world that matters to us. This mattering is what
Heidegger refers to as “understanding” (p. 181). Human beings find themselves in a
world that already makes sense. Objects are understood pre-reflexively and available for
use.19 This understanding is a result of ever evolving historical practices that mark the
horizon of intelligibility for any given form-of-life, which comes before reflexive
cognition. It is that very sense of being at home in a material world that seems altogether
familiar, comfortable, and human. Hence, things like rocks, birds, hammers, and
freeways become something only through our practical engagement, which is cultural.
18

And since at the core of our human existence we are the possibility of possibility, what we are
essentially—Our existence, our being — “is at issue” (p. 32).
19
A type of engagement that Heidegger called ready-at-hand (pp. 191-912).
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When we try to understand what something is we are inevitably working-out how the
object has come to be something useful. Hence, if we study rocks, we are not getting at
the rock in-itself, but the totality of relationships the rock has within our culture. Hence,
any study, whether it is of horses, humans or rocks, is an examination of the form of life
within which those things have meaning. In short, when we study things, we study
culture and when we study culture, we study ourselves.
The interpretive process through which we come to understand ourselves and our
world is a circular progression. It proceeds from understanding, toward the objects of our
inquiry, and then leads back to a new understanding of ourselves and our form-of-life.
This is the hermeneutic circle. Heidegger states that:
Interpretation….is grounded in something we grasp in advance—in a forehaving….[and] when one is engaged in a particular concrete kind of
interpretation…one likes to appeal... to what 'stands there' in the first instance [but
this] is nothing other than the obvious undiscussed assumptions....our fore-having,
our fore-sight, and are fore-conception (pp. 191-192).
Hence, for Heidegger the task of science should not be to get outside of the
hermeneutic circle (i.e. outside of culture), but to approach it in the right way. Science
must recognize itself as a cultural practice that arises out of our particular form-of-life.
This is not meant to denigrate science. Heidegger was very clear that science is a
necessary practice that can systematically uncover the totality of relationships embedded
in our understanding of ourselves and our world. Without science we rely on trite
platitudes and empty assertions that obscure rather than illuminate our existence.20

20

As Heidegger states in Being and Time: "What is decisive is not to get out of the circle but to
come into it in the right way. The circle of understanding is not an orbit in which any random
kind of knowledge may move; it is the expression of the existential fore-structure of Dasein
itself….To be sure, we genuinely take hold of this possibility only when, in our interpretation, we
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Radical Realism and Psychological Research
How we understand realism is important because it influences how we do
research. If we hold the independency thesis then we will need to eliminate all of our preexisting assumptions in order to get to the things-in-themselves. However, this is
problematic because human beings cannot understand their world except through their
form-of-life. Furthermore, this also leads to research that is blind of its own interests and
ethical underpinnings. The independency thesis is an attempt to avoid the idealist
assertion that there is no way to prove the existence of the material world. However,
radical realism offers a perspective that can honor the primacy of both culture and the
material world.
Psychological research influenced by radical realism looks somewhat different
than research that holds to the independency thesis. We are not interested in what people
are essentially, but how people live. We want to examine the practices that people engage
in and how they become certain kinds of people within their form-of-life. Hence, a
science based on radical realism would rely on empirical research. Human beings are
beings-in-the-material-world. They become the kind of people they are by engaging in
have understood that our first, last, and constant task is never to allow our fore-having, fore-sight,
and fore-conception to be presented to us by fancies and popular conceptions, but rather to make
the scientific themes secure and working out the support structures in terms of the things
themselves" (p. 195). Regardless of the clarity of this quote, some, including Dreyfus (2001),
have argued that we can follow Heidegger’s ontological project, but still hold onto the
independency theory. He states that when understanding breaks down, as Heidegger describes in
the state-of-mind of anxiety, things exist in their raw, in-themselves form. Hence, if we could
develop scientific practices that foster this state than we would be able to understand objects inthemselves. The problem is that this would still involve developing practices that are themselves
part of a certain form of life. Furthermore, Glazebrook (Glazebrook, 2001) critiques Dreyfus
stating that this would lead to a techno-science that denies its own interests and that Heidegger’s
radical realism allows for ethical reflection and critique, which is increasingly important in our
modern age. Glazebrook goes on to state that science is the modern expression of our own must
being: a practice of asking and inquiring into our material existence.
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practices that are worldly. Action is at the heart of being human. People are doers:
Thinking is doing, talking is doing, emotion is doing. These actions are observable. In
order to understand what people are we have to examine the actions; the practices that
people engage within their form-of-life.
Furthermore, as researchers, we understand that we are not outside of the form-oflife in which we study. Therefore, our assumptions, biases, and intuitions need to be
acknowledged and systematically reflected upon in order to illuminate the object of
inquiry and the process through which it is understood. Yet, this reflection on
assumptions is not an attempt to trim away unnecessary biases. From a radical realist
perspective these biases and assumptions are the essential way in which we understand
the phenomenon being studied. It is our membership in a given form-of-life that gives us
access to the object of inquiry. If we reflect on our assumptions simply to remove them
from the research process we lose critical empirical data. Also, we create the illusion of
the unbiased observer void of ethical and cultural interests. When we allow our
assumptions to become empirical data we complete the hermeneutic circle. We can test
our assumptions against the data and begin to refine how our understanding of
phenomenon and ourselves.
Scientific research has to be understood as a social practice aimed at answering
the old and fundamentally human question: What is the meaning of our existence? In
other words, what does it mean to be human? If we understand that this question is
embedded in all scientific research then we can start to reflect on the ethical and moral
interests of our research. Hence, psychological research would be able to reflect upon
itself as part of a field of practices through which people understand themselves, others,
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and the world. This would amount to what Packer (2011), following Foucault, refers to as
Historical Ontology. Packer states that "qualitative research is good for historical
ontology" because it can “attend to the complex interrelations of knowledge, politics, and
ethics…[and] foster personal and political transformation without resorting to violence. It
would be an investigation that could create new ways of being". (p. 6). Hence,
psychological research based on radical realism would see itself as a type of practical
action aimed at opening up the ways of existing in our form-of-life.
Four Methodological Principals Derived from Radical Realism
1. Detailed Interaction Analysis (DIA) as a methodology well suited for studying
constitution. First, in order to understand how a client is constituted as a certain kind of
subject in psychotherapy, we will need to develop a method that attends to the details of
interaction during psychotherapy. Broadly speaking, Detailed Interaction Analysis (DIA)
can make explicit the actions that both therapist and client use during the practice of
psychotherapy. This new methodology draws from similar approaches that share
ontological assumptions central to the constitutional approach to change. During the last
half of the 20th century different approaches for studying interaction gained favor in the
social sciences (C. Goodwin & Heritage, 1990; ten Have, 1999; Wodak & Meyer, 2009).
Both Narrative Analysis and Discourse Analysis can now be seen as general categories
containing similar, yet varying methodological approaches to studying social interaction.
However, many of these methodologies still hold onto a representational framework,
even if this is not explicitly acknowledged (Packer, 2011; Wortham, 2001).
Conversation Analysis (CA) is one of the many discourse methods that attempts
to make the details of social interaction sensible. In chapter 3 we discussed how CA
100

avoids the problems that plague representational based methodologies because of its
focus on language as action and social order as produced through everyday interaction.
CA’s intellectual roots go back to the phenomenology of Alfred Schutz and Heidegger
and, hence, the fundamental assumptions are akin to those of radical realism (Packer,
2011). Most important is the relationship between the participants and unfolding social
context. CA "articulates the work of ordering," the way in which participants are skilled
agents who interpret and understand each other's conversational moves and design their
utterances with the context and identity of both themselves and the other parties in mind
(p. 267). In this framework, meaning is not what someone intends, but something that
gets worked out through the participants’ own understanding of each other’s talk and
subsequent action. The relationship between the context and the participants is dialectic.
The context sets the ground rules for what is excepted and acceptable, but the participants
have to play along in order for the context to persist. Every interaction can be an act of
reaffirmation or reconfiguration depending on the actions of the participants.
Remember that the context is the local-level, temporal unfolding of a social
practice (e.g. a specific psychotherapy occurring in time with its own unique participants,
history, and unfolding possibilities). Hence, what we are talking about is the hermeneutic
circle of the constitutional process. Participants engaging in social practices act in ways
that respond to the rules and expectations. In this way they become certain kinds of
people depending on the practices they engage in. However, they are not passive subjects.
Their actions not only affect the context (reproducing or altering it) but also affect how
they are constituted as certain kinds of people. Last, and most importantly to
psychotherapy, is that social practices are obviously social. People do not enact practices
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in isolation from others. In all social practices, including psychotherapy, participants are
acting on one another based on the unfolding context and the previous actions. As Packer
states, "Each person involved in a conversation has their own interpretation of what is
going on, but these interpretations are intersubjective in the sense that every person treats
the adjacent utterances in similar ways. People share an understanding of the ‘game’ they
are engaged in and its ‘order’” (p. 256). Whether in psychotherapy or in the checkout line
at Walmart, participants act on one another based on an understanding of the rules of the
practices and the result is a constitutional process that brings into being certain kinds of
people.
2. Data should be a natural occurring specimen. In Chapter 3 we discussed how
CA takes an inductive approach to data and views each conversation as a specimen.
Individual specimens might be good or bad, but they are never wrong because they are all
examples of real conversations that have occurred (ten Have, 1999). From a Radical
Realist perspective every human practice is a specimen that can be studied in order to
understand how the participants are being constituted. Ideally, data should be naturally
occurring, not staged, and researchers should have access to both audio and video so the
interaction can be studied as an embodied, temporal event.
The goals of this present study are to describe the change process in
psychotherapy and develop a methodology capable of providing such an account. Hence,
we want to collect the best specimen available, rather than seeking out a certain kind of
psychotherapy that seems universal or indicative of a certain approach. This is different
from typical CA studies of psychotherapy. Most researchers analyze large quantities of
conversational specimens and then make claims about normative sequences. This
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inductive approach tends to focus on certain sequences in the conversation; rather than
the conversation as a whole. This is typically how studies are conducted across CA. As
Jefferson (1988) reflected, “While the analysis of conversation which I practice tends to
focus on very small, crystalline bits of the conversational machinery, I also have an
ongoing interest in the analysis of what Harvey Sacks has discussed as the ‘big packages’
” (p. 418). This study will be an examination of psychotherapy as a “big package” and
therefore we will have to go beyond the typical approach used by conversation analysis in
order to demonstrate the methodology.
3. Our Membership in the form-of-life that we are studying provides vital
assumptions and basic understanding. The roots of conversation analysis stretch back to
the ethnomethodology of Harold Garfinkel. For ethnomethodologists, participants and
researchers or not individual subjects, but members of a shared form-of-life or at the very
least share a basic understanding. As Packer (2011) writes, "Ethnomethodologists speak
of ‘members’ ….[with] ‘vulgar competence’ …necessary to gain the ‘membership
knowledge’ that enables the researcher to recognize the relevant phenomena….‘Vulgar’
is used here in the old sense of ‘belonging to people’“ (p. 195). The data for the study is
of a therapist-in-training and client, where I was also a therapist-in-training. Therefore, I
am a member of multiple relevant communities. I am a therapist-in-training and, in my
personal life, I have been a client. These experiences provide rich assumptions that will
inform how I understand and interpret my data. Ignoring this would impoverish the study
by eliminating rich, empirical data.
4. The researcher as active stance and research account as action. The stance of
the researcher and our understanding of the research account have to be re-conceptualized
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if we are going to grab hold of radical realism and let go of the independency thesis.
According to Packer, "Foucault ….offered a powerful conception of the project for a
critical scientific inquiry, and of the appropriate stance for an investigator. This stance is
always a way of life….A way of being in the form-of-life" (p. 377). Just as the therapist
and the client are active participants engaged in the social practice of psychotherapy, so is
the researcher. However, the research and the researcher are very different from therapy
and the therapist. The researcher takes a critical stance aimed at changing the way we
understand the object of study (i.e. psychotherapy). As the researcher it is my role to take
an active stance and make an account the can affect the reader.
Hence, within this paradigm the research account is no longer conceived of as a
representation. Rather, it is seen as an action. Truth, is not a question of correspondence
rather it is conceived of in terms of effects. As Packer writes,
These accounts will have truth not to the extent that they correspond with how
things 'really are, ‘but insofar as they point out things we haven't noticed because
of the illusio (the false consciousness, the alienation) that our practices and duties.
Such as, these accounts will have the potential for phronesis: practical relevance
that his political in the original sense of guiding activities (p. 389)
Research is a re-problematization that allows us to see things differently and open up new
ways of being (pp. 376-377). It is an action, among other actions, in a field of power that
aligns itself with and against other practices, all of which have their constitutional effects,
shifting the overall culture and changing what it means to be human (Foucault, 1978).
Hence, the methodology developed for this research project re-problematizes one of the
core concepts of psychotherapy research—change. In following sections, change will be
described as here-and-now process of actions that position participants in dynamic
relational matrices.
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Studying Constitutional Change
At first glance it seems unlikely that this study can show change occurs in
psychotherapy. Having only two sessions and no outcome or subjective reports, the
reader might wonder how this dataset and methodology can even identify change.
Outcome studies show that a person has changed over the course of treatment, most
commonly by comparing changes in symptom inventories (Kazdin, 1994; Lambert &
Bergin, 1994; Orlinsky et al., 2004; Wachtel, 2010). This is change over time. Similarly,
this study will chart the course of 2 session and attention will be paid to how things shift
over the course of time. However, the promise of this study is that it can illuminate how
change occurs in psychotherapy. Therefore, the idea that change is something that simple
happens and can be measured based on 2 data points has to be challenged. In order to
show how change occurs we have to let go of the notion that a study must provide at least
two data points were difference can be clearly assessed and ideally quantified. Hence, to
let this notion go we have to shift our attention from how a person is changed to how a
practice changes the participants. The difference is not simply semantic. Following
radical realism, participants are active agents engaging in a practice where they act on
one another in ways that constitute them as certain kinds of people. Certain ways of
being, acting, feeling and relating are put forward as how to be (good). Participants are
engaged in a process through which they acted on one another creating ways of being in
relation to each other’s actions. Just walking into a therapy office, sitting down and
providing a psychosocial history is a way of being a certain kind of person that is
uniquely configured (in her relationships toward the therapist, family, friends, and self)
by the social practice. Before a person is changed, a person changes. This occurs
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naturally when we engage in a practice. Hence, when we look at the data we will be
asking the following:
● What is emphasized as important and how is this importance made evident?
● What is the relationship between the client and herself and how is this
constituted?
● What is the relationship between the client and others and how is this constituted?
● How do the client and therapist align and dis-align?
● What are the emotions between the therapist and client and how do they manifest
and what is their function?
Because outcome studies are a way to looking at how a person has changed over
time, they envision change as something the person possesses, it is part of them, and is
often thought of as something internal (Sa t-> S(a-i)). Radical realism allows us to break
apart change and view it as an active process rather than a passive possession. Talk and
emotion are seen as tools. By talking and feeling we are doing something that affects the
other participant and ourselves. In CA studies on psychotherapy, they describe the
client’s speech as resisting, extending, and elaborating. Likewise they described the
therapist as formulating, interpreting, questioning, extending and so on (Vehviläinen et
al., 2008). Furthermore, using the Structural Theory of Emotion (to be describes in the
next section) emotions can be described as transactions that bring people closer or push
people for their part. Hence, anger pushes the other away, desire draws the other closer,
contempt recognizes the other as not belonging, shame recognizes the self as not
belonging (de Rivera, 1977).
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When taken as a whole, use of talk and emotion constitute a field of action on
action — a field of power. Psychotherapy has to be understood as a historical practice
with a certain configuration of power relations. In psychotherapy personal/everyday
problems become therapeutic problems, which ideally allow the client to gain more
control over their symptoms and more satisfaction and their life. Yet, through this process
the client is positioned as a certain kind of person. Hence, our study is concerned with
how psychotherapy actively positions (i.e. changes) the person during the practice itself.
This amounts to an assessment of the constitutional function of the practice. Following
Foucault (1978, 1983) we might frame the question as the relationship between power
and ethics: How is power used to create a certain kind of subject that engages in a certain
kind of ethics?
The Problem of Explicating Emotion through Conversation Analysis
Conversation Analysis has avoided studying emotion for good reason. Influenced
by both ethnomethodology and phenomenology, researchers avoid introducing external
constructs in their research. By focusing on what our utterances do, rather than the
intentions behind what we say, conversation analysts only attends to what is transparent
to the participants and the researcher. Power, false conscience, and emotion might be of
interest to the researcher, but if they are not visibly present in the conversation then they
are not relevant to the participants or practical activity being studied. In other words,
unless the participants are explicitly talking about emotion, conversation analysts has
shied away from speculating on what emotions are present and how they are relevant to
understanding the interaction. Hence, CA has difficulty identifying emotion and this
limits its ability to describe emotion as a social action.
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Regardless, a few studies have attempted to explicitly look at emotion by using
conversation analysis. Sundland’s (2004) analysis of emotional displays during graduate
seminars attempts to understand how emotions are social actions that conversation
analysts have overlooked. The study is quite good and unique; however, Sundland still
holds onto the idea that emotions are, at least in part, subjective experiences. This can be
seen in her methodological decision to use participant interviews to identify and
distinguish different emotional experiences. Although her overall analysis is solid and
insightful, her struggle to re-conceptualize emotion as a completely social phenomenon is
problematic. Another study is Goodwin & Goodwin’s Emotion within Situated Activity
(M. Goodwin & Goodwin, 1999). They use various examples to demonstrate: “how
emotion is a social phenomenon…organized and made visible…through systematic
practices which are lodged within the processes of situated interaction, used by
participants to build in concert with each other the events that make up their lifeworld”
(pp 24-25).
From little girls playing hopscotch to the emotional displays of an aphasic adult,
they use pitch height changes, tone, and non-verbal gestures to identify the occurrence of
emotion. This way of identifying emotion is not an attempt to decontextualize emotional
indicators from the unfolding context; on the contrary, a “pitch height does not function
as an isolated, decontextualized display. Instead it becomes visible as a specific,
meaningful event, by virtue of the way in which it is embedded within a particular
sequence of action.” (p. 6). Goodwin & Goodwin make this point because they want to
distinguish themselves from the trend in affective research to treat emotional displays as
decontextualized elements (Ekman & Friesen, 2003; Ekman & Rosenberg, 1998). And
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yet, the fact that this distinction needs to made, indicates how both Goodwin & Goodwin
take similar approaches to other researchers such as Ekman when it comes to identifying
emotion.
By relying on distinct, observable data such as pitch changes, gestures, facial
expressions, and so on, Goodwin and Goodwin utilize strategies similar to those
employed by Ekman, yet avoid implementing an explicit coding system to identify
emotion. Many methods have been developed to identify emotion, so much so, that
affective science, has become an interdisciplinary field of study (Coan & Allen, 2007).
Methods have been developed to study emotion in a wide range of contexts using
different techniques. Most relevant to this present study are the techniques to identify
emotion through observation (as opposed to physical measurements or subjective
reports). John Gottman, who developed one such method, stated that there are basically to
types of approaches: those that rely on the intuition and background knowledge of the
observer and those that decontextualize the event into discrete micro-features. The
following quote indicates which method Gottman (1996) prefers:
I did not want my summary codes to read something like: “Husband shows
zygomatic major contractions on face with contraction of the cheek raiser muscle,
with shift downward in fundamental frequency, decrease in amplitude and voice
in a major key and rapid inhalation and exhalation of breath with hut hut
vocalizations.” Instead, I wanted to say that the husband laughed. (cited in Coan
& Gottman, 2007, p. 268)
One of the most important tenets of this study is that context and basic human
understanding matters. People feel and understand emotions even if this feeling is hard to
put into words. These unformalized hunches and intuitions are assumptions that ground
our understanding of any given situation (whether we are engaged in an argument with
our spouse or watching a therapy session where the client becomes angry at the
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therapist). Coding methods such as the Facial Action Coding System (FACS), developed
by Ekman and his colleges (Cohn, Ambadar, & Ekman, 2007; Ekman & Friesen, 2003;
Ekman & Rosenberg, 1998) eliminates the surrounding context and only pays attention to
small facial movements (called Action Units (AU)) to systematically identify different
emotions. This type of approach also eliminates the researcher’s assumptions and instead
relies on recipes of combined AU’s that are correlated with different emotions.
Gottman’s (2007) approach differs in that it “requires the use of human beings with a
personal history of interpersonal, affective communication. Such a personal history
provides access to subtle cues that even many years of strict training in the identification
of discrete physical features may neglect” (p. 268)
However, neither Gottman’s approach nor the methods used in CA or DIA
completely leave behind the use of discrete movements or vocal changes. Coders
utilizing Gottman’s Specific Affect Coding System (SPAFF) use a dialectical process
that moves back and forth from an intuition based understanding of the emotional event
to an analysis of discrete behavioral movements. Gottman states:
Thus learning to observe emotional behavior means, on the one hand, learning to
identify multiple discrete indicators,21 any one of which may or may not be
present during a particular emotional episode, and, on the other hand, drawing
from one’s own personal history of affective communication in order to spot the
complexities of behavior that remain outside the grasp of highly detailed discrete
analysis. SPAFF coding means learning to integrate voice, physical features,
verbal content, and more—indicators that are sometimes hard to describe (e.g.,
“positive energy”) but that are easily grasped by most coders (p. 268)

21

For Gottman: “An indicator is an objective piece of evidence that any observer can see or hear
directly” (p. 268). The indicator indicates that the emotion (which is conceived of as a latent
construct) is present.

110

Because this is an exploratory study there will inevitably be areas left uninvestigated due
to time and competing concerns. Using SPAFF coding requires extensive training and
practice. Because of this I will not be using it as a coding method for this study, but I do
think it is worth exploring in future research. That being said, we still need some way of
identifying emotion.
Goodwin & Goodwin have shown that emotion can be conceptualized and studied
as a social action. The data that they chose were situations where emotions were clearly
present and important to the interaction. And yet, the method they used to identify the
emotion seems like a lite version of SPAFF (except that the indicators are chosen based
on studies in sociology and anthropology). Goodwin & Goodwin have the right idea, but
what they lack is a theory of emotion that aligns with their fundamental assumptions.
Such a theory is necessary because it can assist researcher identify and distinguish
emotion without having to rely on coding system that has fundamentally different
ontological assumptions.
The Structural Theory of Emotion: An Action Based Interpersonal Theory of
Emotion
As stated above, psychology has been stuck in a debate as to whether emotion is
psychological or physiological (or both) for the past 120 years. We need a theory that
goes beyond this debate and can adequately conceptualize emotion as a form of social
action. In the late 1970’s one such theory arose and despite its potential it has remained
unrecognized in discursive research. Joseph de Rivera’s Structural Theory of Emotion
(STE) was derived from contemporary theories of emotion, psychoanalysis, and
interpersonal phenomenology (de Rivera, 1977). For de Rivera, emotions are
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conceptualized as interpersonal phenomena, which always have a directional movement
that extends or constricts the psychological space between self and other or subject and
object. The object or subject of the emotion can be either explicit or implicit. Meaning
that emotions can be directed toward real individuals in the present moment or they can
be directed towards oneself. In the latter, the individual who manifests the emotion is
both the subject and the object. In this case, either the subject or the object is typically
implicit. This definition of emotion and the structural relationships between emotions
were developed out of an empirical research methodology called “conceptual encounter”
(de Rivera, 1981, 2006; Lindsay-Hartz, de Rivera, & Mascolo, 1995). Here researchers
work with individuals as “research partners” to examine “some aspect of human
experience” in order to arrive at “an abstract conceptualization that really comprehends
[the] experience” (de Rivera, 1981, p. 3). This research oscillates between abstract
conceptualization and the concrete experiences of the research partner and the
researcher.22 During the process the conceptualization can change, but so can the
experience of emotion on the part of the participants. Initially, de Rivera developed this
methodology to explicate the experience of anger; however the fruitfulness of the work
led to the entire theory of emotion.

22

This research methodology is ultimately a hermeneutic method that privileges pragmatism. It
acknowledges the dialectical nature of the research process whereby the object of study and the
participants are transformed. Conceptualizations that proved to be useful for the participants and
the researcher are privileged over others. Reflecting on his research de Riviera stated “in the
course of this encounter, the existence of concrete instances of anger may change one’s
conceptualization of what the essence of anger is. On the other hand, the existence of a good
conceptualization may change how a person experiences concrete instances of the phenomenon.
Thus, a dialectical process is involved in the encounter” (de Rivera, 1977, p. 77).
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Besides their directional aspects, de Rivera states that emotions are distinguished
as occurrences that provide specific instructions to modify the “relationship between
person and other” (p. 118). Taking a cue from Sartre and other phenomenologists, de
Rivera (1977) describes how emotions are not isolated subjective experiences, but world
transforming events:
The experience of emotion reflects the transformation of our relationship to the
world — to the persons, objects, events, and actions that are important to us.
These transformations are the movements of emotion and each type of emotion
reflects a different kind of transformation. The transformation is not a passive
reaction to a given stimulus situation, rather it is a transaction between the person
and his environment, a way of organizing the relationship between the person and
the other so that the response itself gives meaning to the stimulus situation — e.g.,
‘a hole is to dig’. (pp. 35-36)
Therefore, our subjective experience of emotion is only one aspect of a world
transforming event that is visible because it modifies our present-moment relationships.
When examining discourse we are able to identify movements toward and away initiated
by participants. This is the first step toward identifying emotions that are not simply
referred to, but experienced and processed through social interaction.
Conversation analysts studying emotion avoid using theories of emotion to
ground their findings. Most likely this is because many theories of emotion hold
ontological assumptions that are contrary to those held by conversation analysts. I argue
that by not having a theory of emotion, researchers limit their ability to talk about the
variety of emotion and relationships between emotions. Furthermore, some researchers
might unknowingly rely on subjectivist assumptions about emotion when designing
studies. De Rivera’s theory is necessary because it allows us to make our assumptions
about emotion explicit. Furthermore, the theory is compatible with CA because it views
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An arena of development (pp. 33-54). Stamford, CT: Ablex. Copyright
2000 Marjorie Goodwin. Reprint for educational fair use.
The oppositional turn contains no emotional terms whatsoever.
Nonetheless it vividly displays a strong emotional stance on the part of its
speaker, e.g. what we might gloss as outraged indignation at the despicable
behavior of the first speaker. How is this stance made visible? The oppositional
turn begins with a preface,"N'ai" , announcing at the earliest possible opportunity
in the turn that the prior move is being objected to. Moreover this preface is
spoken with a dramatic pitch excursion. Such forms of "emphatic speech style"
resemble what Selting (1994:404) has described as 'peaks of involvement' within
the domain of storytelling: "sudden shifts from an unmarked normal style to a
marked emphatic style." Within the single syllable of the preface the second
speaker's voice leaps from 400 to 600 Hz. The display of outrage, with its
associated emotional components, is made visible as an embodied performance -that is, through the way in which second speaker controls her voice and
intonation. (pp. 5-6)
As you read this excerpt there is a clear sense of the process used to identify an emotional
event. They write “it vividly displays a strong emotional stance on the part of its speaker,
e.g. what we might gloss as outraged indignation at the despicable behavior of the first
speaker.” This first step is simply to find places where one’s intuition clearly says, “Oh,
that got heated” or “There is some real feeling”. Hence, just as Gottman found that
people who share similar backgrounds are really good at intuitively identifying emotion,
Goodwin and Goodwin use their pre-reflective understanding to identify data sequences
that involve emotion. Next, they highlight certain observable indicators (i.e. pitch height)
that denote the presence of emotion. And last, they contextualize all the different features
of the interaction and demonstrate how emotion is social and embodied, not physiological
and subjective. This process of moving from (1) the intuitive assumptions that arise as we
co-participate with the data, toward (2) highlighting analytical details and last, (3)
refining our original assumptions in ways that change our overall understanding, is the
hermeneutic circle we discussed previously.
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Similar to Goodwin and Goodwin’s work, this study will use a hermeneutic
process to identity and explicate emotion in psychotherapy. However, the process
detailed above could be improved by using STE as a guiding framework. STE could be
used as a theoretical reference backing up the emotion identifications made during the
study.23 But more importantly, STE allows the researcher to look at the data in a new
way. Becoming aware of how the participants move toward and against each other
becomes a way of understanding the interaction. Clear emotional transactions like the
example above are plain to see, but difficult to describe using emotional language. Is this
anger, contempt, or mixed emotions that we are seeing?
STE allows us to make these difficult distinctions. The interaction we see above is
clearly a transaction. Gloria moves against Carla as she calls for an another turn.
According to de Rivera (1977), anger arises in a situation where “the others’ behavior
constitutes a challenge to what a person believes ought to exist” (p. 78). Ought is the key
term. de Rivera bases his analysis on the work of Fritz Heider who argued that oughts
derive from shared values that are experienced as an objective aspect of reality. This
implies that the individuals involved in the situation have the capacity to understand these
shared values and act upon them. Furthermore, the individuals have to be part of the same
group from which the values derive. De Rivera points out that groups can be both large
and small, but that the fundamental unit is the self-other dyad (p. 80).
Here we have just such a group. Carla’s ‘calling for another turn’ and Gloria’s
23

A reference is simply a source that has shown that something, such as a pitch height change, is
an indicator of emotion. Step two in the hermeneutic process above, is accomplished by finding
some behavior, or action in the data that has been previously identified as an indicator of emotion.
The reference can be an external study, theory of emotion or coding system (such as SPAFF and
FAS).
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‘angry refusal’ are possible because both girls belong to the same form-of-life, which
includes the hop-scotch rules, the unfolding interaction, and the history of games
previously played. Emotional transactions are unwilled, spontaneous transformations of
the relationships within an unfolding context, but other emotional “choices” are always
present. Hence, instead of anger, Gloria could have fallen into a depressive withdrawal
(sadness, defeat). She could have just sat there and said nothing because she felt like
Carla would yell at her if she would have said anything. Furthermore, she could have
remained silent, but rolled her eyes at Carla and then commented: “Have all the turns you
like.” According to STE, this would be an indication of contempt, rather than depressive
withdrawal, or anger.24 All of these differences are detailed in STE and this provides a
theoretically grounded and holistic way of looking at emotion.
Goodwin and Goodwin were correct in that emotions occur as embodied, practical
activity embedded within a social context. STE allows us to distinguish between the
different types of emotion and to understand how an emotion occurs as an unwilled
response that transforms the participant’s relationships (to self, other, and the world)
within a given context. Also, as will be shown in the analysis, STE allows us to better
identify, distinguish, and analyze emotion as it is transacted between participants and as it
is enacted during narration. This allows us to see how emotions relate to one another as
they are transacted and enacted during the therapy session. Furthermore, it allows us to

24

Two components of STE that will be discussed during the analysis are the three emotional
dimensions: Belonging, Recognition, and Being; and the structural relationship of emotion. For
now let me just say that anger and depression are ways of claiming or disclaiming one’s right as a
member who belongs to a certain group. Contempt is a way of recognizing someone as Other.
These differences distinguish anger, depression, and contempt, while also indicating how the
emotions relate to one another.
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understand that emotional choices are not made by the participant per se, but arise in
unique situations in order to change one’s relational world. Hence, adopting a theory of
emotion allows the researcher to see emotion more clearly and completely. Also, by not
adopting a theory of emotion the researcher could unwitting allow the research to be
influenced by implicit assumptions about emotion, which hold onto subjectivist models
of emotional phenomena.
The Hermeneutic Circle of Emotional Identification
Below is a diagram that illustrates the process that will be used to identify
emotion during the study. It proceeds according to the three-part hermeneutic process
discussed above and relies on indicators that are both empirical and theoretical. Although
SPAFF coding will not be used for the study, I will use the empirical evidence that this
system has amassed in order to justify certain emotional identifications.
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situation that led to an emotion for example), and the audience then acknowledges that
the point was understood. Hence, CA has worked extensively to show that the narrative
itself occurs across several turns and the meaning of a narrative is not contained within a
discrete monologue decontextualized from the preceding or following conversation.
Hence, CA allows us to understand how narratives are sequential, mutually constituted
phenomena that place the participants in positions (story-teller and audience) that are
different, yet related to each other.
Yet, this focus on the storytelling sequence ignores a majority of the narrative
content. Labov (1977), who took an extensive look at narratives in psychotherapy, stated
that stories in psychotherapy are typically designed to do something specific. For
example, narratives can be complaints, agreements, or protests. Hence, the content, as
well as the sequence of the narrative are important in understanding what type of action
the narrative is trying to achieve.
This idea that narratives do something is actually quite radical. Narratives are
classically understood as a form of representation. As Labov states, “we define a
narrative as one means of representing past experience by a sequence of ordered
sentences that present the temporal sequence of events by that order” (p. 105). Hence, the
narrative has meaning because it represents something that has happened in the past.
Furthermore, this representation might not be a dry history of events, but a recalling of
feelings attached to the events. From a therapeutic perspective, it might even point back
to unresolved conflicts that the client is keeping out of consciousness. The point is that
the content of the narrative has typically been seen as a representation. This is a major
reason why CA has avoided dealing specifically with content and instead has focused on
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the sequential structure of narratives. However, there are ways in which the content of the
narrative can be analyzed as more of an action.
Wortham (2001) contends that in order to understand narrative, and its ability to
construct the self (as he puts it), we have to understand the representative content as well
as the interactional positioning that it creates. He agrees that this enriches narrative
research which primarily focuses on the representational function of narratives. Wortham
writes: “the predominant explanation for a biographical narrative’s power sites their
representational functions. Telling the story of his or her life gives the narrator an
opportunity to redirect that life when the narrator tells a coherent story that foregrounds a
certain perspective or direction” (p. 5). This perspective has been endorsed by many
theorists and researchers throughout human science. Although there are individual
differences, most explain that: “an autobiographical narrative selects from among many
events of the life and places them in a sequence that leads toward an ending or
resolution.” (p. 7). Importantly, this idea has been advanced in psychology and used to
explain important aspects of the self and how psychotherapy can create change (Epstein
& White, 1990). Wortham (2001) argues that this account is too simplistic. It ignores
postmodern and feminist critiques of the self as uniform and holistic. Rather, the self is a
series that stretches both horizontally across time and vertically in the present moment.
In order to understand how autobiographical narratives construct the self, we have
to understand their interactional effects and the relationship these effects have with the
represented material. Wortham proposes that narrators create a “doubling of roles” where
“the narrator has at least one role in the represented content of the story and one role in
the ongoing interaction between the narrator and the audience” (p.13). This creates a
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“parallelism” where patterns in the narrative (represented material) align with how the
narrator is acting in the interaction. This can be simple, such as telling a story about being
assertive and then being assertive during the storytelling. However this can also be much
more complex.
Wortham’s methodology is based on Bakhtin’s understanding of the relationship
between the novel (i.e. narrative) and the narrator. He claims that typically narrators do
not speak for themselves. Rather, they speak through their characters. This is referred to
ventriloquation and it gives the narrator the ability to speak with many voices.
Furthermore, characters establish certain positions in the narrative by forming
relationships with one another. In other words, cops have their robbers, lovers have each
other and families have mother, father and child. Even if the narrator does not speak for
herself, she also takes a position in relation to her characters by virtue of the ways she
crafts the narrative. In natural conversation, these positions are always being negotiated
and are never finished.
Wortham has developed the concepts of mediation, voicing, and emergence to
show how this process unfolds. To illustrate these concepts Wortham uses an excerpt
from a classroom discussion in which the students and teachers were discussing the social
structure ritual infanticide in Sparta. The conversation centered on how powerful elders,
Ephors, would judge whether a child was strong enough to live and if a child was judged
to be sickly it would be left out to die. In Wortham’s excerpt a student protests, saying
that it is unfair for them to decide whose child could live. The teacher then plays devil’s
advocate, arguing for the merits of such a practice. For this analysis, Wortham divides the
interaction into the two events: the storytelling event and the narrative event (p. 19). The
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former is the interaction in which the narrative is being told and the latter is the narrative
being told. The need for such a division goes back to the claim that we need to
understand the relationship between the interaction and the represented content of the
narrative. In this example, Wortham points out that the participants make use of the
original narrated event about the Spartans, which was assigned to them as a reading.
Through their interaction the participants create other narrated events that parallel the
structure of the original narrative (i.e. reading assignment). By structure, Wortham is
referring to the relative position of the characters in the narrative. For example, the
original narrated event has the relationship of masters, privileged subordinates, and
unprivileged subordinates. The complaining student shapes her complaint as a
hypothetical narrative. “What if,” she states, “they sentence my baby to death and not my
friends. Then there would not be equality.” In response, the teacher creates a narrative
about Asian students, stating that maybe we should just focus on Asian students (as
opposed to lazy students on welfare) because they will turn out better.
These narratives are developed over the course of the interaction. Wortham claims
that by the end of the excerpt there is a parallelism between the narrated events that draws
on previous “voices” (social positions) that denigrate those on welfare as being lazy and
leeching off of society (see figure 3). If we look at the figure we see that the narrated
events are related to social positions held in our society. Wortham acknowledges that
connecting the narrated event with social positions can be difficult. We cannot assume
that certain utterances correspond with a social position on a one-to-one basis. Utterances
can be appropriated and used by an infinite number of others, towards different ends.
Therefore, these parallels have to emerge during the interaction.
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important to understanding the narrative itself. In other words, "Narratives often cohere
only with reference to preceding and subsequent conversation. In such cases, the segment
of conversation relevant to understanding the meaning of the narrative is larger than the
narrative itself." (p. 62). This is something that we see quite often in psychotherapy.
Clients will tell a story that may be quite short, but it becomes the catalyst for a great deal
of conversation. Oftentimes both the client and therapist continue to comment on the
narrative long after is has been closed. Comments are conversational turns that elaborate
on the character’s behaviors and feelings first introduced in the narrative. Comments do
not have the temporal structure or sequential order indicative of storytelling, but the they
are used to shape the client’s relationship to herself, others and the world first established
in the narrative (Ochs & Schieffelin, 1989). Hence, commenting in psychotherapy is a
process of mediation whereby both participants work out what the narrative means as part
of within a therapeutic dialogue.
How to Use NIA to Study Constitution
Wortham’s method will be used to understand (1) how the client creates a
relational structure by positioning herself within her own stories, (2) how this positioning
aligns with the relationship between the client and therapist, and (3) how this changes
based on the sequential interaction. This aligns with our approach to studying emotion.
Remember that emotion is conceptualized as a relationship that is transformed and
modified. Therefore, the basic approach to analyze the ways in which relationships are
created in narratives, and how they form parallels with relationships in the interaction
will be important. This approach will allow us to understand how the client’s way of
relating to others is constituted. For example, we want to pay attention to how the
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therapist and the client shift the structure of the relationships found within the narrative.
If the client depicts herself as a victim, does the therapist then depict her as a hero? If the
client positions herself as a rational actor, does the therapist depict her as an emotional
creature? How do these shifts parallel or conflict with the relationship between the
therapist and the client? Last, what is the relationship between the emotions discussed in
the narrative and the emotions between the therapist and client?
In summary, Wortham has developed a method for analysis of how the relational
structure of the narrative positions the narrator in unique ways that also parallel the
relationship between the participants. The narrative has the power to change a person not
because the narrator simply represents himself in a certain fashion, but he begins to
interact in the same manner. Hence, narratives are actions that accomplish certain things
depending on the unfolding context of the conversation. The narrative itself might be
brief but the implication of the narrative, what it does and how it is to be understood, can
unfold over time and across various sequences through the commenting. The content of
the narrative is not important because it represents some past event or even because it is a
way of speaking with from a social position, but because the relational structure of the
narrative positions the client in an emotional relationship with the narrated character and
the therapist. As discussed at the end of chapter 3, Korobov (2001) claims that this kind
of positioning analysis can be used to augment CA and allow researchers to better study
the constitution of subjectivity.
Data Collection: A Case Study of Psychodynamic Therapy
As might be expected, my vision for this project has changed over the course of
time. While working through the proposal, pilot work, literature review, and data
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selection, I came to realize that some of the original parameters needed to be changed.
For example, when I began the project I did not want to confine myself to one particular
type of therapy. Working with archival data has its advantages, but it also has a
downside: you have to work with what is available because you are unable to solicit
therapists and clients into your study. Because of this, I worried that if I defined the study
around a certain therapeutic orientation, I would limit the possibility of collecting the best
data available. Furthermore, I originally envisioned collecting data from two different
dyads. I feared that finding two dyads with the same orientation would be difficult, if not
impossible, and therefore I constructed the project in a manner that did not emphasize
clinical orientation.
This desire to examine two dyads came out of my early reading of conversation
analysis. From classic CA all the way through to the recent work on psychotherapy,
datasets are typically large, often hundreds of hours in length. Therefore, I originally
thought that I needed at least 8 to 10 hours of data in order to conduct the study. Because
I knew that it would be improbable to find that many sessions of the same dyad, I decided
to use two dyads. Yet, as the project developed it became clear that there was a critical
difference between my project and most of the work being done in CA. Most CA studies
examined large amounts of data in order to find multiple examples of unique
conversational sequences. By identifying multiple examples of a specific conversational
sequence, researchers could build the case that a normative structure guides the
conversation. I am, on the other hand, primarily interested in how conversational
sequences are linked together over the course of time. I will not be looking for individual
sequences in and across multiple therapies. Because my interest is in the temporal
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sequence of a particular dyad (as opposed to common conversational sequences across
multiple therapies), collecting multiple dyads became unnecessary and even problematic.
For example, by collecting two dyads and examining each temporal sequence I would
have to inevitably compare my findings. As interesting as this might be, a comparison
study with only two datasets is quite small, limiting the conclusions that can be made. In
the end, it became clear that a single case study was more appropriate, methodologically
speaking, for the study. The decision to pursue a single case study, instead of a
comparative study, was made prior to data collection during a consultation with my
dissertation chair.
Needing only a single case allowed me to be more selective and I soon realized
that I was choosing therapies that felt psychodynamic. Looking back, this should not have
been a surprise. I began this project by examining psychoanalytic interpretation through
Gadamerian Hermeneutics. Also, my proposal, pilot work, and literature review have
primarily focused on psychodynamic psychotherapy. To not make this implicit interest
explicit would have been a grave oversight, which could have damaged the integrity of
the study. However, this created a new problem: Why do certain therapies feel more
psychodynamic? To answer this question I had to reflect on my assumptions and clarify
what psychodynamic therapy is and what influences me to feel that one therapy is
psychodynamic and another is not.
It turns out that distinguishing between different types of therapies is very
difficult in practice. As Alan Kazdin (1994) points out in his overview of methodology
and design in psychotherapy research:
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In many cases, it may be difficult to select and evaluate treatments that are known
or established as faithful renditions of the treatments. Perhaps the main issue is
that rarely is there a single, agreed upon, or standardized method that can be
gleaned from prior research or clinical practice. Thus, investigators usually
develop treatment guidelines and manuals to make explicit those procedures that
are poorly specified or highly variable in clinical work. (p. 36)
In other words, researchers have found that the best way to distinguish been different
therapeutic models is to intervene on the front end and have therapists conduct therapy
following a step by step instruction manual. According to Kazdin, this differs from
naturally occurring clinical practice where the therapist is able to work more
spontaneously, changing her approach whenever she deems necessary. Therefore,
manualized treatment distorts the natural practice of psychotherapy, flattening its nuance
and spontaneity. Furthermore, by manipulating therapy on the front end, researchers
knowingly and intentionally affect their data. The data is now intimately tied up with the
research itself, which forces us to question the quality of the data and the results of the
study. If a researcher’s primary concern is comparing different therapeutic approaches,
then possibly they would be willing to accept these concerns for the sake of being able to
demonstrate orientation fidelity.
My research differs from the orientation comparison studies significantly. My
goal is not to isolate a prototypical example of psychodynamic therapy, but to study a
natural occurrence of psychodynamic therapy as it was practiced. Archival data gives us a
window into this type of therapy because it was recorded during the normal course of
daily practice. The specific or direct impetus for recording was not to collect data for this
particular study. Therefore, neither the therapist nor the client was influenced by my
research question or concerns. Here we have naturally occurring data untainted by the
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research process. This is essential for the validity of the study. By using DIA to examine
constitution, our foremost concern is that we have data from an ordinary, everyday
therapy. This goes back to the idea that we are examining a specimen of institutional
interaction that is part of, but does not stand for, the entire species. If we were pursuing a
comparative study then we might be more concerned with isolating a certain therapeutic
orientation. Even though we are still burdened with answering the basic question of how
we identify and define a psychodynamic therapy, ensuring orientation fidelity is less of a
concern. Furthermore, ensuring absolute fidelity would pose a danger to the integrity of
the study itself because this would require restrictions, imposed by the researcher, which
degrade the quality of the naturally occurring data we seek.
So, how do researchers identify psychodynamic therapy when they are accessing
archival data and are unable or unwilling to rely on manualization? Furthermore, is there
a satisfying definition of psychodynamic therapy that helps us recognize this type of
therapy in practice? These are difficult questions, but ones that need to be answered.
Let’s begin with the second question. To define psychodynamic therapy we have to
distinguish it from other therapeutic techniques (CBT, Behavioral, Gestalt, and so on),
while also encompassing the fractured field of psychoanalysis. Many theorists have tried
to give an integrated view of psychoanalysis while also recognizing the irreconcilable
differences among many of the theories. Stephen Mitchell and Jay Greenberg (1983)
addressed this problem head-on in their book Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory.
The impetus for their book was a desire to teach their students the important differences
between psychoanalytic theories while also providing a larger framework inside which
the theories could be understood as responding to a universal clinical concern -- i.e.
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object relations. They contend that object relations, a term used to refer to our
relationships with other people, is a helpful way to examine the various clinical theories.
After all, the relationship between the patient and the therapist or the patient and her
family are of central concern to clinical practice and theory. This focus on object
relations allowed Greenberg and Mitchell to examine how each theorist contends with
interpersonal dynamics. They show how each theorist struggles with a choice between
the drive/structure model, first put forward by Freud, and the relational/structure that was
developed by theorists such as Melanie Klein and Henry Stacks Sullivan. After a
laborious and productive discussion they tentatively put forward a lengthy definition of
psychoanalytic theory which I will quote here at length :
Each of the theorists discussed embraces a dynamic view of the process of human
living, considering our lives determined by the complex interplay of a variety of
motivational forces which may operate concordantly or conflictually. Each
believes in a concept of the unconscious…endorses the idea that many or most of
our motives that move us function outside of normal awareness. Each believes
that the most effective way of studying man is through the kind of intense,
collaborative inquiry that defines the psychoanalytic situation…. The models
within psychoanalysis differ with respect to the content each attributes to the
operative dynamic forces, especially to those which are commonly a part of the
repressed unconscious. For the drive/structure model theorists the repressed
unconscious consists of the derivatives of phylogenetically determined sexual and
aggressive impulses which have for one reason or another been deemed
“unacceptable” within…society. For the relational/structure model theorist the
unconscious consists of particular images of self and other which have been
summarily rejected. (p. 382)
This definition is similar to how psychodynamic therapy is distinguished from
other approaches in clinical practice. The Bible of psychotherapy research, Bergen and
Garfield's Handbook of Psychotherapy and Behavior Change, added an entire chapter on
psychodynamic therapy to their 1994 edition (Bergin & Garfield, 1994). In that chapter
the authors struggled with defining the clinical practice of psychodynamic therapy, but
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settled on a succinct definition from Glenn Gabbard (1990): “an approach to diagnose
and treatment characterized by a way of thinking about both patient and clinician that
includes unconscious conflict, deficits and distortions of inner psychic structures, and
internal object relations” (quoted in Henry, Strupp, Schacht, & Gaston, 1990, p. 468).
According to the authors, this definition applies to both psychoanalysis and
psychodynamic therapies. Historically, a division has been created between classic
psychoanalysis and psychoanalytically inspired therapies. However, the authors point out
that empirical research examining these two types of therapeutic practices has shown few
differences. For example, the influential Psychotherapy Research Project of the 1950s
showed that there were equal amounts of interpretive and supportive interventions in both
psychoanalysis and psychodynamic therapy (p. 468).
Where quantitative research has struggled to distinguish psychodynamic therapy
for other approaches, qualitative methods, such as CA, have shown how psychodynamic
therapists practice a depth hermeneutic, recognizing slips, errors, pauses, and thematic
similarities between symptoms and other events. Researchers have shown how these
therapists actively create and solve therapeutic puzzles. As reviewed in chapter 3,
Vehviläinen (2003, 2008) has referred to this practice as an “interpretive trajectory”.
Currently, this practice has only been identified in psychodynamic psychotherapy. The
interpretive trajectory is complex and it utilizes many common conversational tactics
found throughout psychotherapy (i.e. formulation, lexical substitution, and so forth). But
the way that analysts seek to create psychoanalytic puzzles out of symptoms and
corruptions of speech and then offer solutions by way of interpretation is unique
according to current research. Briefly, it is worth noting that researchers have also found
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that these interpretive solutions encourage clients to extend the original interpretation and
engage in a collaborative discussion (Peräkylä, 2005, 2008). This discussion seems to be
a collaborative self-reflection that allows both the client and the therapist to shape the
ongoing clinical narrative.
Taking all this into consideration, we might add to our definition that
psychodynamic psychotherapy is a depth hermeneutic practice that utilizes
psychoanalytic puzzles and interpretation in order to foster self reflection. This way of
understanding the practice of psychodynamic therapy greatly influenced the data
selection. As I watched various dyads I realized that I was looking for a therapy similar to
the ones described by Peräkylä and Vehviläinen. I was looking for a therapist that was
working to create analytic puzzles that could be solved by interpretation, which would
then lead into a collaborative discussion.25
And yet, it would be misleading to claim that this criteria could be used to
distinguish psychodynamic therapy from other approaches. Typically, comparative
studies that examine what actually transpires during the clinical hour reveal as many
similarities as differences (Kazdin, 1994). This is why it has always been difficult to
25

I found it difficult to view these psychotherapy sessions solely from a researcher perspective.
Inevitably, I observed each interaction from a clinical perspective. I, myself, attended to the
transference and countertransference, imagined interpretations and applauded the therapist’s
skillful moments. Inevitably my clinical intuitions informed how I selected my dataset. I found
myself looking for transference interpretations and the use of dream interpretation. Furthermore, I
was interested in therapies that upheld a practical blank screen, keeping clear boundaries between
the patient and therapist, and therapies that used minimal educative and supportive interventions.
As past researchers have pointed out, all therapies have supportive elements. But during data
collection I came upon therapies that were primarily supportive and pedagogical and this was not
in line with my interests in therapeutic interpretation. However, the question is whether these
clinical hunches that arose during data selection process (informing my decision-making process)
have any empirical grounding in the data itself. These are questions that will bear out over the
course of the study.
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distinguish therapies based solely on the empirical criteria. As stated previously many
have attempted to solve this problem by turning to manualization. Others, hoping to
avoid the negative consequences of manualized treatment, have simply tried to solicit
"therapists [who] were experienced and respected exponents of the respective
approaches” (p. 158).26 This quote is from Lambert and Bergin's (1994) review of the
quantitative research on psychotherapy effectiveness. Here, they were discussing a wellrespected study comparing the effectiveness of different therapeutic orientations. In part,
this study was highly regarded because of its method of selecting therapists with specific
orientations. Similarly, Kazdin (1994) points out that a therapist’s training and
supervision can also be used to identify clinical orientation (p. 38). Therefore, knowledge
of a clinician's subscribed orientation, training and supervision can be used as a criterion
for identifying used to determine a psychodynamic dyad. This is where my relationship
with the training clinic and my firsthand knowledge of the other therapists in training was
useful. The therapist of the selected dyad was a well-known advocate for psychodynamic
psychotherapy. This is something he spoke of many times in public and private and it was
well known throughout the training clinic. Although many influences affect our clinical
practice, this therapist could be labeled as strictly psychodynamic when it comes to
clinical practice.
To summarize, during the data collection process I selected therapies that felt
psychodynamic. After reflecting on what psychodynamic therapy is, in theory and in
26

These therapists also fill out a survey where they could endorse or not endorse statements that
applied to various clinical positions (i.e. psychodynamic therapy, CBT, behavioral therapy, and
so on). Those know to be psychodynamic practitioners who also endorsed the psychodynamic
statements were categorized as psychodynamic therapists for the study.
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practice, it became clear that two criteria guided this process. (1) Knowledge of clinician
clinical orentation: similar to some comparison studies of psychotherapy orientations,
knowledge of the clinician's subscribed orientation can be part of the criteria used to
determine if a therapy can be considered as psychodynamic. (2) Find dyads utilizing
conversational practices identified in previous CA research on psychodynamic therapy.
Following the work of Peräkylä and Vehviläinen, I looked for the creation of analytic
puzzles that could be solved by interpretation, leading to collaborative discussion.
Data Collection and Selection
All the data for this study was collected from a training clinic in the northeast
United States. Most of the therapists were students pursuing graduate degrees
psychology. Occasionally, students will work with couples, adolescents, and children;
however the major treatment was individual long-term work with adults. Services are
provided on a pay-for-service, sliding-scale model, and therapy is allowed to unfold with
relative freedom. There is no time limit or session cap and since the theoretical
orientation privileges the in-depth work that can be done over time, long therapies are
common. Demographically, clients are both students and members from the community.
Clients came to the clinic with a wide array of presenting problems from schizophrenia to
adjustment disorder.
All the therapists in training are under the supervision. Students make audio-video
recordings of their sessions to review with their supervisors. When clients consent for
treatment they agree to be videotaped for training and research purposes. Out of the five
consulting rooms in the clinic, three have video equipment installed. Filming occurs
unobtrusively. The camera and microphone always remain in the room; they do not
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appear suddenly when the student decides to record. Recording practices vary between
students. Sometimes students record individual sessions which are viewed during
supervision and then erased. Other times students record a series of sessions, intakes or
individual sessions, which are then placed into the video archive. The archives are tapes
stored for supervisory and research purposes in the clinic office.
The data for this study consists of video recordings from this archive. The archive
was relatively new when I began collecting data. Because of this, the overall size of the
archive was small, roughly about 30 tapes ranging from 1 to 5 sessions per tape. Also, a
consistent archival procedure, such as documenting the therapist, client and session date,
was not yet part of the clinic culture and documentation ranged widely. Some tapes were
labeled accurately listing the therapist (by name) and the client (by two letter pseudonym,
such as TR) with dates that correlated well with the session material. Others were poorly
labeled. For example, a tape might be labeled as a single client and therapist dyad, but
then have four sessions with multiple clients. Or multiple tapes might be labeled as
sessions by a certain therapist, but all the material on those tapes was of a different
therapist altogether.
The relatively small size of the archive and the unsystematic documentation made
data collection difficult. Initially, I spent two days viewing tapes. I viewed 12 tapes
containing numerous dyads. Five of these tapes were mislabeled and excluded from the
study. Mislabeling made it impossible for me to know the session sequence and the
duration between sessions. Because I am interested in understanding the temporal
sequence of therapeutic practice—understanding how earlier therapeutic sequences are
linked to later interactions—knowing the order of the therapy sessions (session 1, session
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2, session 3, and so on) is a vital. Even though these five tapes were excluded, the
remaining data still seemed promising.
However, after viewing the tapes in depth, further problems emerged. Many of
the tapes had very poor audio quality, making transcription impossible. Two tapes were
immediately excluded because of their poor audio quality, which left me with only 3
dyads on the remaining tapes (Dy-B, 2 sessions; Dy-A, 2 sessions; and Dy-C, 4 sessions).
I was initially very interested in Dy-C because it was the longest of the 3 series.
However, the audio quality of the sessions was also poor and even after extensive
engineering I was unable to improve the quality of the audio to the degree necessary for
transcription. This left only Dy-B and Dy-A. Dy-B was actually mislabeled, but after
watching the tape it seemed likely that the sessions were in sequential order because the
second session referenced the first session directly. However, I could not be entirely sure
and, therefore, the complete lack of labeling made this dyad undesirable. Hence, Dy-A
seemed the most promising: both sessions were very active, and the therapist was a
fourth-year student primarily interested in psychodynamic psychotherapy. However,
since I originally planned to only use a therapy series if it contained four sessions, two
sessions seemed far too little. Therefore, I decided to wait for a month and allow new
tapes to be added to the archives in hopes of collecting a longer series.
Shortly after this first attempt at collecting data, I contacted the clinical director
and discussed some of the problems I was having. We collaborated on a memo sent out to
all the therapists currently practicing at the clinic. The memo, sent via e-mail, restated the
importance of consistent documentation and the importance of building the archive for
current and future research. Then, a month and a half later, I returned to the archive.
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Although only a handful of new tapes had been added, they were properly labeled and the
audio quality, for the most part, was much improved. During this visit I collected two
more therapy series, Dy-D (three sessions) and Dy-E (four sessions), which brought the
total number of analyzable series to four:
1. Dy-A, 2 sessions
2. Dy-D, 3 sessions
3. Dy-E, 4 sessions
4. Dy-B, 2 sessions
I have placed dyads in the order that corresponds to the best material for this
project. There are a handful of factors that I considered while choosing between the
dyads. First and foremost was audio quality. Without adequate audio quality,
transcription and analysis would have been impossible. Second, was having multiple
sessions of the same dyad. Third was adequate labeling. And last, was clinical orientation
as identified by the criteria stated previously.
Out of all the data in the archive only these four dyads met the above criteria.
After that, it was matter of assessing which dyad would be best for this project. I chose
Dy-A because the sessions were very interactive, providing ample data despite the
limited number of recorded sessions. Furthermore, the therapy being conducted was
identified as psychodynamic by the criteria stated previously. Also, the therapist was in
his fourth and final year of clinical training. Fourth-year students, having completed their
comprehensive exams and clinical position paper, are competent therapists on the cusp of
transitioning into the field of professional psychology. And, although there are always
individual differences in level of professional maturity, being able to analyze data from
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advanced students more than likely provides a better example of psychotherapy as it is
professionally practiced.
However, the Dy-A dyad was not the only data set with a fourth-year therapist
practicing from a psychodynamic perspective, Dy-D also fit this criteria. The choice
between the Dy-D dyad and Dy-A was difficult. At first I thought that the Dy-D sessions
would probably be my first choice because the dataset had more sessions than the Dy-A
dyad. However, in the Dy-D series there is very little interaction between the therapist
and the client. Actually, the entire second session is a long client monologue with very
little therapist interaction. The third session is much more active and the therapist and the
client discuss a dream throughout, which seemed to do some interesting therapeutic work.
However, after watching all three sessions there seems to be very little analyzable data as
compared to the Dy-A series.
Again, the Dy-A sessions are very interactive. The therapist is making
formulations, interpretations, and asking the client to engage in self-reflection. Many of
the sequential phenomena as identified by conversation analysis studying psychodynamic
psychotherapy (formulation, reinterpretation, interpretive trajectory, circulation figures,
and so on) are present during the sessions. Because conversation analysis focuses on the
sequential interaction between participants (i.e. client and therapist), therapies where
interactions are few and far between pose a methodological problem. This project is
primarily interested in understanding how therapeutic interactions constitute a mutual
understanding between the client and therapist. The question at hand is: how is this
understanding worked out through a specialized form of talk that has therapeutic intent
and, ideally, therapeutic effect? Although this process is, presumably, still occurring in
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low activity therapies, higher activity sessions would make for a richer analysis based on
the research method being employed.
Now, I would like to briefly address why the other two datasets were excluded
from the final analysis. The Dy-E sessions do have some promising moments, but the
therapist is very hard to hear because she spoke in a whisper. If this dyad were chosen, an
alarmingly high percentage of the utterances would have been inaudible and therefore
non-transcribable. Also, the therapist was not a vocal advocate of psychodynamic
therapy, and her reputation was more of a humanisticly oriented practitioner.27 Again,
because of my interest in psychodynamic therapy, both as a research object and as a
therapeutic practice, this makes the Dy-E series less attractive as compared to the other
datasets.
Last, the Dy-B series also had some promise, but ultimately the poor
documentation and the availability of better quality datasets eliminated it as a front
runner. As mentioned before, this tape was originally labeled as a completely different
therapist and patient dyad. Therefore, we have no dates for the sessions, making it
impossible to know for certain what year the therapist was in during the taping and the
order of the sessions.

27 5

Here again are some clinical intuitions that will need to be flushed out during the empirical
research. My feeling was that the therapist was often trying to counsel the client by explaining to
him what human beings are in explicit terms. This is quite different from what you see in the DyA sessions where the therapist seems more interested in provoking the client to engage in selfreflection. The question that I'll have to resolve is if the Dy-A sessions do seem to be doing
something other than supportive, pedagogical work, informing the client about who she is as a
human being.
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Critical Reflection on Data Selection
Because of the above reasons I chose to analyze the Dy-A series, yet the data set
was far from problem free. First, obviously, is its length: it is only two sessions and one
of the sessions is only about 35 minutes long. However, the point has already been made
that the level of activity in this series provided ample data for the study. Many studies
have successfully demonstrated that lengthy interactions are not necessary for producing
quality research. This is because methods that examine the intricacies of interaction
attend to the expansive nuances of discursive practices, turning what might seem small
into something quite extensive and illuminating. For example, the renowned linguist
William Labov partnered with the social scientist David Fanshel to produce their classic
discursive examination of psychotherapy: Therapeutic Discourse: Psychotherapy as
Conversation (Labov & Fanshel, 1977). This book, considered a precursor to
conversation analysis, is based solely on a 15 minute recording of a psychodynamic
therapy (Peräkylä et al., 2008b, p. 8).
Another concern is the collegial relationships I have with the therapists at the
training clinic. As therapists, we often consult on cases and we sometimes have group
supervision where we discussed our clients and our approach to therapy. This provided an
extensive web of preconceptions that informed the data selection process and analysis. As
stated before, this became clear when I watched the archive tapes. I found myself leaning
toward those who I knew were psychodynamic practitioners. This information is part of
the tapestry that makes up my hunches and guides my inquiry. It is part of my
membership knowledge and it will be incorporated into the study as such.
To conclude, let me summarize the process of data collection detailed above. I
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collected data on two occasions, gathering multiple therapy dyads to analyze. There were
no major problems, but some changes were made. In the proposal I stated that data would
be from two different dyads in the hopes of getting 8 to 10 hours of analyzable data. This
stemmed from my earlier understanding of conversation analysis, where researchers
would analyze large amounts of data in order to identify multiple instances of a single
conversational sequence. I came to realize that my research differed from previous
studies in that I was interested in how the therapist and the client affect each other over
the course of therapy. In other words, I was interested in the temporal dimension of
therapeutic talk and its effects, and therefore I would be examining how sequences evolve
over time. Prior to collecting data, Dr. Packer and I came to the conclusion that a classic
case study would be the most appropriate way to analyze this research question. At that
point, collecting two dyads became unnecessary. Also, it raised concerns about validity.
Collecting two dyads would inevitably force my analysis into a comparison. This
comparison would be weak since I would only have two datasets upon which to base the
analysis.
Needing only a single dyad, I was able to be more selective during the data
collection process. Originally I avoided specifying what theoretical orientation I was
interested in studying. I feared that by specifying a specific orientation I would decrease
the chances of finding the two dyads that I needed. Having only to collect a single case, I
decided to seek out dyads that had a more psychodynamic feel. This aligned with my
interests as a researcher and as a clinician.
As I began to collect data there were multiple technical problems with many of
the dyads such as improper labeling and poor audio quality. Many dyads were excluded
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because of these issues and only four remained in the final pool. Of those four, two were
excluded because of a combination of technical issues and an inability to identify the
therapist as psychodynamically oriented. The choice then was between a three session
dyad and a two session dyad. Although the three session dyad was preferable because of
its length, the interaction between the therapist and the client was minimal. Because
conversation analysis examines the exchanges between participants, active sessions with
frequent verbal exchanges are preferable. Therefore, the two session dyad was chosen for
analysis.
One question that had to be resolved during this process was how to identify a
psychodynamically oriented dyad. Because I was relying on archival data I was unable to
guarantee orientation fidelity through measures such as treatment manualization
(manualized treatment would also raise validity issues because conversation analysis
privileges naturally occurring talk over scripted conversation). In the past, researchers
wanting to avoid manualization have relied upon the reputation of the therapist to
indicate the overall therapeutic orientation (Lambert & Bergin, 1994). Therefore, the
number one criterion used to identify a psychodynamic dyad was to seek out therapists
who were known proponents and practitioners of psychodynamic therapy. Because I have
both personal and professional relationships with all the therapists in the study I was able
to identify those practitioners who were strongly psychodynamic and consider their dyads
for the study. Furthermore, while watching the tapes I looked for conversational practices
that CA researchers have identified as unique to psychodynamic therapy, such as the
interpretive trajectory (Vehviläinen, 2003, 2008). Finding instances of the interpretive
trajectory was also a criterion for data selection.
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Research Procedure: Using DIA to Examine Constitution in Psychotherapy
The research procedures used for the study were developed based on the
theoretical assumptions and methods discussed in this chapter. What follows is an outline
of the research process. It is an attempt to systematically explain how the research was
conducted and inevitably this will oversimplify the process. However, this provides a
faithful map for those who are interested in understanding or replicating the study. One
way to understand the research process is to simply view it as a succession of steps that
unfold over time. This is a linear perspective. From this viewpoint, the procedure is a
two-step process with each step containing a number of sub-steps (see figure 4). The first
step involves a systematic reflection on initial assumptions and biases held by the
researcher. This involves keeping a “field Journal” where the researcher can jot down
assumptions and thoughts during the data collection, transcription, and analysis stages. I
found that during the data collection and transcription; assumptions, intuitions, and biases
arose quite frequently and I spent a good deal of time jotting down various thoughts in
journals and as well as using transcription software to “tag” specific points on the tape.
Looking back, it is clear that transcribing the data was a turning point. It changed the way
that I saw the data and hence recording my experience during this time was important.
After the sessions were transcribed I moved into the data analysis phase. This can
be seen as a three part process. First, I analyzed the data using conversation analysis. The
initial step was to map the sequences. I created visual maps that showed the different
types of utterances used by both the therapist and the client. I was able to break the
sessions into a series of interpretive sequences ending in an interpretation similar to what
has been described by Vehviläinen (2003, 2008). Second, I used the hermeneutic-analytic
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procedure to identify emotion within the relationship and in the discourse. And last, I
examined narratives and the narrative commentary produced by the participants and
looked for shifts in relational patterns and for parallels between the relationships
described in the narratives and the relationship between the therapist and the client. As
mentioned before, this analytic procedure goes beyond conversation analysis and is best
described as Detailed Interaction Analysis, which incorporates a theory of emotion and a
theory of narrative as action.
The last step was to look at all of the data and begin to ask how the client is being
constituted as a certain kind of subject. Following conversation analysis, this can be seen
as a move from pure analysis to applied analysis (ten Have, 1999). Applied CA aims to
examine institutional conversation in order to develop a critical understanding that can
enact change. Hence, we are now asking questions that are ethical and political in nature.
In order to understand psychotherapy as a constitutional practice, we have to see it as a
site of power where problems are introduced, worked on, and transformed. How these
problems become constituted affects the kind of person the client can be in psychotherapy
and hence creates the initial condition for change, i.e. forges a way of being (in relation
to self, others, and the good) that is not readily possible in everyday life.
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Figure 4
Linear Map of Research Procedure

Reflecting on assumptions
● 1st viewing (details in data collection) writing down assumptions and
thoughts
● Transcribing and writing notes
● Initial analysis and notes
● Detailed-Interaction-Analysis
● CA
● Analyzing adjacency pairs
● Mapping conversational actions and sequences
● Analyzing relationship between sequences
● STE
● Looking for emotional transactions between the client and
therapist
● Looking for emotion transactions between characters in the
discourse
● NIA
● Relationships between characters
● Relationships between participants
● Shifts in relationships
● Parallels in relationship (participants and characters)
————————————————————————— Move to applied analysis
●
Constitution
● How is the problem advanced and changed (Genealogy)
● When do major changes happen?
● Where is the problem made clinical/therapeutic
● What is the relationship of power/knowledge/resistance?
● How do we relate these findings to our understanding or psychotherapy
as a larger historical practice?
● If psychotherapy is a type of thinking, how is it used to think in a certain
kind of way and in turn foster a certain kind of person?
● Possibly: the client has ownership of the problem
● A more individualistic understanding of emotion
●

By looking at the research process from a linear perspective we can see how the
methods used to understand conversational sequences, emotions, and narratives can be
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understanding of psychotherapy. Each time the procedures are refined and the process
begins again as you try to understand this complex practice.
In the next chapter I will lead the reader through the analysis of the two sessions
of the dataset. However, it is worth noting that the procedure itself is a major finding,
something that was developed in response to problems and discoveries. Because one of
the goals of this study was aimed at demonstrating a methodology; hence this chapter
makes up a significant portion of the findings.
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chapter

5
A DETAILED INTERACTION ANALYSIS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AS
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE: ANALYSIS OF SESSION A

I want to just decimate something (.) And…I decimate me
((gaze))…instead…ya↓…((croaking))…Yea I just get really angry, I guess
it’s anger?
Sarah (client), Session A, Line 285-287

Introductory Remarks on the Research Process
Now, after the second interpretation she seems to start working therapeutically.
What I mean by this is that she uses a dream to interpret her situation. The dream is used
to further explain how she feels. Dreams are saturated with affect and the dream that she
talks about is no different. Although I was not there when she talked of the dream
originally, nor did I have the dream myself, I know that the issues between herself and
her mother-in-law are quite intense and that her mother-in-law is often used as an object
of her rage. The therapist even talked to me about how the client’s mother-in-law stands
in the place of the client’s own mother and how she constantly works out many of her
infantile needs and anger through her mother-in-law (this is an example of displacement
and projection). In other words, the mother-in-law is the bad object externalized.
Ultimately, this is the projection of the torturous internal object that often berates the
client through internal dialogue. Here we might begin to wonder about the associative
links that brought the dream to mind. Possibly, the internal dialogue that she has been
discussing and the mother-in-law are all a manifestation of the bad object. So, with this
dream the client is becoming conscious of her complex object relations and she is talking
about her subjective position vis-à-vis these objects. This is a very powerful statement by
the client, that in some ways he [the therapist] blows over by trying to dig deeper and to
point out her role as the victim of the externalized object.
Reflection on Session B, Lines 76-87
February 20, 2012
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This was one of my initial responses to the sessions, written from the position of a
therapist. As I mentioned in chapter 4, because I am a therapist, client, and researcher I
have many different implicit assumptions about psychotherapy. In some cases these
assumptions are at odds with one another and this makes thinking about, let alone writing
about, psychotherapy difficult. The above example is how I think about therapy from a
therapist’s perspective. It relies heavily on the notion of language as symbolic
representation and the client as a deep self. The ontological assumptions that ground DIA
differ, in that language and emotion are types of action and the client has no essential
self, but is rather constituted as a kind of self by actively participating in the practices of a
form of life. Hence, the analysis that follows looks very different from the excerpt above.
DIA is a fully integrated methodology that uses language common to
conversation analysis, narrative analysis, the Structural Theory of Emotion, as well as
Foucault and Heidegger. The analysis is presented so as to emphasize this integration.
However, I try to alert the reader (through citation or by prefacing the sentence) when I,
for example, shift from conversation analytic language to the language of the Structural
Theory of Emotion. Furthermore, because my own assumptions and reactions as a
therapist are important, I have added in my own thoughts during the analysis. These
comments are often found in the footnotes, but at times they are woven into the analysis.
I have also tried to avoid writing in a way that conveys that I know what the
participants are thinking and intending. Instead, I have focused on describing their
actions, the consequences of those actions, and how that relates to constitution. This, at
times, was very difficult. One word in particular kept popping up and I struggled to
eliminate or clarify the term. The word is ‘deep’. As in the reflection above, I felt
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compelled to use this word and over the course of the analysis I realized that it was futile
to try and strip it from the study. Instead, I chose to use the word. The more I thought
about it the more I realized I had no clue what I meant by it. Sure I could translate it into
therapeutic language, but how could I understand the word and its implications from a
research perspective? I chose to use the word as an indicator of important therapeutic
assumptions that I held as both a therapist and a client. While watching the tape I would
have an intuitive feeling that some parts of the session were deeper than others. The more
I studied the tapes I was able to spot moments that felt particularly deep and then quickly
ended. I noted these spots and tried to understand what happened in these moments. What
was the empirical evidence that could have contributed to these feelings that occurred as I
watched this moment in time? By the end it became clear that these were moments of
emotion, or at least where emotion seemed possible. As you will see, these moments are
rare, yet important constitutional events. Hence, subjecting my implicit assumptions to
empirical explication allowed me to access psychotherapy at the level of participant
understanding and gain important insights that were used to further back up claims made
by this research.
The major claim that will be demonstrated throughout the analysis is that
psychotherapy problematizes the client as a deep emotional being. Emotion will be
shown to be a powerful, yet practical form of action that can take different forms
depending how it is constituted by the participants. Emotion is, therefore, a pliable
‘substance.’ For example, there are varied of ways that emotion can be used by the
participants. First, emotion can be transacted; transforming the relationship between the
participants in the here-and-now (e.g. gets angry, feel ashamed, be compassionate). This
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is what is described by de Rivera (1977) in STE and it is what people commonly think of
when they talk about emotion. These are the rare deep moments mentioned above. The
infrequency of these transactions should not lead the reader to assume that participants
are unconcerned about emotion. On the contrary, the analysis that follows shows how
emotion can be used in ways beyond the here-and-now transactions.
Hence, the second way emotion is used by the participants is to directly refer to
emotion by using emotional language. This is most often done by the therapist, but is also
used by the client. In this chapter, the therapist consistently uses emotional language
when responding to the client’s storytelling or commentary. This can be interpreted as a
constitutional tactic aimed at foregrounding how client feels. This tactic does not simply
elicit feelings; rather it shifts the location of the problem being discussed. As will be
shown, the client talks about John, her partner, who is have trouble holding down a job.
The narrative is told is such a way that the problem (i.e. what is wrong, what needs to be
worked on and fixed) is with John, not the client. Hence, the use of emotional language
changes the location of the problem. The problem is constituted as an emotional problem
that is owned by the client. It is her problem; what is problematized is what she feels in
response to the partner not having a job. Hence, in session A the client is constituted as
an emotional being in order to locate the problem in the client’s experience. This is the
major constitutional objective in session A and is most prominent during the first
sequence of session A (SAS1). This finding is in line with other studies (Davis, 1986;
Goicoechea, 2013; Madill et al., 2001) that have described how psychotherapy can shift
the location of a problem through a “process of problem (re)formulation and
individualization” (Davis, 1986, p. 47). However, what is unique about this present study
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is the description of how emotion is used within an overarching constitutional strategy.
The use of emotional language is one tactic that is used and throughout the analysis other
tactics will be demonstrated. However, emotion will be shown to be an important ethical
substance that can be used to problematize the way the client relates to herself and others.
The third way that participants can use emotion is talk about emotion through
storytelling and commentary. In the analysis, attention will be paid to how the client
crafts relationships between characters when telling a story. Emotion can quickly emerge
and disappear as characters and situations are described. The analysis will show how
emotional possibilities are created and then used when participants talk more directly
about the emotional relationships that were only hinted at initially. This is most apparent
in sequence 3 of session A, but can be seen across the dataset.
Above I discussed how this feeling of therapeutic depth occurred during moments
that were emotional. However, this feeling was not simply a divining tool used to identify
emotion. As the analysis proceeded, I began to see the myriad of ways that emotion could
be used by the participants. These events were often complex fabrics of action that bound
together different temporal orders and emotions that were being talked about while also
being transacted by the participants. This was most apparent in session B, which is
analyzed in the next chapter. Whereas the problematizing in session A primarily focused
on problem location, in session B the participants were more or less in agreement on the
location and type of problem. In session B the problem is emotional and owned by the
client. We might say that session A is concerned with recognizing the problem as
emotional, where as session B is concerned with understanding how to be an emotional
being. In session B we see the therapist introduce a past emotional event, which the client
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avoids discussing directly by using temporal shifts. We also see the client narrate feelings
of shame and rejection while also making explicit an emotional transaction of
compassion that transpires in the here-and-now. The therapist encourages the client to be
“curious” and reflect on all of these instances of emotion. This produces talk about the
ways the client can recognize and reflect on herself (relationship-to-self), as well as
respond and act on others (relationship-to-others) in order to be a good, ethical person.
This constitutional process is a way of thinking about emotion as an alluring substance
that must be recognized and understood in order to change and heal. Because emotion is
unwilled and can take many different forms; it can be constituted as a powerful, yet
foreign substance that is complex in its pervasiveness. Hence, this intuitive sense of depth
is not a simple sign of recognition, but a grasping of the constitutional process in which
emotion becomes an alluring ethical substance whose depth is better understood as an
expansiveness of actions present on the surface of psychotherapeutic thought.
What follows is the analysis of session A, beginning with the opening sequence
and then proceeding through all seven sequences and ending with the conversational
closing. The analysis is presented to the reader in the form of a visual map and as a 3rd
person narrative. There is a map for each sequence place at the beginning of the analysis.
The logic of the maps is described in a footnote attached to the map of the first sequence
of session A. These maps are meant to supplement the body of the analysis. The analysis
is written in the present tense in order to convey the sense of a by-standard’s account of
the conversation. Whenever possible I have used the participants own words in the
description; however I have taken out all the transcription codes and made edits to
improve readability and flow. Most of the transcript has been excerpt and placed with the
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corresponding analysis to give the reader access to the unedited version. The complete
transcript is located in the appendix. Furthermore, the analysis does contain references to
and review of literature not addressed previously. My hope is that having this information
during the analysis will be more useful then confining it within a traditional literature
review and forcing the reader to continually look back for defined terms. Hence, the
analysis starts with a discussion of trouble talk, which is a type of conversation studied in
CA. However, I argue psychotherapy differs from everyday conversation, in that the
tendency to move away from trouble talk is replaced with a type of problematizing that
locates the trouble inside the client. In other words, psychotherapy keeps the focus of the
conversation on the trouble talk in order to constitute the problem as individualized and
personal.
Conversational Structure of Opening and Sequence 1 (S1)
As a therapist, one of the first things I came to realize is how difficult it is for
people to talk about what bothers them. In everyday conversation there is also this
tendency to move away from “trouble talk” and try to keep social interaction at the level
of “business as usual” (Jefferson, 1988, p. 419). Therapists and clients have to figure out
how to move from everyday talk to therapeutic talk. This is what we see occurring in the
opening and initial sequence of session A. The client begins by talking about a problem
that she has been struggling with during the past week. In everyday conversation most
listeners try to be polite, but they look for ways to change the topic from the problem
being discussed. In the initial sequence of session A we see the opposite occurring. The
therapist continually brings the client back to the problem and highlights the possible
emotional and personal impact it could have on the client. The client resists this, but
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eventually she begins to talk about the problem as a “chaotic feeling” that occurs when,
as the therapist puts it, she feels “evaluated” (Lines 96 and 109). Below is a map of the
basic conversational structure of the Opening and Sequence 1 (S1) (see S1 sequencing
diagram).28 What follows is a detailed description of how therapeutic talk is different
from everyday talk. Although there are more powerful moments later on in the session,
this sequence is described in detail because it demonstrates how participants act with and
against one another in order to create a different type of social interaction that ultimately
changes how the client relates to herself. It is a prime example of how problematizing is
uniquely performed during psychotherapy.

28

In the diagram below the therapist's turns are represented by different symbols. This is because
the therapist uses different types of utterances (questions, formulations, extensions and so on) that
are well studied in the CA literature. On the contrary, all the client’s turns are represented by
ovals. For the most part, the client uses commentary, storytelling, and elaboration during her
turns. Most of her turns are in response to the therapists questions and formulations. Yet, this
does not mean that the client simply follows the therapist’s lead. She has many ways to change
topics, to take hold of the conversational floor and influence the therapist. This, I hope, is clear in
the analysis. In the conversational maps I have tried to document some of the client’s tactics, if
you will, that stand out. Naturally the map leaves out data, but I hope it helps the reader grasps
the temporal flow of the sequence and the dance that unfolds during the session. Time marks
correspond to the therapist's turn and were taken from the video data. Notice that session A starts
at 3:29, when the participants enter the room and begin talking.
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Figurre 6
Open
ning and Seq
quence 1 (S1)), Basic Con
nversational Structure
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Opening Pre-sequence
As session A begins, the client enters the room and casually sits down. She yawns
and stretches, taking her time, as the therapist sits silently. She ends her opening
utterance by saying:“…it is a hectic week” to which the therapist responds: “What is
going on?”(see Excerpt 1, line 3). This is what conversation analysts call an opening presequence. It is a specific type of sequence that prepares the participants for the sequences
to come (ten Have, 1999, p. 114). There are many types of pre-sequences, but this one is
special. It is called a “gloss,” which is often used to initiate conversations about a
difficult subject know as “trouble talk.” Jefferson (1985) defines a gloss as a
“'generalization' and/or somewhat inaccurate and/or incomplete and/or a masking or
covering-up of 'what really happened'” (p. 436). This gloss is enticingly incomplete and
compels the therapist to show interest.29 His response demonstrates his interest and allows
the client to easily tell her troubled story about her family, in-laws, and her boyfriend.
Hence, the client initiates the pre-sequence to open the session and this allows her to
select the problem to discuss.

29

At first glance it might seem like the client is testing the attentiveness and concern of the
therapist. However, I do not think that it is that simple or deliberate. Rather, she is drawing upon
aspects of the unspoken, but shared interactional context. The practice of psychotherapy is based
on a relationship of interest. The client is an object of interest. Her stories and behavior are
displayed and observed by the therapist. He is interested in the client and he has a desire to know
her (Fink, 1997, 2007; Habermas, 1968; Ricoeur, 1974).
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Excerpt 1, Opening, Session
S
A, lin
nes 1-3: Troouble talk glooss30

Sequ
uence 1 (S1)
Narrativee (N1). The first
f
narrativee (N1) elaboorates on thee “hectic weeek” that the
clientt introduces in the pre- sequence.
s
Sh
he begins thee story with a declarativee statement
that utilizes
u
metaaphoric langu
uage. Speakiing softly, shhe refers to hher week by saying: “It iis
a threee ring circu
us.” (see Excerpt 2, line 4).
4 Obviouslly, this is nott a statementt of fact. It iss
an hy
yperbolic sim
mile that is often used to convey emootion and iroony (Cano M
Mora, 2010;
McCarthy & Cartter, 2004). This
T elaborattes on the glooss in the prre-sequence: life is
n lists the nuumerous thinngs that are m
making her
“hecttic” and diffiicult to manaage. She then
life hectic.
h
“I’ve got John’s mom
m
coming
g…my familyy coming…Wanda’s birrthday….thee
new move
m
and…this job stufff” (lines 4-8). By sayingg “I’ve got” sshe indicatess that these
circus acts are heer responsibiility. She hass to “coordinnate” her fam
mily’s travel
arran
ngements, thee party, and the move. This
T way possitioning her partner as aanother
burdeen is importaant. She coulld have iden
ntified these as shared beetween herseelf and her
live-iin partner, bu
ut she does not.
n Rather, he is also soomething thaat she has to manage. As
she liists all the th
hings that shee is responsiible for, her tone changees. Everythinng is said
with a sarcastic smile. Depictting her fam
mily as incapaable of makiing travel plaans she

30

Forr an explanation of transcriipt please see the transcripttion key
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mock
ks them: “theey’re not cleear on who’s coming, or how they’ree coming” annd laughs
(liness 4-5).
Excerpt 2,
2 S1, Session
n A, lines 4-1
19: Narrativve 1 (N1)

These firsst lines are an
n emotionallly laden intrroduction settting the stagge for the
n
(N1) of the session. This em
motionally l aden introduuction is a coommon
first narrative
method of introdu
ucing narratiives in psych
hotherapy (L
Labov & Fannshel, 1977, p. 105). It
introd
duces the ch
haracters and
d sets the sceene (context)), out of whicch the prominent
narraative will em
merge. The client has to deal
d with fam
mily coming in, the birthhday, the
movee and the “jo
ob stuff”. Thee introductio
on depicts thhe client as aan overwhelm
med
ringm
master. This feeling of beeing overwh
helmed can aalso be heardd in the tone of the
clientt’s voice, bu
ut as she listss all the acts she has to m
manage, her ttone changes and she
begin
ns mocking her
h family.
Out of alll the things th
hat the clien
nt has to mannage, it is thee “job stuff” that stands
out. It
I is the last thing
t
that thee client men
ntions and it ttakes on speecial significcance when
she in
ntroduces it by saying: “yea
“
(one seccond pause) ahh (clinchees and shakees her fists)
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and this job stuff on top” (lines 7-8). The rest of N1 focuses on the “job stuff.” All the
preceding concerns (or circus acts) fade into the background. Turning her gaze toward the
therapist she says, “John got let go at work” (see Excerpt 2, line 8). As her tone changes
and becomes calm and measured, she begins to shift her positioning as a narrator. This
shift is hard to convey through transcription, but we can see some evidence in her
language. John was not “fired,” “kicked out,” or “canned”—he was “let go.” The term is
not biting, nor aggressive. In other words, it is a neutral way to put it. As she continues,
the client takes a very fair and measured assessment of the situation. She does not
villainize or idealize her boyfriend or his employer. She says that the “boss is meeting
with [John] today to try and relocate him” (lines 8-9). This was put in motion because
John was able to admit that he was not a “good fit” for the position (In the story, John
actually meets with his boss and says: “I don’t think I’m a good fit for this position,”
lines 9-10). According to the client this creates an agreement (“they agreed”) between
John and his boss and they decide “to try to see if they can’t put him somewhere else and
put him to use” (lines 10-11). The client’s narrative describes the characters as rational
actors coming to rational conclusions. The characters are able to assess their own and
each other’s weaknesses and act without emotion or hurt feelings. They don’t blame each
other for their problems and they do not experience shame or anger when they admit
them publicly. However, this does not mean that the client approves of the decisions that
the characters make.
At line 11 she offers a commentary on the job stuff problem by saying: “I don’t
think it’s a great idea, (looking at therapist) but…you got to try, you know” (lines 11-
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12).31 At first glance this comment might seem benign. However, it is vitally important
because it strengthens the position that is being constituted during the storytelling of N1.
During the description of how John was “let go” the client positions herself as a fair and
rational subject, similar to the characters in the story (John and his boss). She describes
the situation as if she is a rational executive, fairly describing both the difficulties of the
situation and the genuine effort of all parties to find a solution. The commentary at line
11 is spoken to the therapist and is a personal comment (“I don’t”) akin to what is said
between peers behind closed doors. While looking at the therapist the client says, “You
got to try, you know.” The “you know” projects agreement. What I mean is that the
phrase is designed in such a way that it presupposes that the other participant agrees
because what is being said is so typical. This is powerful because it creates a similarity
between the client and therapist as well-informed, thoughtful, and understanding
individuals. This similarity should be thought of as a relational position, a way of acting
on and relating to other, self, and world. Hence, relational positions are established and
transformed through thinking, which as we can see is a practical activity. So far, N1 has
introduced narrated characters (John and his boss) and established a commonality been
these characters and the participants (therapist and client). They are all rational subjects
able to unemotionally assess their situation and make good judgments.
However, this commonality is briefly broken apart as the client continues her
commentary, which appears to be critical of John: “it’s a job I think that he’d be really
31

A narrative is a way of representing an event (Labov & Fanshel, 1977). It has a temporal order
and characters. This combination of characters relating to one another across time is what we see
prior to line 11. Here the client steps away from the story to offer a commentary. This comment is
inserted in the narrative but it does not end the narrative.
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good at, but he is not” (lines 12-14). At this point there is a breakdown (or slip). She
suddenly shifts away from what sounded like a criticism of her boyfriend, into an
explanation about how another employer “approached him about doing a job,” but John
“didn’t do anything really conclusive” (because he was employed) and now he is having
difficulty getting “a call back” (lines 14-16). It is important to note that the breakdown
transforms her negative commentary on John into a transition back into the job narrative,
which is more positive. In other words, it initially sounds like a continued assessment of
John’s failure to reach his potential at his current position: “it’s a job I think he’d be
really good at, but he’s not.” Yet, it awkwardly transitions back into the “job stuff”
narrative about how there is a better job for John, but he is having difficulty getting a
“call back.” This abrupt transition is created by two repairs (Schegloff, Jefferson, &
Sacks, 1977). First, after saying “he’s not” she seamlessly makes a repair and says “he is”
(line 14). In the actual utterance these two contradictory statements are set side-by-side:
“he’s not, he is.” The second repair occurs after the transition. After the client already
mentions that John is “having some difficulty getting a call back” she backtracks and
explains that “someone approached him about doing a job.” This is necessary because the
client transitions back into the “job stuff” narrative while she was also making a critical
commentary. The breakdown and repairs are important because they highlight the two
positions ascribed to John. First, John is a rational and responsible person who still needs
to find the right position. The second, John is a failure who was unable to reach his
potential. These two positions will become even more important as the therapist uses his
utterances to focus on how this impacts the client emotionally.
Hence, the first narrative that the client introduces is not a continuous story. It
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consists of an introduction, main narrative, commentary, and conclusion. The
introduction is about herself and her family. Here, she is positioned as an overwhelmed
ringmaster who has to manage everything including John. In the main narrative, John and
his boss come to a rational decision about his poor fit with his current job. In the
conclusion, John is still searching for the right job. The reason he has not found the right
job is due to bad timing, rather than his own fault. However, between the main narrative
and the conclusion the client makes a commentary, which contradicts John’s position in
the main narrative and conclusion. Making her assessment as a fair and rational manager,
the client (as narrator, aligned with the therapist) views John as a failure who is unable to
reach his potential. However, this is quickly disowned and the more predominant position
is reestablished through a repair sequence. Up until the slip, there is a parallelism being
created between John, his boss, the client, and the therapist. Similar to what Wortham
describes, the characters (John and his boss), and the participants (the client and the
therapist) are positioned as belonging to the type: fair and rational actors. The slip breaks
this parallelism. John is not like them, he is not capable or competent. This is similar to
the emotionally laden introduction where John is another thing to manage (see figure 7).
This is a clear example of how the client thinks about herself and others during
psychotherapy. She creates multiple possibilities for how the problem should or could be
understood. She highlights how John, his boss, the therapist, and herself are rational
people and the problem is circumstantial. However, she hints at how the problem could
be personal, i.e. it is a problem about John's capability as a worker. There are other hints
or what might be called latent problem possibilities that are created, yet not addressed.
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Figurre 7
Posittioning Diag
gram S1 Sesssion A: Narrrative 1 (N1)

So far thiss sequence looks like thee trouble talkk found in evveryday connversation.
Yet, as
a previously
y mentioned
d, in most tro
ouble talk theere is a “a prressure towaard business
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as usual” (Jefferson, 1988, p. 424). Hence, what we see unfold after N1 would be atypical
outside of therapy. Instead of moving away from trouble, the therapist moves toward it.
He does not let the conversation move toward business as usual and instead he focuses on
possible problems, which are nascent in the client's previous speech, yet remain implicit
because of the focus on John and his "job stuff."
Formulation (4:28). The client’s turn ends when she utters a conjunction followed
by a process token “but hum.” The “but hum” is what Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson
(1974) called a transition relevant place (TRP). This marks the possible end of an entire
turn, typically referred to as a turn construction unit (TCU). Here the client signals that
N1 is more or less complete. The TRP allows the therapist to offer a formulation that
connects N1 to material from the previous week. Remember that a formulation is a way
of commenting on what is being said. The therapist jumps in to offer a reflective
statement32 about how the “job stuff” affects the client, saying, “This is kind of what you
feared last week” (line 18). Hence, he glosses what she “feared last week” and connects
this to N1 (“this is”), formulating N1 as a being stuff that she has feared. However, the
utterance is not a perfect formulation. It is very similar to an extension, which is a way of
extending someone’s speech (e.g. P1: “I want to go to the store” P2: “But you are too
tired after a long day”). Hence, the utterance could also be taken as the client’s own
words. We can imagine the client extending the process token by saying, “but hum this is
what I feared last week” which would have been a different way of talking about the
problem: the problem would not simply be John’s “job stuff,” it would be how the “job
32

By reflective statement I mean an utterance that is used to comment on the speaker. Hence, the
speaker becomes the object of the commentary (e.g. "I guess when I think about the job stuff, it
makes me feel anger and I take it out on my family").
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stuff”” makes her feel. Furtherrmore, the fo
ormulation sshifts the foccus of the cliient’s storytellin
ng, ultimately
y foreground
ding her as th
he primary ccharacter, whhile back-groounding or
eliminating the prrominent characters of N1.
N John is thhe main chaaracter of N11, not the
clientt. Yet, the naarrative is in
ntroduced as her “hectic w
week.” The pre-sequencce and
narraative introducction convey
ys emotion by
b using emootional wordds, rhetoricall devices andd
tone. These emottions are the client’s (“heectic week” “three ring ccircus,” clincching and
shakiing her fists when she in
ntroduces thee “job stuff” problem), yyet she disapppears when
the “jjob stuff” prroblem is disscussed. The therapist usses his turn tto bring the ttopic back too
her feeelings and repositions
r
her
h as the mo
ost importannt person in tthe story.
It is important to noticce how the therapist
t
intrroduces the eemotion of ffear in an
ambiguous way. He does nott clarify whaat he remembbers about laast week or hhow it exactlly
ms a connecttion and leavves the rest uup to the clieent. After thee
relatees to N1. Ratther, he form
formu
ulation at lin
ne 19 the clieent respondss by elaboratting on her ““fear.” She im
mmediately
conveeys that she remembers the
t conversaation from laast week by springing too offer an
ackno
owledgmentt token (“Ya”” line 19), which
w
she theen attempts tto clarify. Shhe elaboratess
by paartially rejectting the therrapist’s glosss. She tells hhim, “I was ffearing slashh anticipatingg
this” (lines 19-20
0).
Excerpt 3,
3 S1, Session
n A, lines 18
8-23: Formullation

The “slash
h” in fearing
g/anticipating
g creates an ‘either or booth’ ambiguity. This
conveention is com
mmon in acaademic writin
ng and helpss to positionn the client ass a rational
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observer, some distance from her emotions. Fear is clearly a negative emotion. According
to de Riveria (1977), fear is an “it” emotion in the belonging dimension (p. 45). It is one
of the emotions that most people can clearly understand in terms of its basic structure. In
fear, an object or other, which does not belong has come too close to the subject (de
Rivera, 1977; de Rivera & Grinkis, 1986). The subject recoils, creating distance from the
object or other. This is the emotional transaction. The instruction is to move away by
creating distance, but this can be transformed. For example, in fear a person can act to
eliminate, destroy, or confront the object/other. This is not done in anger (to assert your
version of what ought to be), but in a fearful attempt to reestablish a safe distance. Yet,
for the most part, the instruction is simply to turn and run.
On the other hand, anticipation is not clearly negative or positive and a case can
be made that it is not an emotion at all. Merriam-Webster defines anticipation as “the act
of looking forward.” It continues by adding: “especially : pleasurable
expectation.”(Anticipation, n.d.) Therefore, in desire we anticipate the next meeting with
our lover; in anger we anticipate a future confrontation with a foe; and in fear we can
anticipate the reappearance of an undesired object or other that has the potential to do us
harm. In other words, anticipation is a cognitive act that accompanies many different
emotions. It can accompany emotion, but is not emotion itself. Hence, the client’s move
quickly dissects the emotion that the therapist introduces with his formulation. By
equating fear with anticipation she transforms fear into a cognitive act. The quick and
clear acknowledgment token offered by the client now seems less like an agreement and
more like momentary appeasement.
After this initial utterance, the client turns back to the main narrative of N1 and
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elaborates on John’s behavior and motivation. She says, “I was fearing
slash…anticipating…this because…it was very clear he was quitting…mentally” (lines
19-21). The therapist does give a verbal acknowledgment token, which can be interpreted
as an affirmation that he understands what John was going through (line 24). From lines
23-27, the client then elaborates further on John’s behavior (“he wasn’t barreling into the
work anymore”), his thought process (“He was sort of just saying, ‘If I didn’t make it to
this meeting, I think I’d be okay with that’”), and his emotional state (“He was getting to
that sort of checked out place”) (see excerpts 3 and 4). She characterizes John as being in
a state of depression33: he gives up his claim or identity as a hard working employee by
not “barreling into the work” and gives up on making to “meeting[s]” and being “okay
with” being let go. The client goes to great length to compel sympathy for John and he
continues to be in the center of the narrative as she does her best to present him in a
positive light. Yet, while doing this the client, as character in her own story, fades into the
background. The therapist’s formulation at line 17 brought the client back into the story,
but only briefly. After quickly dispatching the emotion ascribed to her, she turns back to
John and the “job stuff”. This contrast clearly displays the different ways that the client
and therapist are trying to think about the problem. As we can see, this is not a passive
cognitive exercise. Rather, it is process of action on action that constitutes the problem,
and therefore the participants, in very different ways.
Extension (5:13). At line 28 the therapist again uses his turn to bring the client
back into her own story. The therapist offers a strong interest token (Hum, line 28) that
33

A movement away from the world, where the instruction is to give up one’s claim of belonging
(de Rivera, 1977, p. 46).
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overllaps the clien
nt’s speech and
a causes her to pause. During the ppause the theerapist takess
a deeep breath, wh
hich signals that
t he is about to speakk (somethingg that happenns frequentlyy
throu
ughout the seession) and he
h then offerrs an extensioon: “But thaat wasn’t okaay with you.”
The power
p
of thiss utterance comes
c
from both
b
its consstruction as aan extensionn (of the
clientt’s speech) and
a that it peerforms a “ciirculation off figures” (Peeräkylä, 20004, p. 294).
The therapist
t
tran
nsforms the client’s
c
prev
vious phrase,, “okay withh that” (uttereed twice in
lines 26 and 27) into
i
the “butt that wasn’t okay with yyou” formulaation. Previoous studies
have demonstrateed that peoplle can circulate figures oof speech in order to makke a
poral events or topics (pp. 302). Hencce, what we see here is a
conneection betweeen two temp
conneection being
g formed betw
ween John lo
osing his jobb and how thhis affects thhe client. Thee
exten
nsion attempts to make explicit
e
that the
t “job stufff” problem iis the client’s problem. IIn
otherr words, the “job
“
stuff” iss problematiized as someething that afffects the cliient—the
probllem is locateed in the client's experien
nce and thereefore she haas ownershipp of the
probllem.
Excerpt 4,
4 S1, Session
n A, lines 25-33

The clientt responds to
o the extensiion by seamllessly continnuing her uttterance. On
an intteractional leevel the therrapist’s speecch functionss as if it weree the client’ss. In a sense,,
it creates a bridgee between th
he client’s uttterances. Thhis bridge dooes change thhe
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conversation, or at least it attempts to. Participants can always resist each other’s turns
even in an institutional setting such as psychotherapy (Vehviläinen et al., 2008;
Voutilainen et al., 2010). Here, the client continues to talk about the “job stuff” as John’s
problem and does not turn toward discussing how this “wasn’t okay with [her].”
After the extension she says quite pointedly, “He was sort of looking for
permission to stop working” (line 30). “He was looking to get fired” (line 32).
Previously, the client positioned herself as a rational and fair person. This was done in
part by describing John’s “job stuff” in neutral terms. She talked about John being “let
go” and “relocated.” These terms are soft, non-abrasive, and neutral in terms of positive
and negative attribution. However, here she shifts to direct language. “He was looking to
get fired.” The term fired is abrasive, angry, final, and accusatory. No one wants to get
fired. It is a negative thing. It implies confrontation and attributes qualities to those who
are fired—i.e. John. This change is subtle and short lived. She follows the “get fired”
utterance with a paternalistic comment: “And I think that’s unfortunate” (line 32). The
comment feels paternalistic and contemptuous. Although the tone and the word choice
imply a neutral position, it is a judgment. It is a recognition that John is not acting as he
should. He is no longer a rational person, but someone who is judged as “unfortunate”.
This transformation is what we see hinted at in the slip described in figure 7, and it draws
on ways of thinking about the problem, which are implicitly present.
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Excerpt 5,
5 S1, Session
n A, lines 32-54

From linees 32 to 54 (eexcerpt 5) th
he client elabborates on w
what she meaans by
“unfo
ortunate” (fro
om line 32). As far as I can
c tell, this elaborationn is not calledd for by the
therap
pist. Rather,, the client offers it up. Although
A
wee can interpreet this as herr attempt to
explaain her statem
ment that Joh
hn’s behavio
or is “unfortuunate,” the cclient also diiscusses her
own feelings.
f
Shee says that th
he fact that “‘no
“
one hass a job’”34 creeates a “shitstorm…in
my mind”
m
(line 43).
4 This is th
he first time the client haas returned tto her emotioonal life
since she briefly positioned herself
h
as a frantic
fr
ringm
master “coorddinating” herr “three ringg
circus” life (excerpt 2, lines 4-5).
4
The fraantic emotionnality in the narrative inttroduction
now returns
r
with more force and immediiacy. The “shhitstorm” is wonderfullyy descriptivee,

34

A ventriloquatio
v
on of herself as
a character.
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yet vague. It is chaotic, violent, and uncontrollable. With this utterance she moves away
from the rational position she has established as a narrator as she begins to talk about
herself as a character in her own story.
Questions and a shift in the problem (6:50-7:34). Up to this point the participants
have primarily been dealing with the “job stuff” that has been collaboratively selected as
the problem at hand. This problem has been advanced by the client as John’s difficulty
securing a job. This affects her, but she has tried to keep herself at the margins both as a
character and as a narrator. The therapist has attempted to shift the spotlight onto the
client and focus on how the “job stuff” problem makes her feel. At line 54, the therapist
continues this effort by asking how the client “[has] been dealing with it.” The “it” is an
index pointing back to the “job stuff.” The short and direct question is a more strong
handed attempt to get the client to talk about herself. By asking: “So, how have you been
dealing with it?” the therapist makes it extremely difficult for the client to keep talking
about John. It is true that she could have offered a superficial reflection and then moved
back to the old narrative (Something like, “I have been trying to be understanding. John
went in the other day and said…”). However, she instead breaks from her previous focus
on John and begins talking about herself. It is worth pointing out that she sets this up in
the last utterance where she exclaims, “Now nobody is employed again” (line 41). The
difficulty of finding a good job is a shared problem and in the next utterances the client
talks about her own struggles looking for a job. This is a turning point. The question at 51
marks a shift in the relational positioning that is constitutive of the problem. She not only
foregrounds herself as a character, but she begins to tell a new story about her own
struggles. Although the therapist question was vital in making this shift, it was setup by
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the cllient’s own turn
t
toward her
h emotions in her prevvious turn.
Excerpt 6,
6 S1, Session
n A, lines 54
4-70

In the clieent’s initial response
r
to the
t therapist ’s question, the client saays that she
has “applied to so
ome more work”
w
(line 55
5).35 She conntinues by saaying that shhe has a
ng for a job (line 55). Thhen, with tonngue in cheeek, she jokess:
“reallly hard time with” lookin
“I alw
ways feel lik
ke an assholee” (lines 55-5
56). She laugghs as she saays this and looks at the
therap
pist. Lookin
ng at the tran
nscript one might
m
think thhat this is ann emotionallyy laden
mom
ment. Howeveer, when wattching the in
nteraction it comes acrosss as clever aand sarcasticc.
This is conveyed by her tone and delivery
y, the way shhe utters thiss line with a smile and
H
even though
t
her uutterance opeens with a slight exposurre
lookss right at the therapist. Hence,
aboutt her insecurrity and limittations (she is looking foor more work
rk even thouggh she has a

35

Thee question: “H
How have you
u been dealing
g with it?” is ambiguous (ssomething thaat we see
frequeently with thiis therapist). She
S interpretss the question as an inquiryy about her acction (The
questiion might be interpreted ass: “What havee you been dooing in responnse to John loosing his
job?”)).
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really “hard time with” it). She closes the utterance with a pointed jab, mocking her own
feelings.
The therapist responds to this utterance by quickly turning his head as if curiously
provoked and then asks: “Why?” In response to this question the client shows us a side of
herself that we have not seen. Instead of the confident, rational actor, we see an insecure
person unable to “talk about” herself or her feelings. Elaborating on why she has a “hard
time” looking for a job and why she feels like an “asshole,” she comments that she is
“really bad at” the “process” of looking for a job (lines 58-59). During her delivery she
cuts herself off and stumbles. Eventually, she acknowledges that she is having a problem
explaining herself and says: “I don’t know how to explain this—ya got me” (lines 59-60).
We have discussed how therapists use formulations as therapeutic tools, but here we see
the client also using a formulation. This is a special type of formulation where the
participant comments on what is going on in an interaction, making explicit what is
implicitly happening. This type of utterance was what Harvey Sacks originally identified
as a formulation. Later Heritage expanded this to include the reflective glosses that we
see in psychotherapy and everyday conversation (Antaki, 2008).
The client’s formulation highlights the action on action dynamics that we have
been seeing throughout S1. Although the client has tried to get the therapist to align with
her (as a rational actor), there has been an adversarial dynamic throughout this initial
deepening of the troubled talk. We can see this in the adjacency pairs. The therapist’s
utterances are always pushing the client to tell her story in a different way. He indicates
that there is more to say, that something is left out and needs to be discussed. Mainly, the
therapist has been directing the client to talk more about herself and her emotions. Yet,
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the client avoids talking about herself even when she agrees with the therapist’s
formulation (recall the exchange about what she “feared,” lines 19-23). By saying “ya got
me” the client comments on this dynamic. She does so in a non-confrontational way that
is hard to convey through transcription. She is not quite joking, but it is humorous. It is as
if the two were both playing a game, but they were pretending that it was real. The
comment exposes the game of psychotherapy for what it is: a micro-practice of power
where participants use actions on actions to think about a problem in ways that shape
how the problem is understood.
Even though the client formulates the therapy as a sort of game, this does not
relieve her from the expectation that she needs to explain her feelings. The client’s
struggle to explain herself stretches beyond the utterances discussed above. Right after
she ends her utterance at line 63, the therapist and the client both offer process tokens.
This double process token pair rarely occurs across the dataset. It further distinguishes the
sequence and can be interpreted as a mutual acknowledgment that something important is
being said. The therapist then asks, “What do you make of that?” (line 66), indexing her
previous utterance about having a “hard time” “trying to talk myself up” (lines 62-63). In
response the client stumbles: “Ahh it probably doesn’t speak good things to me” (line
67). The utterance has a tortured delivery, accompanied by laughter and a long gaze at
the therapist. It comes off as strange and is hard to understand, and the therapist quickly
asks for a repair (“I’m sorry I didn’t catch that” line 68). The client’s repair is shaky at
first, but she eventually rights herself and returns to the more articulate delivery that was
so apparent during the beginning of the sequence. It is worth noting that this return to a
confident and competent delivery comes at a cost: she turns on herself with the pointed
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sarcaasm.
She does display this new confideence while aacting out ann imagined joob interview
w
and uses
u dry, bitiing wit to describe herself as an interrviewee. Venntriloquatingg her
respo
onse to an im
mplied questiioner left unv
voiced,36 shee says: “I cann say, ‘Hire me, I am
hard--working’ an
nd that’s prettty much it…
…. ‘Hire me, I won’t steaal things or sset fires.’
‘Hiree me, I could
d figure thing
gs out on my
y own’ ” (linnes 70-75). S
She narrates hherself as
someeone who is minimally
m
qu
ualified, som
meone who sstruggles whhen she is, “ttrying to spinn
what I have donee and trying to
t talk myself up” (line 662).37 She saays, “And then it feels
like: ‘Prove it,38’ and I’d be liike, smile” (line 75). Whhen she sayss smile she tuurns to the
therap
pist, smiles at
a him, while turning herr head in a ccoy, innocennt way. This utterance haas
multiiple implicattions.
Excerpt 7,
7 Session A, lines 70-77

First, by using
u
“It feells like” to in
ntroduce the ventriloquatted speech thhe client
createes an ambigu
uity. On the one hand, th
he utterance can be read as a straightt forward

36

At no
n point doess she introducce an interview
wer or their qquestions, but it is implied based the
wordiing of the ven
ntriloquations that follow.
37
If we
w look at thiss emotionally
y we see someeone who feells undesirablee. This is an eextension of dde
Riverria’s theory, where
w
desire is wanting to incorporate
i
soomeone into ooneself. A jobb interview iss
just th
his, it is an ev
vent where on
ne person wan
nts to bring annother into theeir business. T
The person
has to
o be desirable, having quality or traits th
hat the employyer wants. Thhe client’s talkk is about
havin
ng nothing dessirable.
38
Clieent ventriloqu
uating the em
mployer.
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ventriloquation: “And then the employer would ask, ‘Prove it’ and I’d be like—smile.”
But, it can also be read as an emotional transaction: how the client “feels” when she
imagines being questioned about her qualifications. She is saying “It feels like ‘prove it’”
when she has to talk about herself. The utterance is about what she “feels” when she is in
a situation where others have to recognize her worth and desirability. Second, as stated
above, the “prove it” and coy smile can be understood as an imagined enactment of
herself as a job interviewee. After the client lists her basic qualifications, the employer
says, “prove it” and to this the client responds with a coy smile and look of innocence.
The implication here is that instead of having a response the client would fain child-like
innocence hoping the employer would forget the question and simply find her endearing.
However, this is not a personal daydream. It is an action in response the unfolding
context and aimed at the therapist. It occurs directly after the client’s awkward stumble
and therapist had to call for a repair. For the first time the client was not polished, but
unsure, lost for words and struggling. The formulation that she used (”ya got me”)
establishes that the therapist is watching and evaluating the client. Hence, the coy smile
sets up a parallel relationship between interviewee-employer and client-therapist. In both
cases the coy smile is aimed at transforming the feeling of being evaluated into
something more tolerable (see positioning figure 8).39

39

For de Rivera, the feeling of being evaluated would fall into the recognition emotions. These
feelings like shame, guilt, and contempt. Shame and contempt are prominent themes that will be
discussed in greater detail later on.
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Figurre 8
Posittioning Diag
gram S1 Sesssion A: Being
g evaluated

At line 77
7 she offers a commentarry about whyy she has a ““hard time” with the
“proccess” of gettiing a job. Att this transitiion point, shhe commentss about her uunfortunate
work
k history in order
o
to forgee an understaanding of the “hard timee.” She talks about how
“I…d
did my careeer backwardss,” having th
he most “rew
warding and fulfilling woork [and]
most…impressiv
ve work early
y on in my liife” (lines 777-79). She deetails how shhe was a
“man
nager at a mo
ovie theater”” and how sh
he “proof-reaad for one off [her] profeessors” (liness
79, 91-93). She compares
c
theese jobs with
h what she haas done receently saying “the last twoo
jobs I had were under
u
the table…I would
d never put [tthem] on myy resume beccause the
job…
…was nightm
marish” (liness 80-83). Ho
owever, she eexplains thatt she also caannot use thee
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early experiencess because thee “theaters got
g sold to annother company” (line 88) and the
profeessor is now “retired” (lin
ne 93) makin
ng it imposssible to use thhem as referrences.
Excerpt 8,
8 S1, Session
n A, lines 78
8-95

A parallellism between
n the here-an
nd-now and narrated possitioning is nnow being
established. The narrative
n
positions the client as a vicctim of circuumstance. Evvents, outsidde
of her control, haave made talk
king about herself
h
a “harrd time.” Shhe is capable of landing a
ng well, but things have just not worrked out for her. Therefoore, her
good job and doin
narraated position is that of a competent
c
em
mployee, wiith a solid w
work history, who is a
victim
m of circumsstance. The narrator
n
posiition is simillar. The cliennt’s confidennce had beenn
build
ding during th
he sarcastic self-statemeents, but she moves into an even morre assured
placee as she weav
ves the “back
kwards career” narrativee. She comess across as a competent
interv
viewee. You
u could imag
gine her tellin
ng this storyy to a prospecctive employyer. In this
sensee the client iss selling hersself to the th
herapist in thhe same way she would ssell herself too
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an employer. She has moved from being inarticulate to confident articulation. However,
we need to acknowledge that this comes with a price.
First, she turns on herself with sarcasm, which then evolves into a narrative about
herself as a competent victim. This positioning unfolds within the context of the previous
utterances where the client begins to think about the problem as emotional and personal.
While she talked about her discomfort with being evaluated, she created a parallel
emotional relationship with the therapist where he was also positioned as an evaluator.
These difficult feelings are then transformed into confidence. This is performed by a
commentary that reestablishes the relational position of the client as an employee. This is
a way of thinking about who she is as a certain kind of person. What this demonstrates is
how this thinking is a process that uses narrative positioning and emotion to change how
the problem is constituted. Furthermore, this demonstrates that emotion is both talked
about (and therefore fundamental to the positioning in the commentary or narrative) as
well transacted between the participants in ways that parallel the emotion of the narrative
(i.e. being evaluated). Hence, this demonstrates the way that problematizing involves
narrative positioning and emotion in ways that are complex, contextual, and most of all
relational. What occurs next is that the client makes a rare explicit statement that
summarizes the problem that has been constituted. The relationship between the complex
problematizing described above and the explicit formulation of the problem is an
important dynamic in the constitutional process of psychotherapy.

181

Excerpt 9,
9 S1, Session
n A, 96-110: S1 Interpreetation

Througho
out the clientt’s commenttary, the therrapist does nnot offer a response
beyon
nd his listening tokens. His
H responsee comes onlyy after the cllient concluddes with a
summ
marizing stattement. She starts the staatement withh an index, w
which points to the basic
probllem about th
he “job stuff.” She says: “It’s
“
just thiss very (pausse of a long ttime and thenn
begin
ns to shift baack and forth
h) chaotic thiing (pauses aagain) and I…don’t likee feeling
judgeed and I don’t like really
y having to explain myseelf” (lines 966-97, t = 9:077). This is ann
important utteran
nce. The problem has shifted over thhe course of the sequencee and it is
e
both personal and emotion
nal.40 She is talking abouut herself firsst and
now explicitly
forem
most, which is
i something
g she has ressisted despitee the therapiist’s intervenntions.
Watcching the session, this is a moment where
w
I felt liike the sessioon deepenedd. The
mom
ment feels gen
nuine, unscriipted. When
n examining the details oof the utterannce the long
pausee between “v
very” and “chaotic thing” grabs the llistener. Durring the pausses the clientt
40

It iss worth noting
g that the clieent actually in
ntroduced N1 (overwhelmeed ringmasterr) as emotionaal
and personal, but th
hen move aw
way from this quickly.
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shifts back and forth in her seat as if she is searching for the right word. When she finally
says “chaotic thing” she says it in a slow, deliberate tone. The phrase “chaotic thing”
characterizes the movements she was making during the pause: chaotic, unanchored, and
shifting back and forth. Although we might not initially refer to chaos as an emotion,
certainly chaos has a certain feeling to it. It is unpleasant and unwanted. The client’s
pauses and bodily movements add to her account. She is describing the “job stuff”
problem as something that occurs during the job interview “process.” It is a “chaotic
thing:” a personal feeling that is unpleasant, yet not a clear emotional transaction.
This feeling aspect of the problem is further reinforced by her next utterance. She
continues by saying, “And I…don’t like feeling judged.” This statement adds on to the
“chaotic thing.” It is unclear if feeling judged is central to the “chaotic thing” or
secondary, but the direct reference here to “feeling” reinforces that the problem is being
constituted as emotional. “Feeling judged” and “having to explain” imply other people.
One cannot be judged without, at the very least, an implicit other. Hence, because of the
parallel positioning demonstrated earlier, this utterance has here-and-now implications.
Leading up to this point the therapist was positioned as an evaluator. Although the client
is summarizing the “job stuff” problem, the entire commentary is like a job interview
where she has to explain herself to an interviewer. Hence, it is also a commentary on her
relationship with the therapist who is positioned as an evaluator. She feels “judged” and
has to “explain” herself and this is a very “chaotic thing.”
Extension (9:26). After the client summarizes the problem the therapist tries to
speak, but he is cut off. She quickly offers a clarification by saying, “Not that I don’t like
describing things like that,…but when it comes to justifying myself I have a hard time
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with that” (lines 99-101). The clarification changes how the therapist chooses to address
the client’s utterance. When the client cuts off the therapist he was offering a formulation
(“So you” is the turn initiator commonly used to formulate what was just said). Yet, after
the clarification the therapist shifts tactics and offers an extension. At line 102 he says:
“Being evaluated.” He offers this immediately, and delivers it smoothly. The extension
actually refers back to the index that the client used to end her clarification: “I have a
hard time with that.” By removing the index and replacing it with a concrete experience
the therapist brings the problem into the light, rather than continuing to understand it at
the margins. The “job stuff” problem that started the sequence now emerges as a problem
with “being evaluated”.41 The client demonstrates this mutual recognition in her response
to the extension. She immediately offers a strong acknowledgment token saying, “Ya, I
don’t like it, I don’t like it at all, it makes me queasy” (line 103). The strong
acknowledgment token is reinforced by how she does not “like it” (the index here
pointing back to “being evaluated”).
Yet, she goes beyond agreeing with the therapist, she adds that “it”—“being
evaluated”—makes her “queasy.” Queasy is a visceral word. It implies a bodily
experience, something that is felt, that is personal and unpleasant. The “queasy” utterance
continues the constitutional work on the problem, focusing on the personal emotion
aspect that has emerged. Previously, she described the problem as a “chaotic thing,”
which was shown to have emotional implications. This was furthered by talking about
41

The therapist describes the problem as “being evaluated,” whereas the client describes it as
“feeling judged.” These are very similar, demonstrating a evolving co-understanding of the
problem. However, it is worth pointing out the they are not the same. “Feeling judged” is a
personal emotional experience. “Being evaluated” an interpersonal act indicative of certain
situations (job interviews, first dates, performances of all kinds) where one can feel judged.
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“feeling judged.” The problem seems to be becoming clear to the participants. Their
coordination and collaboration has increased as there is little resistance at the end of the
sequence. The therapist can seamlessly offer an extension that is fully owned and carried
forward by the client. The “job stuff” problem has been constituted as a “hard time” with
being “being evaluated” and “feeling judged.” This is not only something she experiences
in her day to day life, but it is also something that she experiences here with the therapist.
He can be positioned as an evaluator that she stumbles in front of and then has to explain
herself.
The interpretation sequence S1 (9:40). The double acknowledgment tokens at
lines 104-105 reinforce the importance of the previous “queasy” utterance. The client
creates a pause in the conversation by offering a confirming, “Hum yea” instead of
continuing to elaborate upon the problem. This can be seen as an attempt to close the
sequence. “Closings” are a series of utterances that end a sequence or conversation (ten
Have, 1999, p. 17). Closings are typically negotiated rather then forced, which is what we
see happening here. The attempt to close the sequence indicates that the problem, to a
certain extent, has been understood. This adds to the importance of the previous
utterances and the implications identified above.
This calling for the closing of the sequence does not, however, create a clear
demarcation between this sequence and the one to follow. A complete abandoning of
what had been said would be very strange. Rather, the participants must make a
transition. The transition marks the end of the first sequence and sets the groundwork for
the next sequence. The therapist provides the transition by offering an interpretation.
In this project I follow Vehviläinen’s notion that psychodynamic therapy proceeds
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by way of an interpretive trajectory, which creates analytic puzzles that are eventually
solved by the interpretation (Vehviläinen, 2008). Therapy sessions can be seen as a
procession of interpretive sequences each ending with an interpretation. However, when
we look at the interpretation that ends S1, it is clear the interpretation does not provide a
clear ending. After the client calls for a closing, the therapist takes a deep breath and then
begins to setup his interpretation with a formulation, which pulls in material discussed in
a previous session. He tells her, “You know, I’m thinking back to…when we were
talking about, how it is difficult for you to talk about yourself” (lines 106-107). This
formulates what the client has said (presumably in a previous session because they do not
talk about this here), while positioning himself (“when we were talking”) as a
witness/participant and therefore making it hard for the client to disregard his
recollection. To this, the client offers a strong acknowledgment token (“Yea”), which
allows the therapist to continue to offer his interpretation: “I’m wondering if it’s related
to this uncomfortable feeling that you’re being evaluated” (line 109). The interpretation
does many things (which I will get to) but what it does not do is end the sequence in any
clear way. Therefore, we cannot think of Vehviläinen’s interpretive solution as an ending
of a certain problem, but as an expansion, drawing upon present material and making
connections across the session(s) in order to foster further conversation that will expand
upon the ongoing constitutional work (Vehviläinen, 2003, 2008).
Conclusion S1 and the “job stuff” problem. Even though the solution does not
end the conversation, it still offers a ‘solution’ to something that has been constituted as
problematic. The therapist puts forward that the client’s problem of “talking about”
herself is “related to this uncomfortable feeling of being evaluated.” The problem is
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formulated as something from a previous session and the solution comes out of the
current conversation. Hence, the interpretation does not, on its face, solve the “job stuff”
problem constituted during S1. Rather, it uses the emotionality (“feeling uncomfortable”)
and relational positioning (“being evaluated”) to solve the previous problem of “how it is
difficult to talk about [herself].” In other words, her emotions and the relational context in
which they arise are used to understand a persistent behavior: having a hard time talking
about herself.
And yet, as we have seen, not being able “to talk about [herself]” has been a
persistent problem during the first sequence. All of the therapist’s utterances have been
directed toward foregrounding the client as the main character in her own story. This has
frequently been accomplished by highlighting the emotionality of certain narratives and
utterances. Furthermore, the therapist and client are positioned in an evaluator-evaluatee
relationship, which the client feels is chaotic. This problem remains implicit even in the
interpretation that discusses it directly. By placing the problem back in previous work,
the therapist makes inter-session connections, but avoids talking about the problem in the
here and now—at least directly. From a therapeutic perspective the therapist is missing an
opportunity to talk about something in a more immediate and genuine fashion. By talking
about the problem in the here-and-now we might hope that the client would experience
and process the problematic emotions associated with her behavior. However, by being
more direct the therapist could invoke strong resistance and sidetrack the course of the
conversation. It is hard to know. Regardless, it is quite remarkable how the therapist
offers an interpretation that brings in past material, while also implicitly addressing the
“job stuff” problem and the here-and-now relationship parallelism that has been
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constituted during the sequence.
A major task facing the psychotherapist is to move from "business as usual" to
"trouble talk". The first sequence of session A shows what the therapist must do to
sustain and even deepen the trouble talk. The preceding analysis makes explicit my
intuitive assumption of therapeutic depth. A session becomes deeper when the client
begins thinking about the problem as personal and emotional. From my experience, this
depth is hard to sustain for an entire session. Admittedly there are moments when the
topic shifts to concerns that feel more superficial. Hence, some parts of the session are
more important than others. As we move forward we will limit the scope of our analysis.
To describe the entire session with the same level of detail used to examine S1 is
infeasible and unnecessary. This is where the assumptions of the researcher are
important. By closely examining the moments where the session feels deeper and more
powerful, I will explicate the initial assumptions about the data and attend to the
overarching constitutional strategy of psychotherapy. Namely, depth psychotherapy is a
constitutional process where the client must think about herself as certain kind of
emotional being. As in S1, this is will be continually demonstrated across the dataset. The
question, however, that will need to be answered is why must the client think about
herself in this way? And, how does psychotherapy constitute the client as a certain kind
of emotional being?
Sequence 2 (S2)
The client’s response at line 106 marks the beginning of the second sequence (S2)
of session A. It is far shorter than the first sequence, lasting for 5:28 (9:40-13:14 session
time) and overall felt superficial compared to the depth at the end of S1. Below is the
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basic structure of the sequence. After the client’s response, the therapist uses questions
and formulations to foreground aspects of the client’s speech. He continues to make
formulations that index material discussed in previous sessions, while his questions call
for the client to expand on what has just been said. The client’s speech also indexes
material discussed in therapy, yet she seems to be referencing work done with a previous
therapist. However, the bulk of the client’s speech is about her past. She talks about how
she was taught not to do anything that she was not good at and she talks about how
getting bad grades was hard on her during high school. Interestingly, she finishes the
sequence by offering insightful comments about herself and then tells a story about how
in one instance she did not let her bad grades affect her. The therapist acknowledges this
by using his interpretation to focus on how: “if things don’t go right you…see them as a
reflection on yourself” (lines 183-185), which again is a way of making the problem
personal.
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Figurre 9
Sequeence 2 (S2), Basic Conveersational Structure
S

Elaboratiion on S1 intterpretation. The client’ss elaborationn on the therrapist’s
interp
pretation by signaling ag
greement, bu
ut she framess the problem
m as something related tto
perfo
ormance, say
ying: “Yea, and
a I don’t feeel like I do a terribly goood job of it”” (line 110).
It is not
n actually clear
c
what sh
he is referrin
ng to becaus e the interprretation is abbout “this
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uncom
mfortable feeeling that yo
ou’re being evaluated”
e
(lline 109). H
However, if w
we examine
her in
nitial utteran
nces up to thee therapist’s formulationn the connecction becomees clearer.
She goes
g
on and says that “w
when [she] was younger”” she was “taaught…that yyou don’t doo
thing
gs you don’t do
d well. Thaat you don’t enjoy thingss you don’t ddo well” (linnes 112-115)).
By ussing the simp
ple past tensse “when I was
w younger”” the client eencapsulates a large
chunk
k of her early life during
g which she was
w taught a general lesson. This lessson is
summ
med up as an
n axiomatic gloss
g
(“you don’t
d
do thinngs you don’’t do well”) that she
eventtually relatess to the “job stuff” probllem as it beccame constituuted at the ennd of S1.
Yet, this
t takes a few
f momentts to unfold.
Excerpt 10, S2, Sessio
on A, Lines 109-117:
1
Elaaboration onn S1 Interpreetation

what don’t yoou
Question (10:07). At line 116 the therapist offfers a questiion: “And w
do weell?” After a moment, th
he client answ
wers the therrapist’s quesstion by offeering a how
respo
onse, focusin
ng more on how
h she cam
me to this undderstanding, rather than answering
the th
herapist’s qu
uestion directtly. She sayss that it “wass always myy understandiing” (line
119). She explain
ns: “my mom
m wasn’t goo
od at sports aand she refuused to let mee participatee
becau
use she thought I would be bad at theem too” (linnes 119-121). Hence, thee client uses
the qu
uestion to taalk about herr early childh
hood experieences.
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on A, Lines 116-123
1
Excerpt 11, S2, Sessio

Then at liine 125 she uses
u “So” as her turn inittiator, whichh indicates thhat what
follow
ws will be a summary. She
S says: “It is very hardd for me…to keep at thinngs if I feel
like I’m
I failing…
…. The adjud
dication process for me reeally…highllights the pootential for
failurre” (lines 125-127). The summary co
ontinues to sshape the prooblem of “beeing
evalu
uated” (which has now become centrral to the “joob stuff” probblem). The cclient uses
the ph
hrase “adjud
dication proccess,” which
h is quite form
mal languagge, and referss to a
situattion where one
o is judged
d — where one
o is evaluaated. This is rrelated to the “potential
for faailure” and what
w she und
derstood as a child; nameely: “You doon’t do thinggs you don’t
do weell.” This su
ummary is im
mportant because it is a cconstitutionaal moment: a clear
instan
nce of “mutu
ual formation
n between people and thheir forms off life" (Packeer, 2011, p.
10). The
T summarry relies on th
he context built
b
up in S11 and S2. It iis an elaboraation on the
interp
pretation end
ding S1: an interpretation
i
n which is reelated to the general struuggle with
employment that her family is
i having and
d specificallyy to her diffficulty with tthe job searcch
proceess (all aspeccts of S1). Th
he summary
y arises out oof this contexxt, but it alsoo acts to
defin
ne the contex
xt. It reinforcces some asp
pects of the pprevious connversation, w
while
disreg
garding otheers. Certain themes
t
comee to light, whhile others fa
fade.
The remainder of her utterance em
mphasizes hoow the past hhas shaped hhow (who)
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the client is. First, the “adjudication process” mentioned above is contrasted with a
situation where “no one is really watching, [and] no one loses” (lines 127-128). She then
relates the “no one is really watching” to “the way I play most of my games” (line 128).
She continues by describing that when she plays games “nobody keeps score and things
are just for…shits and giggles” (line 129). She rationalizes this by saying that the rules
make the game “overly complicated or competitive” and says that this is opposed to her
more “copacetic…nature” (lines 133-134). Hence, the client’s utterance links present
behavior to her basic “copacetic…nature,” contrasting this with her childhood
relationship with her mother, and the difficulty with being “evaluated.” In this subtle turn,
the client tries to background the negative emotions and lack of confidence she was just
discussing and instead emphasizes her “copacetic…nature.” She frames herself as relaxed
and free spirited, rather than anxious, fearful, depressed, or any other negative emotion
that might be driving her behavior.
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Excerpt 12, S2, Sessio
on A, Lines 125-144
1

he is talking about throw
wing out the rrules she slipps and says:
Interestingly, when sh
“halff the rules geet thrown outt of the way because the y just make the game ovverly
petent” (liness 130-133). She
S immediaately initiatees a repair byy saying, “yoou know,
comp
overlly complicateed or compeetitive.” Thiss slip is meanningful whenn we take innto
consiideration thee unfolding context.
c
She has describeed feeling inncompetent in situations
where she is evalluated. Altho
ough she triees to frame hher attempts to throw outt the “rules”
p
cho
oice based on
n a “copacetiic…nature” the slip betrrays her rhetoorical reas a personal
framiing and align
ns more with
h the less positive positioon of the clieent as an inccompetent
interv
viewee, whicch arose the S1.
Formulation (11:07). At line 135 the therapisst seems to ccall for his tuurn by
overllapping the client
c
speech
h with an ack
knowledgmeent token andd then takes deep breath.
He th
hen offers a formulation
f
about materrial discussedd in a previoous session. H
He says: “I
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remember maybe a couple sessions ago you said that you have your standards for
everybody else and you have your standards for yourself” (lines 135-137). The client
offers a strong acknowledgment token and then begins to talk about how she “was really
hard on” herself (line 138). The formulation ends up diverting the client’s attempt to
frame herself as being “copacetic in nature” and instead steers the client toward more
problematic aspects is her life (i.e. being hard on herself). Although the formulation
follows directly after the “copacetic” phrase, it is responding to the description of how
she throws out “half the rules” (line 130). The therapist’s formulation uses the word
“standards” which is a synonym for rules. His choice of the word “standards” is
interesting because it creates a tacit, rather than explicit link between the two utterances.
He could easily have said “rules” rather than “standards”. We might speculate that a more
explicit connection could come across as forceful and create resistance, where as a tacit
connection creates an opportunity of the client to change her focus.
In response to the therapist’s formulation the client offers a strong
acknowledgment token followed by a narrative (N2) about how she was “hard on
[herself]” in “middle school or maybe early high school” (lines 138-139). Similar to N1,
N2 is introduced using Labov and Fanshel’s (1977) classic rule of narration. The
narrative is introduced by a “proposition” that is “affective” (p. 105). After the strong
acknowledgment token the client delivers the proposition: “I was really hard on myself.”
According to Labov, the narrative introduction tells the listener that a narrative is going
to be told. Furthermore, the narrative “functions as [a]…single speech act” that might
challenge, respond to, or resist the implications of the therapist’s utterance (p. 106). In
this case, the client uses the narrative to agree with the therapist, while also
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contextualizing how her high “standards” for herself have been distressful.
Question 12:23. However, when the therapist uses his next utterance (“And that’s
what you seem to do?”) to summarize this as a current problem (line 155), the client
resists. Initially she pauses and then she says, “I have done [it] in the past, I think I’m
slightly better at it” (line 156). In other words, the high standards that the client was
discussing previously were more of a problem in the past and she has gotten slightly
better at not being perfectionist. With the therapist’s question answered the client then
launches into a story about how her physics teacher “didn’t teach” and she ended up
getting a bad grade (line 159). In the story the client depicts herself as a hard-working
student that would not give up even though she had a bad teacher. She describes how the
teacher, “stopped writing the answers down and I started failing” (lines 164-165). The
story actually demonstrates a moment where she was not holding herself to too high of
standards. She says, I only got a “high C in the course…which didn’t break me up all that
much” (line 179).

196

Excerpt 13, S2, Sessio
on A, Lines 145-186:
1
Naarrative 2 (N
N2) and S2 Innterpretationn
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Interpretation 13:40. The therapist then makes an interpretation by saying: “Well
I wonder if in that situation…you see that it was maybe not a reflection on you, but a
reflection on the teacher. But it sounds like in a lot of things, that if things don’t go right
you…see them as a reflection on yourself” (lines 182-185). To this the client offers a
strong acknowledgment token saying “Ahh definitely, definitely” (line 186). The
acknowledgment that the client offers here is one of the strongest agreements we have
seen so far. And yet, what the therapist does with his interpretation is foreground the
problem of ‘being hard on herself,’ while backgrounding the more positive depiction that
the client has put forward. Again we see the therapist attempting to keep the conversation
focused on the problem as personal.
By steering the conversation toward the client’s negative depictions of herself the
therapist problematizes the client’s story differently than the client. When the client tells
a story about how she had a bad teacher who was responsible for her bad grade she
foregrounds a type of experience where she is a victim that survived. Yet, she is not
responsible for her bad grades. Hence, the problem is with the teacher, not herself. The
therapist could offer his support, empathizing with her experience, but ultimately if
therapy is going to continue the problem has to reside, to some degree, with the client in
order to give therapy direction and motivation. To this end, the foregrounding that the
therapist performs in S2 changes the location of the problem. For example, it shifts the
problem from the teacher to the client (lines 180 — 185), and works to disregard a nonproblematic depiction of the client for a problematic one, such as when he disregards the
client’s “copacetic in nature” comment and instead highlights how she has different rules
for herself.
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How these problems are related to those in S1 is unclear. The therapist continues
to focus on problematizing, yet there is no clear connection between the problems being
discussed. As we move into S3 we will encounter even more unexpected changes that
seem to take us further and further from the “job stuff” problem of S1. This is an
important finding. There is no essential or underlying problem that evolves during the
session. Hence, we will not find the problem of “being evaluated” behind every utterance.
Numerous problems exist, but a few stand out because of the way they are talked about—
the way they become constituted in the conversation. The “job stuff” problem comes out
of the initial narrative. The problem becomes important as its very nature is contested by
the client and therapist. By the end of S1 the “job stuff” problem is so transformed that it
almost seems like something else entirely. It is a problem with “being evaluated,” a
“chaotic feeling” when the client feels “judged” rather than a problem with John losing
his job and no one in the family having a job. The “job stuff” problem of S1 is initially
elaborated upon in S2, but when we examine the entire sequence the only connection that
we can make is that the phrase “adjudication process” is synonymous with “feeling
judged” and “being evaluated”. Yet, this is the only prominent connection to the
problems in S1. Therefore, going forward we must remain focused on the process of
problematizing, rather than attempting to identify an underlying problem that evolves in a
linear fashion throughout the session. When we look at this process we see that the client,
over time, begins to think about herself, others, and the world in ways that constitutes her
as an individual emotional subject—a type of subject, which is a necessary condition for
therapeutic change.
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Sequence 3 (S3)
In responding to the therapist’s S2 interpretation the client offers a strong
acknowledgment token, “Ahh definitely, definitely” (line 186). The tone of her voice is
solemn. A listener might interpret her tone as acceptance. The pace of her speech is
average, but deliberate. After the initial acknowledgment, she begins to ventriloquate
herself: “‘Why couldn’t I have it held down?’” “‘Why couldn’t I have made it?’” She
pauses between each ventriloquation reinforcing her solemn deliberateness. She
continues ventriloquating by saying: “‘Why couldn’t I have fixed things?’” At this point
she makes an essentializing comment: “I have a lot of fix in me. I want to fix things”
(lines 186-188). She emphasizes the word “fix” by saying it with more force. It stands out
in comparison to the solemn, deliberate tone the utterance. She also leans forward,
clutching and shaking her fists as she utters: “a lot of fix…”. This comment construes the
desire to “fix things” as something more or less essential to the client. By turning “fix”
into a noun the client changes the desire to “fix things” into a possession. It is something
that she has “in her”. This is important, not because it represents something internal, but
because the client is shaping the problem as something that she personally possess and is
emotional. By emphasizing the word “fix” with both the force of her speech and by
shaking her fists she displays her frustration. Yet, as a listener the utterance does feel a
little playful.
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Excerpt 14, S3, Sessio
on A, Lines 182-190:
1
Elaaboration onn S2 Interpreetation

Right afteer she talks about
a
the “fix
x” in her, shhe takes a lonng pause andd then
comm
ments: “whicch is a good thing in som
me ways in a terrible thinng and other ways
becau
use I drive myself
m
crazy”” (lines 189--190). This liine is more pplayful at thhe beginning,,
but th
he seriousness returns by
y the time sh
he says “drivve myself craazy”. The plaayfulness
comees out when she says “terrrible thing””. She oscillaates her tone in a sing soong manner aas
she saays “t↑erri↓b
ble”. This is furthered by
y her laughteer after she ssays, “thing””. By the tim
me
she saays I drive myself
m
crazy, her voice has
h become m
more ‘gravelly’. This is impossible
to seee in the transscript and it is extremely
y difficult to convey. However, as a listener the
tone feels
f
sarcasttic. In truth, the
t playfulness that I havve been poinnting out is m
more of a
playfful sarcasm, rather than a lack of seriiousness. Wee can see thiis most clearrly when shee
says “terrible
“
thin
ng”—the chaanges in into
onation givess the “terriblle” a singsonng quality,
and th
he laughter creates
c
a sarrcastic irony.. The playfull, non-seriouus tone combbined with
the laaughter is thee opposite off “a terrible thing” and iin this way itt conveys iroony rather
than negative
n
em
motion.42

42

Wh
hen we look at the position
ning in this uttterance we seee the client reelating to hersself through
sarcassm. By ventriiloquating herrself as someo
one who is strruggling and experiencingg frustration
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This initial elaboration on the therapist’s interpretation is different from what we
saw with the S1 interpretation. There the client immediately started commenting and
narrating. Here she displays frustration (even if she retains her playfulness) and talks
about herself and her feelings. As will see, S3 is a unique sequence. The utterances are
more ambiguous, yet the participants do not call for repairs. Furthermore, there is more
talk about emotion and negative behaviors (in this sequence the focus is on self injurious
behavior). In a nutshell, the sequence feels less ‘canned’ and more spontaneous.
Watching the tape I felt that the session got deeper during S3 and I came to see this
sequence as a pivotal moment that changed the focus and emotionality of the session.

she described herself as an emotional character who has “a lot of fix” that causes her frustration.
The first part of the utterance allows this character to voice her frustration: “Why couldn’t I have
fixed things”. The second part explicitly acknowledges this frustration by emphasizing the word
“fix” as described above. The last part of the utterance is an evaluation of this quality. The
sarcastic tone establishes the narrator’s position towards the character. This is not the first time
that the client has talked about herself in emotional terms infused with irony and sarcasm.
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Figurre 10
Sequeence 3 (S3), Basic Conveersational Structure
S
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Explanatory gloss formulating past session (14:16). In response to the
elaboration, the therapist does something unique (lines 191 and 194), and if we were
simply examining the content of the response, it would seem off-topic. At no point in the
previous utterance had the client discussed hitting herself, yet he proceeds to introduce
the topic right after the client’s initial elaboration. In order to understand this response we
have to look at the client’s previous turn as a TCU (Turn Construction Unit) (Sacks et al.,
1974). Turns are not attempts to represent something, but actions. A TCU is complete as
soon as the action is completed. When we look the client’s utterance from lines 186-190
we see that she agrees with the therapist’s previous interpretation, and then begins to
extend this agreement by ventriloquating herself. Then she sums up the basic point of the
ventriloquation, which is to convey how she wants “to fix things”. At this point (line 190)
the action is complete. This is the first TRP (Turn Relevant Place): the point where the
therapist could speak, but he does not. Instead, the client continues by saying that having
“a lot of fix” is both “good” and “terrible”. Furthermore, it is “terrible” “because I drive
myself crazy”. This statement acts as an addendum. The primary action of the utterance is
to convey how frustrating it is to have to fix things and to constitute this as an essential
aspect of the client’s personality (rather then something she does based on
circumstances). The addendum stands as a related, yet secondary action. It evaluates this
aspect of her personality. Once the evaluation is complete the therapist responds.
Therefore, in order to understand the therapist’s response we have to see it as a response
to the client’s evaluation that this aspect of her personality is a “terrible thing…because I
drive myself crazy”.
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By saying: “Yea, because…last week…you said that you…hit yourself”(line
192), the therapist expands on the evaluation made by the client. It’s like saying: “Yea,
you drive yourself so crazy that you hit yourself, that it is pretty bad”. Listening to the
exchange as a non-participant (such as myself) you might feel a little lost because you
were not there when this was previously discussed. However, we know that that the
therapist’s response made sense to the client because there was no call for a repair. As
Sacks, Schegloff, and Jefferson (1974) point out, participants craft their utterances with a
“orientation and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the coparticipants” (cited in
ten Have, 1999, p. 111). Utterances are recipient designed. Although it might not be
entirely clear what the therapist means to do with his utterance, it seems to fit, at least
enough for the client to agree and offer her own response.
Question (14:24). Even though the therapist’s utterance was ambiguous, we are
able to make sense of it when we analyze it in terms of action. However, when the client
responds to the therapist’s utterance she does so in a way that is even more ambiguous.
Initially she offers a strong acknowledgment token, despite the fact that the therapist tries
to repair his original formulation. Eventually, the client extends her agreement by
brushing her fingers over her left forearm and then saying “there are remnants of that
still” (line 195). When she says “still” she looks right at the therapist. He returns her gaze
and asks: “What do you make of that?” (line 197). The question is as ambiguous as the
client’s extension. It is unclear what “that” is, which might help to explain how the client
answers the therapist is question.
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on A, Lines 191-208
1
Excerpt 15, S3, Sessio

r
to the
t “what doo you make oof that” quesstion the
Question (14:41). In response
clientt begins to taalk about thee “noise” thaat her daughtter makes. S
She indicatess that it is
someething speciffic to her child because “other
“
babiess cry and it ddoesn’t botheer me” (line
199). Listening to
o the client’ss response, the therapist jumps in as soon as the TCU is
comp
plete. He doees this even though
t
the client
c
attemppts to continuue her turn. H
However, shhe
quick
kly gives the therapist the floor and he
h then asks a clarifyingg question onn lines 201202: “So this starrted when Wanda
W
was bo
orn?” The cllient then cassually answeers this
questtion by clariffying that no
o: “I…initiallly started thherapy for cuutting, and…
…when I feel
comp
pletely overw
whelmed, it’s just a way of releasingg” (lines 203-205).
The theraapist repeats back to the client
c
the woords “overwhhelmed and releasing”
and th
hen begins to
t ask the qu
uestion: “Wh
hat comes to…
…[mind]” (lline 206). Thhe therapist
doesn
n’t actually complete
c
this question. As
A you can ssee in the excerpt he beggins to trail
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off as he says “comes”. However, because the therapist uses this question repeatedly a
listener can have a clear understanding of what he was going to say. This is something
that conversation analysts call projection: the way in which full words can be cut off and
yet the listener can still understand what was going to be said based on the context (C.
Goodwin & Heritage, 1990). The context here is the history of this and other similar
conversational actions, which incite the client to talk about herself—what she is feeling
and thinking. The client is encouraged to elaborate in an autobiographical or personal
manner, which is an example of the conversational action that Labov (1977) referred to
as a type A-event. The therapist’s questions and the client’s personal elaboration are not
random. Instead, they are actions granted to them based on their roles. In short, the
context here includes the kinds of people they are in psychotherapy—clients and
therapists—which come into being through their tactically different actions on actions.
Question (14:56). Right after the therapist repeats the client’s words she offers a
strong acknowledgment token and then begins to expand on the feeling of being
“completely overwhelmed”. She actually begins this elaboration prior to the therapist
trailing off and in this sense we can see the therapist was giving up his turn in order to let
the client continue. It is a unique moment where the client asserts herself. I do not think
that it is a coincidence that in this assertive moment the topic of conversation is clearly
emotional. The client and therapist are talking about being “overwhelmed”. The client
continues by talking about how she feels like she “is full of chaos”. Previously at the end
of S1 the client talked about how having to explain herself and being evaluated was a
“chaotic thing”. In S2 during N2 (line 142), the client describes herself as a “chaotic
mess” when she got a 97 on an exam. Here, six minutes after first using the term (
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“chaotic thing” t=9:01, “chaos” t=15:12), the client echoes her previous talk by referring
to herself as being “full of chaos”. Previously, during S1, she talked about the experience
of being evaluated as a “chaotic thing”. Here we see a shift. It is not the experience or
situation that is “chaotic”, rather the chaos is something that resides inside, it is
something “you’re full of”.43
An interesting thing about the client’s response from lines 207 to 209 is that she
elaborates on the experience of being “overwhelmed and releasing” and then goes back to
talking about how her child’s scream “drives [her] crazy”. She tries to keep these two
things separate by placing the “releasing” in the past tense. She says: “It is sort of
like…you’re just full of chaos ((shaking hands back and forth)) and…I don't know why it
works it just did” (lines 207-208). By saying “I don’t know why it works, it just did” the
client switches from present tense to past. This verb confusion fits in with the ambiguity
throughout the sequence. Immediately after this change in tense the client returns to
talking about how and why her daughter drives her crazy. Again, the sudden shift back,
without a clear explanation is very apparent when looking at the transcript. However,
neither participant looks to be all that confused. When looking at the details of the
interaction I find myself asking what the connections are between her screaming child,
cutting, being overwhelmed and releasing, and hitting herself?
At line 209, the client returns to talking about her daughter and gives more
context to the “noise” that Wanda makes, which is so bothersome to her. However, the
client does not simply talk about the noise she makes, but instead describes how she acts.
43

Notice how the client uses the universal “you” rather than saying I. This is a way of distancing
herself from the experience as well as a means of normalizing it (Du Bois, 2007, p. 28).
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She sets up her description by saying that what bothers her is “not being able to…reason
with her.” Her description is centered on how Wanda will “work herself into…such a
lather that she won’t let you give her what she’s demanding” (lines 213-215). She goes
on to talk about how she sometimes makes “jokes about it” (line 215) and then
ventriloquates the things she has “said” to Wanda such as “Wah wah wah, I’m gonna die
of mild discomfort” (line 217). It is worth pointing out that this is a double
ventriloquation. The “Wah wah wah, I’m gonna die” is actually Wanda’s speech
ventriloquated by the client both in the past as well as in the present. This story is about
how the client deals with her daughter’s cries and frustrating behavior by “mocking her.”
Again, the connections between cutting, hitting, crying, being overwhelmed, and
releasing are not clear, but if I were the therapist I would conceptualize the mocking as a
higher order defense that alleviates the client’s frustration and keeps her from cutting or
hitting herself.
Extension/Question (16:07). The therapist responds to the client story by saying
“but when things feel chaotic” (line 227). The therapist’s utterance is difficult to classify
from a conversation analytic perspective. On the one hand, it can be seen as an extension,
continuing the client’s speech and acting as a bridge between the preceding and
forthcoming utterance. However, the utterance functions more like a question. It is
actually a sentence fragment and it lacks the necessary predicate in order to be a complete
sentence. By offering only the first part of the sentence the action initiated by the
utterance remains stalled. Therefore, it is left up to the client to finish the action. In this
case she is explaining what she does “when things feel chaotic”. Therefore, the utterance
feels like an extension, and yet also acts as a question. Furthermore, it is a response to the
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begins by saying “Ahh really, really, sort of overwhelming” (line 228). The way she
initiates her turn is as if she was asked: “What does it feel like when things are chaotic?”
At line 206, when the therapist repeated her words “overwhelmed and releasing” she
similarly initiates her turn by saying that it’s like being “full of chaos”. Although we can
quibble over the differences between feeling chaotic and feeling overwhelmed the client
uses these almost interchangeably in order to convey the distress she feels. To fully
elaborate what it feels like to be overwhelmed and feel chaotic she takes almost an entire
minute. Even though a minute might seem like a short period of time, in conversation,
where the other participant speaks in short bursts that last less than 5 seconds, a minute
feels longer than one would expect. During her elaboration the client uses ventriloquation
and an analogy to describe what it feels like to be overwhelmed. The analogy not only
compares being overwhelmed to another kind of experience, but also incorporates the
here-and-now to illustrate her point.
She starts with a ventriloquation. As she initiates her turn and says the word
“overwhelming” she brings her hands to her head and begins to shift them back and forth.
She does this while she strains her face in a way that looks painful. She then
ventriloquates yourself by saying: “‘I don’t know what to do, I don’t know how to make
this situation better’” (lines 229-230). When she does this she looks like an actor acting
out a scene. She looks away from the therapist and gazes out at a distance. She has a
painful and stressed look upon her face. She emphasizes the words “what to do”.
Watching this you get a sense of panic, confusion, stress, and uncertainty. She continues
to describe the experience by saying it’s like “everything just stops…there’s too many,
too many things happening” (lines 230-231).
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240). The first part of this quote is probably the most important. The “so like the noises
we are able to filter out” indexes the client and therapist in the here-and-now because it is
using the present tense. Of course, she could be talking in general terms, which would not
necessarily be specific to the here-and-now, but when she indicates examples of sounds
such as the music, the buzzing of the lights, or the air brakes she’s actually pointing to
things that are happening right there in the session. When she says “air brakes” you can
hear air brakes on the recording for example. This way of illustrating what feeling
“chaotic” is like by bringing in the here-and-now and indexing both the client and the
therapist is a powerful tool used by the client. As a listener, I had a visceral experience
listening to her description. You can follow her logic and attend to the experience along
with her as she guides you. It is a powerful moment that brings emotion into the hereand-now experience of feeling overwhelmed and “chaotic”. It is a way of enacting
emotion so it can be experienced mutually44, yet still emphasize what it is like for her to
personally feel overwhelmed.
She finishes by tying her analogy to the experience of feeling overwhelmed by
saying “and it’s sort of similar to that, but only more panicked for me, so sort of like just
feeling like you are going to drown because all these things are just bombarding you”
(lines 240-242). The “it’s sort of similar to that” contains two indexes: the first referring

44

As a therapist it is very hard to work when there is very little feeling. Maybe this is not the case
for all therapists, but I am constantly trying to feel what is being said. The client tells her story
and I tune into what I feel. Although this feeling relies on many things, it is also a response to the
client’s story. How does the story move me as both a therapist empathizing with the client and as
a person with my own stories? Can I identify with the client, can I imagine what it would be like
to be them in the situation they describe? Most importantly, do I feel moved? If I don’t have this
data I am lost and I flounder. That is why I see this moment as so important, the client really
shows the therapist how she feels. This is something that she does to act on the therapist.
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to being overwhelmed, and the second referring to the experience of having your hearing
return. But more importantly the second index refers to the experience that was just
shared by both the therapist and the client. The importance of this moment is that the
client was able to talk about how she feels during her day-to-day life in a way that
construes emotion as powerful and personal. Emotion is shown to be something that she
experiences as problematic, and it is further constituted as what Foucault (1983) called
the "ethical substance" that needs to be selected, identified, and worked upon (p. 238).
How you work on this is substance is by sharing your personal experience with the
therapist, which she does here in an evocative manner. This transforms the client’s
personal experience into a shared experience, which can be used later for further
therapeutic work. This is the process through which type A actions can become later
constituted as type AB actions, and be used to formulate the client’s previous experience
(Labov & Fanshel, 1977).
Extension (17:02). With his next turn the therapist again responds to the client by
offering an extension that is unfinished and therefore functions as a question. However,
this time the client actively cuts off the therapist, overlapping his speech, and then
finishing his turn. First let’s look at the therapist’s turn. He says: “And so cutting and or
hitting yourself breaks that…” and is then cut-off by the client (line 244). The utterance
relies on possible connections between discourse objects (cutting, hitting, overwhelmed,
chaos) that have remained only possibilities up to this point. Here “cutting” and “hitting”
become paired as a kin behavior, functioning in the same manner. He hedges this a bit by
saying “cutting and or hitting”. This allows the ambiguous relationship to remain, while
also, more or less, equating the two. Both the therapist and client have avoided
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connecting these two behaviors directly. Why that is I can only speculate. What is
important however is that both the therapist and the client are both apprehensive and they
construct their response with this in mind. The therapist’s response is sensitive to the
preceding context, and yet he moves to equate the two. The soft connection actually
makes it less likely that the client will flat out disagree with him. Saying the hitting and
cutting are the same might feel wrong to the client for whatever reason and lead to a
discussion about how they are different. This discussion would be a side-track. The
purpose of the therapist’s utterance is not to equate these two behaviors, but to link those
behaviors to the chaotic overwhelming emotion that she has been describing.
The client cuts-off the therapist right as he is forming the predicate of his
utterance. She stops him from saying what “cutting and or hitting” does and instead says
this herself. The transition between the two utterances is illuminating. The therapist uses
the action verb “breaks” to describe what the “cutting and or hitting” does. However, the
client jumps and the says “it g-” (line 245). The second word is cut off but as is often
seen it projects a full word, which is it “it gets”. This is most apparent when you hear the
entire utterance as the client jumps in and cuts-off the therapist in order to correct him.
She does not hit herself to break something, but because “it gets something out”.
The remainder of the utterance is a meditation, of sorts, on how she is trying to
remove something. She says, “it lets me…vent my frustration” and, “for whatever reason
it relaxes me. It gets, you know a sort of, I guess I get angry at being overwhelmed or just
frustrated at the situation but it gets, it gets something out. I am physically doing
something that gets me out of the moment” (lines 245-251 ). So here we see that the
client is trying to understand the experience of being overwhelmed and feeling chaotic
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but this is not made explicit. The client talks about how her daughter’s crying really
bothers her and how she mocks her, but there is no explicit discussion of this connection.
Rather, they remain possibilities that can be used or ignored as the participants talk.
These possibilities fade when the client describes what frustration feels like because she
talks about feeling like you might “drown because all of these things are just bombarding
you”. This is furthered by her here-and-now analogy that evocatively conveys being
overwhelmed by external stimuli that is non-specific and ubiquitous. In other words, what
is characteristic of the experience is that there is no clear object. The therapist’s
interpretation describes the hitting as a means of directing anger toward a clear object.
Responding to this, the client emphatically agrees and then says, “I don’t want’a…to
[hurt] my child” (lines 253-254). Here we see the client uses the possibilities, yet unused.
She uses the connections between anger at her child being redirected toward herself.
This all arises out the previous ambiguity as the client talked about hitting,
cutting, and Wanda’s tantrums in ways that hinted at connections, while also creating
disconnects. For example, when the therapist reminded the client that “you’ve hit
yourself” (line 194) she responded by brushing her arm and saying there were “remnants
of that still.” She might have been talking about a bruise from hitting or scars from
cutting, the therapist (and the researcher is left to guess). Then responding to the
ambiguous question, “What do you make of that?” she talked about her daughter. So are
we to assume that hitting and/or cutting are related to the daughter? Both the researcher
and the therapist can only speculate. When the therapist asked if this started “when
Wanda was born” she said: “No….I started therapy for cutting”. So were the “remnants”
scars or bruises, are they related, and if so how? All this is therapeutic food for thought
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and it is not hard to imagine what the therapist was piecing together at that time. The
cutting and the hitting are akin behaviors. They are related to her daughter and her
screaming, but how? The client then talked about the cutting as a way to feel a release
when she is overwhelmed. This led into the story of mocking her daughter when she
throws the tantrum. Hence, the self-harm could be interpreted as a way of directing her
frustration (or anger) at her child toward herself.
As a therapist it is hard not to see the links here, but as a researcher I have to take
a step back and assume that there are no given connections. The connections have to be
made, they have to be forged. What we see in S3 is how associations are not simply
something we have internally, but something that can be displayed. The client talks about
things that are not explicitly connected, yet the way in which they are talked about creates
a possibility for forming connections that can then be worked into therapeutic theme
(Spence, 1982). Hence, cognitive associations can be seen as an interpersonal process
that entails bringing forward depictions of others, behaviors, and emotion in such a way
that connections are almost clear and therefore available to both client and therapist. At
best the therapist might be a little ahead of the client, connecting things that are just
coming to light (Boss, 1963/1979, 1979/1983). This is a good example of how
problematizing involves the creation of implicit problem possibilities, which can later be
made explicit by both client and therapist. Conversational ambiguity allows for numerous
possible problems to arise, and therefore ambiguity can be seen as a conversational
resource. A sequence, such as S3, where ambiguity is high, yet not so high that the
participants are lost and call for repairs, can provide a rich context from which problems
can be pulled and made useful across the session.
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Sequence 4 (S4)
As a therapist, my first impression was that S4 was a productive sequence with a
deep beginning and ending, yet filled with defensive narratives that the client uses to
avoid talking about emotions. There are some important moments that are worth
spending some time on, so I will try and flush these out while summarizing the narratives
with less detail. Below is the basic conversational structure of S4.
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Figurre 11
Sequ
uence 4 (S4),, Basic Convversational Structure
S
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Initial elaboration on S3 interpretation. The client elaborates on the interpretation
ending S3 by making a topical shift. She moves away from talking about herself as a
“safe place to vent” anger (line 255) and instead begins to talk about “one of the things I
hate about John’s mom” (excerpt 19, line 260). She goes on to talk about how John’s
mother “acts with such impunity” and does not “even apologize for just crapping all over
people” (lines 262-263). At line 265, the client signals that she has completed her turn by
concluding that “I hate that about her” and then laughs. The therapist then uses a question
to refocus the client on the content of the S3 interpretation. The therapist asks why
“expressing anger…is difficult [and] has to be directed towards you?” (lines 267-268,
question at 18:54). This shifts the focus of the conversation back on the client and away
from John’s mother. The client states that, “You’re not supposed to get angry… that’s
what crazy and mad people do” (lines 269-272). As she says the word angry she looks
right at the therapist and then turns away laughing and gesturing with her hands as she
associates anger with people who are crazy. She then goes on to elaborate how her
mother never got “close to angry” (line 274) and her “dad swears, but is really
lighthearted” (line 277). These reactions are then compared to her own expression of
anger which she describes by saying: “meanwhile I’m…like break[ing] furniture
and…trash[ing] your place like I’m in an 80s rock band” (lines 282-283). She concludes
by saying: “I want to just decimate something and…I decimate me instead” (lines 283285). Most of the elaboration was delivered with humor directed towards her parents and
how they express anger. This is continued when she begins to talk about herself wanting
to “break furniture”. Yet, as she talks about how she wants to “decimate something,” her
speech begins to slow and the smile in her voice fades when she pauses and offers a long
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Watching this unfold I felt like this was an important moment where the client
was having a deep emotional experience. This seemed to be building throughout S3, but
that sequence was so filled with ambiguities that it was unclear exactly what was
happening. This moment stands out because of its sequential relationship to S3: an
elaboration on what was being constituted during S3. The client begins the elaboration by
trying to shift the topic away from herself, but the therapist guides her back to her
emotional experience. She then talks about anger in her family by using a humorous and
somewhat sarcastic tone, but then she shifts, making eye contact with the therapist, and
emphasizes how: “I decimate me instead,” followed by a long series of croaking
utterances. The directness of this statement is starkly different from S3 where there were
a number of ambiguities. I believe it is this combination that conveys emotion. The way
the elements of the conversation contrast with each creates a relational pattern marked by
shifts in content, tone, and clarity that make a small moment like this stand out within a
long conversation.
Following this emotional pause, the client says: “I just get really angry, I guess its
anger?” (line 287). This concluding statement captures and makes explicit features of S3
and the initial elaboration in S4. First, it is a clear reflective statement.45 The client
reflects on herself as an object and makes an evaluation: “I just get really angry”.
Although this might seem simple and unremarkable, when we reflect on the effort the
therapist has made toward focusing the conversation on the client and her emotion, this
moment becomes exceptional. S3 focused on anger direct toward herself and others. Here
45

I use the word reflective here because it is a moment when the client is both a subject and an
object. She (subject) is reflecting on herself as an object. In a sense she is problematizing herself
as a certain kind of thing, which has constitutional implications.
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we see the client talking about her relationship with anger in a way that brings clarity to
the previous conversation. Second, the client follows with a rhetorical question reinfusing the ambiguity back into the conversation. She states: “I guess it’s anger?”
Hence, the ambiguity that was so present in S3 is not completely resolved. Rather, it is
reestablished as an ambiguity of the emotional experience. This can be seen in the
therapist’s response. He offers what looks like concise interpretation: “I bet it’s a lot of
things” (line 288, Interpretive 3rd, 20:11).46 The interpretation does not resolve the
ambiguity, but accentuates it. What is so interesting about S3 is that it contains a series of
adjacency pairs whose connections to one another are highly ambiguous. And yet, that
sequence moved the conversation into the realm of emotion, anger, and self-injurious
behavior. In the initial elaboration of S4 the conversation stays on emotion and anger, but
the conversational ambiguity decreases. There is more clarity in what is being said, but
this does not completely destroy ambiguity. Instead the client’s emotional experience
becomes ambiguous and the therapist acknowledges this by accentuating that what she is
feeling is “a lot of things”. Hence, emotions are being further constituted as ambiguous
and therefore ascribed the quality of depth, which can be plumb for insight into the
therapeutic problem.
Narrative 3 (N3). After the therapist’s interpretive 3rd turn, the client gives a
partial agreement token and then sets the groundwork for a narrative that elaborates on

46

Initially, I wondered if I should classify this as a sequence ending Interpretation. Yet, it was not
a strong enough interpretation to mark the next sequence, but was rather another interpretive 3rd
turn that was expanding on the elaboration, adding what Peräkylä would call “more layers”
(Peräkylä, 2010, p. 18). So are sequence ending interpretations further spread out and responding
to more material? It feels that way as a therapist. Often you sit back waiting to see what develops:
waiting for some insight that seems relevant.
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the angry, ambiguous feeling identified in her previous utterance. The introduction gives
us a clue as to how the narrative is being crafted to have a certain effect. The client
explains, “I just…sometimes…want to be like, ‘Fucking dishwasher,’ and just be like,
‘No more plates’” (lines 289-290). After she says “plates” she looks right at the therapist
and he offers an acknowledgment token. Again this is the same type of introduction that
was used to begin N1. She offers an emotional gloss and seeks the therapist’s
acknowledgment and interest. The emotion is conveyed as she ventriloquates herself
cursing “Fucking dishwasher.” Because the conversation has been focusing on anger, it
would be easy to assume that this introduction is about being angry. Yet, that is not
certain, it is only a possibility. The client’s previous turn highlighted anger as a
problematic emotion, but at the end of the initial elaboration the feelings were seen as
ambiguous. The story primes the listener for a story about being angry and yet leaves
open other possibilities. For the therapist it is a story worth listening to because it is
primed as a story about emotion—specifically anger—which has been foregrounded
during the session. Hence, the introduction’s effect is that the client gets permission to
take several turns narrating. This move to story-telling allows her to structure her
utterances deliberatively and gives her control the conversational topic.
N3 is a story about how the client threw away some plates because John had
“made a mess” (line 293) and their cats had gotten into the left out food. The major
problem was that their child had a “sanitary” spot where her “clean dishes [go] and he left
food there” (lines 303-305). The cats, who “are kind of assholes” (line 295), got food all
over the sterile area “with their dirty feet and were making a mess and fighting over
food” (line 307). The client ends up getting angry and throws the dishes in the garbage,
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saying “‘God Dammit’…’Fuck this’” (lines 309-310). This portion of the narrative is told
with a smile. She laughs on occasion and looks at the therapist keeping him engaged.
You don’t get the sense that she is becoming angry. The physical indicators of anger: thin
lips, clenched teeth and tempo, pitch, and amplitude increases, are not present (Coan &
Gottman, 2007, p. 273). Yet, the story seems to be about anger. First, this largely has to
do with the context of the conversation. We are expecting a story about anger. Second,
the content of the narrative concerns the violation of agreed upon rules. In the client’s
home they have a “sanitary environment [where] only clean things go with Wanda’s
clean dishes, no food goes there….the only thing that goes where Wanda’s clean dishes
go is also clean dishes” (lines 303-305). This is a list of rules that were violated by John
and in response the client cursed and threw away the dishes. This is in line with de
Rivera’s description of anger as moving against someone who has violated a shared set of
values or rules (de Rivera, 1977, 1984, 2006). This brings us to the last indication of
anger, which is her use of expletives. In modern English, “cursing” has been associated
with anger and frustration (Archer, 2010, p. 398). Furthermore, if we look at the
unfolding context of the conversation we see that the client describes her father’s anger
by ventriloquating him cursing (line 277). Hence, the narrative projects anger even
though the client tells the story in a tongue-in-cheek manner.47 In sum, N3 begins as the
narrative about anger, but the emotion is contained within the narrative and does not
affect the client or the client-therapist relationship during the retelling.
47

Interestingly, if you pay close attention to her speech when she says “God dammit” and “Fuck
this” you can hear changes in the pitch and amplitude. These are the indicators of emotions used
by Goodwin and Goodwin (M. Goodwin & Goodwin, 1999) when analyzing the anger displayed
by girls playing hopscotch. However, these changes are controlled and have a sing song quality
which decreases their impact.
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walk 10 extra feet…. [and] put this in the God damn fridge, would it have really taken
that much more effort out of your stupid day” (lines 315-319). She continues by
challenging him: “‘How could you not think it was a problem, you have met our cats’”
(lines 321-322). Gottman (2007) states that hostility, mockery, and sarcasm are clear
indications of contempt. The tone of her speech during the section is that of sharp, biting
sarcasm. There is humor in her speech, but it is sharp. Meaning she often ends with a
strong upward inflection. The overall cadence of her speech is fast and she becomes more
animated, quickly looking at the therapist and shaking her head. Gottman states that
“contempt can be any statement made from a superior position” (p. 274). This is similar
to de Rivera’s (1977, p. 53) contention that contempt occurs when we recognize someone
as unfavorable or unlikable. Contempt is part of a class of emotions that have to do with
recognition: how we see ourselves; and how we see other people. When we recognize
others as similar to us, often holding ideal qualities, we pull those people closer through
identification. However, when we see someone acting in a way counter to how we see
ourselves, we push them away by being contemptuous. That is what we see occurring in
the narrative. The client depicts herself as the upholder of the household rules and John as
the neglectful, inconsiderate, and incompetent rule breaker. The positioning of John as
incompetent was first hinted at during the slip of N1. This positioning allows the problem
to reside with John and make him an object of contempt. Contempt, as an emotional
transaction, locates the problem in the other, rather than the self. Hence, what we see here
as well as elsewhere is the therapist foregrounding emotions—like anger— in a way that
locates the problem within the client.

228

Question (23:35). At line 339 the therapist keeps the focus on the client’s anger
by saying: “So you do feel that you can get angry with John?” She says that she can, but
she feels like this never changes anything. The therapist then connects this with someone
else from the client’s life, possibly a previous boyfriend by saying “I wonder if that is
reminiscent of how you felt with Jake?” (line 368, Question 25:08). The client uses the
question to elaborate how: “John doesn’t know how to deal with angry people” and she
“make[s] a point of not saying things that…are hurtful” (lines 369 & 376).48 The therapist
asks if she “ever feel[s] guilty” and if she ever “want[s] to say those things?” (Line 375
and 37; Questions 25:08, 25:13). The client responds by saying that she never wants to
say these things because: “I don’t want to hurt him” (line 380). After she says this she
signifies that she wishes to end her turn and utters the empty objects “ahh yea” (ten Have,
1999, p. 22). This allows the therapist to quickly offer an extension, “but you’ll hurt
yourself,” which poetically extends her speech and circulates utterances used previously
(line 383, extension 26:23).
The client uses the extension to complete an emotional transaction and talk about
things that she wants to change. She starts her turn by offering two quietly spoken
acknowledgment tokens and then states: “I don’t know what to do with that” (line 384).
She attempts to revert back to her humorous delivery style by saying “something’s got to
give you know, it just boils over, something got to give” (lines 384-386). Yet, it is almost
like she has run out of steam. She is less animated and when she finishes this line she
pauses and then makes a statement that felt very powerful as I watched the tape. In a calm
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These questions keep the focus on the client’s own experience of her emotion. Furthermore, it
is an explicit attempt to differentiate the chaotic emotions that she’s been describing as not only
anger, but also guilt.
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and quiet voice she says: “I want to get that under control, because I don’t want to…have
Wanda see me…screaming and storm out of a room and just…furiously unmake the
whole bed or…kicking things, or break things”(lines 386-390).
The previous narrative (N3) began as a story about being so angry that the client
was out of control and breaking things. Here we see a shift where the client depicts this
anger as something she wants “to get under control.” Throughout the session the therapist
has been continually focusing the client on her emotions. Even though emotions can be
viewed as “social relationships,” the focus of the therapy has been on how the client’s
emotions are her personal possession and therefore her responsibility (de Rivera &
Grinkis, 1986). The “I want to get that under control” is an acknowledgment of emotion
as something she has to take responsibility for. In a sense, the client takes responsibility
for emotions, while also creating distance from her acts of (hurting herself, breaking
things, screaming) during this utterance. De Rivera (1977) describes guilt as the pushing
away of an aspect of ourselves that we do not want to belong to us. I believe that, in part,
that is what we are seeing here. However, shame also functions in a similar way. Shame
is experienced when distance is created between ourselves and others who we admire.
This distance is created when we are recognized as lacking features that we admire in
others. In this utterance we can also see the possibility of shame. The client states that “I
don’t want to have Wanda see me screaming.” Hence, both shame and guilt are emotional
possibilities that the client opens up with her utterance. However, instead of exploring
these two emotions and moving towards a more complete and clear emotional
transaction, the client swiftly moves into a story (N4), which is told with the same
sarcastic humor that we have seen throughout the session. Although the therapist uses N4
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by pointing out how it is a description of “intense anger,” the story nonetheless moves
away from this unique emotional moment and never allows these possible emotions to
come to fruition. Meaning, these emotions never fully take form within the conversation
because the client swiftly moves back into storytelling that is sarcastic and canned.
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objects (lines 392-399). At line 402, the therapist uses his turn to ask a question (27:30)
that highlights the emotion implicit in the story: “So there is some intense anger?” The
client responds with a shrug, saying, “Ah well I guess that is anger…I feel silly…I don’t
know”. The therapist then asks her to explain why she feels silly and she replies “I should
know what I'm feeling. If it is something so visceral…I should have some semblance of
what's going on” (lines 403-409). At this the therapist calls for his turn by taking a deep
breath, but the client holds on to her turn and continues to speak. This is rare and hence
the move gives the following line more prominence: “I don't know if it is anger…I just
feel overwhelmed and then just like this desire to break things” (lines 409-413). This is a
circulation of the “I guess it’s anger” figure of speech used by the client prior to the
transition into N3 (line 287). In response the therapist makes an interpretation (lines 414415,28:02) that marks the end of S4. He states: “I wonder if that's what maybe gives it
this kinda chaotic feel is that you’re not really sure what you're feeling. You just know
you want it to stop.” This interpretation also uses a circulation of figures. The “chaotic
feel” has been used by both the client and therapist across the session (S1 client line 96,
S2 client line 142, S2 client line 207, S2 therapist line 227). Hence, the “chaotic thing”
(S1, line 96) that the client first introduced and has been emerging over the course of the
past 4 sequences, has become constituted as a “feeling,” in response to not knowing
“what you’re feeling” only that it is unpleasant and you “want it to stop.”
As stated at the outset, my first impression was that S4 had a deep beginning and
end, but was filled with defensive narratives that lacked emotion. For the most part, this
analysis has produced evidence that supports those initial impressions. However, it seems
clear that the narratives are not simply defensive. N3 moves from muted anger, to clear
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contempt, and ends with the possibility of guilt and shame. There are defensive aspects.
The narrative allows the client to control the conversation and talk about emotion (or
whatever she chooses) in a way that feels most comfortable. The narrative does produces
a topic shift. It moves the conversation away from the self harm discussed in S3, and
toward her fights with John (N3). Hence, the narrative allows that the client to change the
topic, but she does not stray too far. She keeps the narrative focused on emotion, but
displays mainly contempt which locates the problem in John and not herself.
Watching the tape, S3 felt like a very deep and emotional sequence, yet felt
loosely connected and strange. S4 seemed to borrow energy from S3, but I felt there was
more clarity. The narratives combined with the comments generated by the therapist’s
questions and extensions kept the conversation focused on emotion, and provided the
client with conversational structure (plot and storytelling sequence structure) and topical
control. The client is able to make some clearly powerful statements as she responds to
the therapist. She opens up the possibility of transforming her anger and contempt into
guilt and shame and she exercises her power as a speaker to hold her turn and state that
she does not know what she is feeling; only that she wants to break things. The therapist
tries to use this to constitute her emotions as an ethical substance that has depth. The
interpretation takes this even further: the problem is this “chaotic” feeling that is caused
by not knowing “what you’re feeling” only that you “want it to stop.” Hence, the problem
is one of not knowing your emotions, which is a substance of depth. As this is occurring,
the client is trying to constitute the problem differently: It is a problem of not “know[ing]
what I’m feeling” except “I feel overwhelmed” and have a “desire to break things.” This
is a different type of problem than the “job stuff” discussed in S1, yet by circulating the
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really sure what you’re feeling” (S-4 interpretation lines 414-415).
Then after roughly 1 minute and 30 seconds the client signals that she is ready to
give up her turn by offering the empty objects “and uhum” at the end of line 442. The
therapist quickly jumps in and offers an interpretation that is just as off-topic as the
client’s elaboration. He states: “I wonder if there is something also kind of expressive
about the way you hurt yourself” (lines 443-444). If we examine the content of the
elaboration and the interpretation of S5, we see that the elaboration seems to be focused
on the content discussed in S4 (N3, fights with partner), whereas the interpretation is
focused on the content discussed in S3 (self harm). S5 is interesting because it juxtaposes
the tactics available to the client and the therapist to change the focus of the conversation.
Although the client offers an acknowledgment token, she is free to comment or narrate
away from the topic that is brought to the foreground during the interpretation. In
contrast, once the client gives up her turn the therapist is able to utilize an interpretation
to swiftly shift the topic of conversation. Part of the constitutional process of
psychotherapy is exercising certain rights that derive from the participants’ different
roles. Clients are granted the right to narration, commentary, and elaboration, where as
the therapist is entitled to interpretation, questions, and formulations. These utterances are
very different types of actions, granted to very different kinds of people. Clients are to
speak down into the depths of their experience; therapists are to light the path by which
the client is to tread.
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Elaboration on S5 Interpretation. The topical shift back to self harm is not
immediately taken up by the client. Instead of responding, she initially shrugs and opens
her hands. She says, “I don’t know” (line 445) with an upward inflection that can be read
as dismissive. We can assume that this is the therapist’s take because he quickly offers a
justification for the interpretation, initiating his turn with “cause” (short for because, or
the reason for) and stating “I don’t think I would have noticed unless you pointed it out to
me” (excerpt 23, lines 446-447). This statement is vague and the client quickly calls for a
repair and clarification (“The bruise?”) to which the therapist offers a strong agreement
token. The client then describes how: “Everybody else..pointed out” the bruise and
exclaimed: “‘What happened, what happened?’” (lines 450-451). The “everyone else”
creates a comparison between the therapist and “everyone.” The therapist is the odd man
out, not noticing the bruise. The utterance shifts the relevance of the client’s previous
action when she pointed out her bruise during S3. The fact that the client had to show the
bruise says something about the therapist, not the client. This struggle over the relevance
of the action continues until line 471 where the therapist uses a question to bring the
focus back on the “idea that maybe there is something expressive about it [indexing self
harm discussed in a previous utterance]?” The entire exchange is another attempt to move
the location of the problem, but this time it is placed in the therapist, rather than John.
Hence, what we see at the start of S6 is the therapist trying to build relevance for
the S5 interpretation. However, this does not work. By showing her bruise the client is
being a good client and reporting to her therapist in order to assist with treatment (lines
464-465). Furthermore, the fact that she has to show the therapist says something about
him, because everyone else noticed. The therapist could have followed the client’s lead
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and apologize for not noticing the bruise or reinforced the client’s actions as that of a
good patient. Instead, he comes back to the “expressive” nature of the self harm. Yet, he
softens his assertion. The client does not have to agree that the self harm is expressive, he
is only asking that they “entertain the idea that maybe there is something expressive
about it?” (Question 31:03, lines 471-472).
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The client responds by saying: “I’m really not thinking about anybody else when
I’m doing it” (line 473). The response clearly shows that she does not see something
“expressive” about harming herself, but she does play along with the therapist and
“entertain the idea.” The therapist responds with a quick follow-up question, “What about
to yourself?” (Line 478, 31:31). The question is vague and at line 479 the client calls for
clarification: “What do you mean?” and immediately the therapist expands his original
question by saying: “What are you trying to express to yourself?” (line 480). Again, the
client rejects the question saying: “It doesn’t really feel like I’m making any big
statement, it is just getting…the desire out of me” (lines 481-482).
Hence, what we see is the therapist offering questions that keep the topic focused
on the idea that self harm is expressive, while the client uses her turns to illegitimate the
therapist’s questions. At line 483, the therapist changes strategy and offers a declarative
statement about the “assumption” that explains why he thinks this topic is legitimate. He
states “I guess you know I kind of operate on…the assumption that the symptom speaks.
And I’m wondering what it’s saying” (lines 483-485). Again, the client begins her
response by opening her hands as if the answer is not clear. However, this time she does
attempt to answer the question. She offers a ventriloquation that actually gives the
“symptom” a voice. In response to the question of what the symptom might be “saying”
the client says: “Ahh ‘everything sucks.’ That’s the way it feels [like]” (line 486). The
ventriloquation, “everything sucks,” it is spoken with the smile, but the rest of the
utterance is spoken quietly. By the end of the utterance it feels like there is less
contention between the therapist and the client. This is demonstrated by the softness of
the client’s tone and her willingness to use the therapist’s assertion that there is
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something expressive about her hurting herself. Furthermore, the client ends her utterance
by talking about how the therapist and client can indeed work on this together, stating
“we can…we can think about that” (line 488), referring to the idea that the symptom
speaks.
Formulation (32:09). This alignment is furthered by the formulation the therapist
offers at line 489. This is another formulation that indexes previously discussed material
from past sessions. The therapist recalls: “I remember asking you, ‘Do you if you get
angry in session’ and you said, ‘No probably not’ and if you can cry in session and you
said, ‘Not if I can help it.’” The therapist and client display their alignment by
coordinated laughter in the last ventriloquation (see excerpt 24). The therapist is actually
ventriloquating the client here, which feels more intimate or shared. This is furthered by
the coordinated laughter and acknowledgment token that begins the client’s next turn.
The formulation is very important in terms of the emerging context of the session. It is an
explicit acknowledgment of the client’s difficulty expressing emotion. We have seen
throughout the session that bringing emotion to the foreground has been a central task
pursued by the therapist. Here we see an acknowledgment of this as a problem for the
client. This problem is identified through a formulation of the client’s own speech during
a past experience that was shared by both the client and the therapist. The formulation
relies heavily on the preceding context. Using implicit problems made possible in S3, the
therapist returns to the topic of self harm and makes explicit that self injury is a type of
problem that involves the client's relationship to herself. The "symptom" is trying to say
something to the client. By converting the symptom in discourse, it is transformed into an
action from the client, toward the client. This is the consequence of entertaining the idea
243

that the symptom is "expressive," i.e. symbolic. The symptom acts on the client. It is her
own unwilled action. Even though the action is unwilled, it is still intentional—it has a
purpose (it “speaks”), yet that purpose is unknown. The therapist asks the client to look
into this unknown in order to understand herself. The client does this by giving the
symptom a voice, which is then followed by the therapist formulation that brings in past
shared experience to foreground the client's problem of not wanting to get emotional in
session. This is an example of how implicit problematizing of the client as certain kind of
emotional being is made explicit, which produces a sense of a rich and deep therapeutic
experience.
The client responds by offering a strong agreement token and an elaboration,
which indicates that it is “strange” that she struggles to cry because she is “pretty
sentimental” (lines 492-493). The therapist then marshals another formulation (32:35)
that indexes past shared experiences. He states: “I have seen you actively try to hold the
tears in” (line 494). At the same time the client is smiling and nodding while opening
hands towards her face and then she emphatically agrees: “Yea, yea I do that” (line 496).
When asked why she does hold back her emotions, she responds by saying: “I like to put
a…brave, tough face on things” (line 498). This leads into a discussion of how she was
raised to “soldier through,” and when she was “growing up [she] was one of the guys”
(lines 500 & 504). The therapist quickly participates with her in the idea that guys “don’t
talk about their feelings” (extension, lines 505-506, 33:14). Both the therapist and the
client are laughing and joking during the section. It is one of the few times the therapist
joins in with the client to joke around and be less serious. This is not because there is a
lack of emotional content in the client’s speech. She states “I had some pretty terrible shit
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“You’re supposed to be tough…or life and everyone else will get you down and get on
top of you” (lines 519-520). Her response seems to shift away from the question of why
she did not have many female friends. Regardless, the therapist then uses the question to
both call for elaboration and challenge the basic idea in the client’s response. He asks:
“Where did you come to that conclusion?” (line 521, 34:10). To this the client responds
in a curt and direct tone: “I don't have…an instance ((curt))….If you are tough you can
take care of yourself and if you’re not then you’re a burden to others. Need[ing]
someone, you know, coddling you all the time, well, what the fucks the point of that?”
(lines 522-528). At the word “coddling” and “fuck” the therapist raises his eyebrow and
the client interprets this gesture saying: “ I said something bigger than I think I did, didn’t
I? Because you made a face….that one, with the eyebrow” (line 530-531). At line 532,
the therapist encourages her to reflect on what she “make[s] of it?” but she tells him: “I
want you to tell me what it is…I don’t know” (lines 534-535). Yet, instead of telling her
what he thinks he asks her: “What comes to mind?” (line 536) to which she responds: “It
seems like…a very strange mentality to have had as a child.…the point of being a kid is
to be…nurtured and coddled, and get your booboos kissed….Not run around
with…gaping wounds and gravel on your knee” (lines 537-541).
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response that feels different; it feels powerful. Part of this is the evocative language
(“coddling,” “fuck”). Yet, it is also the way in which the client directly and succinctly
lays out a firm belief about the “way things go:” You have to “take care of yourself” or
“you’re a burden to others” who have to coddle you.49 She ends with an angry dismissal:
“What the fuck’s the point of that?” Recall that anger is an emotion tied up with belief.
Hence, we have an utterance where the tone changes and becomes more direct and curt.
There is no irony, sarcasm, or wit, but a clear declaration of a belief. Although this does
not seem like anger directed at the therapist, it does feel like the most direct expression of
anger we have seen so far in the session. Possibly this is what the eyebrow raise was
responding to and hence the hermeneutic work done by the client is a response to
emotion. If this is the case, then what we see is the client interpreting the therapist’s
response (eyebrow raise) in order to interpret herself as an emotional being. Hence, there
is some evidence that the client uses the hermeneutics of therapy in order to recognize
and indirectly foreground herself as an emotional being. This ends the contentious
beginning of S6 and leads into the 3 narratives offered by the client. A sequence that was
marked by both the client’s and therapist’s action against one another, ends with them
collaborating and what seems to be an expression of anger that is unique so far in the
session.
Narrative 5 (N5). At this point the client starts a pre-sequence to open the first
narrative (N5) of the sequence. At line 541, she again uses an evocative, emotionally
laden gloss: “Man, childhood sucks!” to introduce and assess the therapist’s interest in
49

Remember the from the standpoint of STE, anger is a transaction that is enacted in order to
assert what “ought to exist” (de Rivera, 1977, p. 77).
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hearing her story (see excerpt 26, line 541-543). However, the therapist does not give the
client clear permission to proceed. Rather, he calls for a repair, as if he did not hear her or
understand. Although repair requests often occur for technical reasons (e.g. an utterance
is muffled, or phrased in a way that does not make sense), Sacks (1989) has shown how a
repair can also be used to resist the actions initiated by the previous speaker. The client’s
utterance is clear. Hence, the therapist repair request can be read as resistance against the
client’s move to begin narrating. In response to the request the client repeats herself and
then offers another emotional gloss that is even more evocative: “Kids are vicious, kids
are vicious” (line 545). By combining a technical repair (maybe he did not hear me so I
will repeat myself), with another gloss aimed at opening a narrating sequence the client
demonstrates the degree to which wants to tell her story.
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“dressing like a dork” (lines 556-557, 563). Watching the session, the introduction
actually seemed quite productive and deep. Possibly this is due to the implicit emotion
hinted at during the introduction. The client depicts herself as a “huge kid” that stood out
because of her size and because: “[my] mom dressed me….like an overgrown toddler”
(lines 560, 564-567) and she ventriloquates her fellow children saying to her “ ‘you look
like a clown’ ” (line 569). The content here is emotionally evocative. The idea of a young
child being picked on because of her size and what she wears pulls for emotion.
Furthermore, she narrates herself as misunderstood. It is her mother’s fault that she wears
clothes that make her look like a “dork.” Even though she was a “huge kid” she described
herself as “actually on the athletic side” (lines 561-563). In other contexts this could be
considered a strength, but in the introduction it is something that is overlooked.50
She also describes herself as being more intelligent than her peers. For example,
she ventriloquates a conversation between herself and an imaginary childhood playmate:
“‘Yea, yea I know. I know, and I read at a fifth-grade level. Don't you want to talk to
me?’ ‘No we don’t. You don’t…watch enough thunder rangers [and] we don’t like you’”
(lines 570-573). Hence, she positions herself as a mature child whose mother tried to
“preserve my innocence…. By dressing me, like an overgrown toddler” (lines 566-567)
and because of these two factors she was unfairly picked on during childhood. Hence, the
narrative depicts her as a victim of her own development and of her mother’s desire to
keep her “innocent.” Both the mother and the other children are described
contemptuously. This is demonstrated by the language that the client uses, the witty
50

Interestingly in S1 (line 121), the client contemptuously comments on how her mother would
not allow her to play sports during her childhood.
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sarcastic tone, and the way in which the children and her mother are positioned as people
that don’t see the client’s strengths or positive characteristics. This has a direct effect on
the listener (in this case both the therapist and myself as researcher). The pull is not
simply to feel sympathy toward the client, but to feel contempt toward the other
characters in the story while also recognizing the client as someone who should be
appreciated or admired.
According to de Rivera (1977), this interplay of contempt and admiration can
produce powerful effects because of the structural relationship of these two emotions (see
positioning map below). Both contempt and admiration are emotions that involve
recognizing positive or negative qualities in the other. In contempt we see the other as
having negative qualities that makes them dissimilar from us and the emotional
transaction is used to push the other away by accentuating these negative, dissimilar
qualities. Admiration is the opposite of contempt in that the “person whom we admire
embodies personal values” or “ideals” that we see in, or want for, ourselves (p. 55).
Hence, the other is drawn closer as someone who holds similar, ideal qualities. The
qualities that the client emphasizes are being “athletic,” “huge” and intelligent.
Previously in this sequence we saw the client and the therapist align over being “one of
the guys” (line 504). Uncharacteristically, the therapist laughed and joked with the client
about stereotypically masculine characteristics such as: “guys don’t talk about their
feelings” (lines 505-506). Hence, the client and therapist have already selected masculine
characteristics as something that binds them as similar kind of people. The characteristic
of intelligence is not found in the conversation but we can speculate that there is a fairly
universal assumption that therapists are part of the intelligentsia and the notion that the
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instead of elaborating further she moves away from the topic and quickly begins
narrating (N5) how she was raised in “a daycare center” and that boys were her friends,
but they would only play with her if other boys were not around. The narrative is short,
lasting from line 578-591 (see transcript). The narrative does not evoke the same
emotional response because it does not use admiration and contempt to position the
characters. Hence, the narrative feels resistive in that it allows the client to move away
from the topic of the “sad face” and hold the conversational floor for an extended turn.
The notion that the narrative is resistive is reinforced by the therapist’s response to the
story. Instead of focusing on any elements brought up in the story the therapist returns to
the client’s initial response saying: “You say that…you didn’t want to go there?” (line
592, excerpt 28, question 39:03). This circulates the client’s original figure of speech: “I
don’t want to go there” and returns to the contradiction between the content of the
client’s speech and her delivery, which was pointed out by the therapist’s previous
noticing.
In response the client says that she does not “want to think too hard on it” (line
593). The “it” indexes the “sad face” uttered by the client and then circulated by the
therapist in his noticing. In other words, the “it” indexes the implicit sadness in the
client’s introduction and also her contradictory style of talking about something that is
clearly sad. The client then offers a formulation stating: “I suppose I’m supposed to be
going in, that is probably the purpose of all this” (lines 594-596). Although it is not
entirely clear what she means by “all this,” my interpretation, as a listener, is that she is
referring to the practice of psychotherapy. The therapist also seems to hears the “all this”
index this way and he responds by saying, "Well I'm not here to, you know to force you
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into anything,
a
but I think we need to expllore why it iis difficult too go, or whatt…gets in thhe
way of
o going therre.” (lines 59
97-599).
Excerpt 27,
2 S6, Sessio
on A, Lines 592-601
5

This exch
hange has a number
n
of im
mportant feattures. First, this is a uniqque momentt
where the client’ss utterance is treated as a question annd the therappist providess an answer.
….that is probably the pu
urpose of all this,” is a sppeculative asssertion that
The: “I suppose…
can be
b read as a question.
q
The client usess “this” as ann index that a listener cann interpret aas
referrring to the prractice of pssychotherapy
y. Hence, thee client’s uttterance can bbe read as a
questtion about what
w psychoth
herapy is sup
pposed to bee. The therappist could haave respondeed
by qu
uoting sourcee material reeferring to so
ome general rule (such aas “psychothherapy shouldd
be a way
w of lookiing inside an
nd explaining
g how you thhink and feeel”). Howeveer, what he
does is position himself
h
as an
n arbiter of what
w they aree “supposed”” to do in “thhis”
psych
hotherapy. Namely,
N
they
y “need to ex
xplore why itt is difficult to go or what…gets in
the way
w of going there.” Agaain this is a circulation
c
off figures whiich recycles the phrase
“goin
ng there”. Heence, this lin
nks back to th
he difficultyy the client hhas in experieencing
emotion directly. As she sum
ms up in the next
n utterancce: “I don't w
want to get, I feel myselff
going
g, getting…eemotional an
nd I really do
on't want to ddo that, so I’m…puttingg the brakes
on” (lines 600-60
01). Here wee see problem
matizing aim
med at the cliient’s relatioonship to
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herself as an emotional being. This way of thinking about herself is made explicit by both
the client and the therapist at this moment, but it relies on the entirety of the previous
context where emotion as a personal substance of depth was problematized as in need of
hermeneutic interpretation.
Narratives 6 (N6) & 7 (N7). The remainder of S6 contains two narratives (N6
lines 619-627,51 N7 lines 639-664, see transcript) that bring about topical changes and
avoid the therapist’s attempts to focus on why she has to avoid “feeling emotional” (line
603). In both cases the topic changes are abrupt (lines 619, 627). During both narratives
the client returns to her witty, sarcastic delivery; speaking with a smile and laughing. The
stories do have emotional undertones: N6 is about experiencing fear when she saw
“rattlesnake pelts” (line 621) and N7 is about being so afraid of “clowns” that she
“punched [a clown] in the nuts” when one approached her at a circus (line 661). N7 is
more complicated because there is positioning occurring between the client’s friends who
taunt her into going to the circus by saying: “‘Pussy, pussy, pussy’” (line 645). However,
because of the topic changes and the style of delivery these narratives feel ‘canned’ and
resistive.

51

N6 is extremely short and it could be viewed as part of the pre-sequence of N7. However, it
does have the basic elements of a narrative: a telling of a past event that unfolds in time.

256

Excerpt 28,
2 S6, Sessio
on A, Lines 661-679:
6
Intterpretation S6

Interpreta
ation S6 (43::03). At line 666, the theerapist takes a deep breaath to call forr
his tu
urn and then offers an intterpretation. He uses anoother speculaative assertioon to ask:
“I’m wondering if
i you are try
ying to tell me
m somethingg…with thiss story as weell.”
ough the utteerance takes the same forrm as previoous interprettations, this uutterance is
Altho
desig
gned in such a way that itt acts as a qu
uestion. In oother words, it has the sam
me effect ass:
“Are you trying to
t tell me som
mething with
h this story aas well?” Heence, it callss for the cliennt
to refflect on her intention
i
forr telling the story.
s
In respponse, the cllient stalls foor a moment
and th
hen points to
o the therapiist and says: “I’m not tryying to threat
aten you” (linne 668).
Quick
kly the theraapist followss with anotheer speculativve assertion, but this timee it functionns
more like an interrpretation:52 “You said ‘I
‘ wonder hoow we got onn this topic.’’ [Well] we
starteed talking ab
bout emotion
ns, things thaat are difficuult for you too…talk abouut here, and
52

However, this in
nterpretation does
d
formulatte some of whhat has alreaddy been said aand therefore
is stilll hard to classsify.
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maybe I'm the clown….talking about emotions, talking about things that are difficult and
you're saying: ‘slow up’” (lines 672-677). This interpretation answers the question posed
by the speculative assertion while also summing up S6 as sequence concerned with
emotion. It brings back to the foreground the problem of talking/feeling/expressing
emotion, which the client moved away from while narrating. It does this by proposing
that the story is not simply a representation of a past a event, but possibly something
“expressive.” The story is interpreted as an action in the here-and-now directed against
the therapist, or as the client put it, ‘a threat’ aimed at the therapist. In a sense, the
interpretation converts N7 into an indirect expression of anger against the therapist.
Furthermore, the interpretation positions the client as an active agent who is responsible
for her actions in the present moment. This contrasts how the client often depicts herself
as a victim and how she actively avoids enacting emotion in the here-and-now of the
session.
Sequence 7 (S7)
Sequence 7 (S7) is much shorter than S6, and lasts only 8 minutes. It is the last
sequence prior to the closing and it is important because both the client and therapist talk
more explicitly about emotion as a problem. As we have seen emotion has been
continually foregrounded and problematized, but up until S6 this process was implicit.
The power of S7 comes from its relation to the previously implicit talk about the problem
and the shift toward explicit formulation. As the therapist and the client are discussing
this, there seems to be a possibility of the client getting angry. However, the client
quickly changes the topic and offers a long commentary about her mother-in-law. Much
like in S6, the therapist uses an interpretation to transform the client’s commentary,
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givin
ng it another meaning bey
yond its reprresentationall function. Below is the basic
conveersational strructure.
Figurre 15
Sequ
uence 7 (S7),, Basic Convversational Structure
S
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Elaboration on S6 interpretation. After the S6 interpretation the client begins to
elaborate, accepting the interpretation and then taking it further. She begins with a
humorous denial, saying, “I don’t want to punch you,” but then she follows this by
saying: “There might be something to that, I suppose, I suppose” (lines 678-679). She
continues: “I really don’t want to make it seem like a threat, but the fact that I was so
quick to fire back: ‘It’s not a threat, it’s not a threat, you’re not the clown.’ You probably
are the clown, you are probably are the clown” (lines 681-684). In this last utterance, she
is again utilizing the hermeneutic practiced that the therapist demonstrated in the S6
interpretation. She is interpreting herself (“the fact that I was so quick to fire back”) in
order to understand what the story meant and why it was being told. Hence, the client has
taken herself as an object to be interpreted and understood. In her interpretation she even
tries to acquit herself by saying, “it’s not a threat, it’s not a threat, you’re not the clown,”
but then follows this up with her interpretive conclusion which is: “You probably are the
clown.” Hence, this is a moment where we can see psychotherapy changing the client in
the sense that she begins to adopt the hermeneutic strategy of the therapist. Interestingly,
the client is acting as both interpreter and the object that is being interpreted; therefore
she occupies two positions and creates a doubling. Again, this use of the therapeutic
hermeneutic occurs when there is some evidence of anger and this furthers the notion that
the client is taking up the hermeneutic of therapy and using it as a technology to decode
herself as an emotional being.
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Excerpt 29,
2 S7, Sessio
on A, Lines 672-684:
6
Elaaboration onn S6 Interpreetation

Formulation (43:49). The therapiist then jumpps in and offfers a formullation that
index
xes material from past seessions. The formulationn brings in a previous mooment in
therap
py when thee client expreessed her disscomfort witth a “momennt of silence”” (line 686).
How this connectts to the prev
vious utteran
nce is somew
what unclearr. However, tthe client
pickss up on this immediately
i
and discussses how thesee silences m
make her feell “awkward””
becau
use she is un
nsure if she is “supposed
d to be talkinng” (lines 6877-689). She ends her
utteraance by sayin
ng that “I do
on’t want to put up a whoole bunch off walls, but
I’m…
…increasinglly aware thatt I certainly must
m be” (linnes 689-6933). The therappist then
jumps in and offeers what is best
b described
d as an interrpretive thirdd turn, whichh comes out
T therapist offers an intterpretation that is aimedd at
of Peeräkylä’s worrk (2010). The
deepeening the preevious interp
pretation end
ding S6. Insttead of simply agreeing w
with the
clientt that she “pu
uts up walls”” he instead changes thee metaphor. H
He states: “II think…we
kind of skip along
g the surfacee. You like to
t stay at a sppace for onlyy so long” (llines 694696). Hence, the therapist firsst transforms the “I put uup walls” prroblem into a “we skip
along
g the surface” problem. In
I other word
ds, the probllem is an intterpersonal issue that
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they share together rather than one that the client has herself. This shift in ownership of
the problem changes again when he states that she doesn’t like to stay in one space very
long. At this point, the client takes a deep breath, similar to the way that the therapist has
done throughout the session to call for his turn. It seems as if she wants to speak, yet the
therapist continues. Moving on, he holds the floor in order to offer an explanation of why
she doesn’t like to dwell in one space too long. He explains, “maybe you fear that if you
spend too much time talking…or just reflecting on some of the things we talked about,
…that maybe if some of the, I don’t know what you call this….” at which point he
pinches his pointing finger and thumb together repeatedly. When the therapist gestures
the client offers a strong acknowledgment token as if she recognizes the gesture. Then the
therapist says “may not hold everything back” (lines 696-701). Watching this exchange it
seems as if the pinching is a gesture the client has used in previous sessions in order to
keep herself from becoming emotional. Hence, the gesture acts like a formulation
indexing previous sessions. The indexing of previously shared experience furthers the
constitution of the personal, emotional problem, and adds a historical dimension that is
shared by the therapist who stands as an intimately involved witness to the problem that
has continually been problematized as personal.
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Excerpt 30,
3 S7, Sessio
on A, Lines 685-704:
6
Exp
xplicit formulation of thee problem

Interpretiive 3rd turn (44:15). Thee interpretivee third turn ggives the clieent an
opporrtunity to co
ontinue her elaboration.
e
She
S does thiss by talking about her “tthree years”
in theerapy and ho
ow during th
his entire tim
me she has “aalmost alwayys wanted to… keep a lidd
on the jar” (lines 702-704). Hence,
H
the prroblem of tallking about eemotion hass been a
persisstent problem
m that she iss aware of. Again,
A
this aw
wareness is something thhat occurs
becau
use she is bo
oth the interp
preter and thee object of innterpretationn. The therappist uses his
next turn
t
to pointt out the timee constraintss of their ow
wn work togeether becausee he has onlyy
“a yeear in this pro
ogram” and this means that
t he wouldd like to stepp “on the gas a little”
(liness 707-709). He
H then poin
nts out that he
h is not askiing her to “sspill [her] guuts;” howeveer
he staates: “I am asking
a
you to
o be curious about why iit’s so imporrtant that youu do put
thosee brakes on” (lines 711-7
714). This lin
ne is importaant because w
what he is asking is for
her to
o be curious about hersellf. It is an ex
xplication off what it takees to be an etthical subjecct
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in psychotherapy. You must be curious about yourself. This curiosity is the constant
condition of the therapeutic relationship. The therapist is curious about the client first and
foremost. When this curiosity wanes the alliance crumbles. This curiosity is the implicit
condition of the therapy relationship and in order for the client to be an ethical subject—a
good client and good person—she has to be curious about herself. Hence, curiosity, for
the client, is a relationship to herself, which further constitutes the problem as personal.
Question (45:37). Initially the client responds with humor by saying: “Nobody
likes the crying lady” (line 715). She says this line with a smile. By using “nobody” as
her turn indicator she offers a response that is directed at everyone and no one at the same
time. This gets flushed out after the therapist asks: “Who’s nobody?” (Line 716). She
then moves on to talk about how: “you will be a bother if you…do that” (line 721). The
index (“that”) refers back to what she doesn’t allow herself to do, which is become
emotional. She goes on to connect this to her mother who “preemptively guilted [her]” so
she would not have “tantrums” (lines 728-729). She does end with an emotional
statement. The emotion is expressed through her tone and delivery. She states: “You just
don’t do certain things, and letting myself get overwrought feels like one of those things
you just don’t do…And I mean that with all the sort of (gestures up and down with her
hands in a stepping motion) hard stepping percussiveness that I’m implying now, you just
don’t”(lines 731-735). The “percussiveness” that she is referring to aligns with the way
she punctuates her speech by forcefully saying certain words that I have tried to show in
the transcript. Here again, we have a moment that feels like anger. However, the client is
not angry at anyone in particular. Rather, she is passionately stating her beliefs which
help to explain why she has problems expressing her emotion. Although this is not a clear
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emotional transacction, the ton
ne that she uses
u and the sstatement off belief are inn line with dde
Riverra’s understaanding of anger (de Riveera, 2006).
Excerpt 31,
3 S7, Sessio
on A, Lines 704-738:
7
Em
motional trannsaction of aanger

I argue th
hat what we’rre seeing herre is the ons et of emotioon – most likkely anger –
which
h is then cut off by how the client en
nds the utteraance. Insteadd of continuing to talk
aboutt this belief that
t she hold
ds, she insteaad asks a queestion. The ssession is cloose to
endin
ng, so the cliient ends herr turn by ask
king: “Are we here on Thhursday?” (liines 735265

737). This is a call to close the sequence and close the session more generally. It is a
strong topic change that occurs right at the point where we see the beginnings of what
might be an emotional transaction of anger. Furthermore, we see a parallel between what
happens at this point in S7 and what they have been discussing so far. Namely, that the
client begins to skip along the surface and never goes too deeply into her emotions.
Remember that questions are powerful because they demand responses and they give the
questioner another chance to talk once the question has been answered (ten Have, 1999).
Hence, the therapist does offer a response about when they will be meeting next and once
he’s finished the client quickly introduces another topic. The client begins to discuss how
her partner’s mother is coming to town and how much she dislikes his mother. She
discusses this for almost 5 minutes. Hence, we can see how the call for a closing really
was a shift away from the problem being discussed previously. This gives further
evidence that what we saw was the beginning of a emotional transaction, which the client
shutdown by utilizing powerful conversational tools such as calling for closing and
asking questions.
Discussion of her partner’s mother is told once again in a sarcastic, witty tone.
Although this commentary does not fit the criteria to be considered a narrative, it
functions much like a narrative because it is a discussion about other people and their
relationships with the client. The client describes how her and her partner are “always in
the position where we have to lie to her. Because the truth tends to make her insane” (see
transcript, lines 746-747). She ends her commentary by saying John’s mother is “a
torrent” who “drives me fucking crazy” (lines 799-802). The therapist then offers an
interpretation much like he did at the end of S6. He again offers a speculative assertion
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that is in the form of “I wonder” followed by an interpretation that offers an explanation.
Hence, the therapist asks if there might be something about John’s mother, which “drives
you so crazy… that you recognize in yourself” (lines 803-804). Initially she rejects this,
but the therapist continues by connecting back to where the client talked about how she
“got [a] 97 and all [she] could focus on was the question that [she] got wrong” (lines 806808). The client then offers a strong acknowledgment token, which is a clear shift from
her original disagreement and focuses her elaboration on self-harm: “Ya, but I’m…only
harming myself, …I think Sandy is the other way around, Sandy is hard on everybody
else but herself” (lines 809-811). The therapist then uses another interpretative third turn
and states: “So maybe she's like that to everybody else…, but I guess what I am trying to
point out is that you are that way to yourself” (lines 820-821). The client initially offers
an agreement saying she “concede[s],” but she goes on to say that “I think my way of
doing things is better than her way of doing things, objectively speaking (lines 828-830).

267

Excerpt 32,
3 S7, Sessio
on A, Lines 802-833:
8
Intterpretation S7

At this po
oint the theraapist offers an
a interpretattion that cann be viewed aas an
interp
pretive fourth turn. Yet, this interpreetation feels vvery differennt than the oothers. From
m
a therrapeutic persspective it lo
ooks like a su
upportive staatement thatt highlights sstrengths andd
distin
nguishes the client from John’s moth
her who reprresents negattive, distasteeful, and
disow
wned aspectss of the clien
nt (i.e. the baad object). E
Examining thhe interactionn we see thatt
the cllient ends heer utterance by
b offering her
h own asseessment of hherself (“I think my way
of do
oing things”) which she then
t
labels as
a “objectively speaking..” The therappist then
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offers his assessment (“Well I do think”) about the client: “you are curious about the way
you do things. And I think that is one of the reasons why you’re here is to explore those
things” (lines 831-833). Hence, the therapist does not agree with the client that her way
of “doing things” (i.e. “only harming myself” and not others) is better. Rather, he ascribes
the client with a quality—curiosity. “You are curious about the way you do things” is a
clear shift away from the topic of “doing things” her way. The positivity of the quality is
created through the design of the turns and the unfolding context. The therapist designs
his turn as an agreement with the client’s evaluation that she does things “better” than
John’s mother. Hence, whatever comes after the “Well I do think that you are…” will
come across as a positive an evaluation (unless it is spoken in a way that conveys
sarcasm). What follows is that she is curious about herself.
Considering the context of the session, we have seen a few places where the client
does seem curious about herself and begins to interpret her own behavior. This has been
shown to be an adoption of the therapist’s hermeneutic strategy that he demonstrates
again and again with his utterances. The therapist is intently curious about the client,
always bringing the focus of the conversation back on her, rather than John, John’s
mother or their child. In truth, this seems to be the overall strategy of the session: the
therapist wanting to focus on the client as an object of curiosity and the client resisting
this except in a few places. Therefore, this interpretation does not seem to be an
“objective” assessment of a positive quality that client possess. Rather, it is a way of
relating and understanding oneself that is being constituted as something good—
something that distinguishes her from her ‘mother-in-law’ who is a “torrent.”

269

Closing Sequence
The S7 interpretative sequence is followed by a powerful elaboration that
continues to makes problematizing of SA explicit (see closing sequencing diagram). It is
what therapist’s call a “door knob statement” because it often feels emotional, authentic
and deep, yet it is said right when the session needs to be closed. Here the client spells
out what she wants from therapy. She explicitly formulates what she sees as the
problem—the sticky issue of emotion regulation—and how this interferes with what she
wants for her child. She also makes implicit the connection between herself and John’s
mother, a similarity that she does not want:
I don't want to be a big ball of crazy, and I don't want to be unable to give Wanda
something to look to. Like she is very smart and she's very aware and she's gonna
pick things up very quickly. …I don't want her getting to the place where she
can’t, I I don’t want her thinking that something not done perfectly isn't worth
doing. And I don’t want her thinking that not being perfect makes her worthless. I
don't want her not being able to, you know, get it out without breaking things or
hurting herself. And I don’t want her seeing, and I don't want her being afraid of
me, I don't want her being afraid of setting me off because half of what John does
is just trying to damage control his mom. (lines 834-844)
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Figurre 16
Closiing of Sessio
on A, Basic Conversation
nal Structuree
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The statement stands out as a powerful moment for a number of reasons. First, the
client shifts from talking about other people to speaking for herself in relation to others.
Almost every sentence in the utterance is started by “I don’t want.” By stating what she
does not want there is a directness and clarity that is different from most of the previous
session. Second, there is no sarcasm or wit. As a listener I did not hear that contemptuous
edge that often accompanies her utterances. The statement feels forthright and honest,
and in part this is because of the tone and the use of I statements. Last, as a listener I felt
as if there was a different emotional resonance. Again, this has to do with the tone and
the use of I statements, as well as the long dramatic pauses at the end of the utterance
followed by a deep inhalation by the client. Analyzing the content of this utterance we
see that the client is talking about what she does not want to be/be seen as. She does not
want to be “a big ball of crazy” and have her daughter be “afraid of setting [her] off.” She
does not want to show her daughter that the only way to deal with emotions is through
“breaking things or hurting herself.” And most importantly, she doesn’t want her
daughter to be “afraid of” her.
Guilt, according to de Rivera, is structurally related to the emotion of “horror.”
Both horror and guilt are “recognition” emotions. In a later article, de Rivera (1984)
describes these emotions as having to do with social recognition. In every form of life
“there are different roles that different persons are expected to play” and “with an
awareness of the emotional relationships between people, one cannot avoid being struck
by the way in which emotional dynamics maintain the system and the positions of the
individuals within it” (p. 129). These are classified as recognition emotions. Hence,
horror is the emotion we experience when we “pull back from another whom we cannot
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recognize, another who is so distorted that we can no longer identify him as a member of
our group” (de Rivera, 1977, p. 55). In guilt there is a similar sense of pulling back in
order to create distance; however this is done in order to pull away from an aspect of
ourselves that we no longer recognize. As de Rivera states:
Just as in horror the person cannot recognize the other as the person he once was
— cannot identify him as a member of the group — so in guilt the person cannot
recognize himself. Paradoxically, this preserves the person’s identity as a member
of the group. Think, for example, of a person who has committed some crime: if
he experiences guilt do we not feel less horror than if he experiences nothing? (p.
59)
Hence, guilt effectively distances an undesirable aspect of oneself while also
reinforcing the person’s identity as a member of the group. Here, the client describes
herself as something unrecognizable: “a big ball of crazy” that her daughter might be
“afraid of” or even worse, “look to” emulate. The basic elements of guilt as described by
de Rivera are present. The utterance is primarily about being recognized as something
undesirable. This is something the client herself recognizes, but also that she is concerned
her daughter might recognize. However, this is not a description of a past event that she
feels guilty about—this is what she wants for the future. The conventional understanding
of guilt is that it concerns a past event and this raises doubt about the utterance being a
transaction of guilt. Yet, when we look more closely we see that the client accounts for
why she is not, at present, feeling guilty. Even though her daughter “is very smart
and…she’s gonna pick things up very quickly,” she is still young and not aware of her
mother’s behavior (lines 835-836). Hence, because the daughter is not old enough to
recognize the client’s behavior as something horrible, then the client is able to postpone
her guilt until the future. The utterance opens up the possibility of guilt at some future
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point, while also rationalizing why she does not feel guilty now.53 This, combined with
the other factors above, convey emotion and makes the utterance noteworthy in the
context of the session. However, the evidence shows that this cannot be considered a full
emotional transaction of guilt.

53

This is a circulation of figures used in S3 (lines 219-223) where she talks about having to stop
mocking her daughter because she is "pretty…clever" and will soon understand.
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Excerpt 33,
3 Closing SA,
S Session A,
A Lines 831 -870: Elabooration of S77
Interp
pretation

After the doorknob sttatement, thee therapist atttempts to cloose the sessiion, but endss
up offfering a form
mulation thaat makes exp
plicit what hee expects thee client to doo during the
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sessions. He states that he “tend[s] ask a lot of questions” but then “we skip along very
quickly” and he needs to try “slowing things down and seeing what’s there, reflecting,
and that may involve some silence” (lines 855, 867-869). This is a circulation of figures
from their previous discussion about silence and skipping along the surface. In both
places the therapist formulates what he does and what the client does in response. Here
and at important moments in the session we see the client being encouraged to be
“reflective” and “curious” about herself.
Through our analysis we have shown that being “curious” means using a
hermeneutic strategy where one’s own actions, thoughts, and feelings become objects for
the client to interpret. As we see in the door knob statement above, the client is thinking
about herself as an emotional being, but still finds ways to avoid fully transacting
emotion. Her relationship to her emotion is problematizing as the ethical substance that
needs to be worked on in order to become an ethical subject during psychotherapy. This
work is accomplished by using the hermeneutic of psychotherapy as a technology of self
understanding that makes conscious the reasons why the client “skips” along the surface
of her feelings. This is an ongoing project that requires, first and foremost, a curiosity
about oneself as a deep emotional being. This constitutional process can be seen during
the original problematizing of S1 as the therapist deepens the trouble, foregrounding both
the client and her feelings in order shape the problem. In S3 we saw how conversational
ambiguity can create many possible problems and act as a therapeutic resource.
Throughout all the sequences we saw how both the client and the therapist constitute their
roles by utilizing specific kinds of utterances (e.g. the client narrates personal experience
and the therapist formulates shared experience that foregrounds the client), which
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contribute to the unfolding constitutional strategy. Each utterance was shown to link
together as action on action, creating a complex field of power. These tactics can now be
understood as part of an overall strategy through which the client is constituted as a deep
emotional being.
In the next chapter this analysis continues. The data occurs approximately 2
weeks after session A. I will continue to demonstrate how the client is constituted as a
deep emotional being; however, the next session, session B, needs to be understood as its
own event. It is not an extension of session A, but another enactment of the practice of
psychotherapy. Session A is part of the history of this practice and therefore it is
contextually important. They are close relatives whose similarities are not due to shared
universal features, but are instead formed through the tactical deployment of power
within the same general strategy aimed at constituting the client as a deep emotional
subject.
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chapter

6
A DETAILED INTERACTION ANALYSIS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AS
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE: ANALYSIS OF SESSION B

T: I wanted to pick up on something hmm that we talked about ahh last,
last week.
C: ((Looks away)) Okay. ((rolls eyes))
Topic Change Pre-request Sequence,
Session B, Lines 25-26

Overview
Session B (SB) occurs about 2 weeks after session A and at least one session had
transpired between the two sessions. We do not have access to any of the sessions
between SA and SB; however in SB the therapist brings up an event that occurred in the
previous session and he continually uses this event to constitute the therapeutic problem
as personal and emotional. Hence, constitutional strategy in SB is the same as in SA. Yet,
there are differences. In SB the client often problematizes herself as an emotional being.
This differs from SA where the client often resisted this way of thinking about herself. In
SB both the client and therapist constitute the problem as something emotional and
personal; however this does not mean they talk about the problem in the same way, nor
do they stop acting against one another in ways that are both explicit and implicit. Rather,
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the problematizing becomes focused on how the client relates to her emotion and how
this affects her relationships with other. Hence, in session A the participants
problematized the location of the therapeutic concern, where as in session B they focus
on how the client relates to the problem, which has been collaboratively understood as
personal and emotional. As a listener, I found SB to be a very deep session that was filled
with emotion. The analysis detailed in this chapter shows how this emotional depth is
part of the constitutional strategy across both SA and SB.
Opening Pre-Sequence
At the beginning of the second session the client enters the room and sits down.
She sits upright and faces the chair where the therapist is about to sit with her legs folded
up so they do not dangle from the couch. The therapist then trails in quickly and sits as if
in a hurry. Yet, prior to getting situated the client begins to speak.
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Figurre 17
Open
ning and Seq
quence 1 (S1)), Session B,, Basic Convversational Structure
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openings useful in understanding the overall context of the conversation. For example,
Sue Fisher (1986) analyzed medical doctors interactions with female patients who are
seeking treatment for reproductive care (this included consultations about cervical cancer
with oncologists as well as OB-GYN consultations). She found that most medical
consultations were initiated by information requested by the doctor. This led the patient
to provide information. All of this might seem like a benign everyday occurrence, but
Fisher argued that this opening structure of the conversation was a product of the
institutional power of the doctor. Fischer stated that: “Institutional authority is revealed in
the structure of the discourse. It is the doctor who opens and closes the interaction…It is
the doctor who asks the questions and initiates most of the topics” (p. 60). By starting off
a consultation with a specific question the doctor limits the conversational choices of the
patient. A question demands answers, and if the patient doesn’t provide an answer then
this has to be accounted for. Therefore, most often patients provide the preferred
response, which is an answer to the question at hand. She goes on to describe how this
differs greatly from what we find in ordinary conversation. Studies have shown that
“there is balanced participation” in ordinary conversation where the participants are of
equal status (p. 64). This balanced participation is, however, “disrupted when one
conversational partner has more status and power than the other” (p. 64). This ability to
control the conversation is evidence of the asymmetrical power relations in medical
practice.
Psychotherapy is a type of medical practice, but one that differs from other types
of care. This is evident in the conversational structure at the opening of this session. Here,
the psychotherapist does not initiate the conversation. The client begins accounting for
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her behavior before the therapist can even get settled down in his chair. At first we might
see this as a stark contrast from the typical medical consultation as described above. We
might applaud psychotherapy for its egalitarian construction. Even though this is a
compelling and hopeful conclusion, it is, sadly, not the case.
The client accounts for her tardiness because psychotherapy is a practice that has
its roles and expectations, which provide a mutually understood context for both the
therapist and client. Therapists often refer to these roles and expectations as the
therapeutic frame (Gray, 2002). One of the expectations is that the client will be on time
and so will the therapist. This differs greatly from medical consultations where doctors
can routinely be late. This expectation is woven into the context of psychotherapy. The
client begins to account for her tardiness before the therapist even sits down. She states:
“John was my ride in and my alarm clock today” (excerpt 33, line 1). The utterance by
itself makes little sense. Yet, the therapist does not ask what she means, he asks: “What
happened?” (line 4). There is a presumption that something happened, presumably that
something went wrong. The context of the psychotherapy session, and hence, the mutual
understanding of timeliness is shared by both the therapist and the client. The ability to
speak first does afford the client a certain amount of conversational freedom. Yet, the
context of the conversation does affect what she will say. By not meeting the implicit and
shared expectations she chooses to account for her tardiness, rather than bringing a past
clinical material or talk about a crisis that she experienced since the last session. This is a
demonstration of the institutional power of psychotherapy. From my experience as a
therapist and as a client, I know that therapists often account for their own tardiness.
These accounts might be different; however both the therapist and the client find it
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necessary to explain their deviations from the therapeutic frame. Therefore, what we see
here is institutional power being exercised through the context of psychotherapy, rather
than being exercised through the conversational tactics of the therapist. From the outset
the client re-constitutes her role by narrating personal experience for the therapist to be
curious about and eventually formulate and interpret.
Question and N1 (00:41). However, the opening sequence is more than just an
account for the client’s tardiness, it also has the potential to affect the participants by
enacting emotion. The beginning of Session-B is very similar to Session-A. The client
begins with a pre-sequence gloss that tests if it is okay to begin a “trouble talk” (“we are
not doing that again,” line 1). After the therapist ‘agrees’ (his question of interest, “what
happened?” gives her permission to proceed) she launches into the first narrative of the
session (N1). As discussed above, this occurs in response to being late. She is
contemptuous, sarcastic, and entertaining as she tells the story. Her boyfriend is cast as
self-centered and neglectful. He sets “the alarm clock for himself,” she says sharply (line
5). And he didn’t call “until after 11,” and he offers the dopey excuse: “I thought the
phone call would wake you up” (lines 16-17). Here, she enacts his speech using a
melodic and spacey tone. Because of his self-centeredness and neglect, she reprimands
him and says: “‘it doesn’t count’” (line 18). She places emphasis on the word count,
saying that: “if you're waking me up when I'm supposed to be somewhere else….even if I
would have answered the phone I still would've overslept and been late…So no, it does
not work that way” (lines 18-22). The story is about being angry at her boyfriend for
being self-centered and neglectful and causing her to be late. It depicts her moving
against her boyfriend’s actions and arguing about what his behavior ought to be.
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However, by telling the story in therapy it becomes a discursive object of contempt. The
story is put on display for the therapist and the client. Its purpose is not to change the
boyfriend’s behavior, but to paint a picture of a neglectful self-centered boyfriend that
both the client and the therapist can recognize.54 This narrative functions to shift
responsibility from the client to her boyfriend. He is to blame for the client’s tardiness.
This move can be seen as a preemptive defense on two fronts. First, it makes it
difficult for the therapist to interpret her tardiness as resistance. If she is late because of
somebody else, then her tardiness cannot be a symbolic act aimed at avoiding, defying, or
denying issues currently being addressed in therapy. Second, the story acts as a defense
against contempt. The client is eager to tell the therapist that it was her boyfriend who
caused her to be late. She changes her cadence, acts out the different parts, speaks with
irony and wit, and delivers her lines with a smile. She is entertaining and charming and
her utterance can be interpreted as an attempt to get on the therapist’s ‘good side.’
Therefore, to defend against the therapist being contemptuous toward herself, she
performs a narrative in order to form a contemptuous alignment (between herself and the
therapist) against the boyfriend.
This is an interesting dynamic that the Structural Theory of Emotion brings to
light. Although emotional transactions might be distinct, emotional potentiality is diffuse.
As you can see in the example above, the attempt to elicit emotion does not determine
what emotion is transacted. The client attempts to bring the therapist towards her by
getting him to align against the boyfriend. However, the therapist might become
54

Anger and contempt are structurally identical emotions, belonging to different dimensions (de
Rivera, 1977). Therefore, the transformation we see here should come as no surprise.
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contemptuous towards her defensive blaming of her boyfriend. He might see it as
avoidance or as resistance. Furthermore, he might withdraw into boredom because of the
client’s inability to talk about what seems therapeutically important and professionally
interesting.
Actually, the therapist says very little during the opening of the session. He does
not inquire about the significance of her lateness as you might expect from a
psychodynamic practitioner. At first this might seem odd. When clients show up late to
sessions, this can be seen as a sign of resistance and interpreted (Vehviläinen, 2008).
However, we soon find out that the therapist came into the session with an agenda and we
see this clearly when he makes his first conversational move.
Sequence 1 (S1)
Pre-request (1:52). At line 22 the client makes a sudden topic change and tells the
therapist that: I have a “frog…in the back of my throat” (excerpt 34, line 24). To this the
therapist offers a one-word question: “Still?” (line 23). The question is interesting. We
might see it as an empathetic gesture indicating how the therapist has a history with the
client and remembers that she was sick. Hence, the topic change does what the
contemptuous story could not: draws a response from the therapist that is neither
contempt nor anger. Instead, the therapist offers a question that might be seen as intimate
interest.
Excerpt 34, Session B, Lines 20-26
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provisional annoyed tone—are not disparate actions strung together, but parts of a whole
emotional transformation. According to Gottman (2007), eye rolling is almost always
associated with contempt. Hence, in response to the pre-request the client breaks her
attempt to align with the therapist. Initially she wanted to bring the therapist closer, but
now she wants to keep him at a distance. The therapist’s pre-request, along with the
opening pre-sequence and narrative, are good examples of the actions on actions that the
participants use in the practice of psychotherapy. Much like the beginning of SA,
different tactics are used to change the positioning of the participants, as well as the
characters that are discussed. However, during the opening of session B the tactics are
more directly aimed at modifying the relationship between the participants. This contrasts
with session A, where the tactics focused on locating the problem in the client, rather
than John.
Formulation (1:56): Contempt, Shame, and Discursive Defense. This might
explain the tortured structure of the therapist’s formulation that follows the client’s
begrudging permission to proceed. The first part of the utterance identifies the topic the
therapist wants to talk about. He states: “You were talking about the coworker you
had…” and then he pauses for a brief moment (excerpt 35, line 27). During the pause the
client offers a strong acknowledgment token: “Yea” (line 28). This is important. As
Liddicoat (2011) points out, there are typically two types of preconditions that must be in
place in order for a pre-request sequence to be granted: the “availability of the requested
object or ability of the person to carry out the request” (p. 168). Here the therapist is
requesting permission to return to some previously discussed clinical material. This is the
requested object. The clinical material is an object constituted by both the therapist and
288

the cllient. Both th
he client and
d therapist haave shared oownership off this experieence and
therefore it is avaailable for diiscussion.55 The
T acknow
wledgment token at line 228 indicates
that the client reccognizes the object of thee request,56 bbut there is sstill some treepidation in
her voice. The therapist then continues, extending
e
hiss formulationn: “you saidd
after…
…talking about…all the…difficultiees you…had with her yoou were like: ‘if I keep
talkin
ng about thiss I’ll blame myself’”
m
(lin
nes 27-31).
Excerpt 35,
3 Session B,
B Lines 27-5
50

The clientt seems to bee set at ease by the latterr half of the therapist’s fformulation

55

Thiis is another example
e
of a “AB-event,”
“
which will beecome relevannt in the chappter 7
discusssion (Labov & Fanshel, 1977).
56
Herre we are rem
minded of Ausstin’s conceptt of a happineess with regarrds to utterancces (Austin,
1962)).

289

and she responds with a strong acknowledgment token followed by a long elaboration
that runs from lines 32 to 68. Immediately after her acknowledgment token she says: “it's
a kind of thing that I have that keeps me from really making changes or confronting
people” (lines 32-33) By stating “it’s” she creates an index, which points back to the
therapist’s previous utterance. The index is most likely referencing the end of the
therapist’s utterance where he ventriloquates the client stating: “you were like: ‘if I keep
talking about this I’ll blame myself’” (lines 27-31).
This ventriloquation also has an index (“about this”), which refers to the
“coworker….difficulties” that the client was discussing during the previous session. The
ventriloquation (and the entire formulation in which it is set) is complex because it
involves 3 different temporal events: the present moment, the previous session, and an
outside event (see Figure 18).57 The formulation is purposely uttered in the presentmoment as a temporal reference to the previous session. This is done by using the past
tense turn initiator, “You were talking about…”. The ventriloquation invoked is from the
past session as the turn initiator indicates. However, because the ventriloquation uses the
index, “about this,” it simultaneously points to the previous session and the outside event.
Hence, the ventriloquation points to all three temporal events. However, in the present
conversation the outside event is less of a concern than the previous session where the
event was discussed. It is there that something happened: a new event, shared between
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We do not know whether the client was discussing an event or a series of events, but for
simplicity I will refer to it as an event (the difficulties with her co-worker) that the client
discussed in the previous session. Presumably, these “difficulties” occurred outside of therapy, at
the client’s work.
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runs through the remainder of the session. Regardless, the client has her own agenda. She
avoids directly addressing the past session by making her own conversational path, which
aligns with the previously discussed material, but creates distance between herself and
the event indexed by the therapist. This begins with her initial response to the therapist
formulation in lines 32 - 40. As mentioned before, she begins her turn with an
acknowledgment token followed by the turn initiator, “Yea, it’s a kind of thing…” (line
32). We have already discussed how this is an index pointing back to the previous
utterance. We could simply see this as a demonstration of the basic collaborative nature
of conversation (and psychotherapy) by highlighting how participants orient to each
other’s turns. However, the client also uses this index to distance herself from the
therapist’s utterance (and indexes). This is done by shifting the temporal frame from past
tense to the simple present (see the lower portion of figure 18). The therapist’s
formulation directly references the past session in various ways. The client, instead of
directly addressing the past session by stating, “Yeah, I was…,” she shifts the temporal
frame by using the simple present (”it’s…”). The simple-present-index points to a thing
that exists as a matter-of-fact. As the tense implies, the thing’s existence is temporally
infinite—it has always, and will always, exist. Although she is still referencing the
previous utterance (and we can assume that she is discussing something that is relevant to
the previous event), her subtle move allows her to distance herself from the events of the
last session.
The client’s elaboration continues with her discussing “a kind of a thing.” This
implies that we are dealing with an object that is of a certain class or category. This type
of thing is quite problematic it seems. She describes how it affects the way she interacts
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with people and keeps her from “really making changes” in her life. She states: “It’s a
kind of a thing that I have that keeps me from really making changes or confronting
people because I go (makes noise shrrrch and points away from her head), ‘you are
probably overreacting. You're being an ass, you’re not acknowledging your fault in this’”
(lines 32-36). Interestingly, she begins by linking the thing to her behavior. The thing has
the power to “keep [her] from making…changes or confronting people.” Initially, it
seems like she is going to clearly explain how the thing goes about affecting her behavior
with the remainder of her utterance. She uses a subordinate conjunction (“because”) to
connect the first and second clauses of her utterance. By using “because” the client
indicates a causal relationship. Therefore, it seems likely that the client will use her
utterance to establish a simple causal relationship between the thing and the content of
the subordinate clause. However, after using the causal conjunction she states “I go…”
and then launches into a series of non-verbal gestures and third person statements (see
lines 35-38). In and of itself the “I go” combination is unremarkable and it can be easily
overlooked. However, upon further examination we see that this marks a shift from
object to subject, which complicates and confuses the simple causal relationship that we
might expect.
Immediately after the client indicates that the action in the subordinate clause
comes from her ( “…because I go…”) rather than the thing, she holds her hand to her
head with her finger pointing toward the ceiling. Then she quickly rotates her hand
forward and ends with her finger pointing outward. While she performs this gesture she
looks away from the therapist following the line of her finger and makes a loud clicking
sound with her mouth. It sounds like a soda can opening. It speaks of immediacy and
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force: something that catches her attention, but in a routine, mechanical way. She uses
this sound and gesture to punctuate each of her statements. Eventually she drops the
sound, but continues to punctuate with the gesture until line 40. Although the dependent
clause ends at line 35, its content is extended and developed by the series of statements
that follow. The statements are bound together by the continuation of the gestures and the
grammatical similarity (see excerpt 3). After the initial gesture at line 33, the client
finishes the dependent clause by stating: “‘You are probably overreacting.’” While
watching the session, this comes across as a third person statement and this initial
impression was reinforced upon a closer examination of the utterance. The entire
utterance is self directed. This began with her description of the problem as a “kind of a
thing that I have…”. This self-direction was continued with the subjective action
statement “I go…,” which set up the third person reference. Hence, the “I go” functions
in the same manner as ‘I say.’ It is used here as a simple-present transitive verb that is
commonly used to introduce oral speech or narration (Go, n.d.). Because there is a
continuation of the simple-present, this statement cannot be viewed as reenacted speech.
It occurs as a matter-of-fact outside of any specific instance because it is infinite by
definition.
The question that confronts us is: why does this utterance arise now? Why does
the client move away from the therapist’s initial formulation and introduce a different
temporal order, which bypasses the shared event that the therapist was trying to discuss?
Is this a defensive operation? Is it an ingenious strategy to avoid discussing the past
session because she finds it anxiety provoking or disturbing? Or is it something else all
together? I argue that with her utterance the client is attempting to grasp the emotion (the
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phenomenon) of shame. According to the Structural Theory of Emotion (STE), emotions
are interpersonal phenomena, which always have a directional movement that extends or
constricts the psychological space between self and other or subject and object (de
Rivera, 1977). The object or subject of the emotion can be either explicit or implicit.
Meaning that emotions can be directed toward real individuals in the present moment or
they can be directed towards oneself. In the latter, the individual who manifests the
emotion is both the subject and the object. In this case, either the subject or the object is
typically implicit.
According to de Rivera, shame is a “me” emotion where the individual is both the
subject and object. In the case of shame, the movement originates from an implicit object
that is contemptuous towards the subject. This creates distance between the object and
subject and can often look like a retreat or withdrawal on the part of the subject.
Furthermore, shame is part of the recognition dimension of emotion. According to de
Rivera, recognition emotions arise in relation to how we are seen by others. In the case of
shame, the implicit other (object) sees the individual acting inappropriately. In other
words, the experience is that of being viewed as not in line with the values held by the
other.
When we look at the utterance, we see a series of third person contemptuous
statements directed toward the client. The other here is implicit. As we have established,
the client’s utterance does not directly address the event of the previous session nor
“difficulties” with her coworker that occurred outside of therapy. By changing the
temporal order the client indexes these events, but avoids specifics. Hence, the simplepresent tense allows for the creation of an implicit, no-one-in-particular-other who stands
295

outside of time. This lends some needed clarity to our analysis. The troublesome
complexity caused by switching from object-initiated-action to subjective-action can now
be seen as an attempt to grasp the interpersonal relationship of shame.59
However, enacting shame through discourse is not the same as experiencing
shame. We have all experienced shame at some point in our lives. For example, imagine
standing in front of a store clerk with a line of people waiting to check out behind you.
As you swipe your credit card the store clerk waits patiently and then turns to you
sheepishly and says, “It was denied, I am sorry.” Now, you know you pay off your
balance every month and you are currently up-to-date. “There must be some mistake,”
you protest as you swipe your card one more time. Yet, it is all in vain as the cashier tells
you again, “Sorry, declined.” During this entire process you feel as if everyone in the
entire store knows that you are broke. That you are some lowlife that can’t pay off his
credit cards. Now, no one is saying this to you directly. If you pay close attention you
will see that anyone within hearing range is looking away and avoiding eye contact. Even
the cashier who could be contemptuous only sheepishly informs you that there is a
problem. She does everything she can to look away and not make the problem worse.
And even though you know that you are fully employed and financially responsible there
is an experience of recognition. You feel ashamed in that moment. In that moment you
do not get angry at the cashier or the credit card company. Instead you retreat. You pull
away and try to get out of the situation as quickly as possible.
59

De Riviera (1984) explains that “me” emotions have the same structural components as
emotions which are explicitly interpersonal and he speculates that these emotions originate out of
interpersonal experiences where the implicit other becomes internalized. Hence, even though
these emotions are self -originated and self-directed they are still considered interpersonal
phenomena.
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What we see in the client’s utterance is very different from shame itself. She is
talking about shame, rather than feeling ashamed. What we call the experience or
“transaction” of shame only occurs when there is a movement—a distancing between
subject and object—along with an instruction to change the interpersonal situation (p.
41). Here, there is no distancing indicative of shame, nor is there a transformation of the
client’s world or object relations (at least not yet anyway). Rather, shame has been
transformed into an object via the discourse. It is a discursive object that both participants
can orient to and use in whatever way seems appropriate and adventitious. In many ways,
we are seeing something quite remarkable happening. The client is able to bring about an
emotion that is often difficult and troublesome, yet renders it innocuous. The discursive
move allows her to talk about shame without becoming emotionally involved. Hence, she
is able to treat this very real and powerful emotion as an abstraction. This ability to
transform difficult emotional experiences into innocuous abstractions is indicative of
intellectualization—a common defense mechanism found in the psychodynamic literature
(Gabbard, 2005; McWilliams, 1994).
With this phenomenon in view can we answer why this arises at this point in the
therapeutic conversation? One possible explanation is that the therapist’s formulation
oriented the client toward an emotion laden event. Feeling compelled to take her turn she
chose (quite unconsciously I would argue) to shield herself from the onset of emotion by
creating an intellectualizing temporal shift that could convert the event into a discursive
object. We are at a disadvantage because we do not have access to the event that the
therapist brings up with this formulation. This is one of those cases where the research
participants are formulating their turns based off of previously shared experiences that the
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researchers are blind to. However, remember that the formulation and response make up
an adjacency pair.60 Therefore, the therapist’s formulation at line 27 and the client’s
response makeup a concrete conversational unit. If our hypothesis is right, and the client
is addressing shame in her response, then we would expect to see some evidence that the
emotion was introduced in the therapist’s formulation.
As we have discussed, the therapist begins his utterance by referring back to the
previous session and offering an account about how the client was “talking about… all
the…difficulties” she had with her coworker (line 30). Interestingly, the formulation is
delivered as a sort of truncated narrative that has its own temporal order. In other words,
the formulation is like a story that unfolds over time. He starts off by saying “you were
talking about the coworker you had…and you said after kind of…talking about…all the
difficulties you have had with her, you were like: ‘if I keep talking about this I’ll blame
myself’” (lines 27-31). By using the word “after” he implies that a certain amount of time
had passed. The implication is that the client was initially commenting or narrating about
a coworker conflict, mostly likely issuing complaints toward the coworker. This
movement toward the coworker changes in the latter half of the therapist’s utterance.
After indicating that some time had passed, the therapist ventriloquates the client’s
speech saying: “‘if I keep talking about this I’ll blame myself.’” This ventriloquation
indicates a directional movement away from the coworker. The client is no longer
60

Recall that the adjacency pair has become the fundamental building block of CA's empirical
methodology. Each conversational sequence can be broken down into a series of adjacency pairs
that continually show how the participants are orienting to previous utterances. This discovery is
exactly what Austin (1962) spoke of when he said that utterances require a sequel or response.
Require is the key word because participants have to give some kind of response or end up having
to make excuses for why they changed the subject or did not respond at all. See chapter 3 for
more details.
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addressing her complaints toward the coworker; rather, she is on the verge of blaming
herself— of directing her complaints inward. Hence, the formulation tells the story of an
emotional event. A transformation had occurred. The client initially focuses her attention
on her coworker. Following STE, this movement toward the co-worker is in line with
transactions of anger and contempt.61 In the latter half of the formulation, the client
blames herself. This inward movement is in line with feeling ashamed.
Therefore, the therapist’s formulation introduces an emotional event that the
client must address. Formulations project agreement and make it difficult for the client to
offer a dis-preferred response, such as disagreeing with the therapist. It is hard enough to
disagree with a formulation when the therapist is simply summarizing what was
previously said. However, when the formulation includes reproduced speech,
disagreement becomes even more complicated and possibly confrontational. If the client
wholesale disagreed with the formulation she would be calling into question the integrity
or competence of the therapist. “No, I never said that! Did you not listen to a thing I
said?” This could have been the client’s response. A clear disagreement and a clear
transformation of the situation. In this alternate response the client moves against the
therapist by challenging how he ought to behave. According to de Rivera (1977), anger
arises in a situation where “the others’ behavior constitutes a challenge to what a person
believes ought to exist” (p. 78). Ultimately, oughts “have the same status as a belief in
what is real” (p. 79). Therefore, the imagined response from above would be a challenge
61

In anger, we challenge the other for acting inappropriately and creating “difficulties.” In
contempt, we recognize the other as not upholding the important values of our society.
Furthermore, we recognize them as someone we would not want to be. If we acted in such a
manner, we would feel ashamed.
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directed at what transpired in the previous session and what a therapist ought to be (i.e. a
good, curious listener who remembers). However, it would be difficult for the client to
respond in such a way. Even in normal conversation disagreements are dis-preferred and
rare (Sacks, 1987; ten Have, 1999). In institutional conversations where there are power
differences, such as between patients and doctors, disagreement is even rarer (Fisher,
1986). Although psychotherapy differs greatly from medical interviews, therapists have a
unique authority making disagreement difficult (Bartesaghi, 2004). Clients rarely flat out
disagree with therapists. Rather, they resist the therapist utterances by distancing
themselves from what the therapist has said (Lepper & Mergenthaler, 2007; Peräkylä,
2005; Saladin & Grimmer, 2009; Vehviläinen, 2008; Viklund et al., 2010). Conversation
analysis is very good at distinguishing the subtleties of resistance, yet they are unable to
explain why this resistance occurs. By examining utterances in terms of emotions, we can
see disagreement as the emotional transaction of anger. By disagreeing we challenge the
other. De Rivera states:
The other is seriously acting as though what he thinks ought to exist is reality, and
this differs from what the person asserts ought to exist. Since….only one of the
oughts can be correct, there is a real conflict of wills where one may win or lose;
the contenders occupy the same “reality space” and one must leave. (p. 82)
Anger can be risky because the challenge could lead to a rupture. Instead of
transforming situations as intended, the transaction of anger could lead to the withdrawal
of the other, creating interpersonal distance and individual isolation. Or, the other could
erupt in anger and contempt. Possibly, the individual is not prepared or capable of
withstanding this kind of assault and fears having to withdraw in shame or dreaded
rejection. Ultimately, anger is to be avoided and this is why disagreement is a dispreferred response in conversation.
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So if the client would prefer not to disagree, then what other options are at her
disposal? She could simply address the event that the therapist indexes in his formulation.
In most situations this might prove to be the best option. However, here, the event is an
emotional transaction. By directly referencing the event the client puts herself in risk of
re-experiencing the transaction of shame as implied by the therapist’s formulation: “if I
keep talking about this I’ll blame myself”. For some clients this might not be a problem,
but for this client emotions have been constituted as problematic. This is addressed in the
previous session and can be seen as the central problem being constituted across the two
sessions of our dataset. Hence, the client finds herself in a difficult position. She has to
make a response. By not responding the client would be breaking the conversational
structure and normative expectations (Sacks, 1987, 1989; Schegloff et al., 1977; ten
Have, 1999). This possibly could lead into a present moment transaction of shame (or
embarrassment). Yet, most of her responses might also lead to an emotional transaction.
Therefore, she performs a brilliant, defensive operation. She transforms the emotional
transaction into a discursive object. This creates distance between herself and the emotion
and allows her and the therapist to manipulate the object and not get their hands too dirty.
This extinguishing of a potential emotional transaction has its own affective resonance.
Perceivable on the recording, she responds with a mix of excitement and, what might be
described, as the dead, flatness of objectification.
According to Ego Psychology, defense mechanisms affect our behavior and create
a “compromise formation” (Gabbard, 2005, p. 33). A deal is made between the desire of
the Id and the defenses of the Ego. The resulting defensive behavior is an amalgam of the
two movements—a dynamically motivated expression. The client’s response is similar.
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Although she defends against directly experiencing emotion, she still addresses the
emotion implied in the therapist’s formulation. This is done in a way that identifies the
problem as her own. Unlike SA, the client starts off thinking about the problem as
something personal. Furthermore, I have shown that she also constitutes the problem as
something emotional, i.e. shame. However, she uses tactics that contain this emotion in
generalities and therefore avoids enacting the emotion in the here-and-now. Hence, the
move maintains her general prohibition against experiencing emotion, while still
constituting herself as an emotional being.
Topical change (2:34): Parallel parking. At line 40, the client begins to finish her
turn, bringing her description of shame to a close. She finishes by exclaiming, “this, and
this, and this, and this and this” to indicate the relentless criticisms that are used against
her. As she speaks the last “this” she briefly looks away from the therapist. With her gaze
broken, the therapist takes a moment for himself. He gently scratches his eye, diverting
his attention away from the client and the therapeutic encounter. At that precise moment,
the client redirects her gaze back at the therapist, but there is a instant where her gaze is
unmet. She then continues her turn, but shifts her delivery and uses a humorous and
playful tone. She says: “I’m convinced that if I get upset or if I let that feeling be known
I’m going to be wrong and an [with a brief pause she turns to the therapist with a playful
look and says] asshole. And I really don’t want that” (lines 42-43). At this point she looks
away again and states that: “this is enough to normally keep me pretty angry on the inside
and nowhere else” (lines 45-46). This last statement is again delivered with a smile while
gazing at the therapist. The therapist returns her gaze, but not her humor. He is stoic. She
then looks away as she offers a few process tokens (umm yea) and then falls into a long
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pause. Watching the tape I felt like this was a sincere and deep moment. It stands out
because of the tone change. Furthermore, the explicit reference to anger is something that
we have not found in the client’s speech. In session A, the client directly refers to herself
as angry only 3 times (SAS3, lines 287, 403, and 412) and in each instance she qualifies
this with some variation of: “I guess it is anger.” Here, the poetic description of anger “on
the inside and nowhere else” grabs the listener’s attention as the client continues
constituting herself as a kind of person who has anger “on the inside.” She is a kind of
subject that has internal and personal emotions that can be understood in a way that
constitutes her as an ethical subject. The intuitive deepness of this moment is a grasping
of this constitutional process, shaping the client as an emotional subject. However, this
moment is short lived.
Question (4:14). Quickly the client launches into a long story about how being an
asshole keeps her from doing all sorts of things such as parallel parking (see transcript).
The entire story is delivered like a scene out of a play. The client acts out the different
parts, dramatically delivering self-deprecating jokes at her own expense.62 The story runs
from lines 51 to 68 (see transcript). The client talks about how she has difficulty parking
62

Watching this I could not help but feel like the client was trying to quickly move away from
the more sincere reflective moments by performing a sarcastic comedy directed at herself. Her
long story about parallel parking is a prime example. However, when we examine the transcript
we see that the story is introduced through a pre-sequence at lines 48 through 49. The client states
that: “Feeling like an asshole…it’s very good at…stopping me from doing all kinds of things. It is
why I do not parallel park in traffic” (line 46-49, see excerpt 35). As she delivers this utterance
the therapist looks at her with a playful and somewhat overly curious look. We can view the
client’s utterance as a veiled request to deliver a more expanded story about her problems of
parallel parking. The simple acknowledgment token paired with his playful look at line 50 gives
permission to proceed with the story. Therefore, the client did not simply force the story onto the
therapist. Even if we see the story as a defensive moving away from the more emotional and
reflective moments that preceded it, we have to recognize that it was brought into the session
through an interpersonal exchange where permission was granted.
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when there’s traffic around, but how she is actually a very good parallel parker otherwise.
This evolves into her other driving habits, all of which seem to be related to a general
nervousness about driving. At line 69, the therapist asks: “And this would be something
to do with not wanting to feel like an asshole?” This question is more than simply an
attempt to elicit information. Adams (1997) has shown how questions can be used as
therapeutic interventions. Here the therapist is using his turn to ask a question that
redirects the client back to the topic of “feeling like an asshole.”
The question at line 69 does more than refocus the client on a certain aspect of her
speech, it also reserves an interactional slot that the therapist uses to insert the first
interpretation of the session. Much like the beginning of the session, the therapist uses his
question tactically. Previously, he used a question to express empathy and to reserve an
interactional slot to bring up past clinical material for discussion. The question acts as an
intervention, but also reserves an interactional slot, which the therapist then uses to make
an interpretation.
Interpretation S1 (4:30). At first glance the interpretation offered by the therapist
seems completely unrelated to the majority of the client’s extended response, or the
answer to his more immediate question. The therapist goes right back to talking about the
previous session where they discussed the client’s relationship with one of her coworkers.
However, the therapist does tie his interpretation to the client’s previous utterances by
circulating one of the most significant figures of speech that was used. He carries over the
word “asshole” and incorporates it into his interpretation: “What I kinda noticed with
your story about your co-worker [is] for the first part of it she was the asshole…and then
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you were
w afraid if you though
ht about too long you woould be the aasshole” (exccerpt 36,
lines 73-75).
Excerpt 36,
3 Session B,
B Lines 70-8
89: SBS1 Inteerpretation aand Interpreetive 3rd turnn

So, after all
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There is a
similarity betweeen the interprretation and the original formulationn. In the origginal
formu
ulation the th
herapist sayss that the client had “diff
fficulties” wiith her cowoorker and if
she continued to talk about th
he difficultiees she wouldd “blame” heerself. As staated
previiously, this formulation
fo
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i a complex
x web of tem
mporal indexees. The form
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therap
pist’s gloss of
o what the client
c
said while
w
telling a story abouut her coworkker. He
emph
hasizes how the client beegan to blam
me herself whhile talking aabout the diffficulties thaat
were occurring between herseelf and her coworker.
c
Thhis self blam
me was someething that thhe
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client feared would arise during the telling of the story. Therefore, her fear of self-blame
arose in the present moment of the previous session.
With the interpretation we see something similar. Here the therapist refers to the
temporal dimension of the story-telling that occurred previously. He says that in the “first
part” of the story the coworker was the asshole and then if the client thought about the
story too long she would become the asshole. However, in the interpretation the therapist
made an important shift. Instead of talking about self blame and ambiguous “difficulties,”
he labels the coworker using the pejorative noun— asshole. By stating that the coworker
was the asshole the therapist gives her an identity with a negative connotation. Then he
creates a one-to-one correspondence between the coworker of the story and the client’s
experience during her telling of the story. The interpretive utterance is a shift towards
identity, both of the coworker and the client. It also constitutes a similarity of kind
between the client and coworker because they can both be identified by using the same
pejorative. Yet, it is still unclear what it means to be an asshole? If we look at the client’s
previous utterances we see that she described herself as an asshole over and over again
when she makes a complaint about another person’s behavior or when she
inconveniences others. However, what an asshole is to the client and how it relates back
to the previous clinical material is still uncertain and remains a task to be worked out in
the clinical discourse.
Interpretive 3rd turn (5:11). Yet, this will have to wait because initially the client
rejects the therapist’s interpretation. She initiates the turn by stating: “I don’t think” (line
76). However, she abruptly cuts off the end of the statement and then changes to an
extremely qualified acknowledgment token (“ah, I feel like ya, I feel like”), which leads
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into an elaboration of how she sees the problem. She states: “I feel like if I…put it out
there, that I'm an asshole” (line 76). While saying this she lifts both her arms up and
moves them outward in front of her. By saying “put it out there” the client indexes anger.
This becomes clear when we look back to where she first introduced the word asshole at
line 43. There she stated: “I’m convinced that if I get upset or if I let that feeling be
known I’m going to be wrong and an asshole.” This was her response to the therapist’s
initial formulation. Furthermore, “put it out there” is a spacial reference. In order to put
something out it has to first reside inside. This inside/outside dichotomy was established
by the client when she quietly reflected how she is “angry on the inside and nowhere
else” (line 45-46).
Consistently, the client uses her utterances to describe the problem as a general
phenomenon that is ever-present. Yet, the therapist uses his talk to address a specific
moment that occurred in therapy. He is focused on how she began by talking about her
coworker as the asshole and then during the retelling she felt like she might become the
asshole. Although they both describe a similar process, they continually use different
temporal dimensions to talk about the problem.
After this the client elaborates further by bringing in past clinical material about a
dream. She closes her eyes and gestures wildly while stating: “Umm if I, if I snap then it,
then perspective change, and you know, a paradigm shift kinda thing and now I'm the
asshole” (lines 76-77). Then her speech quickens. She begins snapping her fingers as if
something important and relevant just dawned upon her. She finally says: “Sort of
like…the dream I was talking about” (lines 78-79). The last part of the utterance is said
slowly. She looks at the therapist and points towards him and he nods. The utterance and
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the non-verbal gestures give permission to continue and serves as an acknowledgment of
past shared experience (the therapist remembers the dream). When the therapist nods at
line 80 he does so prior to any description of the dream. She goes on to describe the
dream stating: “where I yelled at John’s mother, and they all went to her, like THAT, that
is what happens in my head. It is like the second I say something back, or the second I am
like, ‘you need to stop this,’ then—ya” (lines 79-83). As she begins to describe the dream
the therapist offers an acknowledgment token after which the client’s speech speeds up
slightly as she becomes more animated. Her gloss of the dream is short and succinct. She
describes yelling at her boyfriend’s mother, causing them all to go to her side. She then
connects the dream to what happens ‘in her head’ the second she says something back or
tells someone that they need to stop. This is another complex construction. The client
takes the dream experience, where she was in a social situation with an unknown number
of other individuals, and then uses this to describe what happens in her head. By using the
dream to demonstrate what happens in her head the client uses material that is familiar to
both her and the therapist. This familiarity increases the persuasive power of her
utterance. Furthermore, she utilizes preferred clinical material such as a dream to
elaborate her understanding of the problem.
After the client’s elaboration the therapist makes an interpretive third turn. The
therapist begins by using the neutral epistemic marker “it sounds like” (line 84). He has
used this phrase previously to mark interpretations. There is a familiarity to the
construction of the interpretation, but here he introduces some new content. He states: “It
sounds like you…move between…being the victim of other people being an asshole, and
then you being the asshole, and then all the sudden being the victim like the dream” (lines
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84-87). Up to this point there has been no discussion of “being the victim”. Yet, the
therapist uses it to describe the client’s position relative to the actions of others whether
they be real or imagined. Earlier, the therapist used his interpretation to create a
correspondence between the client and her coworker. Her coworker was the asshole and
the client was becoming an asshole. Here the relationships are becoming more complex.
When other people are being assholes then the client is “being the victim”, which leads
the client to be an “asshole” and then she returns back to the position of “the victim”.
This last stage of victimization is different. It is like “the dream” where the client
becomes the victim of other peoples’ disapproval rather than their anger. These complex
interpersonal relationships are being constituted in this interpretation and throughout S1.
In this last interpretation the therapist utilizes not only the client’s most immediate speech
— by referring to the dream and using it to elaborate his interpretation — but also
continues to circulate the figure of “being an asshole,” which was introduced by the
client and has become an important part of this session.
For S1, I have chosen to include the elaboration and interpretive 3rd because it
powerfully expands on the constitutional work across the sequence. The interpretive
ending of S1 continues to problematize the client as an emotional being. Her problems
are found in her own personal experience of what she feels when she gets angry. The
interpretation expands this personal experience to involve comparisons with others. As
was shown above, the emotional transaction that was brought forward by the therapist’s
initial formulation was a movement from anger and contempt to shame. This movement
is used to structure the interpretation, the elaboration, and the interpretative 3rd. These all
rely on the transformation of the modes of distancing. Meaning, that in anger you move
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against the other, in contempt the other retreats from your critical gaze, and in shame you
retreat from the other’s critical gaze. Hence, these emotional movements are used by the
client to pull in the dream that she shared with the therapist. The dream has the same
kinds of emotional shifts as the formulation and hence the dream becomes a well
designed tool that can be used to understand herself as an emotional being. This is
reinforced by the therapist’s interpretive 3rd, which again relies on the same emotional
transformations. Hence, S1 demonstrates how problematizing the client as an emotional
being allows for an increased scope of collaboration. Diverse material such as co-worker
difficulties and dreams can be identified and utilized by the participants as relevant and
creative associations that constitute the client as a deep reservoir of emotion that needs to
be understood in order for her to become a more conscious and ethical being.
Sequence 2 (S2)
S2 is a short sequence where we see a more explicit display of resistance in the
form of topic changes and disagreement responses (see the basic conversational structure
below). After the first part of the therapist’s interpretative 3rd turn, the client gives a
strong acknowledgment token. This is offered right after the therapist pauses for a brief
moment, opens his hands, nods and says “being an asshole”(line 86, see excerpt 36). The
strong agreement token offered by the client projects agreement with the idea that she is
the victim of other peoples “being an asshole”. Yet, once the therapist finishes the
interpretation she offers a weaker agreement token and then begins to elaborate her
disagreement with the interpretation. She states: “it’s not like there….is a victim…[to]
my bad driving, there is no victim to my bad driving, I just feel like a stupid ass” (lines
88-89). Hence, the client resists the therapist’s interpretation by bringing in previously
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Question (5:40). The therapist uses his next turn to ask: “What comes to mind
when you think of the word asshole?” (line 93). As a therapist, I recognize this as a free
association question. Empirically we can say the question selects the word “asshole” out
of the previous material and leaves behind the recent topic of victimization (given the
resistance that this topic engendered, it was probably a good move). Hence the question
initiates a slight topic change and leads into some interesting moments. First, the client
says that an asshole is “not a good thing,” someone that “doesn’t have their shit together”
(lines 94-95). Yet, she says her co-worker is “profoundly worse” than an asshole, she is
“a tire fire. Just noxious and nasty and serves absolutely no purpose but to give
people..cancer…she is not an asshole” (lines 116-118). She then makes a topic change
and begins to talk about how to time the traffic lights just right so you don’t hit any red
lights. And last, she ends the utterance by again trying to define what asshole means in
general.
Interpretation (S2) 8:44. The therapist then uses a familiar two-part interpretive
sequence, beginning with a speculative assertion and ending with an interpretation. As we
have seen in session A, he uses this sequence to focus the talk on the client, rather than
the co-worker or timing traffic lights. He asks: “I’m wondering what that word meant,
what meaning it has for you?” (excerpt 37, line 128). To this the client shakes her hands
around in confusion, which allows the therapist to interpret: “Cause I was wondering if
you’re feeling that way, it brings up a lot?” (line 130). This ends S2 and on a whole the
sequence was less eventfully than S1. However, the circulation of “asshole” is important
as we shall see in S3. Furthermore, the explicit resistance displayed in S2, leads into a
rare emotional transaction between the client and the therapist at the beginning of S3.
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Sequ
uence 3 (S3)
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client’s utterance is powerful because it is a subtle transaction of anger. The client gets
angry at the therapist in this moment and challenges the direction of his question. This
can be seen in the subtle confrontational language she uses along with the change in tone
and rate of speech. Furthermore, the client’s utterance forces the therapist to abandon his
position and approach the subject in a different way. Although subtle and fleeting, this is
a moment where there is an emotional transaction between the client and therapist.
Furthermore, it is the emotion — anger — which has been a subject of conversation
across the two sessions of the dataset. It is an emotion that the client struggles to
experience and even define. And yet, we see it manifesting here in a way that seems
appropriate. The questioning by the therapist during this small section does feel like
badgering at times. She forces a topic change with her anger and in response both the
therapist and client refocus the problematizing on the client’s emotions.
Formulation (9:11). In response to the client’s subtle anger the therapist asks that
they go “back to the story… and what happened last session” (see transcript, line 137).
He then offers a formulation of what occurred during the last session. The formulation
occurs in two parts. In the first, he states: “you were talking about this woman who is
worse than an asshole” and then opens up his hands (line 138). At this point she offers a
strong agreement token that stands out because of the up and down tone changes as she
says “↑Oh ↓Ya” (line 140). On the one hand, the strong agreement token seems to give
the therapist permission to proceed and he finishes the formulation by saying: “but
then…something happened” (line 141). However, this strong agreement token also
contrasts with the previous transaction of anger. This indicates that the shift the therapist
made was appropriate and accepted. De Riviera might say that this is the coming back
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together after the distancing that was created during the subtle anger of the previous
exchange. Possibly this renewed closeness contributes to the emotionality of the next
section. What follows from this point is a long elaboration where the client talks about
subject matter that should be painful (see conversational structure below). Watching the
tape this section feels more emotional than any other section in this dataset. However,
there are no clear transactions of emotion. Hence, as we walk through this section of the
session we have to attend to the subtleties of tone, content, and non-verbal ques, in order
to assess why this section feels so deep and emotionally laden.
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Figurre 20
Sequeence 3 (S3), Session B, Basic Conversational Strructure

316

Rejection trouble talk (9:11-15:33). The client begins her elaboration (on the
therapist’s formulation) with the turn indicator “And then” which makes the utterance
feel like it’s a continuation of what has previously been said (excerpt 38, line 142). It is
not an extension per se, but the turn indicator does reinforce this new alignment that has
occurred after the subtle anger expressed earlier. She continues by saying: “I always feel
like if I get upset, if I say something back, I always worry that I’m…overly sensitive”
(lines 142-143). Notice that again she does not talk about the event in therapy that the
therapist is referring to in his formulation. Like before, she changes the temporal
dimension and refers to this in the continuous present. This is something she “always
feel[s] like” (line 142). However, here she refers to another event(s) that causes her to
think she is “overly sensitive.” She does not indicate what this event was and instead
hints that there is a story behind her feelings (“Probably because I've been told I'm overly
sensitive,” lines 143-144). This is another gloss used to assess whether it is okay to
transition into a trouble talk sequence. The therapist recognizes this and quickly asks:
“Who said it?” (line 146, 9;47). And this leads into a powerful commentary on how her
parents were dismissive of her difficulties when she was being abused during junior high
and high school.
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incongruent laughter ( e.g. “… it’s not funny…((laugh)…” at line 153), intonation
changes, and sharply emphasized words. She ventriloquates him mocking her saying:
“He got upset with me for being sullen. He was like, ‘Ooh so moody, ooh so
melodramatic, ooh leave me alone’” (lines 148-151). She follows this by saying that: “it's
not funny if the joke is me” and goes to describe herself as the “punchline” of his jokes
(lines 152-153). At the end of this utterance her tone changes. Her speech is softer as she
drops the sharp accentuations and instead starts to draw out her vowels. She says, “So
there is that….Ya that always sucks by the way, it always sucks” (lines 153-154). This is
another gloss. It has two indexes “that” and “it”, which point back to the mocking
interaction between herself and her father. Yet, instead of simply nodding the therapist
asks: “What always sucks?” (lines 155-156). This should not be seen as a call for clarity;
rather it is an invitation to expand on the emotionality of the “it always sucks” gloss.
The client responds to the therapist’s question without sarcasm. She speaks
directly at first and incorporates long pauses that we have not seen previously. She states:
“He never got why I didn't think it was funny, he just thought it was more of the same.
(7) And so asking someone to stop becomes fodder for it to keep happening.63 (3) And
that su(h)cks ((looks a therapist and squints))” (lines 157-159). When she says “sucks”
there is a breathy, slightly broken quality, as if the emotion of the utterance impaired her
ability to say the word. This moment is followed by a few words, a deep breath and 6
seconds of silence. It is a short moment that could easily be abandoned. However, the
client chooses to do something novel. Similar to a what we saw in session A, the client
63

Here, as a therapist, I can't help but hear the parallel to the "abusive relationships" mention
previously. The inability to stop someone from continually abusing you is a common theme,
especially the idea that "asking someone to stop just becomes fodder for it to keep happening."

319

turns her attention on the therapist and asks: “What?” (line 160). Then using an endearing
tone she offers a noticing: “Ahh, you have the furrowed eyebrows” (line 160). This is
quickly followed by a series of apologies and dismissals. She states: “I am sorry, I have a
hard, it is not, nothing, it is nothing” (lines 161-163). To this the therapist asks: “What are
you apologizing about?” (line 164, 11:16). She responds with a clear confident
declarative statement: “For making it about you.” She then moves to a more humorous
tone and offers a ventriloquation of herself saying: “‘hey, let’s talk about what your face
is doing’” (line 165). She ends by stating: “I don’t exactly know how to handle
compassion or…complements, or attempts at understanding, it just feels sort of foreign
and weird to me” (lines 166-168).
This is a complex interaction where something new happens. It has many facets
so let’s begin by breaking it down piece by piece. First, as we discussed previously the
client is the object of interpretation during psychotherapy, meaning that her utterances
and behaviors, both past and present, are being talked about and examined. This is
primarily done by the therapist, but at times also done by the client. This is the primary
reason why the therapist uses many different types of utterances, where as the client
primarily just responds with elaboration. However, here the client briefly makes the
therapist an object whose behavior is to be wondered about. She begins by asking a
quick, punctuated question (“What?”) that indicates that he is doing something worth
noticing. She then elaborates the question with the noticing itself, starting with an “ahh”
token that conveys a sense of something being endearing. She then points out that it was
his “furrowed eyebrows.” Hence, not only is the client taking on the role of interpreter,
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she is making the therapist the object of interpretation rather than herself. Yet, this
changes quickly.
There are two points in the next utterance where she indicates that she is shifting
from talking about the therapist’s behavior to talking about her own. First she offers a
quick, yet cut off, statement saying: “I am sorry, I have a hard….”. She does not
complete the thought, but by using the first-person pronoun “I” she indicates that she is
now talking about herself. Moments later, she follows up by ventriloquating herself
saying: “‘Hey, let’s talk about what your face is doing.’” Hence, by ventriloquating
herself she indicates that she is now the object of interpretation. Furthermore, what she is
interpreting is her difficulty talking about herself during the present interaction. Given the
context of both session A and session B we know that the client and therapist have been
talking about how she “skips along the surface” (SA, line 694). Furthermore, our in-depth
analysis has shown that she often shifts topics when things get emotional or when
emotion is even brought up. Hence, what we see happening here is the client interpreting
this tendency as it occurs. From the therapist’s perspective we might say that the client is
interpreting her own defenses. What this research shows is that she is reflecting on a
tendency that manifest both explicitly in the conversation and implicitly throughout the
data of this case study. Here, she is using the hermeneutics of therapy as a technology of
self understanding. This technology is being used to constitute her as an emotional being
who relates to her emotions in ways that need to be understood in order for her to heal
and become a good, ethical subject.
Second, the interaction has many indicators of emotion. Remember, less than
three minutes ago there was a display of subtle anger on the part of the client toward the
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therapist. This was followed by indications of a realignment between the client and
therapist, which lead into trouble talk introduced by an emotional gloss. The trouble talk
that was introduced—being mocked about her “sullen” mood while being abused outside
of the home—is an emotional topic (or at least should be). She shifts from sarcastically
talking about how her father’s behavior “sucks” when she displays emotion, as she says
“sucks” in a breathy, broken tone. The emotional transaction happens at that moment
when the client says the word sucks and the therapist responds with a look that the client
later described as “compassion”. Her questioning of this look is because she does not
“know exactly how to handle compassion, compliments, or attempts at understanding.”
De Rivera (1984) describes the emotional movement of compassion as akin to
acceptance. “Acceptance is the emotional relationship that is involved when we do not
insist that the other be what we want…her to be, do not dictate….but simply allow the
other to be what… she is, without our withdrawing or distancing” (p. 135). Both
compassion and acceptance are considered Being emotions because they transpire in
moments where who we are, our very existence, is affirmed or denied. However,
compassion differs from acceptance. Compassion implies “a willingness to suffer with
the other,” which, as de Rivera notes, is vital to “alleviating suffering” (p. 135).
Third, the positioning that gets worked out over the course of the next few turns
creates a contrary relational structure between the characters (Sarah and her father) and
the participants (Sarah and the therapist). Emotions, by our definition, are the
“transformation of our relation to the world-to the persons, objects, events, and actions
that are important to us” (de Rivera, 1977, p. 35). The emotional transaction (lines 157164, 10:34-11:16) that occurs transforms the relationship between the client and the
322

therap
pist in a way
y that contraasts with client’s relationnship with heer father. The father “gott
upsett” and made her the “pun
nchline” of his
h jokes, whhile the theraapist shows
“com
mpassion.” Th
hese differen
nces get refin
ned over thee next few tuurns, but heree we see thee
raw difference.
d
The
T emotionaal relationshiip between tthe therapistt and client iss very
differrent from thee narrated reelationship between the cclient and heer father (seee positioningg
figuree 1).
Figurre 21
Posittioning Diag
gram , S3 Sesssion B: Com
mpassion Veersus Rejectiion

The three aspects listeed above maake this is a vvery powerfu
ful moment iin the
sessio
on. Howeverr, in responsse to the clien
nt’s turn, thee therapist haas to choosee where to
focuss his utterancce, what to highlight
h
and
d open up forr elaborationn. Initially, hhe chooses
the ‘d
defensive’ asspect of the turn.
t
He issu
ues a commaand to: “Say…more abouut…what
you think about when…some
w
eone is trying
g to understaand or to be compassionnate” (line
323

169-170). The client complies and says that there is a “spectrum,” on the one hand
“nothing sticks like Teflon” and on the other it “promotes a…very aggressive response”
like what is being said is “‘horseshit’” (lines 174-175). This elaboration was not about
what she was experiencing with the therapist, but what she generally feels. This was
established by the therapist during his command when he asked what she thinks when
“someone” is trying to be compassionate. The client’s turn initiator “Umm it varies”
indexes the more general experience (line 171).
However, the therapist then tries to apply this general experience to the here-andnow. He asks: “Did you feel like that was what I was conveying?” (line 177, 12:31). The
client tries to avoid talking about the experience by first generalizing (“someone,” line
178), then confusing the object of analysis (“I didn’t want to make this about you,” when
the therapist is trying to focus on her experience, line 181), but eventually she agrees that
the therapist had “just a look of compassion” (line 182). Again the therapist asks about
the experience, but this time implicates himself (with a “that” index) and the emotional
transaction: “what did that bring up for you?” (see transcript, line 183, 12:59). The client
states that it makes her feel “uncomfortable” because she is “missing something” and
others see how “bad” things are (lines 184-192). Hence, the emotional transaction has
become understood as “a look of compassion” toward the client, which produced an
“uncomfortable” feeling where she became aware that others recognize her as having it
“bad.”
At line 193, the client creates a turn relevant place indicating that the utterance
about her response to compassion is complete. However, instead of giving the floor to the
therapist she inserts a commentary about her mother. She says that her mother always
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told her that “things are going to be okay,” however “she was always wrong” and this is
“where the horseshit part comes from” (lines 195-196). The client frames it as a
“dismissal” (line 197). She describes her mother as never wanting her “to be upset” so
her mother would “deny things for me” (lines 199-200). She states “I need my own
special denial for that…I can’t borrow yours” (lines 199-202). After this there is a long
pause lasting 19 seconds. She then offers a summarizing statement that describes how
both her mother and father relate to her problem in a way that contrasts with the
therapist’s response. She states: “It made it very hard for a long time, to talk to either of
them. Because my dad made fun of my problems and my mom refused to admit that I had
any problems” (lines 202-204). This is followed by another 19 seconds of silence. These
long silences are important.
Although there is some laughter in this commentary, the long silences and the
content of the utterance convey an emotional weight. The presence of silence in this
sequence is unique. In session-A there were few silences, the longest lasting 8 seconds
(SA, line 735). At the end of SA the client and therapist explicitly address this as they
formulated some of the things they would need to change going forward (SA, line 694).
Here we see long silences (some lasting nearly 20 seconds) that accompany emotionally
provocative content (abuse and neglect). Furthermore, the content stands out because it
contrasts with the emotional transaction of compassion between the client and therapist.
Her parents’ responses are lacking compassion. Compassion is the acceptance of another
regardless of how you feel towards them, combined with the ability to feel suffering. The
client’s father mocks her and her mother denies that her problems exist. If we were to
conceptualize the relationship between the client and parents as emotional relationships
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according to de Rivera, we could describe the father’s relationship as one of contempt
and shame and the mother’s relationship as one of denial and rage. Hence, the emotional
transaction creates a relationship that differs from the relationships being described by the
client. As a therapist, I would describe this as a corrective emotional experience, which
is, according to many authors, essential for change (Bernier & Dozier, 2002; Greenberg
& Safran, 1989; J. P. Miller, 1990; Safran & Greenberg, 1991). Even though the client is
unable to fully accept the compassionate look, she is aware of it, and recognizes it as a
different response than what she’s describing as she talks about her parents.
What is important to attend to is how emotion, as an ethical substance, can be
related to, experienced, and understood in many different ways and how this allows for a
rich constitutional process which produces in the client a deep self. During SAS7, lines
687-689, the therapist and the client talk about how hard it is for Sarah to be silent during
session. At that time, it was not clear how this was relevant to the overall constitutional
strategy, but it seemed important. Here we can see how silence is a way to doing
emotion. The silences during this section are long, dwarfing anything we saw in session
A. Hence, the problematizing of silence that we saw at the end of SA was in fact a tactic
aimed at constituting the client as an emotional being. The problematizing centered on
her ability to be silent. Hence, it is her relationship with her own behavior and feelings
during the behavior that becomes an object of curiosity and interpretation. Silence, or
lack thereof, can be questioned for meaning. Furthermore, silence can be used to
demonstrate ethical activity. The client is doing emotion. She is engaged in the practice
of emotion which has been problematized at what needs to be worked on in order to heal.
During the interaction described above this is all present. Yet, there is also emotion
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transacting between the client and therapist, as well as, emotion being transacted between
the characters in the client’s commentary. The client is the one who makes these
transactions explicit and available for thought, for problematizing. Reflecting on the
number of ways that emotion is used during psychotherapy, it is justified to argue that the
depth of the emotional subject is the vast expansion of variation that emotion, as an
ethical substance, makes possible; rather than what lies beneath the lived surface of life.
Questions and Elaboration on “Wounds” (15:33). After the long silence the client
makes a topic change towards physical injuries inflicted by herself, accidents, and her
parents. The transition is ambiguous. She casually says, “rough week” and then says, “I
don’t have any,” while wiggling her fingers in front of the therapist (lines 204-206). She
points out that she does not “have any nails” and this leads into conversation about not
having any nails because she “aggressively…tear[s]” them and they don’t “heal
properly”(lines 206-212). At line 217, she makes another topic change abruptly. She
comments: “My mom broke my finger twice and never apologized,” which is followed
by an awkward laugh. She then describes the experience while also showing the therapist
her fingers and talks about how they “never got set, because, ‘I was fine. I was making a
big fuss out of nothing’” (lines to 224-226). At line 234, the therapist offers a formulation
(17:05) saying: “You’ve got some wounds.” The client uses this to list even more injuries
and the therapist offers another formulation saying, “Some of your wounds are selfinflicted” (line 240, 17:22).
Initially, the client disagrees with this formulation but the therapist points out that
her nails are self-inflicted wounds and then she begins to talk about her self-inflicted cuts
that have healed on her forearm. She discusses other injuries as well. She offers a
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narrative (N2) about a time when she was building a “terrarium” and she accidentally cut
herself, which is quickly transitioned into a short commentary about when she smashed
her toe and the “top popped off” (lines 254-275). While talking about her smashed toe
she makes a brief comment that is not clearly connected to the previous material. She
says: “she never apologized” (line 277). The client goes on to describe how, presumably,
her mother told her that she was making a “fuss” and how she never took her to the
doctor: “I never got a splint, we didn’t go to the doctor, we didn’t get an x-ray” (excerpt
39, lines 284-285).
Formulation (20:25). At line 286, the therapist makes a formulation to summarize
the client’s prior speech and says, “Completely ignored.” This formulation also utilizes
the client’s prior talk by re-circulating a partial figure of speech. The client, referring to
her broken pinky finger, states that her entire nail was “completely purple” (line 279).
The therapist recirculates “completely” in his formulation. This circulation of figures is
interesting in that it draws from a section of the client’s speech that references the
wounds that she has endured during her life. This is a major aspect of the prior sequence.
Yet, the therapist uses this phrase to focus on the more interpersonal (and personal)
aspects of the previous sequence, hence constraining the client’s next turn.
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ventriloquation and instead questions her about wanting an apology. If we look at the
turn-taking organization of these utterances we see that the therapist offers an
overlapping acknowledgment token at line 294 and then initiates a turn request in the
form of a deep inhale (it is common for this therapist to signal/claim his turn with a deep
inhale). However, instead of giving up her turn, she adds the assertive response quoted
above and then yields her speakership.
The therapist takes the floor and asks: “Do you think that there is a part of you
that is still waiting for an apology?” (line 296,20:54). As he finishes his question the
client utters a neutral token (ahh at line 297) just before the therapist continues his turn
and qualifies his original question by asking if there is a part of her: “That still wants
recognition of...?” He trails off and doesn’t finish the question, leaving it highly
ambiguous. I draw this out in detail because it shows the way in which the client can
influence the speech of the therapist. By extending her turn and not allowing him to
speak, she influences his turn, compelling him to contend with the new material that is
more assertive then her previous talk. Furthermore, by initially offering the neutral token
(ahh at line 297), rather than the more preferred acknowledge token, she nudges the
therapist to qualify his original question. Although the qualification is unclear, there is
some compelling evidence that the client’s neutral token pushed the therapist to respond
to her assertive statement.
In response to the therapist’s question the client offers an agreement token, which
is then elaborated. In her elaboration she discusses: “The whole apology thing” (line
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299)64 by saying that she was forced to apologize for everything, rather than talking about
wanting an apology from her parents. For her the “whole apology thing” is complex. She
states: “I was in a position where, I was told I had to apologize even if I was sure I was
right and I was not allowed to ask for apologies and that really... made me feel sort of like
an untouchable, like ‘you always have to be in a state of...being sorry [and] always be in
a state of either feeling shame or...feigning shame’” (lines 300-304). Notice that her
utterance is focused on her feelings. No longer is she talking about her physical injuries;
rather the interpersonal dynamics of her family relationships and her feelings are being
foregrounded. Interestingly, this is not because she responds directly to the therapist’s
questions. Rather, she makes use of his question, shaping her response around the
proceeding material and then moves in a new direction. She borrows his focus on
apologies and uses this to bring in previous clinical material. Then she shifts the focus,
emphasizing how she was made to “feel...like an untouchable.65”
In terms of emotion, the “wounds” elaboration above is a commentary on
rejection. “In rejection, the imperfect being of the other’s existence is denied by making
the other meaningless — by denying that there is an essence to the other’s existence or
any meaning to the occurrence of an event” (de Rivera, 1977, p. 64). Although parts of

64

She creates an index indicating that this was something discussed previously: “I think I touched
on last time.”
65
This utterance has a number of temporal dimensions. First, at line 299 the client indexes a
previous session where she discussed “the whole apology thing.” This is an event that both
participants share. The “whole apology thing” is also a gloss that the client then unpacks by using
a temporal reference (“I was in a position”) to talk about the position that she was in, presumably,
during childhood. Yet, the index is unclear. In a sense the index is floating: it refers to an
unknown period of time. This response demonstrates how a client can form a response by
weaving together multiple temporal indexes to produce an utterance that goes beyond the original
thrust of the therapist’s question.
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the elaboration deal with self injury or accidents, prominent throughout are commentaries
on parental rejection of an aspect of the client—namely her suffering. Whether she was
being mocked by her father for her suffering or having her suffering denied by her
mother, there are numerous examples of rejection. The movement of rejection is to push
the other away to such a degree or distance that they no longer exist. It is the opposite
movement of compassion, where we move toward the other even though there are
elements of their existence that might be unpleasant or unappealing. Hence, after the
emotional transaction of compassion we see the client move into a commentary on her
long history of rejection, which is the emotional movement opposing compassion (p. 69).
Rejection is an emotional transaction that her parents enact against her. At the end
of the “wounds” elaboration there are two indications of her response to their rejection.
First, there is the assertive statement prior to the therapist’s last question where she states:
“No, my finger is broken and I get to react this way.” If we think about this last line in
terms of emotional movement we see that it is a moving against her parents. She declares
that she has the right to “react this way.” This is a declaration that challenges the way her
parents “ought” to behave. Hence, this last line stands out because it is an attempt to
respond to rejection with anger. However, there is no clear indication that the client ever
said this to her parents. Meaning, it is not proceeded by, “so I said to them…”. Hence, the
line comes across as something that she would like to say, but has not. On the other hand,
when the client discusses the “whole apology thing” she makes a reference to the past
and discusses explicitly “feeling shame” and always be in a state of “being sorry.”
Because this directly references the past there is a sense that this is how the client
responded to her parents’ rejection. Namely, she felt ashamed, like “an untouchable.”
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Interpretation S3 (21:35). As the client is talking about “feeling shame or
feigning shame” the therapist offers a loud acknowledgment token and then takes a deep
breath. His inhalation overlaps the client’s closing line: “And never being able to say:
‘you’ve hurt me, I demand recompense’” (line 306). Much like the previous exchange,
the client ends with a more assertive statement just as the therapist is calling for his turn.
Hence, the interpretation starts prior to the closing line and does not seem to take its
content into account. Instead, the therapist indexes a “tension” in the client’s previous
speech that was also present in the “story with your coworker” (lines 309-312). In the
excerpt above you can see the entire interpretation. It begins with a neutral epistemic
marker, “And it sounds like,” which indicates that what is being said is independent from
the client's previous speech. Then he uses “that’s” to index a “tension” in the previous
speech that is connected to the “story” about the coworker. However, as the interpretation
unfolds he indicates that the connection is not to the story per se, but what she feels when
she tells the story. Namely, “You feel like: ‘If…I think about this too long, I’m going to
start thinking I’m the asshole.’”
This line closes the interpretation and its power comes from its construction. The
therapist designs this as a ventriloquation of the client’s speech and also recirculates the
word “asshole.” This word was first used by the client at line 43 in response to the
therapist’s formulation about co-worker “difficulties.” There she spoke the word with a
sarcastic smile saying: “If I get upset or if I let that feeling be known I'm going to be
wrong and an ((gaze )) £asshole£.” In S2, the therapist asked the client “What comes to
mind” when she thinks of the word and this continued until the client displayed subtle
anger and made the therapist shift course at the beginning of S3. Since that point the
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word has not been used, yet the therapist brings it back for the interpretation. The word
creates a link to these moments of the session, giving a sense of coherence and
connection between the vastly complex preceding context (Peräkylä, 2004). Furthermore,
the interpretation is a temporal reference that again points back to the emotional
transaction that occurred in the previous session (which is itself another reference to an
event that occurred outside the session). Hence, the interpretation has the same temporal
construction and emotionality as the original formulation. As we have seen, the client
uses different tactics to distance herself from this event, but the therapist continually
points back to it. The interpretation creates links throughout the session by continuing to
utilizing this unique temporal construction. Last, by indexing a “tension” the therapist
introduces metaphorical language that can be used to interpret the client’s previous
speech and the event indexed in the initial formulation of the session. Tension implies a
mutual pulling of opposite forces. However, what those forces are is not entirely clear. As
we have seen throughout the dataset, the interpretation leaves a lot to be filled in. This is
part of its power. The client is called to elaborate on what that tension is and how it
applies to her understanding of herself, her emotions, and her relations to others.
However, the elaboration after an interpretation is different than the elaboration
after a formulation. Formulations gloss shared experience and compel agreement.
Interpretation introduces something new that comes from outside the shared experience
of the client-therapist dyad as well as the client’s personal experience (type AB and A
events respectively). Hence, interpretation calls for more than just elaboration: it calls for
contestation, modification, partial agreement, agreement, reflection, and so on.
Interpretations are openly disputable claims (D events) and therefore interpretation
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requires interpretation. There is no set way to interpret an interpretation; however
psychotherapy as a constitutional practice problematizes the client as an emotional being
who is asked to be curious about her emotion. The client can avoid talking about
emotion, but this is problematized as a way of relating to herself that also needs to be
understood. The only way out is through the use of the therapeutic hermeneutic as a
technology of self understanding. By interpreting one’s own emotions the client places
herself on the ethical path, which is the path toward goodness and health. Hence, this
analysis has shown that psychotherapy constitutes the client as a deep emotional subject
that requires hermeneutic understanding in order to heal. This hermeneutic healing
process is the rediscovery of the ethical within the pathological.
Closing Sequence
S3 elaboration. The client offers a series of strong agreement tokens and then uses
an index to connect the S3 interpretation to a “notion…that I’m not supposed to get angry
and I’m not supposed to want things from others” (lines 314-315). This does not utilize
the metaphor of opposing forces that creates tension. However, the therapist quickly uses
a question that can also be read as an extension. He asks: “And if you do?” (line 317).
The client seamlessly extends the therapists turn and says, “Then, now I have the
problem”(line 318). This is a wonderful moment of collaboration where the therapist and
the client work together in order to elaborate on the metaphor of tension. Hence, if we
imagined their turns as one unit of speech it might look like this: “I’m not supposed to
get angry or want things from other people, and if I do then I have the problem.” Tension
is created because if the client has a problem with someone else she immediately
becomes the problem herself. Hence, the problem is located in the client regardless of
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what she does and this tendency is now being further problematized as something
therapeutically important.
Throughout session B the client has thoughts about the problem as something that
is personal and emotional. Only during S2 did she focus more on what was problematic
about others and this was quickly abandoned. The S3 interpretative elaboration would be
considered highly collaborated according to Peräkylä’s research (Peräkylä, 2008). The
extensions that create seamless speech are present just as Peräkylä has found elsewhere.
What this analysis reveals is that here the client and therapist are talking in the language
of personal emotion. They are talking about how the client relates to herself as an
emotional being. Here, the client is interpreting the S3 interpretation in order to think
about herself as an emotional subject, which has been the overall strategy identified by
this analysis. Hence, it is possible that moments of high collaboration, indicative of
strong therapeutic alliance, are constituted by the client’s use of the hermeneutic tools in
ways that align with the strategic deployment of power within psychotherapy.
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discussed, transacted, and problematized in psychotherapy. The next chapter will review
the finding identified during the analysis of both session A and session B. After this,
there will be a discussion of what the findings say about psychotherapy, as well as, a
reflection on this research project as a whole.
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Chapter

7
A DETAILED INTERACTION ANALYSIS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY AS
CONSTITUTIONAL PRACTICE: FINDINGS

"We should not be surprised that….in the twentieth century, madness
should have discovered at the center of itself a primitive nucleus of guilt
and aggression…this is not the gradual discovery of the true nature of
madness, but simply the sedimentation of what the history of the West has
made of it for the last three hundred years. Madness is much more
historical than is usually believed, and much younger too.”
Michel Foucault, Mental
Illness and Psychology,
(1987, p. 6).

Overview of the Findings
An analysis of this size and depth produces a number of interesting findings.
However, some findings standout because they directly concern the research question or
are important in terms of evaluating the overall project. In this chapter I cover two major
findings (findings 1 and 2), which answer my research question: How is the client
constituted as a certain kind of subject during psychotherapy? In the following chapter, I
discuss two major findings (findings 4 and 5) that help to illustrate the success of DIA as
methodology capable of explicating the constitutional change process in psychotherapy.
The findings are as follows. (1) Interpretation was shown to be a pragmatic practice that
asserts the therapist’s subjective perspective into the conversation. This allows the client
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to respond with her own interpretation. This collaborative process was found to be an
important change process in psychotherapy and these findings conform to the more
interactional understanding of interpretation (Aron, 1992; Winnicott, 1971). (2) The
study shows how psychotherapy constitutes the client as a deep emotional subject who
must understand her emotions in order to be an ethical being. (3) The analysis provides a
description of how Foucauldian problematizing occurs through the deployment of
conversational actions that shift the location of the therapeutic problem and encourage the
client to think about herself as an emotional being. (4) This study demonstrates how the
indeterminacy of talk is used as a creative resource for both the therapist and client
during problematizing.
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Table 1
Major Findings from the Detailed Interaction Analysis of the Constitutional Change
Process in Psychotherapy
Findings

Description

(1) Interpretation asserts the therapist’s Related to Labov’s description of D-event
subjectivity and calls for the client’s actions, interpretations were shown to be
actions that assert the therapist own
interpretation.
subjective experience and call for a
subjective response from the client. In
response to the interpretation the client can
respond by using the hermeneutic
technology of therapy as a tool for self
understanding. Interpretation can be seen as
an emancipatory process as described by
Habermas.
(2) Psychotherapy constitutes the client
as a deep emotional subject

Emotion was identified by both the
therapist and the client as the substance that
needed to be worked on and understood in
order to heal. Healing is synonymous with
becoming an ethical being. Hence, in
psychotherapy, emotion is what Foucault
referred to as the substance èthique.

(3) Conversational actions shift the
location of the therapeutic problem
and encourage the client to think
about herself as an emotional being

This process is an example of Foucauldian
problematizing. Throughout the dataset this
was accomplished, by the therapist,
through selective questions, formulations,
indexing, foregrounding emotion, subject
positioning, and interpretation. The client
engaged in problematizing through
narration, commentary, temporal shifts,
topic changes, and interpretation.

(4) The indeterminacy of talk is used as
a creative resource for both the
therapist and client during
problematizing.

The analysis shows how problems arise as
implicit possibilities that are later made
explicit. These problems are always subject
to change and numerous possibilities exist.
Hence, psychotherapy is a creative task that
both the client and therapist engage in as
they constitute the clinical problem.
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Interpretation as Constitutional Practice
At the beginning of this dissertation I discussed my desire to examine
psychotherapy in a way that best captured its subtleties, while demonstrating its
humanity. I explained how interpretation is a way into psychotherapy because it is a
pivotal construct that can be reinterpreted and put to work for both the researcher and the
practitioner. This research has shown that it is not only a pivotal construct, but an
organizing tactic used to constitute the client as an intentional being capable of self
interpretation and understanding. As was discussed above, many of the therapist’s turns
were used to problematize the client as an emotional being. If we return to the analysis
we see that the kind of emotional being that was foregrounded was one whose emotions
are intentional. The interpretations of the case study are, for the most part, used for this
general purpose. However, my interest in interpretation goes beyond the therapist’s
tactics. Interpretation is important to the constitution of the client as an intentional subject
because (1) it is the site where subjectivity is claimed and therefore constituted explicitly,
(2) it is where the hermeneutic technology of therapy is utilized, and (3) it is where the
solution to the interpretive problem as an ethical transformation that demands the
incorporation of the interpretive technology as a means for achieving the good.
Previously in chapter 3, the distinction was drawn been A-events and AB-events.
This distinction was derived from the work of Labov and Fanshel (1977). Labov stated
that in order to understand psychotherapeutic discourse we have to view each utterance as
an action. The type A-event is a representation of the speaker’s past, where the speaker
has sole ownership of the experience. We can see this in the narratives and commentary
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offered by the client during this case study. On the other hand, AB-events involve shared
experience. Here, both participants have ownership of the experience. Formulations have
been identified as a type of AB-event that glosses a shared experience between the client
and therapist (Antaki, 2008). As we saw in the analysis, formulation was a common tactic
used by the therapist.
AB-events occur in both everyday conversation and psychotherapy, but as my
analysis has shown, AB-events are used tactically by the therapist. In psychotherapy,
these AB-events begin to accumulate quite quickly. As a therapist learns more and more
about the patient’s experience he or she has greater access to the patient’s biography and
are able to comment on these experiences. As with the case study, formulations can be
directed toward what has just been said or what was said in previous sessions. As was
discussed in Chapter 3, formulations are the most non-coercive type of therapeutic
intervention, but they are extremely powerful because they selectively foreground
elements of the previous talk and they project agreement, making them very difficult to
contradict. This ability to project agreement rests on the subtle manipulation of the
ownership of experience. The formulation concerns shared experience, but it is uttered as
if it concerns the client’s experience. This can be seen in the design of the utterance.
Formulations start with some variation of personal pronoun that indexes the client as the
owner of experience (“So, you say you are tired of all this”). There is a key distinction
between a formulation and an interpretation: interpretations assert the therapist’s
perspective on the client’s experience (“It seems to me that you are tired of all this”)
(Bercelli et al., 2008).
As shown in the case study, psychotherapy precedes as a series of actions
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volleying between A-events and AB-events. There are norms dictating who should use
A-event actions and AB-event actions in psychotherapy. The client’s role is typically to
elaborate further and further on A-events. The therapist encourages this with questions
and extensions, but much of the therapeutic work is done through the intentional use of
AB-event actions such as formulations, which selectively foreground certain elements of
speech in order to constitute the client in specific ways. This was demonstrated in
chapters 5 and 6; however, there were also moments where other types of actions were
utilized. Furthermore, there were a few moments where the client used utterances that are
most often wielded by the therapist.
The first was where the client used AB-event utterances to formulate what was
happening during the session. These events stood out when I first began looking at the
dataset. I remember feeling as if these were powerful moments where the therapy
deepened. This initial reaction was important because it indicated that something
different was going on during these brief moments. The client shifts from a common type
of action and begins to act in ways that are more typical of the therapist. She does this in
order to gloss what they are doing in therapy (“Ya got me,” SAS1, line 59 and “I'm
supposed to be going in [emotion], that is probably purpose of all this,” SAS6, line 594),
and to gloss what she is trying to do during her commentary (“For making it about you,”
SBS3, line 165). My initial reaction was a response to this shift. In these moments the
client was no longer elaborating on her own biographical experience for the therapist.
Instead, she was formulating on a shared experience between the therapist and herself.
Hence, she was no longer offering up her own story in order for it to be selectively
formulated and problematized, but selectively formulating and problematizing the shared
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experience of psychotherapy. During these moments she clearly declared herself not
simply as an object of psychotherapeutic understanding, but as a subject who shares
ownership of the psychotherapeutic relationship, which then became an object for her to
interpret.
As mentioned in chapter 3, A–events and AB–events are only two of the many
different types of actions that take place in psychotherapy. Traditionally, the distinction
between A-events and B-events has been the most useful in terms of generating CA
research on psychotherapy (Peräkylä et al., 2008a). Utterances that pertain to another’s
experience are B-events. These utterances have the form of “B believes that A believes”
(Labov & Fanshel, 1977, p. 80). What has interested conversation analysts is how the
ownership of experience influences sequential organization. Typically, the owner of the
experience is given the chance to respond to B-event statements. Furthermore, new
research has shown how the ownership of experience can be shifted depending on the
type of social practice in which the participants are engaged. Vehviläinen (2008) has
argued that psychoanalysis modifies the common rights given to the owner of experience
and he speculates that this is due to the way the therapist uses his turns to display a coownership of experience. Furthermore, conversation analysts have recently become
interested in a third type of action called a D-event. According to Labov (1977), D-events
are disputable events because both participants recognize that the truth of the utterance is
not certain and hence further action is required, whether this be to deny, agree with,
support, or completely reinterpret the original action as required. Labov states that the
most common type of D-event is an assertion. He goes on to say that in psychotherapy
there are two particular assertions “an evaluation….[and] an interpretation” (p. 63). For
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Labov, an evaluation highlights the emotional or interpersonal aspects of the previous
speech, whereas the interpretation treats the previous speech as symbolic. This distinction
between an evaluation and interpretation has all but collapsed for modern day
conversation analysts. D-event actions are collectively referred to as reinterpretations, or
interpretations depending on the researcher (Bercelli et al., 2008; Vehviläinen, 2008). In
this case study we have referred to D-event actions as interpretations.
From this perspective we can see interpretation as an action directed toward A–
events and AB–events. Because the bulk of psychotherapy consists of A and AB-events,
interpretations stand out because of their unique design and sparsity. Interpretations come
from the therapist’s perspective and this can be seen in the “epistemic markers” used in
the design of the utterance (Bercelli et al., 2008, p. 49). The therapist’s perspective is
openly displayed in a way that is overt, yet not definitive. Unlike a formulation, the
interpretation does not project agreement, nor does it claim to be a reflection of the
client’s experience. Rather, it is an expression of the therapist’s own subjective
experience of the client and it therefore calls for “a response” (Labov & Fanshel, 1977, p.
63).This call to respond is a call to subjectivity: the interpretation demands that the client
claim her position as a subject, the “I am,” and respond to the subjectivity of the
therapist. This is why interpretation is a site where subjectivity is constituted explicitly.
Clients are called to interpret themselves as objects. Their interpretation takes their own
autobiographical past, and the lived experience of being with the therapist as its object.
Hence, the client forms a subject-object relationship to herself-in-relation-to-others as she
interprets the interpretation.
This conforms to Habermas’ (1968) understanding of depth therapy as an
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emancipatory practice where the therapist must first take the client as the object of
interpretation and then the client must then take on a subjective position towards herself
as an object: “The subject cannot obtain knowledge of the object unless it becomes
knowledge for the object—and unless the latter thereby emancipate itself by becoming a
subject” (p. 262). The client’s subject-object relationship is a way of understanding
herself, but it is also a way of positioning herself in relation to the therapist as a certain
kind of subject. Much like the therapist’s interpretation, the client’s interpretive
elaboration is a claiming of subjectivity. This makes the interpretive adjacency pair a site
where the participants can act with or against one another’s actions in order to constitute
each other as subjects. The number of responses available is quite large. Clients can
openly disagree or modify the interpretation and in this they create a subject position in
relation to the therapist. Moving away from the traditional perspective that clients never
interpret (Loewenstein, 1951), Lewis Aron (1992) argued “that the optimal way for the
analyst to establish himself or herself as a subject is through the use of interpretations,
which, while being explicitly about the patient, carry a great deal of implicit data about
the subjectivity of the analyst” (p. 479). This study provides solid evidence for the notion
that interpretation is important because it creates a site where client can change because
she is called to interpret herself in relation to others and her world. In line with Aron,
interpretation is important because it provides the client with an opportunity to be
different; rather than simply receive different information about who she is from the
therapist.
Interpretation, Ethical Self-Constitution, and Collaboration
When researchers analyze what clients do in response to interpretations, they see
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a number of different tactics, most of which were described by Peräkylä (2008). Much of
Peräkylä’s work has been focused on this topic. As discussed in Chapter 2, clients
elaborate on interpretations in ways that are complementary and non-complementary to
the therapist’s interpretation. Peräkylä has shown how both the client and the therapist
use extensions to add to the elaboration in ways that are complementary with one
another. According to Peräkylä: “Further explication of the interactional ways in which
the matching and mismatching, the complementarity and non-complementarity of the
therapist’s and client’s actions takes place, is probably one of the central tasks of
conversation analysts investigating psychotherapy" (p. 118). Peräkylä’s description of
how therapists and clients move together and apart is quite powerful. However, what is
needed is a theory of how these movements are part of an overall constitutional strategy.
This is important because as Bercelli (2008) points out, a client’s elaboration to an
interpretation is “something more than accepting the therapist proposals….[it is] the
possibility for clients to show what they make of the therapist's proposals, and how, by
extensively responding to them, they possibly change their perspectives about their own
events and experiences" (italics added p. 61).
Turning to the case study, we see a number of different ways that the client
interprets the therapist’s interpretations. We see her agreeing, disagreeing, as well as
elaborating in ways that initiate topic changes. Furthermore, when we look at the
moments where there is more complementarity, we see something unique occur. In these
instances the client begins to interpret herself in a way that is similar to the depth
hermeneutic of the therapist. She does this in response to the therapist’s interpretation
that her “clown” story was really about her anger towards the therapist (SAS6, lines 681348

682). A more profound example is after the interpretation that ends session B. Here, the
client and the therapist work together to extend an interpretative understanding of the
client’s own anger and its relation to herself (SBS3 elaboration, line 307-318). In chapter
6, I asserted that the collaborative spirit of this moment was due to the client’s use of the
therapeutic hermeneutic, used, more often, by the therapist. In both cases the client began
by directing her own D-event action (interpretation) towards herself. From a therapeutic
perspective she was becoming her own analyst. Hence, it was during these
complementary elaborations that a client performed a type of action that is institutionally
granted to the therapist. However, her use of this type of action was not something that
was dissuaded or discouraged. On the contrary, these are the moments that felt the most
collaborative, deep, and meaningful. These were my reactions as a listener. Furthermore,
these were my reactions as a therapist and as a client. My initial impression of depth and
meaning is telling. These are the kinds of moments one looks for as a therapist and the
moments that feel most profound as a client. They are the moments remembered as
evidence that you were onto something, that you were moving in the right direction, and
that you were doing real therapeutic work.
Hence, these moments are ethical because they point us in the direction of ‘the
good’ as Foucault described (Foucault, 1983). In other words, these moments are
inscribed with a telos. Furthermore, these are the moments where the client takes up and
use a “technology of the self,” which she uses to decipher herself and determine how to
be a good and ethical being. Hence, one of the possible responses to an interpretation is
this constitutional move where the client begins to interpret herself and internalize the
therapeutic technology of self in order to orient herself on the path towards becoming a
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good ethical subject.
Although we see no evidence in this case study of the classic psychoanalytic
depth hermeneutic that directs its aim towards the vicissitudes of sexual desire, we do see
the remnants of the confessional technology of self that Foucault associated with
psychotherapy (Foucault, 1983). For example, the therapist emphasizes that the client is
different from her mother-in-law because she is “curious” about herself. The therapist
does not give her moral instructions about who she should be as a person, but how she
should relate to herself as a kind of object. Here, what it means to be a good and moral
person is to be curious about yourself and about the intentions of your actions.
Interpretation encourages a self reflection or curiosity. Therefore, psychotherapeutic
interpretation is the keystone of a strategy that constitutes clients as deep emotional
beings who are often unaware of their own intentional acts towards themselves, others
and world. The ethical substance that must be worked on is one’s emotions or feelings.
This is something that Foucault predicted in one of his last interviews, and we see
evidence of that quite clearly in this case study (Foucault, 1983). Other researchers have
pointed out how this focus on emotion as personal rather than social is something that can
be seen across psychotherapy (Goicoechea, 2013). They have also pointed out that in
some ways this can be used to obscure gender-based power relations (p. 115). This study
has shown that interpretation is a unique and important therapeutic action that can be
described empirically. Furthermore, it is central to the constitutional strategy of
psychotherapy because it is a site of overt power where the therapeutic technology of self
can be taken up by the client and used to further collaboration, resulting in an increase of
therapeutic meaning. Collaboration as an interactional process, and therapeutic meaning
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as an emotional transaction, are both part of the constitutional field and are often
described by therapists and clients as moments where the therapy deepened. These
moments are indicators of the way in which self interpretation is a solution to the
hermeneutics of psychotherapy—a solution that places us on the path to becoming a good
and ethical being, which, as Foucault points out is a fundamental element of any
constitutional practice.
Psychotherapy and the Deep Emotional Subject
The major finding of this study is that the client was constituted as a deep
emotional subject who needed to be understood in order to heal. Researchers have been
able to show that emotion is vital to understanding change in psychotherapy (Gendlin,
1969; Greenberg & Safran, 1989; Safran & Greenberg, 1991). The notion that emotion is
important for change goes back to the beginning of psychotherapy, when Anna O.
jokingly referred to her cathartic sessions with Breuer and Freud (1955/2000) as
“chimney-sweeping” (p. 30).66 I argue that emotion is fundamental to psychotherapeutic
change not because of a universal connection between emotion and psychopathology, but
because psychotherapy as a practice is interwoven with an understanding of human
beings as emotional creatures and emotion as intrinsic to psychopathology. This
understanding has occurred over centuries, a process that Foucault (1988a) describes in
Madness and Civilization. Psychotherapy is part of this historical process. It is based on
66

Those familiar with the case of Anna O. will recall the emotionally intensive sessions that
Breuer describes. A later case study, recounted by Freud (1955/2000) is more telling. In his work
with Miss Lucy R., he elicits talk about emotion in order to understand her illness. In a footnote
he states: “I turned to psychical analysis and requested her to tell me what emotion had preceded
the onset of her illness” (p. 101). Here, emotion is a source of insight for Freud. Yet this
elicitation of talk about emotion also constitutes the patient as an emotional being.
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the confessional practices of Christianity, but focuses its constitutional work on the
irrational emotion of the symptom, rather than the sinfulness of the soul (Dreyfus &
Rabinow, 1982; Foucault, 1978).
Hence, even when emotion has been a secondary concern in psychotherapy, it has
still been a concern. It was telling that as I began this study I felt that CA alone could not
explicate the constitutional processes in psychotherapy. I felt strongly that emotion had to
be accounted for in order to understand psychotherapeutic change. This has been
identified as an implicit assumption of the researcher that arose during the practice of
research and became fundamental to the results. This assumption is not just an
idiosyncratic preoccupation. It is an assumption that arose out of my own constitutional
process of becoming—being—a psychotherapist, a researcher, and a client. Hence, the
focus of emotion in this study should be understood as a working out of the implicit
assumptions embedded in the practice of psychotherapy and the constitutional effects this
has on those involved in the practice. The ‘deepness’ of psychotherapy can be defined as
the active problematizing of emotion as a type of ethical substance that needs to be
worked on in order to gain self understanding and health. This is the ethical path for the
modern patient, the pathos to becoming “the kind of being to which we aspire” whether
that be the “pure, or immortal, or free, or masters of ourselves, and so on” (Foucault,
1983, p. 239). What we see in this data set is emotion being problematized as that which
must be understood in order to be manage. However, the controlling of the emotion is not
done in and for itself. Rather, it is done in the service of being in ethical relationships
with others. This constitutional work is at a high arc at the end of SA when the client
delivers her compelling ‘doorknob’ statement:
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I don't want to be a big ball of crazy, and I don't want to be unable to give Wanda
something to look to. Like she is very smart and she's very aware and she's gonna
pick things up very quickly. …I don't want her getting to the place where she
can’t, I I don’t want her thinking that something not done perfectly isn't worth
doing. And I don’t want her thinking that not being perfect makes her worthless. I
don't want her not being able to, you know, get it out without breaking things or
hurting herself. And I don’t want her seeing, and I don't want her being afraid of
me, I don't want her being afraid of setting me off because half of what John does
is just trying to damage control his mom. (lines 834-844)
The client has been called to be the ‘master of herself’ because this impacts her
relationships with others. During therapy, the client’s relation to her emotional depth is
brought into a triadic relationship with others and in this way she constitutes herself as a
deep self, teleologically aimed toward fostering ethical relations with others.

353

Chapter

8
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE RESEARCH
"Thought is questioning, a stepping back from what one is doing, a posing
of problems. It is what Heidegger called 'circumspection.' Diverse
solutions may be the result, but what is at the root is the problematization
(itself a result of social, economic, or political processes) which they
attend to.”
Martin Packer, The Science
of Qualitative Research,
(2011, p. 376).

Psychotherapy as Thought; Thought as Problematizing
The research question that guided this project was how clients are constituted as
certain kinds of subjects during psychotherapy. In answering this question I hoped to
achieve two goals. First, I wanted to develop a methodology that could be used to
empirically explicate the actions on actions of constitutional practices. And second, I
wanted to provide an account of how psychotherapy can produce constitutional change.
Let’s begin by reflecting on the methodology. After many roadblocks and dead ends I
developed what I call Detailed Interaction Analysis (DIA). This new methodology is
based on conversation analysis, but incorporates a relational theory of emotion as action
(STE), as well as, an action based understanding of narrative (NIA). As I argued in
chapter 4, these three aspects of DIA are ontologically compatible with radical realism
and are therefore well suited for constitutional analysis. What both distinguishes and
binds them is the assumption that language, narrative, and emotion are all actions that can
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be used to problematize oneself in relationship to others and world.
This understanding of thought has implications for psychotherapy and beyond.
Foremost, it requires us to understand thought as a sociocultural phenomenon that is
historical and constitutive. Thought can be seen all around us and cannot be limited to
internal cognitive processes: Buildings, tools, books, calendars, and cable TV are all
thought materialized; the professional institutions in which we work and live are thought
enacted; and everyday conversation, whether it be in our homes or in the institutional
practices in psychotherapy, is thought in action. All of this has arisen out of a history
where people stepped back and began to ask questions about their form-of-life and
problematize their existence. This questioning allows the world to light up in different
ways, allowing new possibilities and problems to be discovered. Through this process the
world is changed.
However, so are we—problematization not only changes the world, but changes
the people-in-the-world. As Packer (2011) points out:
Thought assumes ‘concrete forms’ in institutions, practices, and systems of
representation (maps, calculi, etc.). ‘Internal’ action on mental representations is
only one form of thought, and it requires the formation of a particular kind of self
as a knowing subject. Foucault reminds us that, for Kant, becoming a Cartesian
subject required a certain kind of ethical stance, a stance in which one viewed
oneself as a universal subject. Thinking for Kant should be individual, detached,
and formal. But Foucault emphasized….that thought is found in all action,
whether it is intellectual, ethical, or self-conscious. (p. 375)
Hence, psychotherapy needs to be understood as a form of thought. From the large-scale
institutions all the way down to the conversational turns in a single session,
psychotherapy is a way of problematizing people within their form of life.
One advantage of seeing thought in this way is that it becomes visible and
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available for empirical research. This project has been an example of how this research
can be conducted. What the methodology has allowed me to show is how thought occurs
within the practice of psychotherapy. I have demonstrated how therapeutic thought is a
social and interpersonal phenomenon, rather than an internal and individual experience.
Psychotherapy is a unique way of thinking about problems and it differs from everyday
conversation. We have seen the way in which the therapist and the client work together to
constitute the therapeutic problem as emotional and personal. The client’s life was
problematized in such a way that the most important problems were located in the client
herself. This locating was done by directing thought toward the client’s feelings and her
response to her feelings, rather than her boyfriend’s difficulty holding a job, or her
mother-in-law’s disregard of others. CA alone would have been able to produce a
penetrating account of the conversational actions, but the insight into the location of the
problem and role of emotion required an expanded methodology. This methodology
allows us to see psychotherapy as a strategic constitutional practice that locates the
problem in the client. The problems are hers, and psychotherapy, at every level of
analysis, is strategically designed to constitute problems in such a way. Confidentiality,
private space, minimal (in the service of therapy) therapist disclosure, and the expectation
to share honestly what you are thinking and feeling (Freud's rule of analysis) are all
normative practices that foster a type of problematization that locates the problem in the
individual.
Yet, psychotherapy as a way of thinking and problematizing oneself begins before
the client even comes to therapy. Expectancy effects have been used to explain why
people get better in psychotherapy (Lambert & Barley, 2001; Wilkins, 1984). The idea is
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that if you expect psychotherapy to work, then you will likely benefit from treatment. The
notion here is that psychotherapy works because of a self-fulfilling prophecy. However, if
we understand psychotherapy as a socio-historical practice that begins when people
recognize their life as a type of problem, we can then state that psychotherapy begins at
this point. This is when therapeutic thinking begins and it is at this point that the
therapeutic conversation is made explicit. Hence, expectancy effects are the way in which
the problem is recognized as a therapeutic problem that can be answered, understood, and
healed. To recognize a problem as a therapeutic problem is to understand it as
idiopathic, yet capable of comprehension—comprehension being a near equivalence to
cure. It is no wonder that when the individual recognizes they have a problem that needs
to be understood, therapy is often, at least in my experience, most effective. The problem
has to be constituted as one’s own in order for therapy to occur and this is something that
permeates not only the moment-to-moment actions during a psychotherapy session, but
also the design of our therapeutic tools (small cozy office spaces, practices of
confidentiality and so on), the formal knowledge of psychotherapy (American Psychiatric
Association, 2000), and theories of psychotherapeutic change (Orlinsky et al., 2004;
Rogers & Dymond, 1954; Snyder & Ingram, 2000).
Conversational Mapping and Indeterminacy of Talk
One challenge I faced during this project was to develop a methodology capable
of making a highly complex and ambiguous interaction sensible without oversimplifying.
By looking at speech as action, I was able to classify different types of speech based on
the actions it accomplished. Largely, this typology was taken from conversation analysis
and to some degree linguistics (C. Goodwin & Heritage, 1990; Labov & Fanshel, 1977;
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ten Have, 1999). The conversational maps were an attempt to simplify the interaction in
order to best explicate how utterances were linked together as actions on actions
unfolding across time. However, the conversational maps are misleading. They give the
reader a sense that utterances can be clearly cataloged, and yet, this is not the case. As I
discussed in chapter 5, many of the utterances could have been classified in different
ways. For example, an utterance could simultaneously be understood as an extension,
question, or interpretation. Conversation analysts have long recognized that this is the
case (Bercelli et al., 2008). By using an inductive approach, conversation analysts are
able to collect different examples of a species and then often use the most ideal specimen
to illustrate the conversational mechanisms that they are describing (Jefferson, 1988).
This study differs from conventional CA studies. The ambiguity did make mapping the
sessions difficult. However, through the process I came to understand the importance of
this ambiguity as a therapeutic resource.
The conversational maps are important because they allow us to see connections
and patterns within individual sequences and between sequences. Although they tend to
obscure the conversational ambiguity, conversational maps, ironically, allow us to
understand the importance of ambiguity as a therapeutic resource. For example, SAS3 is
a highly ambiguous sequence. Both participants make unexpected topic changes and
deploy utterances that can be understood in many different ways. The sequence also
concerns cutting, which was later identified as the original problem bringing the client
into therapy. Furthermore, the sequence has many emotional undertones; namely anger
and frustration. However, because of the ambiguity of the sequence it is unclear how the
client and therapist understand the problem. However, as the client and therapist
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transition from SAS3 to SAS4 the ambiguity lessens. Although SAS4 does not feel as
spontaneous or emotional, the client and therapist are able to talk about emotion in ways
that feel very important. This sequence (SAS4) stands out, not only because of what is
being said, but also because of its relation to SAS3 and the shift from ambiguity to clarity
when discussing emotion. Hence, the conversational mapping allows us to see how
sequences and adjacency pairs relate to each other in organic ways that constitute certain
moments as therapeutically important. Approaches that do not attend to the unfolding
context miss the hermeneutic interrelation of participant and context as it unfolds across
time, which could lead to misunderstanding.
Another reason why conversational ambiguity and uncertainty should not be
‘analyzed out of the data’ is because they are used as a creative resource for the
participants. Again, this is most prominent in SAS3, but can be seen elsewhere
throughout the dataset. Ambiguity and uncertainty about what one participant means with
his or her speech allows for an open dialogue where new understandings of the problem
can be brought to light. As is shown in SAS3, much of the ambiguity arises from the fact
that a number of possibilities are implied by any given utterance. These possibilities
become available for both participants to be used later on and made explicit. For
example, in SA, emotion is constantly being brought to the foreground and discussed, but
how emotion is a problem for the client remains implicit until it is later discussed as an
explicit problem. These later moments draw from the former, selecting certain ways of
problematizing emotion, while neglecting others.
Within any given sequence there are many problems that seem connected, yet
these connections are not given. Instead connections have to be forged. According to
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Donald Spence (1982), this is the central work of therapy: forging connections and
creating themes across a brimming surface of therapeutic conversation. This research
concurs with Peräkylä’s (2004) work, showing that connections are often made by
circulating figures of speech that link together similar topics, emotions, or relationship
across a session. This linkage can be seen in the circulation of “chaos” or “chaotic”
feelings in SA. The focus of SA was on emotion and the circulation of “chaos” linked
together by different emotional transactions. This tactic was used to constitute the
problem of SA as emotional and personal. The problem became how the client could not
express, experience, or describe her emotions. In session B we see a different tactic,
namely the use of interpretation to forge connections and create themes across sequences.
For example, the final interpretation, the SBS3-interpretation, brought back in the
“coworker difficulties” to make sense of problems that had arisen in SBS1, SBS2, and
SBS3. Hence, interpretation was used to link together multiple problems. Last, there were
a handful of occasions where the client or the therapist used classic formulations to make
the implicit problematizing that had been occurring explicit. For example, the therapist’s
SAS6-formulation at 32:09, and the client’s SAS6-speculative assertion/question at line
602 are moments when the problematization of expressing emotion was made explicit.
This is more profound given that the problematizing of emotion was so prominent, yet
implicit prior to this point.
In summary, this research has shown how the therapist uses specific tactics —
questions, formulations, and interpretations—to constitute the client’s problem as
personal and emotional. The therapist’s constant foregrounding of the personal,
emotional aspects of the problem was not, however, an act of domination. The therapist
360

was not simply prescribing a view for the client. The natural indeterminacy of speech
always leaves open possibilities for the problem to be understood differently. A therapist
might foreground emotion as a personal problem, but how the client relates to the
problem — relates to her emotion — is an open ended process. In this dataset, we saw the
client, at times, avoid talking outright about the problem as something emotional and
personal. At other times, she seemed to grab on to the problem as emotional and personal,
and yet how she related to emotion was continually being constituted. Hence, even when
the therapist’s tactics are clear, therapy still has a certain degree of ambiguity, which
allows the problem to continually be constituted, problematized, and understood. DIA
and conversational mapping allow us to produce a coherent account of the constitutional
processes in such a way that the indeterminacy of language becomes a key factor in the
change process, rather than something that needs to be controlled and eliminated from the
research.
Research as Genealogy; Research as Ethics
The next question is whether this research methodology has provided a
convincing account of constitutional processes and given us some insight into how
psychotherapy produces change. Each reader will have to answer this for themselves, but
let me conclude with some clarifying remarks. This research should be understood as a
genealogy. As was described in chapter 2, Foucault used archaeology, genealogy, and
ethics as related, yet differing, approaches aimed at creating a “historical ontology” of
modern human beings (Packer, 2011, p. 378). Foucault’s “project,” as it has been
described, was meant to include an examination of “power in its materiality, its day to
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day operation….[at the] level of micropractices” (Dreyfus & Rabinow, 1982, p. 185).
However, because of Foucault’s early death in 1984, this research was never completed.
My research is a continuation of the problematizing that Foucault, as well as
Heidegger, brought into existence with their work. My project’s contribution is to refine a
methodology that brings to the surface how a client is constituted during the practice of
psychotherapy. Chapters 5 and 6 can be seen as a mapping of the clear tactics, as well as
the mistakes, mishaps, ambiguities, and accidents that contributed to the constitutional
effects of the practice. The method is a genealogy because it creates of record, mapping
myriad ways in which people—in a given culture, in a given practice—become
constituted as certain kinds of subjects. Just as “a family tree is a record of chance
encounters, irrational attractions, and accidents of fertility and mortality. A genealogy
discloses these accidents and the coincidences, surprises, and struggles that produced a
descendant” (Packer, 2011, p. 356). Hence, a genealogy exposes the conditionality of that
which seems unconditional. People and the problems that become deemed as therapeutic
concerns are not given—they are constituted. This research shows what that
constitutional process looks like at the ground-level. It is true that psychotherapy has to
be understood as a practice that exceeds the confines of the consulting room, but it is at
the level of micro-practice—moment-to-moment actions at the everyday level—that
constitution and therefore power occur.
According to Foucault (1978) power is everywhere and it deploys not from the
top down, but from the bottom up. That to say, that power, in its modern form, is best
understood as a productive force that is used to create certain kinds of people. Hence, it is
in day-to-day interactions that power is most potent. It can be seen in the concrete ways
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people act on one another and themselves in order to produce certain ways of relating and
certain ways of existing. These actions are often complex. Actions are always met with
other actions. Actions can align, break, shift and counter one another. These shifts can be
quick, the result of clear tactics or fortuitous accidents. Genealogy maps the field of
power—the actions on actions—as it manifests within the domain of research. Chapters 5
and 6 provide such a map, charting tactics, counter-tactics, and accidents as they unfolded
temporally in the psychotherapy of the dataset.
Power is ever-present because it occurs whenever we problematize our existence
(i.e. think). Problems require actions and because all problems, even those related to
objects, are ways of working out our own existence, power is always present (Heidegger,
1927/1962; Packer, 2011). However, power is not a transcendental force, rather it is the
result of uncoordinated actions on actions that align and oppose, creating a field of forces
in which people become certain kinds of people. Hence, the ‘nature’ of power is
dependent on the concrete actions used in everyday practices. In chapters 5 and 6, I
demonstrated how problematizing can occur in psychotherapy. The turn by turn analysis
showed how the client and therapist resisted each other’s actions, as well as, used each
other’s actions to elaborate, foreground (SAS1), and avoid certain topics and emotions
(SBS1-temporal defense against emotion; narratives to resist, SAS4-N3). These actions
on actions, the way the client and therapist worked with and against each other is the
living anatomy of the therapeutic alliance.
Fifty years of process and outcome research has shown that the alliance is a major
factor that leads to change in psychotherapy (Orlinsky et al., 2004). However, as Kazdin
(2009) points out, we still do not know what the alliance is and how it works. I argue that
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if therapy is viewed as a type of problematizing then the nature of the therapeutic alliance
becomes clear: it is a dynamic flow of actions that unfolds as we problematize who we
are as certain kinds of people. Similar process studies show how the alliance is strengthen
or weakened based on how the participants agree on common problems and work
collaboratively (Saladin & Grimmer, 2009; Voutilainen et al., 2010). Kozart (1996)
argued that researchers wanting to understand the therapeutic alliance should use
conversation analysis because it provides “a set of ideas and terms that focus the
researcher's attention on subtle, and often overlooked methods by which interactants
jointly negotiate a sense of ordinary purpose” (p. 397). Kozart went on to state that a
focus on how the pragmatics of therapeutic conversation affects collaboration would
greatly advance our understanding of the alliance.67
As discussed in chapter 3, conversation analysts have indeed focused on the
subtleties of collaboration and resistance produced by the pragmatics of the participants’
speech. This current research retains that focus on pragmatics while also attending to the
strategic deployment of power. Hence, this research, in part, adds to the study of change
in psychotherapy because it shows how collaboration and the therapeutic alliance can be
understood as constitutional processes of productive actions on actions through which the
client shapes herself as a deep emotional subject who uses the hermeneutics of therapy in
order to understand herself and live a more ethical life. The prime example of this is the
elaboration after the SBS3 interpretation. As I show, the client and therapist extend each
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This claim is connected to Kozart’s advocacy of Bordin’s (1994) theory of the alliance, which
instructs the researcher to focus on collaboration when studying the therapeutic alliance. Kozart
(1996) states that “Bordin forged a pantheoretical vision of the alliance based on the principle of
patient-therapist collaboration (expressed as the bond)” (p. 369).
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other’s speech in a manner that has been shown to be highly collaborative and alliance
building (Peräkylä, 2008). Yet, by using DIA to attend to the constitutional strategy we
see that this collaborative moment is where the client is interpreting herself as an
emotional being. Through her collaborative elaboration with the therapist she constitutes
the problem as: not wanting to get angry and if she does become angry then, instantly,
she becomes the problem. This is a problem of how she relates to her emotions and
therefore relates to herself. Hence, it is a problem of Ethics. Possibly, with future
research, we will find that many of these moments of collaboration and alliance building
occur when the client begins to understand herself in ways that align with the strategic
deployment of power within any given therapy.
In sum, my research allows us to see the psychotherapeutic alliance as a nonegalitarian relationship that is productive, rather than domineering. In his later years,
Foucault (1982) turned away from genealogy towards ethics. He became interested in
studying how people constitute themselves as certain kinds of subjects. He did this by
looking at what people do in order to become the of kind people they believe they should
be (Foucault, 1983). Psychotherapy is such a practice. The ethical moment begins when
the person’s life becomes problematized as a personal psychological problem that therapy
can address. We do not have direct access to the moment, or the moments in which the
client recognized herself as having a therapeutic problem. However, the client does
reflect back on the original problem that brought her into therapy. In session A (line 203),
she says that she originally came in for “cutting.” Cutting (or self-injury) was discussed
across the dataset; however, it was not addressed as a behavioral issue. Instead, the
therapist encouraged the client to understand the cutting as something “expressive” (SA,
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line 472). Hence, the cutting is a problem of expression; it is a maladaptive form of
communication that needs to be understood. Why has this maladaptive expression arisen?
The answer seems to do with how the client relates to her emotions.
Throughout both sessions the therapist continually brought emotion to the
foreground, problematizing the way the client experienced and expressed her feelings.
This research showed how feelings, or emotions, can be constituted as the “substance
ethique” or “ethical substance” that needs to be worked on in order to understand the
therapeutic problem (p. 238). It is emotion that becomes problematized in a unique way
throughout the dataset and it is here that the constitutional work is aimed. The problem is
that the client has difficulty expressing emotion or even understanding why this is
difficult for her. This is the ethical problem that needs to be resolved in order the client to
heal and live the good life. It is not the same depth hermeneutic of Freud. There’s no
digging back into the ever-growing roots of sexual desire. As Foucault predicted shortly
before his death, the modern person has to understand and know their feelings in order to
be an ethical being.
Final Reflections and Future Research
At first glance, the case study approach has obvious limitations. Typically, the
results from case studies are assumed not to be generalizable and so the claims made in
chapters 4-7 may or may not be case specific. Yet, this assumption is based on a
representational ontology where data from surveys, testing protocols, and interviews are
taken to be facts that represent the outside world. This study arises from different
ontological assumptions. As discussed in chapter 3, radical realism assumes that the real
world is right before us and becomes visible through our practical activity. This practical
366

activity is visible and therefore available to empirical research. Naturally occurring
practices are therefore not facts or representations, but specimens that can be examined in
order to bring to light real constitutional processes. Hence, despite the case study
approach, these results are valid processes that occur in psychotherapy. It is true that
other types of therapy exist. Furthermore, all practices, including psychotherapy, evolve
and, therefore, new therapies will arise as old practices fade. However, this specimen is
part of the fabric of modern therapy and one would expect this type of therapy—a
therapy that constitutes the client as a deep emotional subject— to be prevalent in
contemporary practice. Hence, I argue that the constitutional change process explicated in
this study is prominent in modern psychotherapy and future research examining
constitution in psychotherapy would back up this claim. An expansive research project
would find different types of constitutional specimens, for sure, but this would only serve
to richen the discussion of how psychotherapy is a dynamic constitutional process that
exists in a larger field power where all actions transpire with and against prevailing
cultural winds.
Detailed Interaction Analysis (DIA) is my contribution to this project. This
methodology, discussed in chapter 4 and implemented in chapters 5 and 6, can be used in
future research aimed at similar questions of constitution and change. The field of
psychotherapy research as a whole is searching for a way to explain how change happens
in therapy. The constitutional approach to change is promising. This methodology
provides a fine grain analysis through which real of practices that can be understood
within an overarching theory of change. The incorporation of the Structural theory of
Emotion and a theory of subject positioning through narration addresses the problems
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that arises when strictly using conversation analysis to studied constitution.68 However,
acceptance by mainstream psychotherapy research is uncertain. The ontological
foundation of this approach is contrary to the representationalism and positivism found in
mainstream psychology. Therefore, the appeal of this approach and its ability to influence
research remains to be seen. However, there are some signs that change is on the horizon.
I believe that developing a constitutionally-based approach to psychotherapeutic
change would benefit the field in ways that aligns with the aspirations of many prominent
psychotherapy researchers. First, Gottman’s SPAFF coding shares many the ontological
assumptions found in the Structural Theory of Emotion and in the constitutional approach
to change (Coan & Gottman, 2007). Therefore, a future project integrating SPAFF coding
with a detailed interaction analysis of constitutional change would be an inspiring project
that might be of interest to the field of psychotherapy research as a whole. Furthermore,
prominent researchers such as Kazdin (2009) and Orinsky (2006) have both indicated
their desire to see research that describes how change happens in psychotherapy and for
research that reflects the humanity of psychotherapy meaning, that research, which
breaks down a highly complex contextual practice into numbers and self-report scales, is
inadequate to capture what actually happens in psychotherapy. The constitutional
approach to change is a step in the right direction because it provides analytical power
while also retaining a sense of the holistic encounter that occurs during a psychotherapy
session.
68

In chapter 4, I argue that by not having a theory of emotion, conversation analysts limit their
ability to talk about the variety of emotion and relationships between emotions. Furthermore,
some researchers might unknowingly rely on subjectivist assumptions about emotion when
designing studies. In chapter 3 and chapter 4, I also point out the importance of analyzing subjectpositioning as discussed by Korobov (2001) and Wortham (2001).
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One barrier that needs to be overcome is the large amount of data that is required
and generated during this type of research. The inductive approach commonly used in
pure CA is important because it makes data analysis and data presentation manageable.
As Orlinsky (2004) indicates, very few studies have used fine grain analysis to look at
psychotherapy because of the massive amount of data that it generates (p. 6). The
preferred method is to break the therapy sessions into parts, which again interferes with
the desire to capture the holistic contextual nature of the practice. These questions still
need to be resolved if a constitutional approach to psychotherapy is going to become
influential in the field of psychotherapy research.
Last, a constitutional approach to psychotherapy always has an element of
critique. I’ve tried to repress the side of me that wants to defend psychotherapy from any
detraction. Psychotherapy researchers and psychotherapists need to see the constitutional
approach as something creative rather than simply destructive. Genealogy is aimed at
exposing the historical contingency of what we do and who we are. The same impetus is
the guiding impulse of psychotherapy, starting with Freud, and to turn this critique on
ourselves is only natural. Remaining open to critique is vital when doing research and
when considering psychotherapy from within. What would the field of psychotherapy
research look like if creative critique was the general goal of research? Where might this
lead in terms of our understanding of psychotherapy and how psychotherapy can change
given future research? These are all unanswered questions that future researchers,
clinicians, and clients will need to explore.
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APPENDIX: TRANSCRIPTION KEY AND TRANSCRIPTS
TRANSCRIPTION KEY

(.)

Just noticeable pause

(.3), (2.6)

example of time pauses

Word word [word]

Square brackets denote the start of
overlapping talk

[word]
.hh hh

Wor-

In-breath (note the preceding fullstop) and ou
breath respectively
shows that the word has breath in this (or
perhaps laughter or crying) bubbling within
a dash shows a sharp cutoff

(word)

a guess at what might have been said

()

Unclear talk

Word WORD

underlying sounds are louder, capitals are
still louder
attempt at representing something hard, or
impossible to read phonetically
material between "degree signs" is quiet
pitch rising or falling
Colons indicate that the speaker has
stretched the preceding sound.
Inwards arrows show faster speech,
outward slower
One participant looks directly at the other
participant
Look away: Participant looks away for the
other participant
Talk was delivered with a smile

Wo(h)rd

((sniffs))
ºwordº
↑word,↓word
wo:rd
>word word< <word word>
((gaze))
((LA))
£word£

Based on the Jefferson transcription system (2004), and excerpt, in part, from
Conversation Analysis and Psychotherapy (Peräkylä et al., 2008b, pp. 198-199). The
notation for gaze and look away are unique to this study.
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T
C
T
C

T
C

T
C

T
C

T

((Yawn for 6 seconds)) ah ((laughs and grabs back)) umh I have a twitchiness bugging
me…ahh.. it is a hectic week. ((laugh))
Mhh What is going on?
It is a three ring circus, I've got John's mom coming in and my family coming in, but they’re
not clear on who's coming, or how they're coming, or when they're coming ((laughs))
Hmm
And umh try to coordinate Wanda's birthday party and the new move and yea (1) ah(h)h
((clinches fists)) and this job stuff on top. ((gaze)) John got let go (.) at work. Hum his boss
is meeting with him today to try and re relocate him if they he said “I don't think I'm a good
fit for this position;” they agreed and they're going to try to (1)) see if they can’t put him
somewhere else and put ˚him to use.˚ Hum I don't think it's a great idea, but (.) ((gaze)) its
its you got to try, >you know.< ˚So˚ (2) and it's a job I think that he’d be really good at, but..
((Nods))
. . he’s not he is>having some difficulty getting a call back. < Someone approached ↑him
about doing a job. And because at the time he had a job he (.) said, “well let me think about
it,” but he didn't do anything really conclusive so there is a chance that the job’s not there
anymore but hum
This is kind of what you feared last week
Ya I was I was (.) fearing slash im‐ uh anticipating
this. (.) Hum because, (2) ah, it was very clear that he was quitting. Umm, on the a‐,
mentally he was (1) he was quitting. Things were getting to be too hard and he was getting
to the point where he says, “˚Ya know.˚” You know, that moment of like relaxation when
you finally say, “Okay, I'm going to let this go”? He was getting to that sort of checked out..
hum
.. place. It wasn't you know, he wasn't barreling into the w‐, barreling into the work
anymore. He was sort of just saying, "if I didn't make it to this meeting, I think I’d be okay
with that. And if, and if they let me go (1) I'm okay with that. [And] hum [(.)]
h[um]
[((inhale))] But that
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*Converted to landscape to meet ETD formatting guidelines, contact author
for portrait copy.

TRANSCRIPT SESSION A*

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28

C
T
C
T
C
T
C

T
C
T
C
T
C
T
C
T
C

wasn't okay with you.
He was sort of looking for permission to to stop working
Hum
He wante‐ he was looking to get fired. And I think that’s unfortunate.
Hum
I:, I do ahh I I don’t and it is not so much that I think it was a bad decision, because I think
actually it was: (.) I think not working, what he was doing is, is probably for the best
Hum
Hum not just because, it was, he was miserable because of everything else that is on his
plate. He's got all these incompletes and he's got, you know, oth‐ you know other things to,
other things to take care of and so it's (.) For, for me it’s, it’s less of a big deal. My biggest
sort of ((makes grunting noise and gestures outward with both fists)) about it is, uhmm the
fact that we just, now we have (1) no: jobs again. Now nobody is employed again. And so
that, it’s much more me‐like I have ((laughs)) two stages of reaction here. One is the (.) the
sort of like, “no one has a job” and that the the shitstorm that that creates in my mind. And
then there's the, well this wasn't a very good fit for him and (.) hum he wasn't getting paid
and it was really shaking his confidence [and] he was having panic attacks and so I like, like..
[hum]
.. from that, (viewpoint) like you know, this is, you know, ((hands waving from head)) it is a
good thing, it is a good thing that this job is over, but it is a bad thing you're unemployed..
hum
hum
.. Like I try to sort ((laughs)) of, like that that is what I want to say to him, “it's like it sucks
your, it sucks that your unemployed, but that job is bad for you, I wish you had some other..
Hum
..job” You ((laughs )) know? But, hum yea.
So, how have you been dealing with it?
<I've applied to some more work,> which I, I really have a hard time with. I always feel like
an asshole. [((laughs))]
[((swiftly turns head towards client))] Why?
((laughs)) hummm I'm really bad at (2) hum at at at hum, I feel I am really bad at the whole
process. Not that necessarily people are bril:liant at it, but ahh I feel ya oh, um, um, ahh, I
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29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
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45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
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58
59

T
C
T
C
T
C

T
C
T
C

T
C
T
C
T
C
T
C

don't know how to explain this (.) ahh (1) y:a got me. Um (3) ah ah ahh maybe I'll come up
with something brilliant, but for now I'll just say like, the the w:hole like, “this is why you
should hire me” and trying to spin (.) what I have done and trying to talk myself up >I am
really,< (.) I, I really have a hard time (.) time doing that
Hum
Umm
What do you make of that?
Ahh It ((laughs, gaze))probably doesn’t speak good things to me. Hum
I'm sorry it didn't catch that.
(I‐ saying), it probably isn’t saying very much good about me to be honest, that I can’t (.) ahh
say (4). I don't have a follow‐up for that, I can say, “Hire me, I am hard‐working” and that’s
pretty much it (.) ahh its its hum yea (.)((laughs)) (.). “Hire me, I won't steal things or set..
Hum
hum
..fires” ((gestures with both fists looking at therapist)) (.) “Hire me I could figure things out..
Hum
.. on my own.” And then it feels like: “prove it,” and I'd be like (.) smile ((tilt head to the..
Hum
.. side and smiles))(.) ahh I, I don't know, I don't know. Most places I've worked, I kind of did
my career backwards and in the most rewarding and fulfilling work humm in the most sort
of impressive work early on in my life, like I was I was a manager at a movie theater when I
was, (.) 18 years old (.) And the last job I had was.. the last two jobs I had were under the..
Hum
.. table data entry at a place I would never put on my resume because the job there was
nightmarish (.) I have nothing positive to say ((laughs))about the experience,..
hum
and food service. (.)Like ((chortle)) and ahh the movie theater I worked for ..
Hum
got ↓sold to another, like their east, all of their (.) ((smacking sound, makes hand gesture
around head)) East Coast theaters got sold to another company and everybody got fired..
[hum]
..so I don't have a boss, I'm not (.) I don’t have a reference, I don't have the reference for
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that. The things I've done further back [I am losing] contact with. I worked for, I proofread..
[Hum]
.. for one of my professors and he is retired and now that I don't have a way of getting ahold
of him (.)
Hum
And so it's just this very (3) ((shifts hand back and forth)) >Chaotic thing< (1) And I: I don't
like feeling judged and I don't like, really having to explain myself a whole lot.
Hum so [yo‐]
[Not] not that I
don't like describing things like that ((smile)), ( ) narrative awesome, fine with that, but
when it comes to justifying myself I have a hard time with that.
Being evaluated.
Ya I don't like it, I don't like it at all, it makes me qu↓easy.
Hum
Hum yea
((deep breath)) You know, I'm thinking back to, ahh when we're talking about, how it is
difficult for you to talk about yourself.
Yea
I'm wondering if it's related to (.) this uncomfortable feeling that you're being evaluated
Yea and I I don't feel like I do a terribly good job of it hum (.) I don't know if you've had a
chance to read through my, my notes or if Jackson even bothered to write it down (.) cause I
said it like, ↑forever ago, but hum. It was <sort of> taught to me, hum when I was younger,
that you don't do things you don't do well. (1) ((gaze)) That you ((nods head as she looks
hum
.. away)) don't enjoy things you don't do well, and you don't do things you don't do well
And what don't you do well?
I:, umh I, I don't really know ((laughs))
hum
Umh but (2) ahh that was always my understanding, my m:om wasn't good at sports (.)..
Hum
..and she refused to let me participate because she thought I would be bad at them too (.)..
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hum
..Because it's genetic apparently, being able to hit a tee‐ball is gent‐ is genetic ((laughs))
Hum
Ah ((long outbreath)) so it is very hard for me, when I t‐ t‐ (1) to keep at things if I feel like
I'm fai↓ling, and umh. The adjudica on process for me really, sort of, highlights the
potential for failure because if no one is really watching, if you’re not keeping score no one
loses and you know, which is strangely enough the way I play most of my games, there’s
there is no, I, you know, nobody keeps score and things are just for, for just shits and giggles
and half the rules get thrown out of the way because they just make the game overly,..
((uncrosses legs and
repositions away from the client))
.. competent you know overly complicated or competitive like I'm much more sort of
copacetic in nature [and ahh]
[hum] ((deep breath)) you know, I remember maybe a couple sessions
ago you said that you have your standards for everybody else and you have your standards
for yourself
Oh yea, ahh I was really hard on myself with ahh, I have a distinct memory and uhm being
ahh middle school or maybe early high school and I, umh in a math class and I had gotten
like a 97 on an exam and I was (.) a: w:reck ((gaze)) (.) >I was a wreck< I was a complete..
hum
.. and utter chaotic mess, ahh it eventually worked itself ou‐ out a little bit because I ended
up with a C on one of my physics exams, one of my physics classes towards the end of high
school, ya’know, I got over it a little [but,] but hum yea.
[Hum]
What do you make of being so
hard on yourself?
I want things to be right (1) and, ahh (1) ahh yea (.) yea I want things to be right, I want
them to be huh ((Laughs and gestures with hands together)) like, “how could I miss that,”
like, “I know this, I can do this. Why, why am I failing?” You know, and ahh sort of ahh for
me it feels like a lot of loss of big picture kind of things like, “You didn't fail. You got a 97.”
“Ya but you failed question number 2, (.) you failed that,” you know, ((laughs)) if if you're..
hum
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.. looking for failure you could subdivide things, you know, until the piece you have is
nothing but failur[e hum]
[Hum↓] ((pulls head away)) And that’s what you seem to do?
Hum (.) I, I have done in the past, I think I’m slightly better at it, like I said I got a, I almost
failed physics (.) which wasn’t my fault by the way ((pointing at therapist)) it was the..
Hum
hum
teacher’s fault. (.) He didn't teach (.) [and hum] the first half, the first half of the semester..
[hum]
..he would give out problems for you to work and then at the end of the class he would
write the answers down and uhm (.) He got tired of writing, either he got tired of writing..
hum
..the answers down or people weren’t working, and so said he stopped writing the answers
down and (.) I started failing (.)..
hum
.. Ah Because he didn't teach. So the only way that I, so the way that I was learning physics
was he would give me the answer, I would work the problem out until that was the answer
that I got. I’d work the other problem out using the same steps I done for, for problem one
and if I got the answer that was the correct answer to number two, that was the way you
solved the problem (.) [uh]mm
Uh[um] ((nodding)
.. But without the answers I didn't know if I was learning the right thing or not, it was just..
hum
.. yea I, I can give you an answer to problem two, but I don't know, if it is right now, I don’t
know why it would be right (.) Um yea so, that was a little frustrating (.) I got, C‐ I got..
Hum
hum
..an A in the first half and like a D ((laughs)) in the, a low D in the second half and ended up
with a [high C] in the course. ahh which didn't b↑reak me up all that much I got to say (1)..
[hum]
..((laughs))
hum well I wonder if in that situation ahh you see that it was maybe not a reflection on you,
but a reflection on the teacher (.) But it sounds like a lot of things, that if things don't go..
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Yea
.. right you, you see them as a reflection on yourself
Ahh definitely, definitely, “Why couldn't I
have held it down.” “Why couldn't I have made it,” you know “things happen.” “Why
couldn't I have fixed things.” I have a lot of fix ((leans forward and makes fists)) in me, I want
to fix things. Um (1) and ahh which, which is a good thing in some ways and a t↑erri↓ble
thing ((laughs)) in other ways (.) because I drive myself crazy humm
uhum
((deep
breath))Yea because I remember last week, um, you said that you, you hit yourself
Yea
That you’ve hit yourself
Yea, Ya Rr‐((brushes fingers over left forearm))there are remnants of that still ((gaze))
Hum and
what do you make of [that?]
[Ahh] hh I just (.) it’s it’s the no(h)ise that she makes. There is this
particular ahh it’s ju‐, And I, I’ve heard other babies cr↑y and it doesn't bother me: (.)
nearly as much as when Wanda cries, [when] Wanda does it [and] especially,
[Uhum]
[hh]
So this started
when Wanda was born?
Ah no I had ah, I, I ar‐ initially started therapy for cutt↓ing (.) uhum (.) and it just when I feel
hum
.. completely overwhelmed, it's just a way of releasing, uhum (.) yea
Overwhelmed and releasing (.) what com[˚es˚ ˚t‐˚]
Yeah
[it is sort of] like like you’re just full of chaos
((shaking hands back and forth)) and ˚ah˚ I don't know why it works it just did. Uhum and it
disa‐ Yea it is not being able to sort of like £reason£ with her drives me crazy. To be like,
“Listen, you need to stop screaming because you're not dy:ing, you just your threw juice and
that is why you don't have juice right now. So if you could please, just don't hit me I'm..
Hm
.. trying to give you your juice back.” >Because that will happen< she’ll work herself into
such a l‐ like she’ll she’ll work herself into such a lather that she won't let you give: her
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what what she's demanding (.) A:nd yea. Sometimes I can make jokes about it, you know,..
hum
.. slightly lighthearted, like “Wah wah wah, I'm gonna die of mild discom[fort”]. I’ve said..
[hum]
.. that to her a Coup[le of] times, which I think is okay as long as she can’t hear me..
[((laughs))]
.. mo:ck↑ing her. If‐ I'm going to have to stop that pretty so[on be]cause she's pretty it..
[hum]
.. cle:ver, but ahh like I think really (hard) like ((hand to face)) “Wah wah, ((hand as puppet))
[mild discomfort, I’m going to] die I'm going to starve to death, you haven’t fed me..
[hh ((laughs))]
.. in an hour, those kind of things is like ˚okay, okay˚ ahh (.)
But when things feel chaotic
Ahh really, really, sort of overwhelming ((brings hands to face and has stranded look)) like,
that’s sort of like, “a:hh I don’t know what‐ to do, I don't know how to make this situation
better.” Like (.) everything just stops, something stopped, cause there's too many, too many
things happening (.) uhum (2) I am I am par‐ I have mentioned that I am partially deaf in this
ear ((points to left ear)) I think, ah sometimes though my hearing comes back (.) and..
uhum
.. it’s, it's strange because then all of a sudden everything is loud (.) It feels like I'm..
hum
.. swimming in sounds. Like everybody and everything is like right (.) on ((holds hands to
head)) in my head. So like the noises we are able to filter out, like the the musak the in the
room ((pointing to left)), the sounds of air brakes ((points to right as air brakes are heard on
recording)), the the buzz of the lights, all those kinds of things (.) are just oppressively loud
and it is like being, it's like drowning in an ocean of sound. And it's sort of similar to that but
only more panicked for me, so sort of like just feeling like you're going to drown because all
of these things are just bombarding you. And ahh yea that’s that’s definitely what It feels
like.
And so cutting and or hitting yourself (.) breaks [that]
[It] g‐ yea it, I’ll, it lets me sort of vent my
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frustra:tion, so then, cause I think that's probably what a large bit of the torrent is is just (.)
Not the, the sound thing, but ˚sort of˚, I feel I am making this much more (muddled) than it
needs to be. hh uhum (.) Yea it’s it’s (1) For whatever reason it relaxes me. It gets, you know
a sort of, I guess I get an:gry at being overwhelmed or just frus:trated at the situation but it
gets, it gets something out. I am physically doing something that gets me out of the
moment. Umm
((deep breath)) I also wonder if you t‐ turn that anger and frustration towards yourself?
I do, I totally do, I totally do, cause I don't want’a I don't want’a, you know, do anything to
my child (.) I don't want’a, you know, hit John or break dishes because the dishwasher is not
working, you know I don't want to ((laugh)) yea it feels like the only safe place to vent
Hum a‐ and that brings me back to where there’s a different set of rules for you than there
are for other people. (.) That ahh that they can't be objects of your aggression, but..
Yea
Yea
..you can be your own object of aggression.
I think that is one of the things I hate about John's mom. (.) ((laughs)) And that’s that she..
Hum
.. acts with such impunity. (.) That she doesn't c‐, it doesn't, she doesn't have to explain, or
justify, or even apologize fo:r just crapping all over people. (2) A:nd, and like: “No, you..
Hum
.. don't get to do that. No one gets to do that.” And a:hh ya, I hate that about he(h)r.
((laughs))
((quick deep breath) and and what do you think it is about expressing anger that (.)
ahh is difficult, that uh, it has to be directed towards you?
Uhum you're not supposed to get an((gaze))gry. (1) [((LA))] U:hum yea (.) ahhh that’s
H[u:m]
((laughs and gestures with hands)) that’s you know like, that’s what crazy and mad people
do. (1) Yea, ↑ya hum. Like I said, I don't really have, you know, like the most..
hum
.. my mom ever gets close to angry is like a disapproving look or a chiding tone, like my
mom is ((motions hands across her face ‐‐ flat faced))
What about your dad?
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My dad s:wears, but is really lighthearted (.) [So] he will be like, "God dammit" and then..
Hu[m]
.. he's fine. There's never like "Mother fucking piece of shit [why doesn’t a god damn thing..
Um
[ ((laughs and adjusts position))]
((laughs))
.. ever go right and one more thing." £Yea and meanwhile I'm, I am one to, like, break
furniture and and like tra(h):sh, trash your place, like I'm in an 80s rock band, like I,..
hum
hum
..want to just decimate something. (.)£ And a:h I decimate me ((gaze)) instead, [like]..
Hu:m
[mm]
ya↓ a(h)h I a(h) ((croaking)) (.) Yea I just get really angry. I guess it’s anger? Uhum [ahh]
[I bet] it's a lot of things.
Ya pro(h)bably, I just, yea I, just, like <sometimes I do just want to be like>, “Fucking
dishwasher,” and just be like, “No more plates” ((gaze)). Yea, I did that..
hum
..once actually, I threw away some plates, I pulled them out eventually, but (.) John had,
John had made a mess, had cooked, and he made a huge mess in the kitchen and had made
food, and had, but had made more food than he could eat, and he said he was going to put
it a↑way, and I said okay this, you know, we have two cats that are kind of assholes,
because cats are kind of assholes, and uhum, because they don’t..
Hum
understand personal ownership beyond what they own. They own things and and nuts to..
hum
.. the rest of you. Hum so, but he had left it out and he had left, you know this, this dirty
cooking, cooking thing, with food in it on top of the hutch where we keep all of Wanda's
things. And I like to keep Wanda's clean things in a (.) as close to, not a sterile environment,
but to a sanitary environment as possible, only clean things go with Wanda's clean dishes,
no food goes there, no nothing, the only thing that goes were Wanda's clean dishes go is
also clean dishes. (.) And he left food there and the cats had jumped on top of..
hum
.. the hutch with their dirty feet and were making a mess and fighting over food (.) right..
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Hum
..next to all this stuff. And I went, “Go:d da:mmit” and just threw the whole ((hand gestures
up)), “Fuck this” ((hand gestures down and makes noise dummm))
You threw it away? Or the‐
I threw the food away, I ch‐ I threw the plates away.
Hummmm
I, they didn't bre:ak and I eventually fished them out when I calmed down a little, but I was
like, "Would have it been so fucking hard to walk 10 extra feet” because there's only,
there’s a 10 foot span from the hutch to the far side of the kitchen like to just “put this in
the god damn fridge, would it have really taken that much more effort out of your stupid..
hum
.. day to just do things properly.”
<And how did he respond?>
(3) Ahh he said he was sorry, he said he didn't think it would be a problem. And I said, “How
could you not think it was a problem, you have met our cats, you can't leave food out that
they want to eat, that they would have want to eat, and expect them to behave themselves.
(.) mhuf If if you, you you can't leave temptation out with with,..
hum
..with a creature that doesn't have any sense of morality, they'll just ((makes noise gestures
out ward mmnnnaa)), you know?
Hum
Were you satisfied with the, the
outcome of that ahh (.) conflict between you and John?
No, I'm never really satisfied with those kinds of things, because really what I want is for the
situation not to have happened. (.) And no amount of me ↓yel↑ling or Ge ng Ma:d..
Hum
..fixes the fact that, you know now I have to scrub this whole area and you've wasted food
and, you know, you’re <cutting corners when> you don't need to. I have a re:al issue with
people cutting corners. Like, cause, it ↑real↓ly doesn't take a whole lot of eﬀort to do
thing:s (.) in an efficient, (.) thoughtful kind of way, you know, and so it drives me a:hh a
little bit off my, off my keel when someone cuts corners in a:a way that (.) ahh that a:h is
bad for the situati[on and there is this ()]
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[So so, you do feel] that you can get angry with John?
Ya, I totally (laughs) do
Hum
Oh yeah definitely
Hum
But Ummhh (2) Ya and I, “I am sorry I yelled, please don't do this again,” and he’s like, “I
forgot that the cats are assholes. I didn't m[ean] for that to happen.” [And I am] like okay,..
[hum]
.. okay and that, like that part feels better, but I always wonder, ahh wer‐ John and I are
pretty good at talking but I worry that it doesn't do enough (.)
Hum
Like ahh (.) cause I, there are things that I told him <100 times> and you know it is like ..
Hum
..like, "Don't put dirty dishes were Wanda's clean dishes are when I” its , she has a drying
stand, we have we have a narrow kind of kinda of probably about that wide ((holds hands
about a foot apart)) on one side of the sink and a big counter that’s like this big on the..
humm
.. other side, so we have a pretty sma‐, like the kitchen is the length of this sofa really, and
((laughs) hum ahh, ahum I was like just dirty dishes..
hum
.. on that side of the sink, only clean dishes by Wanda’s stuff because I don't want to..
Hum
.. have to re‐scrub things that are already clean (.)..you know. (.) And he doesn't care. And
ahh and he gets mad that I say that. I am like “Well, if you cared, you’d either say this
doesn't work for me and here’s why, let's figure out something different,” or you, or when
you say “Okay babe I got it” you would mean it, and I wouldn't have to keep telling you...
hum
.. this If you were listening and if you were caring, we wouldn't have to keep having this
discussion.
I wonder if that is reminiscent of how you felt with Jake?
Definitely, definitely. And (2) ahh John doesn't kn:ow how to deal with angry <people>. He
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really doesn't have a lot of good means for dealing with angry people. Cau:se ah with his
mom he sort of just blocks everything out. (.) Ahh he just kind of just, it’s like a computer in..
hum
..sleep mode, it s↑its ↑there and it is techni↓cally working . (.) But it is not present, you
know.
<Do you ever feel guilty after getting angry with John>?
(3) No actually cause I don't, I make a point of not saying things that I think are hurtful. And
ahh
Do you want to say those things?
↑No ((shakes head)), no I really don't uhum sometimes I tend to say something shocking
just to see if I can get his stupid attention, but hum I don't want to hurt him, I don't. Hum,
yea .(2.) Cause I don't really think that he is, I think that he's inconsiderate but not bad.
[So] I don’t like, I don't want to hurt him. Ahh (.) yea (.)
[Hum]
But you'll hurt yourself.
˚Yea˚, yea I , I don't know, what to do with that. Uhum (1) £Something's ((gaze)) got..
Hum
.. to give£ you know, it just boils over, >something's got to give< (.) and ahh I I want..
hum
Uhum
.. to get that under control, because I don't want to: you know , have Wanda see me like
screaming and storm out of a room and just you know like, ((laughs)) furiously unmake the
whole bed or you know kick things, or break things, though it is tempting..
Hum
.. ((laughs)). When I was in college we had to, like, design our own, like, our dream house for
one of these sort of writing Project things. And mine was a, mine included a room th‐, a
room in the house that was a, you know how, like how in a church you pay quarter and you
get to light a candle or something like that, it is a similar thing you pay a dollar and there..
hum
.. is a box full of figurines from the dollar store, you just buy them in bulk, and you..
Hum
.. just break the ever living shit out of it, you know, and then you g‐ “Okay” ((makes..
Hum
hum
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.. noise ummmm and hand geustures away)). Let the cupie doll have it.
So there is some intense anger?
Ah well I guess ((open hands and shrugs)) that is anger, I don't ((laughs )) this is this is, I..
Hum
..feel silly, I, I don’t know, I ,I, I
What makes you feel silly?
That I wouldn’t, like, cause it seems like, like I should know what I'm feeling (.) If it is..
hum
..something so visceral that I should have some semblance of what's going on. [a‐ I, I]
[ ((deep
breath as if preparing for speech))]
don't know if it is anger, like, I just feel, I, I just feel overwhelmed and then just like this
desire to break things.
I wonder if that's what maybe gives it kinda this chaotic feel is that you’re not really sure
what you're feeling. (.) You just know you want it to sto[p].
Yea
[Li]ke sometimes I can tell John like
this pisses me off, when you do this, this pisses me off, I can say that. (.) Which is kind of,..
Hum
.. kind of nice (1) ˚ya˚ (1) I know sa‐ I know he tries to >listen too.< I will give him that, but
uhum, it is sometimes I worry we talk too much (.) (( makes “chaaa” moving head toward..
hum
.. therapist))we are always sort of like, “Do you want to talk about this,” “Well yes, yes I do.”
And I'm not, but it never feels like we have, I guess I want some point in timefor there to be
like a, we talk about it and then one of us goes “Okay” and the next course of action, it’s like
I want it to be more than just, “Let’s talk about what we are feeling” I want it to be like,
“Okay, I didn't like when this happened.” “You didn’t like when this happened.” And it feels
like that's when the conversation stops. I want to go to the level of, ahh I would love it to go
to the level of (.) “And this is how are going to, what were going to do differently. What I
can do differently, what you can do differently.” Because just talking about it doesn't keep
us from going back to a place that really neither of us want to go. ahum It doesn't help..
hum
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.. us get there and ahum. (3) I think it is good that we are able to talk..
hum
..about things that like, "You drive me crazy, it’s not always easy to live with you," and be
like, "You drive me crazy, and it’s not always easy to live with with you." And neither of us..
((laughs))
..mean that in a, neither of us mean that in a me:an‐spirited way, just being honest about..
h:um
.. the nature of the each other and this relationship [and that] were not going anywhere..
[hum]
we still love being here but, sometimes you're a bear and that's okay,
you know and uhum. (2)
Hum
I wonder if there is something also kind of expre:ssive about the
way you hurt yourself. (2)
((shrugs and hands open)) (2) I , I don’t ↑know.
((deep breath) cause one of things I was thinking, cause I don’t, I don’t think I would have
noticed unless you pointed it out to me.
The bruise?
Yeah.
£Everybody£ else I've seen pointed it out, they were like ((deep in breath with sucking
sound)) “What happened, what happened? ( (makes SSSS SSSS noise))" I, I guess it..
hum
.. got bigger, ((traced bruise with finger)) it got like really dark purple and this whole like,..
hum
.. it look like I got hit with a golf ball going like 90 ((laughs)) miles an hour, and umm..
hum
.. you know, that kinda of thing. [umm]
[ ((deep breath))] And I kn‐, and I remember talking about
how it is hard for you to talk about yourself (.) Umm that y‐ that you're
Yes
.. aware of kind of other people's suffering, uhum but you you decided to share that..
umhum
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..with me.
Umhum well I, I I made it a point in (.) in a previous session since part of the reason why I'm
here, is for self harm to make mention (.) when it happens. Because I don’t, I think..
hum
it is important that (.) you know as my counselor that ahhh when I'm having any sort of back
fall or side steps or however you want to ahh conceptualize it, because ahh I imagine it
changes the nature of things <I imagine it does,> if I':m (.) simply in recovery or if I'm (.)
having these, these, these moments, so.
((deep breath )) And I guess I'm curious what comes to mind if we are to entertain the idea
that maybe there is something expressive about it?
(2) I'm really not thinking about anybody else when I'm doing it. Uhum (1) I'm really not..
Hum
.. uhum. (1) <As cause like I said> I am just as likely to, much more likely nowadays to (1)
bang ((place heel of hand to head)) as I am to do anything else. I'm much more likely to
bang.
What about to yourself?
What do you mean?
What are you trying to express to yourself?
It doesn’t really feel like I'm making £any£ big statement, it's just (.) ((motions hands away
from the body twice)) getting, like the desire out of me. [(.) Yea].
[Hum (.)] I guess you know I kind of
operate on the, the assumption that the symptom speaks. And I'm wondering what it’s
saying?
((hands open)) Ahh “£ever(h)ything£ sucks.” That’s, that’s the way it feels when it's
˚happening.˚ Ahum I don't, ˚I don't know if there is something ( ) or poetic to be said for it.
But I don’t know.˚ ˚(We) can ahh (we) can think about that.˚
Cause I remember asking you, “Do you get angry in session,” and you said, “No probably
not,” and if you can cry in session, and you said, “[((laugh))] Not if I can help it.”
((looks down))
[((laugh))]
Yea, I'm not,
I'm not, I'm not one for the waterworks, uhum, I which is strange because I'm ↑pre y
↑sen mental, uhum but [ahh yea].
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Hum [((deep breath))] Yeah, and I have seen you actively [try to hold the tears in.]
[((deep breath, smiling, open
hands wave towards face as she nods)) Yea,] yea, yea I do that.
And I wonder what that's about?
˚I,˚ I like to put a, a brave, tough face on things.
And why is that so important to you?
I don't know, uhum the way I was raised I guess, you kind of soldier through and ahh…
Hum
.. and you don’t complain a lot, about a lot of things. (2) I had some pretty terrible shit
happen ((gaze laughs)) as we discussed earlier and hum, (1) I think that's part of it. And also
sort of I, when I was growing up I was one of the guys. (1) I‐
Hum (1) and £guys don't talk
about their feelings£?
<No they don't>, no they talk about that that that that, you know that swe:et ollie you did,..
hmm
.. or how,…how you, how you tweeked your arm when you fell that time. They, they don't..
Hum
.. talk [about that stuff], “Yea, it Didn't hurt, didn't hurt.” “Yes it did, Wuss” [((laugh))] (4)
[ “It , it didn't hurt.”]
((laughs)) [hum]
..Yea, I was one of the guys. I didn’t have an‐, I had hardly any female friends for most my
life, hum, almost all of my friends are guys, <even now> most my friends are guys. (.)..
hum
..hum (2) <I don't know why that is> ↑hum could be coincidence, could be something else, I
don't know, I don't know.
Hum
Sounds like you think something might be there?
Just that sort of hum (2) that sort of ahh, (1) you're supposed to be £tough£. And you get
tough o:r (1) life and everybody else will get you down and get on top of you. (.) hum (1) yea
Hum and where did you get tha‐ conclusion, where did you come to that conclusion?
I don't have a, an instance ((curt)), or an ahh (1) ahh or a particular ((rubs hands together)),
you know, paradigm shift in mind, ˚just˚ seems to be (.) the way things go. (3) If you are
tough you can take care of yourself, and if you:'re ↓not then you’re a burden to..
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hum
..others. (2) Need someone, you know, co:ddl[ing] you all the time, well, what the..
Hum
[((eyebrow ↑))]
..fuck’s [the] point of that? (2)
[((eyebrow ↑))]
hum
((gaze)) £I sa(h)id something bigger than I think I did, didn’t I, because..you made a face?
[((laughs))] Yea that one, with the eyebrow ((hand toward eye and makes noise “Bink”)).
[hum ((eyebrow ↑)) ]
Hum what did you make of it?
[You said]
I don't know, [I don't]
know, I want you to tell me what it is, ((LA sheepishly)) if I said something big. (.) You tell me
what it is. (1) £I don’t know£. Hum
Hum
What comes to mind?
(2) It seems like an a: (.) a very strange mentality to have had as a child. I think that is kind of
the point of being a kid is to be sort of nurtured and coddled, and get your booboos kissed
and things like that. (.) Not run around with, you know, gaping wounds and gravel on your..
hum
.. knee, and, “ I am good” [you] know. (.) ↑I don’t know, I don’t know. (3) #ah# Man,..
[hum]
.. childhood su(h)cks. ((laughs))
Humm?
I said, “Man, childhood sucks.” (2) Kids are vicious, kids are VICious.
What are you referencing?
Oh just being, I got picked on my whole life, whole life. uhum I was very isolated and very
lonely, and being isolated and lonely also makes you we:ird on top of, ((laughs)) whatever
else is going on, because then you have a vocabulary that is too big for your pe:ers and you
make jokes that nobody gets, and (2)
Hum
How long, how far back can you remember being
picked on?
Ahh, <elementary school>. I can remember being picked on in elementary school.
Hum
What is
coming to mind?
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Ahh just ah being teased, <it was kinda one of these like> I had been teased about my
weight for almost my whole life, and I was thinking back to it and like, in, in the, in like the
second grade, I wasn’t heavy, I was just an Amazon, ((looks at therapist)) like I was..
hum
.. fi:ve fee:t tall in like the first, in like the first and second grade. I was a hu:ge kid and it
wasn't that I was, you know, like barrel, like a barrel or anything like that. I was actually on..
hum
.. the athletic side, but hum I got made fun of for being so: big, and for dressing like a dork
because my mom dressed me. And didn’t, she, my mom really wanted to preserve my..
hum
.. childhood and preserve my my innocence, and in the way that she chose to do that was by
dressing me, like an overgrown toddler, like I wore, did not wear jeans until I was in middle..
hum
.. school. So that made me £re(h)al popular£. "˚You look like a clown˚ ((spoken in a
whisper)).” Like, “Yea, yea I know. I know, and I read at a fifth‐grade level. Don't you..
Hum
.. want to talk to me?” “No, we don’t. You don’t you don’t watch enough thunder rangers
[and] we don’t like you.” Sad face ((makes mock sad face laughs))
[Hum]
Hum. You say sad face, but
you don't make a sad face.
Yea, well I don’t want to make a sad face. I don’t want to go there because it <sucks hu:m>.
And also having like friends that would be friends with you, but only when (.) like, no one
else was there. Cause I went to a daycare center, and somedays the other kids would get,
like like the kids in my age group, like within like a grade or two (above me) would all, all of
the other, like all of their other friends would go and they would be like, “Oh, let’s you and I
play, and we’ll have a grand old time. But tomorrow yo:u stink.”(.) Ahh granted these are,..
hum
.. boys and so like around other boys they had to do the whole “girls are yucky” kind of
thing, and they didn't hang out with any girls during, during the daytime hours so the sort of
like the everybody else watching you kind of times, but ahh yea. I was a girl that didn't have
any female friends and I was we:ird because I was a:rtsy and dressed like a do:rk and was £5
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foot tall£. [((laugh))] That's a big kid (.) that's like, there on me now ((holding hands and..
[hum]
hum
.. neck)). In like in the first and second grade, that is a huge kid. hum Yea. So: that kind of
sucked, all of that su:cked, ((moving hands back and forth past each other)), all of that
sucked.
You say that ahh you didn't want to go there?
Yea, <I don't want to>, I don't want to think too hard on it. £Not something I particularly
enjo:y ruminating on.£ Hum (1) I suppose I'm supposed to be ˚going in, that is probably the..
hum
.. purpose of all this˚ but ahh
We:ll I'm not here to, you know to force you into anything, but
I think we need to explore why it is difficult to go, or what what gets in the way of going
there.
Humm, I don't want to get, I feel myself going, getting um (2) emotional and I really don't
want to do that, ˚so I’m putting the, putting the brakes on.˚
Hum
And why is it important to put the
brakes on when you start feeling emotional?
˚Cause you gotta be tough.˚ ((holds hands up)) Like the thing I joked to John is, like, “£I..
hum
.. am actually pink and squishy like, I am not tough at all.£” I'm such a pushover. (2) Yea (1)
I'm not tough at all. £And also I hate spiders and snakes, I hate snakes ((making a point to..
Hum
hum
.. stare at therapist)),I hate snakes and clowns. Hum ((laughs)) yea ah ah I mean that
completely ((motions hands)) with all seriousness completely un‐ironically, I hate clowns,
categorically speaking all clowns are bad people, all clowns are bad people. And I can't..
hum
.. even stand (.) pictures of snakes. Like if I touch, like if I'm like going through a like like a..
Hum
.. book and there's a picture of a snake, if I touch the picture of the snake without, like,
because I didn't know it was on the next page, I, I get the heebie jeebies and like, my whole
skin crawls, and like it is really, yeah I can’t handle snakes. Yea I can't even handle dead..
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Hum
.. snakes. Like, I went somewhere and they had these pelts hanging up and >they're..
hum
.. like, their rattlesnake pelts< and, their like “No, it’s okay these are dead.” I’d be like, “No,
hum
see because this means that at some point in time there were at least three snakes.
Goodness knows how many there are [now].” #Ya know# “There was not a snake, but..
[Hum]
multiple Snakes.” (1) Yea <#I hate snakes# I Hate snakes, hate snakes.> £I hate their faces.
(.) Hate that they can kill you.£ ((laughing)) I hate snakes. £And for whatever reason in..
Hum
.. my mind they are always spring‐loaded£ [Like] ((Motions hands towards therapist..
[Hum] ((smiling and adjusting position))
.. and begins to laugh, making pwwuuu sound)) Snake. Yea, yea I hate snakes. ˚I hate
snakes.˚ I forgot how I got on this topic.
((Deep breath)) You are talking about how you don’t like to get emotional and you have to
be strong.
Yea, and then I'm not because I'm afraid of snakes, I'm not strong because I’m afraid of..
Hum
.. snakes. I'm a big old wuss because I’m afraid of snakes, clowns, but mostly snakes..
Hum
hum
.. (.)£ I punched a clown once, not my fault (.) I had some friends that thought it would be a..
Hum
hum
.. great idea to get me over being unhappy with clowns, by surprising me with a trip..
hum
.. to the circus. I didn't want to get out of the car, and I was persuaded to get out of the
hum
.. ca:r by the way. “Pussy,.. pussy, [pussy]” ((motioning her in a back and forth..
[hum]
.. tomahawk motion)) gets me to do an enormous number of things that I really oughtn’t do.
Hum. Don’t know why, but it does. And probably that inner fourth grade boy mindset..
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Hum
hum
.. that I seem to have. And ahh I got invited to be, like they were doing their ((waves hands
together and says da‐ da‐da‐ da‐)) and the clowns came out and they came up into the
audience to try to bring some people down to do like, to be props, to be essentially props in
one of their, one of their bits. And ahh my friends made such a hooping and hollering and I
was on the end, of course I was on the end, and they came up to us and the guy’s like trying
to get ahold of me, and I don't know if he can’t hear me or if I'm speaking too fast cause I’m,
I can ((motions hands forward and makes noise brabrabra indicating really fast speaking))..
uhum
.. if I'm really agitated. Uhum, and he grabs me by the, he grabs me. (.) “I know you're doing
your job, but I don't think you're funny, let go of me right now, let go of me right now,..
hum
.. I don't think you're funny, let go of me right now. (.) Let go” and I punched him in the nuts,
a:nd he let ↑go. But ((point at therapist)) he was asking for it ((points and wags finger..
Hum
hm
hm
.. toward therapist)),because I said don’t touch me.
Mmm ((deep breath)) You know, it's
interesting, I'm wondering if you are trying to tell me something that this, with this story as
well.
Ahh ((gaze aand points to therapist) £I'm not trying to threaten you. Despite the thoug‐,..
umm
.. despite the fact that I’m, I’m punching somebody, I am, £I am not trying to threaten you.£
((laughs))
But, I coul‐ you said “I wonder how we got on this topic.” And that you know, we started
talking about emotions, things that are difficult for you to ahh (1) [To] talk about here, and
maybe..
[Rig]‐ ((LA))
.. I'm the clo:wn kind of dragging you towards talking about emotions, talking about things
that are difficult and you're [sa:ying] “Slow up.” ((laugh briefly))
[I don’t wan‐]
£I don't want to punch you, I really don't.£
umm (1) ˚There might be something to that˚ I supp↓ose (2) I‐ suppose.
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Umm
Ahh (.) yea, I really don't want to make it seem like a threat but the fact that I was so quick
fire back "£it's not a threat, it's not a threat, [you’re] not the clown.£” You..
[umm]
.. probably are the Clown, you probably are the clown.
No but I I think I have picked up that ahh, I mean I remember one of the first (sessions) we
had a (.) <moment of si:lence>, and you're like, "Please say something, (.) anything.”
umhum Ya ya, it is ↑awk↓ward. (1) Because I feel like I'm supposed to be (1) going and
going and going and going, ((flailing hands around head )) like, “Am I supposed to be
↑talk↓ing?” I don't know, necessarily see ahh how produc ve silence is, and I don't want..
umm
to (.) put up a whole bunch of walls, but I'm, I’m increasingly aware that I certainly must..
umm
.. be. (.) [ahh]
umm [Well] I think also we kind of (1) ahh >skip along the surface. < You like to stay at ..
Umm
.. a spa[ce for] only so long. And I think a that maybe you fear that if we spend too much..
[((deep breath)) Ya]
.. time umm talking or just reflecting on (.) some of the things we talked about, ahh that
maybe if some of the, I don't know what you call this ((Gaze holds hands up touching..
Ya ((LA))
..together his index fingers and thumbs)) may not hold everything back.
I, I don't know why I want to, but I, its like I've been i:n, in therapy for almost thr:ee ye:ars
and it is very mu‐ and almost always wanted to (.) ((Clench his fists and rocks forward
twice)) you know, keep a lid on the jar.
And I think that yo‐ ahh I think that’s <I mean> I am awa:re of that [and] ahh given that..
[hum]
.. you you’ve worked with Jackson for a while and I only have a year in this program..
((nodding))
umhum
.. that I may be stepping on the gas a little ↓bit. [umm] And I don't want you to think that..
Ya [umm]
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.. you have to kind of abandon, umm you have to just, kinda spill your guts to me,..
Okay
.. that's not what I'm asking you do. But I am asking you to be curious about why it's so
important that you do put those brakes on.
(3) £Nobody likes the crying ((gaze)) lady. £ umm
hum
Whose nobody?
£Everybody. ((laughs)) The everybody that is nobody. (1) See nobody becomes..
hum
.. everybody who doesn't like a crying lady.£ (.) ahum I've just always had this notion..
hum
.. that you will be a bother if you, if you do that, that [your]
[You ]feel like it’s going to be a bother
to me?
That that you’re just a nuisance. (.) Or [th]at your, like I I, it has been really impressed..
I se[e]
.. upon me not to complain too too much. (.) And, people have it so much worse than..
umm
.. you, and and I never never had tantrums when I was a kid because my mom
£preemptively gui:lted me.£ ((laughs)) That is the way I see it and umm ya. And so..
umm
.. there ahh ya know, you just don't do certain things and letting myself get overwrought
feels like one of those things you just don't do. (1) umm yea and I mean that with..
umm
.. all the sort of ((gestures up and down with hands in a stepping motion)) hard stepping
percussiveness that I'm implying now, you just don't. (5) ya (3) ↑Are ↑we here on..
umm
.. Thursday?
We are not, we’re off, but the week after that we’ll be going to twice a week.
((Fake laugh)) <˚Then John’s mom is coming to town [Tomorrow].˚> ((exhale))
[Umm]
Do you wish
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that we were meeting on Thursday?
Ahhhh, £if only to give me an excuse to get away from her.£ ((laughs)) Not that that,..
umm
.. your, that this isn’t productive, but I would sit in the lobby just to get away from her.
Hum
We are always in the position where we have to lie to her. Because the truth tends to make
her insane. Like s:he does not yet know that John doesn't have a job and when it..
hum
..comes time to tell her that John doesn’t have a job, we are going to tell her that the
program, that that the program itself lost its, that the funding for the program itself fell
through, and so the job disappeared, because (2) she has a sort of hard‐line of this..
hm
.. always follows this and this always follows this and this always comes from this and so if
Jo:hn doesn't have a job, if John is fired from his job it means that he is lazy and worthless
and will never amount to anything and he didn't care about what he was doing. (.) And..
hum
.. that is so far from the truth because Jo:hn, umm John has anxieties and things that I
talked to you about before a little bit. He is actually is bald in patches from pulling out his
hair. umm He gets stressed out and he just fiddles until he has this big raw bare patch and
so we have had to shave his head every year when he gets a big problem, we end up, I end
up saying, “˚Honey we need to shave your hair˚” so you don't give yourself a sort of molted
look. And umm I g‐ £it is not the fact that he doesn't care, it is that he doesn't care
productively.£ He cares a tremendous amount, so much so that he doesn't sleep, that he
can't eat and that he, you know, he he goes bald (.) from fretting over how much stuff he..
hum
hum
.. has to do, it’s not that he doesn't care, he doesn't know what to do with himself. But she
doesn't, see that. In her mind's eye is, “If you work hard you succeed, and if you're..
hum
.. failing then it’s your fault” (.) a:nd, “If you have opportunity and you Fail then you’re..
hum
..wasteful and ungrateful.” “Because how could you fail, because you only fail if you..
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hum
..don't care, and how could you not care if someone's giving you something.” And that’s,
those are the only terms she sees things in, unless. She always reads..
hum
..the most negative thing into every situation. Nothing is ever, and nothing is ever her..
hum
..fault as well. There's never any role that she plays in anything that goes on around her, and
she never admits to her own, her own issues, or her own feelings. Like she'll call us and be
like, “You guys are irresponsible with my money.” And really what’s happening is that she
has overextended herself, she has made promises to us, and to, I don’t know, bigger than
she can afford and rather than say, "Guys, I feel bad, I don't think I can do what I promised
you," she says, “How dare you still need my money.” Like well you promised us the money..
hum
.. that's why we're banking on it. If you had said you couldn't give it to us, we would've, you
know, we hopefully would have been able to make other arrangements. But we certainly
would've been working on it. (.) And so, she like ya, it’s it’s never in terms of, “I am feeling
this way, ..
hum
.. let me h‐” you know, “I apologize, we need to do something different.” It is always (2) you
know. (1) And so umm I think we're trying to avoid relaying bad news to her has really sort
of complicated John’s language. (.) Because now he doesn't, he doesn't say..
hum
..many declarative things. Like he won’t say, “I'm hungry.” He will say: “it's getting to be
lunchtime.” And I’ll be like, "Do you want food? Or you’re remarking on the hour of the day?
>What is it you want?<” He gives me all of the, all of the, support but not the thesis. "Tell
me what it is. And then, and then we can see if you need to justify what is.” But or he’ll lay
out the justification for something and not say what it is. Because if you say what something
is, if you try to talk directly to her she's a torrent. If you let her kind of, if you give her the..
hum
.. information and see what she pieces out, and then you talk about whatever she figures
out and that's the way he's gotten around dealing with her, it drives me fucking crazy.
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((Deep breath)) I wonder if there's something about what drives you so crazy about that is
something that you recognize in yourself. (.)
˚I don’t know˚
Cause as you described that, I was thinking of about when you got that 97 (.) and all you..
Oh
.. could focus on was the question that you got wrong.
Ya but I'm, I’m only only harming myself, by, I think, Sandy (.) is the other way around,..
Hum
..Sandy is hard on everybody ↓but herself. (2) Ahh it is that that she doesn’t..
((laughs))
.. cause she doesn’t, Sandy does not have to apologize, [she] can say horrible horrible..
[Um]
.. things and she said it point blank, "I'm your mother and you should know I don't mean
it"(.) and like, can I say whatever I want back to you? And you should what I do and don't..
Hum
.. mean because of our relationship? [Is] that, is that, a.. trump card I can pla[y]?
[ya]
((Adjusting
the seating position and smiling)) [So] maybe she's like that to everybody else ahh, but I
guess what I am trying to point out is that you are that way to yourself.
Ya, ah I concede that, and umm it drives me crazy because I think, ahh I guess, of the two of
us I thought I had a better handle on things. Like a I think of the two of us I am closer to
doing things the right way, which is cutting everybody a reasonable amount of slack, but all I
have to do is add just one person to the mix and I've got it made you know.
Um
umhum
She got to add the whole rest of the world to her recipe, she is only serving Sandy right now.
And ahh I think I am close to having a good handle on things and I think its better, I think..
Hum
.. my way of doing things is better than her way of doing things, (.) objectively speaking.
Hmm
Well
I do think that (.) you are curious about the way you do things. And I think that is one of the
reasons why you're here is to explore those things.
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I don't want to be a big ball of cra:zy, and I don't want <to be> unable to gi:ve Wanda
something to look to. Like she is very smart and she's very aware and she's gonna pick
things up very quickly. And if I am, I don't want her get:ing (.) to the place where she can’t,
(.) >I I don’t want her thinking< that something not done perfectly isn't worth doing. (.)..
Umm
um
.. And I don’t want her thinking that not being perfect makes her worthless. I don't want her
not being able to, you know,(3) get it out without breaking things or hurting herself. And I
don’t want her seeing, and >I don't want her being afraid of ↑me<, I don't want her being
afraid of setting me off because half of what (.) John does is just trying to damage control..
Um
.. his mom, he never feels like he can say, “Hey this is what my problem actually is.” You
know (3) ((deep breath))
Umm
Well, we’ll have to continue next week .
Okay
umm So are we on for Tuesday?
And Thursday next week.
Yes.
Sounds great.
th
th
28 and the 30 .
Ummm and hopefully, and hopefully I’ll have work soon. That is what I'm
working on. That’s what I am working on.
Hum umm (2) and I think maybe maybe, part of this is kinda of my style, but I do..
umhum
..tend to ask a lot of questions, ahh but I don’t expect kind of [immediate] packaged..
Umhum
[((laughs))]
..answers. ((laughs))
oh
[I'm] so used to that, sort of like ((makes noise mmrt)) [Iike ]
[Ya] and I, and I again I kind of noticed that we skip along
very quickly, I, kind of, ask a question, get an answer, and then I ask another question. And
I..
˚ya˚
.. think part of what I'm gonna try to be mindful of is maybe slowing things down a bit.
(.) And umm staying [with] the, and I think, and I think..
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Okay
[ya]
.. here again that part of it is kind of my style for me, cause I am curious I ask a lot of
questions. (1) But I think ahh again slowing things down and seeing what's there,..
That’s ok.
..reflecting, and that may involve some silence.
Okay, I will try to be okay with that hum.
And if it’s not let me know, and we will explore that .
Ok‐
I think that if it's not okay I think I'm pretty good at
showing what I'm, when I’m uncomfortable with things. Hum so but yea. Here is to hoping.
Hum
Okay,
well I will see you next week Sarah.
Alright, sounds good.
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£<John was my ride in and my alarm clock today.>£ (.) £Ya we are not going to do that..
hm
..again.£ [((laughs))]
[Humm], What happened?
Umm, he set the alarm clock for himself and snoozed, (1) and then star‐ and then got up
and slept in a different room. So I kept snoozing, so tha‐ the snooze is at like a nine
minute interval so it would wake me up, and I (go out to) him, >I have to get closer<, until..
Hmm
.. I was in the room where he was, till he’d be, he was completely sound asleep in that, in..
hmm
.. that interval. (.) I nudge him, I’d say, <“The alarm clock is going off”>, he’d say <“I need a
little more time,”> (.) ((laugh)) shelp myself back and hit the button. And ahh (1) normally..
hmm
.. he wakes me up before he leaves cause (.) I've asked him to. (.) ((laughs)) And today he..
hmm
.. didn’t and he started calling me, but (.) he didn't call me until after 11:00, cause his, his
meeting was late. So it’s like mm he is like, “I ↑thought ↓that the ↑phone ↓call would
↑wake↓ you up.” I’m like, “It doesn’t count” if if you're waking me up when I'm supposed
to be somewhere else. I'm like (.) ↑ahh↓ tha‐ NO, there is no, even if I would have
answered the phone I still would've overslept and.. been late. (.) ((laughs)) So no, it does..
hm
.. not work that way. ((LA)) (.) <I've been ↓sick>, so:
Still?
Oh yea , I still have the frog ((points to throat)) ahh in the back of my throat just a little bit.
hh I wanted to pick up on something hmm that we talked about ahh last, last week.
((LA)) Okay. ((rolls eyes))
You were talking about the coworker you had (.) and umm (.) and you said after kind of..
>Ye:a< ((gaze: stares motionlessly at the
therapist ))
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.. ahh of talking about kinda of um (.) ahh all the kinda difficulties you have had with her
you were like: “If I keep talking about this I’ll blame myself."
<Yea>, ((LA)) umm it, it’s a kind of a thing that I have that keeps me from ((gaze)) (.) really
making changes or confronting people because I go “ ((makes shrrrch noise and points))..
Hm
..You are probably overreacting. (.) ((schrch noise and points)) You're being an ass,..you're
((points)) not acknowledging your fault in this, you're ((points upward)), you're probably
((points)) as big of perso‐, you know, as big a problem ((swings pointing hand to
horizontally)) as she is. ((LA))[ <You know>, this ((point)),and this ((point)), and this..
[((quickly rubs his eye and looks away))]
.. ((point)), and this ((point)), and this. Umm (.)] I‐ it, that always happens. ((laughs))
Hmm
Umm and I'm convinced that if I get upset or if I let that feeling be known I'm going to be
wrong and an ((gaze)) £asshole.£ (.) £>And I really don’t want that.<£ (.) ((LA)) And..
Umhm
.. it ahh it’s enough to normally keep me pretty (1) ((gaze)) £>angry on the inside and..
.. nowhere else.<£ (.) ((LA)) Umm yea. (4) Feeling like an asshole really just kind of it’s it’s..
Hm
..very good at oh stopping me from doing all kinds of things. (.) £It is why I do not parallel
park in traffic.£
Hm ((gaze with playful, overly‐curious look))
Cause I feel instantly like an asshole, [as] it takes me forever and.. I'm blocking the way and
[hm]
.. I have no, ( ) I instantly ((snaps fingers)) feel like I have no fucking clue what I'm..
Hm
.. doing. ((laughs)) And I'm actually an elegant parallel parker. (1) Ahh, (.) it was the only
thing on the driver’s test that I needed, I‐ just just did with complete finesse, and hmm..
Hmm
.. I can't do it even unless there is only cones around me though. (.) Actual cars, ((makes..
Hm
.. noise hhhmm)) actual cars with traffic, oh fuck no, I'll just walk from four blocks away. (.)
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<John makes fun of my driving>. I don’t, I almost never make left turns that aren’t..
hm
.. protected (.).. cause my ((beats chest with open hand making a slapping sound like a
heartbeat)). ((laughs)) Ahh, I also transition from lanes as SOON as I need to, like if I'm, if I
if I, the second I wanna, like okay, ((gestures forward with hand)) I have to make a left turn
four miles down, (.) so, as soon as I'm able to, without getting run over, get left. Or making
a right turn you know, you know in, in 3 miles, “Okay, I'm going to get in the right lane
now."
And this would be something to do with not wanting to feel like an asshole?
Yea (.) ahh, that is one of the things that happens when I’m panicked, my brain goes, "You
are fucking this up and you are an asshole." ((laughs)) “You don't do anything right and you
are a stupid asshole, look at how you're driving.”
Hmm, cause wha‐ what I kinda noticed with your story about your co‐worker, it was kind
of like, for the first part of it she was the asshole, (.) and then you were afraid if you
thought about it too long you would be the asshole.
I don’t think‐ ah, I feel like ya, I feel like if I, if I put it out there, that I'm an asshole. Umm if
I, if I snap then it, then perspective change, and you know, a paradigm shift kinda thing and
now I'm the asshole. >Sort of like hmm< ((starts snapping fingers as if trying to get the
words out)) the, the dream <I was talking about> wher‐ where I yelled at John's mother,..
((Nods))
umhm
.. and they all went to her like THAT, that is what happens in my head. It is like (.) the
second I say something back, or the second I am like, “You need to stop this,” then, (.)
((hands up facing forward at about shoulder level)) ya.
((Deep breath)) It sounds like you kind of move between kind of being the victim of other
people (.) ((opens hands and nods twice toward client)) being an asshole, and then you..
Ya
..being the asshole, and then all of a sudden being the victim like the dream.
Ya, it’s a, it is sometimes even it’s not like there would be, there is a victim, like my bad
driving, there is no victim to my bad driving, °I just feel like a stupid ass. Umm° (.) ahh, (1)..
hum
I don't know quite how to make a leap from, from the two, but it is a similar concept, ahh.
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Yea
What comes to mind when you think of the word asshole?
Well I don't know, it's, it's very it's, it's, it's not a good thing ((laughs)) obviously hmm just
ah for me sort of like doesn’t, doesn't have their shit together at all, like someone who
drives, like, like let's go back to the driving thing, like someone who drives for 12 miles with
their left turn signal on in the, in the left lane of traffic, but with their right tires over the..
hmm
.. line in the slow lane, now that’s an asshole. Hmm a person who tailgates the whole..
hmm
..Fucking time to, on the road where, there’s like stoplights every block. Like someone,
someone tailgating on Fifth Avenue going through Winston like, doesn't make any sense, if
you're not gonna beat the lights. In fact the only way to get out of, I actually figured this
out, if you go down Winston at the speed limit to four miles over the speed limit, you can’t
go to five because you will ruin, ruin the rhythm, but that is the timing for all of the lights. If
you do that you never have to break all. If everybody, if you keep the proper speed through
that, you know, you stop once. It is almos‐ once to never for the entirety of Winston. Hmm
but yea, hmm. Yea, it is kind of weird when you see it, because if you know what you're
looking for as you're driving through, the numbers on all the crosswalks are all the same
too, the countdown is instantly the same. And you know if you're going too fast because..
Hmm
.. of the number, you don't even have to look at your speedometer to know if you're
speeding up or slowing down because of the past, the, the crosswalk will shift on you.
hmmm (.) yea. Just ahh I guess an asshole is someone who I, I wouldn't say my coworker..
Hmm
... is an asshole, I would say that she is something profoundly worse than that. Like, a tire..
Mmm
.. fire. Just noxious and nasty and serves absolutely no purpose but to give people around..
Mmm
.. it,cancer. Umm she is not an asshole. Umm, for for me the, an asshole isn’t necessarily..
umm
.. mean‐spirited. Umm, wrong but sel‐, wrong, self‐involved, but also a complete lack of
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self‐awareness, I guess is what an asshole is for me. Umm and then in the sense of just as a
big old swear word. Your swear word of choice. Ahh it doesn't have to have any sort of,
you know, nuanced meaning in that sense. Sometimes when I say I feel like an asshole, it's,
“Whatever you can can't imprint,” you know, whatever other ((laughs)) word of that will
(get the spot you want) for the most part, umm.
Umm ((deep breath)) I'm wondering what that word meant, what meaning it has for you?
Umm ummm ((moves hands around and shakes head as if displaying confusion))
Cause I was wondering (if you’re feeling that way, it brings up a lot)
((small cough)) Ya, (.) I don't know, I, I I guess sort of that a person that completely doesn’t
have their shit about them is an inconvenience to others. And sometimes, and I guess also
that sort of an ignorance to thei‐, to ahh like the guy tailgating ((eye roll)) with his blinker
on in the wrong lane. (1) Like that sort of thing I guess, umm I ((LA)) >˚I don't know a better
way of articulating it without more examples, but I feel like (we’re) getting a little˚<
((shakes hand back and forth as if signaling uneasiness)). ((laughs)
Well, let's go back to the story that you were telling and and, what happened last session
when ahh, you know, you were talking about this woman who is worse than an asshole.
((hands open)
↑Okay ↓Ya
Hum, but then you, then ↓some↑thing happened.
And then something, I always feel like if I get upset, if I say something back, that’s (when
it), I always worry that I’m, that I'm overly sensitive. (.) Umm >probably because I've been
told I'm overly sensitive.< Although I probably should take that with a grain of salt cause it
was not something that was terribly thoughtfully said. umm
Who said it?
↑My ↑dad. Umm, when I was in high school. And, no, actually when I was in middle
school and was being bullied and was in multiple abusive ↑re↓la on↑ships. And he got
upset with me for being ↓sullen. ((begins waving hands back and forth, a gesture
reminiscent of one used to indicate a spell being cast)) He was all like, “Ooh so moody, ooh
so melodramatic, ooh leave me a:lone.” ((laugh)) Like it's not funny if the joke is me. If if
you want to make me feel ↓bet↑ter you can tell me a joke but don't make me a joke,
because I ar‐ I already get the punch line and it's not funny. Umm ((laughs)) yea, so there's
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that. Umm ahh yea, it’s ahh. (3) Ya that always sucks by the way, it a:lways sucks (.)
umm
What
always sucks?
He never got why I didn't think it was funny, he just thought it was more of the same. (7)
And so asking someone to stop just becomes fodder for it to keep happening. (3) And that
su(h)cks ((looks a therapist and squints)). Pretty, pretty uniformly. Ahh pretty sucks. ((deep
breath)) (6) ((Looks at therapist)) What? Ahh, you have the furrowed eyebrows. ((motions
fingers back and forth next to her own eyebrows)) tissss ((laughs)) I am sorry I have a..
((smiles))
.. hard, it is not ((places hand up with palm facing therapist)) ˚nothing, it is nothing˚.
What are you apologizing about?
For making it about yo:u. You’re like, £“Hey, let’s talk about what your face is doing.”£
That’s, that’s not ˚nice.˚ (3) ˚That’s not nice.˚ (7) I don't know exactly how to handle
compassion, or ahh complements, or attempts at understanding, it just feels sort of foreign
and weird to me, ahh ˚by and large.˚ ahh () ((scratches face))
Say some more about what, what you think about when, you know, someone is trying to
understand or be compassionate.
Umm it it varies, it sometimes, it just, I don't hear it at all, it’s like, “Oh that's nice,” you
know, and ya. And it real‐ kinda like someone saying, you know, "Have a nice day," it’s like
a pleasantry, a pleasantry exchange, like okay good, and other times it is like: “That is just
horseshit.” Most of the time somewhere in that spectrum of ahh, not ahh sort of nothing
sticks like Teflon, or it’s, ahh promotes a sort of like very aggressive response in my system.
(.) Y[ea]
[Di]d you feel like that, that was what I was (conveying)?
↓No, ahh (2) I just ahh, if someone looks like they’re, like they’re empathizing I don't know
what to do. ((laughs))
[((cough))]
Do you feel like that’s [what it], what I look like?
Not necessarily, umm (2) see I didn't want to make this about you. ((laughs)) Umm ahh,
just a look of compassion, you know.
And what did that bring up for you?
Ahh, it makes me uncomfortable. Hence the reason why I was like, "You're doing this. Did
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you know you're doing this?” Umm yea, “Why are you doing that? Why is your face doing
that? ((laughs)) What did I say? What did I say that means more than what I think it does?
What is it? What is it?"
What comes to mind?
Ahh, I'm wondering what I'm missing, like (1) ahh looking like something is particularly
thought provoking makes me go, "Wait, what did I say?" Umm, also it makes me sort of..
umm
.. acutely aware of when things aren't that way for other people. Be like, “Oh, that's bad,”
I’d be like, “I didn't realize. That's Tuesday for me.” You know, like (2) ahh (1) yea. My..
hum
.. mom used to tell me that things are going to be okay, or that things were okay, £and she
was always wrong.£ ((laughs)) <She was always wrong.> (9) That's where the horseshit part
comes from. The insta‐dismissal. (3)
Umm
You know she never wants me to be upset, but she ahh, I don't think she's quite realized
that she can't deny things for me. ((gaze laugh)) You know I need my own special denial..
Hmm
.. for that, you know, you know, I can't borrow yo:urs. Umm ya. (19) It made it very hard
for a long time, to talk to either of them. Because my dad made fun of my problems, and
my mom refused to admit that I had any problems. (19) Hum rough week. I don't have any..
Umm
hmm
.. ((wiggles fingers for therapist to see)) (1)˚I don’t have any nails.˚ ((continues to wave
fingernails and starts looking at her nails)) (4) I've actually stunted them. [Years]
[You’ve] stunted
them?
Ya, Ye:ars of drastically pulling them back, umm and ripping the under‐dermis
some↑ mes, oh o en, ((giggle)) from how aggressively I tear my (.) nails:, so it's actually
made my nails, my nail bed shorter, cause it doesn't heal, it doesn't heal ˚properly every
time˚.
Umhum
That happened this past week?
Oh, no no, I just was remarking that I don’t have (.) ((shows the therapist her hands palms
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up facing him )) any nails at all like I have almost no nail at all on most of these fingers.
What looks like nail is actually that exposed under‐dermis, are most of these. (5) £My mom
broke my finger twice and never apologized. ((laughs)) (2) The same way..
Hmm
..actually,£ she broke it, like if you, the the knuckles ((leaning over to show the therapist
her knuckles and the therapist leans over also)) don’t line up. See how the knuckle, this
knuckle is pointing this way and this knuckle is pointing that way, versus that one, how..
Hmm
.. they sit on top of each other. I have breaks in here. ((laughs)) And never got set,..
Hmm
.. because I was fine. I was making a big fuss out of nothing. The only good part was that I..
hmm
.. got to cuss without getting punished for it. ((laugh)) But ya, see how they, ((showing..
hmm
.. fingers again))part of my fingers are only, like that is my natural finger. ((holding fingers
extended)) (2)
Hmm
£One of these things is not like the other.£ ((singing))
Hmm, you've got some wounds.
Oh yea definitely, definitely. Umm, my ankle wasn't a problem until they had to rebuild it.
My finger wasn’t wasn't a problem until, until the fact that I ((shows hand again to the
therapist))
Hmm
((laughs)) Ya.
Some of your wounds are self‐inflicted.
Ah not many of them I gotta say.
We:ll, your nails.
I don't think of those as wounds, but, yeah, yeah. (2) ((looking at her forearms and wrists))
I don't have any scars left from, from the cutting and the ones I did, I covered. ((showing a..
Hmm
.. tattoo on left forearm)) That's where they were and you could still see a couple arrant..
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Hmm
hmm
.. marks. You’d have to know they were there ((coughs)) to see them. (1) Umm naa, and..
Hmm
.. they use to go almost the entire way around. ((runs her hand around her forearm..
hmm
.. multiple times and makes a shshshs sound)) There are three or four that I can still see at
this point. (3) £I'm a cutter not a maimer.£ So, so not a whole lot of scarring. (.) I had worse
ones from cat scratches. (6 while looking at hands). Terrarium wound, I cut myself dow‐..
Hmm
.. down to there ((pointing to a spot between her fingers)) I think, up doing unsupervised..
hmm
.. art projects and science projects because everyone else was asleep. ((laughs)) You had..
Hmm
.. to ahh, to get a knife and ahh, this is back when soda bottles had like a black base that
was flat on it’s, so so before they created them with feet, there was this black plastic..
hmm
.. base,that you can pull off. And umm, what you would do is you pull that base off, cut the
bottle right around the neck where the taper was, and then (invert) the whole thing over
the black base and seal it up with glue, and then it would be a self‐sustaining terrarium.
And ahh mine hit umm the (glue) that had been holding the, the label on, the knife slid and
like ((using one hand to show where she was cut on the other)) I dug in deep here and..
Hmm
.. then lightly across there. ((pointing to hand)) Ah, the tips of one of my toes is square, of..
hmm
.. my big toe is just squared off at the top cause, I smashed it ahh really hard and the top of
it..
hmm
.. popped off. (.) Like I ((smacks hands)) smashed it so hard that top came off. And it is
really gross inside your toe, I don’t know, inside mine at the very least. I'm assuming it is. ..
Hmm
.. the norm. But just blood pooled everywhere, yeah. >She never apologized< (.) There was,
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“Let me see it, you're making a fuss.” ((laughs)) And my nail was like, ((grabs pinky finger
and begins looking at nail)) the entire, like you know, was completely purple, my nail bed
was just instantly full of blood and there, you get like speckling from where everything else
around it is crushed and gone. (.) The bruise went on all the way around ((traces finger
around pinky)), which is how I know it was broken. [You don’t] get an get an all‐around..
[Hmm]
.. bruise, ah unless there's a break. (1) And (2)) yeah, >I didn’t g‐< I never even got a splint,
we didn't go to the doctor, we didn't get an x‐ray.
Completely ignored.
Yeah, they’re like, “Oh, I have done that 100 times.” (.) “I I have slammed my finger plenty..
Hmm
.. of times, it’s fine.” I’m like ((holds arm up with a limp wrist and then flicks finger and
makes the noise Mmmnt and then laughs)), so, yeah. (.) Same thing with my seizures, I’m,
I'm just tired. I don't have a problem, I'm just tired. I, I, my finger’s not broken I'm ju:st (.)..
Hmm
.. being a baby. [I am] just overreacting. No, my finger is broken and I get to react this..
[hmm]
((deep breath))
..way. ((laughing))
Do you think that there is a part of you that is still waiting for an apology? [That] still..
A[hh]
.. wants recognition o:f:?
Yeah, I do. Umm (1) I do. Umm, the whole apology thing <I think I touched
on last time>. I was in a position where, I was told I had to apologize even if I: was sure I..
umm
.. was right and I was not allowed to ask for apologies, and that re:ally (.) for me it made
me feel sort of like an untouchable, like, “You, (.) always be in a state of, of being sorry.
Always be in a state of either feeling shame or fe‐ or feigning shame. (.) Always do this.”..
Umhum
.. A:nd (.) [never being]able to say, “You've hurt me. I demand recompense.” [((laughs))]
[((deep breath))]
[And] it
sounds like that’s one of the tensions you’ve had the, in the story with your coworker is

425

278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
294
295
296
297
298
299
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308

C
T
C

T
C

T
C

T
C

that, (1) I mean you were (.) outraged towards this woman. And when you think about it,
umhum
.. even when you talk about it when she's not even in the room, you feel like: (1) “If, if I
think about this too long, I'm going to start thinking I'm the asshole.”
Yeah, yeah. (.) Umm
yeah. And I think it’s, it's tied in to that, this sort of notion that I'm not suppo‐ both that I'm
not supposed to get angry and I'm not supposed to want things from other people.
((breath))
And if you do?
Then, now I have the problem, now I have the problem. (2) Ahh sort of, kind of like, I I
guess a rageaholic, like you go from ahh some guy cut you off and your mad and that’s
okay, but if you, you let it out, or if you vent, then then you’re the problem. It's all like good
for you to be mad as hell, you know, you follow a guy home and break out his taillights, like
(2) but ahh ya, that was a really bad metaphor. I could come up with one a little bit less
groggy. ((laughs)) Umm, it is the sense of feeling like, ahh, it's all well and good to be upset,
but it's never okay to do anything about it. (2) Because you’re not supposed to be mad. (3)
hmm
Again, I don't really know, I don't really have a good sense of what it's like to just be angry.
I know what it looks like to be, you know, furious, and I don't know what it looks, but then I
know what it looks like to be mostly okay. I don't really have a good sense of the in‐
betweens. Umm, ((coughs)) and I notice that there's always this, this worry for me that I'm
overreacting. That's always in my head, that it's, I'm making something out of nothing, I'm
reading into something, I am being too sensitive. And ahh, and I never quite, have never
had the presence or idea like, "No‐no, it's okay. No, you're not acting like, you know, like
this person murdered your family, you’re just acting like they cut you off in traffic or they
were rude to you.” Like, I don't have a good sense of those kinds of things, and umh yea.
So on the one hand you feel this intense anger rage, and on the other hand you feel like
the problem’s with you, you’ve got to either control this, umm, and it's all your fault.
Umhum
umhum umhum
Yeah it is sort of a weird thing I grew up with actually, in the sense that, ahh, if you pick a
fight with someone who's, like someone says something stupid and hateful and hurtful, like
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someone says something, ahh, some sort of terrible stereotype, something racial,
something genderist, something whatever, umm, if you say something back to them in a
way that fuels the argument fire then it's your fault. Whatever happens is your fault
because they’re a big ugly, you know, crazy person, so it's like they have a pass. And that's
what I take from being told that I’m not allowed to speak my mind even when I'm sure I..
Umhum
.. am right. Because that means that, cause apparently me saying anything just makes
things worse and then it's my fault. That is like the person who says the, says the first initial
stupid, hateful, argumentative thing, it is like they get fre‐ like one freebie, go ahead and
ruin how things go. And umm yea, I feel I can't really say a whole lot, and that drives me
crazy, a little bit. ((laughs)) umm
Cause it sounds like you have a lot to say.
I do and ah, at the same time there's this decided lack of confidence in most things. So I’m
like well, “Maybe I’m underin‐, I'm underinformed” you know, or there's a deep
recognition of the fact that I don't know everything. Umm, I have problems with myself in
that regard. Umm, I can't think of anything that I do better than anybody else. I feel always
replaceable. Pretty much always replaceable. And it makes it also harder for me to, not just
because of the fear of being wrong, but the fear of, or the sort of notion I've got nothing
worth saying, nothing someone else wouldn’t say that was a good idea, and nothing you
know, noth‐ I hav‐ I have nothing novel to bring to the table. Like a second of reflection
anybody would know what I'm thinking. You know, and ahh so, makes the job hunt
particularly annoying.
Umm
Because, ah, you have to be confident, they want you to really always sell yourself and I
feel like such a sham, such a fraud, and sometimes it's just, I don't ever feel like myself, like
I read things I write for, for job things, and it takes me like six times longer, cause I am like,
"No, this doesn't sound like me, this sounds like me trying to sound like someone who..
Umm
.. wants to sound like a buzz word robot.” Like this is not good. And also at this point the..
Umm
.. j ob search being so long, it's been ((breath out)) (.) ahh Pretty much a year, it has been..
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hmm
.. a year since I've had any kind of income and it's been 18 months since I had umm a
regular paying, like a regular job where I came on a regular schedule and I had a
guaranteed paycheck every week. Umm, it's been 18 months since that happened, and..
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Umm
.. it's very hard to say with great confidence, “I'll do whatever you say, I’ll be whoever you
want me to be, just pay me.” ((laughs)) And there’s ahh, which is really where sort of my..
Umm
.. head is right now, it’s the like, “I will be excited about whatever product you want me to
s‐ you want me to sell. I will, I will love and believe in it with every fiber of my being. I will, I
am happy to take calls. I am happy to do things that are, that are contrary to each other. If
you tell me my job is to, ah, is to clean bathrooms, and ahh to ahh, to run tours, those will
be the two things I'm most passionate about. You tell me what it is and I'll do it.” And ah,
yeah, it is the kind of thing that smacks of desperation, but that’s where I am. umm
Hum
hum
I'm sorry, Sarah, but we're going to have to stop.
Yea
And we are off next week.
And also Thursday, right?
Ahh, Thursday as in the week after that?
No, no we are off this Thursday.
Yes, yeah, umm but we'll resume on the week of the 15th.
Okay, I think I can remember that.
Okay, and umm my schedule will change then, umm so just maybe think of some times
that would be best for us to meet, umm.
Okay I’m, I’m available, for now, for all those days. I just put in an application yesterday to
() a job, and I am not sure if he’ll take me or not, but fingers pretty much crossed.
Okay. Well I will see you the week after next.
Alright, sounds good.
Okay.
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Sounds good.
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